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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, the South African Constitutional Court’s emerging model for the adjudication 
of social and economic (SE)  rights is used as a starting point from which to consider how 
courts may give effect to these rights whilst respecting principles of democratic decision-
making. The court has chosen to measure government action in this area against a standard of 
reasonableness. Reasonableness has historically been employed as a highly deferential 
standard of judicial review in South Africa and other common law jurisdictions. It is also a 
flexible standard. These features have given rise to charges that an approach based on 
reasonableness cannot but result in vagueness and weak enforcement of SE rights. The 
argument in this thesis is that these flaws are not an inevitable consequence of a 
reasonableness-centred model for SE rights adjudication.  
 
 The judges’ approach is informed by evolving notions of judicial restraint. A range of 
factors impact on the intensity of review in SE rights cases. These factors will be relevant, 
whatever the approach adopted, because courts are bound to adjudicate SE rights within the 
limits of their constitutional mandate and institutional expertise. The most effective way of 
creating greater legal certainty and consistency in the judgments is for both judges and 
litigators to engage with these underlying factors.  
 
 This thesis draws on Indian and United Kingdom jurisprudence. Studies of both these 
jurisdictions show that political sensitivity is no longer an automatic bar to the justiciability 
of disputes. United Kingdom administrative law jurisprudence is used to show that 
reasonableness, as a standard of review, has the capacity to place onerous demands on 
government bodies. The Indian case-study serves as a warning against an ad hoc approach to 
judicial intervention and restraint in SE rights cases. Cases from this jurisdiction illustrate the 
importance of identifying and working with the factors that inform the intensity with which 
judges will interrogate government decision-making in SE rights disputes. This kind of 
engagement will allow courts to move towards a stronger, more principled approach to the 
rights.  
 
 4 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Introduction page 9 
2. Chapter One  page19 
 Social and economic rights and the courts: justiciability of politically sensitive 
issues  
(1) Introduction page 19 
(2) Social and economic rights in the South African Constitution: background to 
the adoption of the rights  page 21 
(3) Why justiciable social and economic rights? page 29 
(4) A’democratically justifiable’ role for the courts page 45 
(5) Limits on judicial review  page 54 
(6) Conclusion  page 62 
3. Chapter Two page 64 
  The Indian experience of social and economic rights adjudication 
(1) Introduction page 64 
(2) Directive principles of state policy, land reform and the judiciary  
  page 65 
(3) Post-emergency developments: the birth of public interest litigation  
  page 71 
(4) A retreat from judicial activism?  page 82 
(5) Conclusion  page 90 
4. Chapter Three page 95 
  Review for unreasonableness in administrative law 
(1) Introduction page 95 
(2) United Kingdom  page 98 
(a) From Wednesbury to the Human Rights Act page 98 
(b) Requirements of reasonableness  page 104 
(c) The place of proportionality in English law page 107 
(d) The scope of proportionality page 109 
(e) The future of substantive review  page 115 
 5 
(3) South Africa page 117 
(a) Pre-1994 review for unreasonableness page 117 
(b) Reasonableness and the Constitution page 119 
(c) Rights, proportionality and the future of reasonableness under the Constitution 
page 127 
(4) Conclusion  page 129 
5. Chapter Four page 132 
 Using reasonableness to enforce social and economic guarantees in South Africa 
(1) Introduction page 132 
(2) Constructing an approach to social and economic rights adjudication: early 
cases before the Constitutional Court page 137 
(3) Competing readings of the Constitutional Court’s approach: criticism, praise 
and alternatives page 145 
(a) Cass Sunstein’s administrative law model page 145 
(b) Criticisms of the Constitutional Court’s approach, including the 
minimum core argument  page 147 
(c) An administrative law model? Alternative readings of the 
Constitutional Court’s approach to social and economic rights   
 page 154 
(4) Developing the South African model for the adjudication of social and 
economic rights: implications of recent cases page 162 
(a) Meaningful engagement  page 162 
(b) Flexibility and the fate of the minimum core argument   
 page 171 
  (5) Conclusion page 175 
6. Chapter Five page 181 
 Using reasonableness to enforce social and economic guarantees in the United 
Kingdom 
(1) Introduction page 181 
(2) Bill of Rights debates: implications for the protection of social and economic 
rights in the United Kingdom page 183 
 6 
(3) Relevant United Kingdom cases  page 189 
(4) Lessons from the United Kingdom jurisprudence  page 198 
(5) Conclusion  page 208 
7. Chapter Six page 209 
  Factors influencing the intensity of review in social and economic rights 
adjudication 
(1) Introduction page 209 
(2) Principles guiding the intensity of review in South African and United 
Kingdom cases  page 211 
(a) Relevant cases and the comparative framework: setting the terms of 
the analysis page 211 
(b) Constitutional balance of powers and relative institutional expertise 
in the cases page 212 
(c) The severity of the impact of the decision or policy on affected 
individuals and groups page 221 
(d) State conduct  page 223 
(3) The relationship between the factors: relative weight and relevance   
  page 226 
(a) Constitutional balance of powers page 227 
(b) Relative institutional expertise  page 228 
(c) Severity of the consequences of government action or inaction  
 page 230 
(d) State conduct page 232 
(4) The South African Constitutional Court’s evolving approach: balancing the 
factors page 233 
(a) Joe Slovo  page 233 
(b) Mazibuko page 237 
(5) Conclusion  page 244 
 
8. Conclusion  page 247 
9. Bibliography page 253 
 7 
Acknowledgements 
 
My decision to study for a PhD was made possible, in the first place, through the support of 
my former colleagues in the Faculty of Law at the University of Cape Town. I am grateful to 
the Faculty and the University for granting me the leave necessary to begin this project. My 
particular thanks go to PJ Schwikkard, Hugh Corder, Lyn Holness, Christina Murray, Tom 
Bennett and Francois Du Bois for academic and personal support. I am also grateful to 
Jacques De Ville at the University of the Western Cape for his encouragement. 
 
I owe a debt of gratitude to the Commonwealth Scholarships Commission in the U.K. 
for the funding which enabled me to study for the PhD on a full-time basis. 
 
During this process, I was supervised by Professor Jeffrey Jowell and Colm 
O’Cinneide at University College London. I am grateful to Jeffrey Jowell for his support of 
this project – from the very early stages of putting together a thesis proposal and applying for 
funding to the final draft – for the benefit of his experience and the insightful guidance he has 
provided to me. Colm O’Cinneide, my secondary supervisor, was always available with 
invaluable comments on draft chapters and for general reassurance. My thanks go to 
Professor Barendt and Diamond Ashiagbor, the Faculty’s Directors of Research Studies over 
the last few years, for their practical and academic assistance.  Sylvia Wilkinson-Lough, who 
is no longer with the Faculty, was a constant friendly presence available for advice and 
biscuits. As the last in a long line of ‘her’ PhD students, I am grateful for her support. 
 
My thanks go to the group of PhD students who welcomed me into the common room 
and shared the joys and challenges of that first year, in particular: Gijs ter Kuile, Sharon Kaur 
Joyce Chia, Ivana Radacic, Tomoko Ishikawa, Karla Pérez Portilla and Arif Jamal. 
 
Emma Witbooi, my friend and former colleague from the University of Cape Town 
trod this path before me and made it look easy. Thank you. 
 
 8 
My research trip to India was made considerably easier because of the advice 
provided to me by Roopa Gulati, my sister-in-law. I cannot thank Geeta Dhingra and Dr. 
Sanjiv Bhambani enough for their warmth and generosity during my time in Delhi. I am 
grateful to a number of people who took the time to speak to me – either about their own 
work or to suggest others I might talk to. They are Justice S. Muralidhar, Dr. Usha 
Ramanathan, Adv. Colin Gonsalves, Adv. Prashant Bhushan, Adv. Sanjay Parikh, Adv. 
Anitha Shenoy, ML Aneja, Dr. Sabu George, Maja Daruwala, Shyamala Shiveshkumar, Adv. 
Rekha Aggerawal and Adv. DS Mahendru. Any errors in the text on the Indian experience of 
social and economic rights adjudication are my own. 
 
I am immensely grateful to my family. To my  parents, Ambi and Kisten, for trusting 
my decision to become a full-time student again;  my sister, Rasagee Pillay and brother-in-
law, Nirvesh Sooful, for easing my move away from Cape Town and giving me a place to 
come back to; my nephews, Devlin and Kaden for (finally) forgiving me for leaving Cape 
Town; my brother Dan, for the benefit of his own PhD experience; my London family – Dan, 
Roopa and my nieces Malvika and Pallavi – for helping me settle in and for providing a 
second home.   
  
Finally to Paul, who now knows more about reasonableness review than any non-
lawyer should: thank you for being my unfailing source of comfort, perspective, tea and 
sympathy. The journey has been richer for having shared it with you. 
 
 
Anashri Pillay 
27 August 2010 
 
 
  
 9 
Reinventing reasonableness: the adjudication of social and economic rights in South 
Africa, India and the United Kingdom 
 
Introduction 
 
The enactment of the 1996 Constitution was a defining moment in South Africa‟s ongoing 
transition from apartheid state to rights-based democracy. The Constitution has a number of 
notable features. Amongst these, the inclusion of justiciable social and economic (SE) rights 
in the Bill of Rights has attracted perhaps the most attention. Justiciable SE rights are still 
something of a constitutional novelty. The South African Constitution has reinvigorated the 
debate about the capacity of judges to pronounce on these rights. Developments in this area 
of human rights in South Africa are being used by legal scholars, human rights practitioners 
and judges all over the world as a benchmark by which to measure the potential of SE rights 
adjudication to enhance equality and alleviate poverty. At the heart of this scholarship lies a 
concern that justiciable SE rights could place too much power in the hands of the judges. On 
one view, SE rights adjudication is a mistake because it inevitably involves judges in policy-
making and resource allocation, areas in which they have no democratic mandate and 
relatively little institutional expertise.
1
  In this thesis, I hope to contribute to the debate about 
whether, and how, justiciable SE rights may achieve their intended effect of facilitating a 
more equal society without threatening democratic values like participation and 
accountability. 
 
As a starting point, it is important to note that South African judges have a 
constitutional duty to give effect to the SE rights in the Constitution. Whilst the question of 
justiciability dominated the SE rights discourse in the country for some time, the real 
question for South Africa is not whether judges should be pronouncing on these rights but 
how they should do so. Concerns that judges lack democratic legitimacy and institutional 
expertise cannot operate as a bar to justiciability in South Africa. But they are relevant in 
considering what the best judicial approach to the rights is, for South Africa and other 
                                                 
1
  I draw on Jeffrey Jowell‟s classification of the limits on the judicial role here - see „Judicial deference: 
servility, civility or institutional capacity?‟ (2003) Public Law 592. See also H Woolf, J Jowell and A 
Le Sueur (2007) De Smith’s Judicial Review (Sweet and Maxwell) at 15-22. 
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jurisdictions in which SE rights could be adopted as part of a future constitutional design. 
Scepticism about justiciable SE rights cannot simply be dismissed – any model of SE rights 
adjudication must be responsive to the important issues raised by the critics. 
 
My primary concern in this thesis is with the role of the judiciary in giving effect to 
SE rights. As with many others researching and writing in this field, this interest stems not 
from the conviction that judges are best placed to implement the rights but from the much 
more modest view that they have a useful role to play in the process. The emerging South 
African experience in this area demonstrates that the most effective campaigns for wider 
access to SE goods combine litigation and the threat of litigation with civil society 
mobilisation and engagement with government bodies at local, regional and national levels, 
outside the courts. This experience is borne out by that in other jurisdictions, India being the 
one most relevant to this thesis.  One of the main arguments in this thesis, then, is that 
stakeholders – judges, litigators, scholars, civil society organisations and the people whose 
interests they represent – must consider the  judicial approach to SE rights within the context 
of the broader attempt to make SE rights meaningful for people without access to water, 
food, housing, social security and other such goods. When judges interpret the rights and 
hand down remedies, they need to be sensitive to this wider context and to the limits of their 
role. 
 
The South African Constitutional Court (CC) has adopted a reasonableness-based 
approach to the interpretation of SE rights. The judges‟ focus on reasonableness has attracted 
both praise and criticism. In this thesis, I argue that reasonableness is a valuable tool through 
which to develop a model of SE rights adjudication.  Reasonableness has historically been 
employed as a highly deferential standard of judicial review of administrative action in South 
Africa and other common law jurisdictions. It is also a flexible standard. These features have 
given rise to charges that an approach based on reasonableness cannot but result in vagueness 
and weak enforcement of the rights. In this thesis, I argue that flaws in the CC‟s approach to 
the rights to date are not an inevitable consequence of the judges‟ decision to measure 
government‟s actions and omissions against a standard of reasonableness. 
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In recent years, courts in countries like South Africa and the United Kingdom (U.K.) 
have been more willing to interpret reasonableness in a way that places onerous requirements 
on government. But the process of detaching reasonableness from its deferent roots has been 
slow and inconsistent. In this thesis, I maintain that the variable nature of the reasonableness 
standard is one of its key strengths. Reasonableness has the capacity to accommodate 
concerns about the effectiveness of SE rights implementation alongside those about the 
appropriate role of the judiciary in a democratic state. Working with emerging theories of 
judicial intervention and restraint and applying these to SE rights adjudication, I argue that it 
is possible to develop guidelines for judicial action which would serve to enhance both legal 
certainty and judicial accountability.  
 
My approach in this thesis is comparative and largely case-based. As noted above, 
justiciable SE rights are an unusual constitutional feature. However, courts in other 
jurisdictions have some experience of pronouncing on access to SE goods like housing, 
health and education through widely recognised constitutional rights to equality and dignity; 
social welfare legislation; SE directive principles of state policy and international human 
rights obligations which have been incorporated into domestic law. This experience could 
prove valuable for a South African audience. The main aim here is to suggest a means 
through which the South African CC‟s approach may be enhanced to most effectively protect 
SE rights in future cases. But lessons learned from South Africa and elsewhere could also be 
of some use to an international audience reflecting on calls for SE rights to be included in the 
constitutional structures of an increasing number of states.  
 
The two jurisdictions I draw on in detail in this thesis are the U.K. and India. The 
development of reasonableness as a standard of review in South Africa may be traced to 
English law. The central role reasonableness plays in this thesis is, in itself, an important 
reason for using the U.K. as a comparative study. An analysis of U.K. law is instructive for a 
number of other reasons. In the U.K., scholars and practitioners have been engaged in intense 
debate about the constitutional role of judicial review.
2
 For some time now, judges in the 
                                                 
2
  See S Palmer „Resource Allocation, Welfare Rights – Mapping the Boundaries of Judicial  
Control in Public Administrative Law‟ 2000 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 63 at 63. 
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U.K. have exercised the power of review over social welfare legislation regulating access to 
housing and health care, for example. In such proceedings, the extent to which judges are 
willing to intervene has varied, but grounds of review like reasonableness and proportionality 
are increasingly applied to interrogate the substance of governmental decisions in judicial 
review proceedings that have significant SE implications.
 
Thus, the debate about the limits of 
judicial review has been gaining momentum in this jurisdiction. The enactment of the HRA 
has led to a more explicit reconsideration of what is and is not justiciable before U.K. courts.  
 
Although the HRA does not contain SE rights, courts in the U.K. have made 
decisions under other rights that have some impact on SE policy and resource allocation. 
Judges have interpreted provisions like Article 8, which protects the right to respect for 
family life, to include access to social welfare benefits. In doing so, they have engaged in a 
balancing exercise that focuses on proportionality when considering whether limitations of 
rights are legitimate. Increasingly, commentators in both South Africa and the U.K.
3
 are 
calling for a real debate about the very nature and purposes of the judicial function
4
 and for a 
„proper consideration of the role of a court in a constitutional democracy‟,5 instead of 
piecemeal critiques of particular judicial approaches as being too deferential or not 
deferential enough. This kind of deliberation will play a valuable role in informing the 
approach to SE rights adjudication that judges are developing in South Africa and elsewhere.  
 
The Indian Constitution protects SE rights only indirectly. Government’s duties to 
ensure that all citizens have access to SE goods like shelter, education and health care are set 
out as directive principles of state policy. The drafters of the Constitution were of the view 
that the directive principles placed specific duties on the government. Supervising the 
implementation of those duties, however, was left up to the legislative and executive bodies 
rather than the judiciary. The directive principles were not intended to be enforced through 
                                                 
3
  C Hoexter (2007) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume Two: Administrative Law 
(Juta: Cape Town) at 132; T Allan „The constitutional foundations of judicial review: conceptual 
conundrum or interpretive inquiry?‟ (2002) Cambridge Law Journal 87; and T Hickman „The courts 
and politics after the Human Rights Act: a comment‟ (2008) Public Law 84. See also A Cockrell „“Can 
you Paradigm” – another perspective on the public law/private law divide‟ (1993) Acta Juridica 227. 
4
  Allan (note 3 above) at 112. 
5
  D Davis „To defer and when? Administrative law and constitutional democracy‟ (2006) Acta Juridica 
23 at 40-1. 
 13 
the courts. Despite this, 
 
following the 1975-77 state of emergency, the Supreme Court began 
to give effect to the directive principles in the process of interpreting justiciable civil and 
political (CP) rights like the rights to life and equality. In a series of cases brought via the 
court-developed public interest litigation (PIL) route, the judges adopted an expansive 
approach to the rights, particularly the right to life protected in Article 21 of the Constitution. 
Drawing on the directive principles, the Court held that Article 21 included a right to basic 
education, livelihood and health, for example. Commentators have praised the resulting 
jurisprudence as innovative and far-reaching.  But the legacy of PIL and judicial activism in 
India is mixed. The Court’s approach to SE rights adjudication is marred by inconsistency 
and there are few formal checks on the manner in which judges fulfill their constitutional 
obligations. Even the more successful examples of judicial involvement in widening access 
to SE goods, such as the right to food campaign, are plagued by the time-consuming, costly 
nature of litigation in Indian courts and non-implementation of court orders.  There are 
valuable lessons to be learned about the benefits and limits of judicial involvement in the 
implementation of SE rights from this jurisdiction. 
 
 The argument in this thesis is set out in six chapters. In chapter 1, I engage with the 
debate about the justiciability of SE rights. As noted earlier, the South African Constitution 
already makes these rights justiciable and the argument in this thesis is mainly directed at 
developing an effective model of SE rights adjudication for South African courts. 
Furthermore, the issue of justiciability of SE rights has been canvassed at great length in the 
existing literature.
6
 Consequently, I spend relatively little time on the question of whether SE 
rights are justiciable in the first place. Instead, I consider the relevance of arguments about 
justiciability in constructing an appropriate model of SE rights adjudication.  
 
                                                 
6
  See, for example, H Steiner and P Alston (2007) International Human Rights in Context: Law Politics 
Morals (OUP: Oxford and New York) Chapter 4; N Haysom „Constitutionalism, Majoritarian 
Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights‟ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights  451; E 
Mureinik „Beyond a Charter of Luxuries:  Economic Rights in the Constitution‟ (1992) 8 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 464; and D M Davis „The Case Against the Inclusion of Socio-
Economic Demands in a Bill of Rights except as Directive Principles‟ (1992) 8 South African Journal 
on Human Rights  475; and N Jheelan „The Enforceability of Socio-Economic Rights‟ (2007) 2 
European Human Rights Law Review 146. 
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In her recent book, Human rights transformed: positive rights and positive duties,
7
 
Sandra Fredman recasts the justiciability debate as an argument about positive duties and 
their implications, rather than a dispute in which CP rights are set in opposition against SE 
rights. This conscious move away from the terms in which the arguments about justiciability 
have traditionally taken place is a powerful reminder that both „categories‟ of rights are 
capable of giving rise to positive and negative duties.
8
 There is support for this position in the 
work of many other scholars, international human rights law and the judgments of the South 
African CC. What this means is that concerns underlying arguments against justiciability of 
SE rights - that judicial attempts to enforce these rights are undemocratic and ineffective - are 
equally applicable to the adjudication of complex matters arising in CP rights cases and must 
be addressed with this in mind.  
 
In chapter 1, I draw on the recent scholarship in this area to show that deficiencies in 
the functioning of all branches of government make the implementation of rights a complex 
task. There are instances in which judges should exercise a level of restraint – when a finding 
is likely to have wide-ranging and unpredictable consequences, for example.  There are also 
cases in which it is possible, and important, that judges scrutinise government acts carefully 
and make orders upholding positive duties to protect rights. Decisions in such cases need not 
threaten principles of democratic decision-making. In such cases, courts could act to provide 
a forum for genuine democratic engagement between government and civil society or, at 
least, facilitate such engagement outside the courts. Rejecting approaches which suggest that 
policy implications always act as a bar to justiciability and those that insist upon a kind of CP 
rights-absolutism, some current understandings of rights adjudication emphasise the need for 
judges to strike a balance amongst a variety of interests. Thus, instead of a basing her 
approach on the answer to the question „Does this case have policy implications?‟ a judge 
would need to consider questions such as how many people are affected by the issue before 
her, the severity of the consequences of government action or inaction for the people 
                                                 
7
  2008 (OUP:Oxford). 
8
  The impossibility of drawing sharp distinctions between CP and SE rights is a central part of the 
argument in chapter 1 and a theme running through this thesis. I have chosen to continue to refer to SE 
rights because, in the South African discourse at least, the term is used widely in both the literature and 
case-law on the subject. This thesis is not about the adjudication of positive rights generally. Instead, 
the argument is very much rooted to the CC‟s approach to specific rights in the Constitution, for which 
the constitutional drafters, scholars and judges have accepted the „SE rights‟ categorisation.  
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affected, and whether, in handing down judgment, she would be making policy or merely 
facilitating the implementation of policies that have been the subject of previous agreements 
between government and stakeholders.  This kind of adjudicatory approach will always entail 
a level of uncertainty.
9
 It is my view that an attempt to identify and understand the factors 
that make a case more or less amenable to strict judicial scrutiny will go some way toward 
containing this uncertainty. This would also promote that „culture of justification‟, which a 
number of scholars and judges hoped would follow from the move to constitutionalism in 
South Africa and elsewhere.
10
  The approach I outline in this thesis may place onerous 
demands on the legislature, executive and administrative bodies in government but it also 
demands more rigorous judicial reasoning. 
 
Chapter 2 consists of a detailed study of relevant Indian jurisprudence. For 
commentators both inside the country and further afield, the Indian Supreme Court‟s post-
emergency development of PIL was a high watermark of judicial activism. There are three 
important points to be made here. First, whilst PIL was nothing short of a revolution in 
respect of who could bring cases to court and how such cases were brought, judicial 
expression of the content of rights was not as far-reaching. Second, even landmark judgments 
protecting rights to SE goods were flawed by insufficient grounding in legal principle. 
Institutional limitations on the court resulted in delays in getting final judgments, which were 
themselves often not implemented by government bodies. Third, since at least the early-
1990‟s the court has handed down a series of judgments in which SE rights claims have been 
superseded by governmental and corporate economic interests.  Taken as a whole, the legacy 
of the Supreme Court in this area is ambiguous. Crucially, commentators do not locate the 
main problem with the court‟s jurisprudence in a retreat from activism. Instead, it is the ad 
hoc nature of the court‟s approach to SE rights that has attracted the most censure. The 
Indian Supreme Court‟s judgments on SE rights have never been grounded in a cohesive 
theory about judicial restraint and intervention, either explicitly or implicitly. In this chapter, 
I argue that this legacy provides the most convincing argument for a more principled 
                                                 
9
  Although arguably not much more than exists in the adjudication of claims in many other areas of the 
law, such as  delict (tort) and  family law, for example.  
10
  E Mureinik „A bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights‟ (1994) 10 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 31 at 32; and De Smith (note 1 above) at 597-8.   
 16 
approach to SE rights adjudication, responsive to concerns about rights enforcement and 
democratic legitimacy.  
 
 In chapter 3, I explore the concept of reasonableness further, with reference to South 
African and U.K. administrative law. The analysis of reasonableness, as it has developed 
through judicial review of administrative action, is necessary for two reasons. First, one of 
the main criticisms of the CC‟s focus on reasonableness is that it is grounded in review for 
reasonableness in administrative law. As a consequence of these administrative law origins, 
the approach encourages weak review by focusing on governmental fulfilment of process-
related requirements. It is not an appropriate vehicle through which to develop the 
substantive content of SE rights. In order to properly evaluate this argument, a clear 
understanding of how the content of reasonableness has developed in administrative law is 
needed. The second reason for a close analysis of how courts have employed reasonableness 
in reviewing government action stems from my argument that variability of the intensity of 
review is an important tool for judges in giving effect to SE rights. The argument is built on 
the idea that reasonableness may be interpreted to demand more or less of government, 
depending on a range of factors. This view is supported by recent interpretations of 
reasonableness in South African and U.K. law. 
 
 In chapter 4, I analyse the most important judgments handed down by the South 
African CC on SE rights, with a focus on the role reasonableness has played in these 
judgments.  A substantial part of the academic commentary on these cases examines the 
question of whether the CC‟s approach is an administrative law model. This is a question I 
discuss at some length in this chapter. My view is that, in the cases decided to date, the CC 
has drawn on an administrative law understanding of reasonableness. However, using 
reasonableness as a key concept in determining the content of the rights and identifying 
corresponding governmental duties does not tie the court to an outdated, overly deferential 
approach to judicial review. As with all other areas of the law, judicial review of 
administrative action in South Africa is changing in response to constitutional imperatives. 
Reasonableness no longer focuses only on the procedure through which decisions are made. 
It may also be interpreted to interrogate the substance of a decision. The CC has used 
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reasonableness to overturn governmental action in the area of SE rights implementation. Its 
later jurisprudence reveals a worrying tendency to defer to government in more complex 
cases but this caution is driven by the judge‟s understanding of their role rather than their 
reliance on a reasonableness-based approach.  
 
In chapter 5, I examine selected U.K. cases, in which judges have been invited to 
pronounce on matters with resource and policy implications. These include cases in which 
judges have reviewed administrative action for unreasonableness and those in which the 
HRA is engaged. Cases in both categories show that judges are willing to use the concepts of 
reasonableness, proportionality and even minimum standards in their judgments; and the 
judgments provide a basis from which to discuss the factors that could legitimately influence 
judges in deciding on the level of scrutiny to apply in a particular case. 
 
I use this comparative jurisprudence to argue that review for unreasonableness and 
the variable intensity of review with which it has become associated are valuable tools with 
which to approach SE rights adjudication. What is missing from the jurisprudence is clarity 
on the parameters within which variability works. Varying the intensity of review according 
to the individual circumstances of the case will never be an exact science but some attempt to 
identify and understand the factors that tend towards more or less intense scrutiny of 
government acts will make for increased certainty. The South African jurisprudence in this 
area is still in a formative stage. Attempts to work with the reasonableness paradigm and 
think about how it could be developed to give further substance to the rights is important for 
future cases.  
 
 Chapter 6 is an attempt to translate the ideas from earlier chapters into a more 
concrete model for SE rights adjudication.  I draw on the material covered in chapters 4 and 5 
to identify factors which judges use to decide the level of scrutiny applicable in a particular 
case.  Decided South African and U.K. cases are a focal point of this chapter.
11
 I have limited 
                                                 
11
  I do not use the Indian jurisprudence in this chapter. The reasons for this flow from the conclusions 
reached in chapter 2. The Indian Supreme Court has not engaged with theories about judicial restraint 
in any serious way. Judgments often betray either minimal concern for the idea of deferring to the 
legislature and executive, or a tendency to translate deference into a non-justiciability doctrine 
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myself to cases decided by higher courts in which judges are called upon to pronounce on 
government SE rights policy in some way, or to give effect to positive duties on the state. I 
draw on these factors to suggest that there are four principal issues which affect the intensity 
of the review: the constitutional balance of powers; relative institutional expertise; the 
severity of the impact of the government action or inaction; and, to a limited extent at least, 
state conduct.  
 
Identifying and categorising the factors referred to above is a useful step toward 
developing a model for SE rights adjudication. But it leaves several questions unanswered. I 
move on to consider these questions – how the factors interact with each other; and their 
relative importance in determining the intensity of review, in particular – in chapter 6. The 
main aim in this chapter is to find a course that is consistent with the theoretical basis for SE 
rights adjudication set out in chapter 1 and elaborated on throughout the thesis. 
 
In concluding this thesis, I summarise the main points of my argument: SE rights 
need not present an insurmountable challenge to the institutional limits on courts and theories 
about democratic legitimacy; the South African CC‟s reasonableness-based approach to the 
rights may be developed into an effective model for SE rights adjudication; and the inherent 
flexibility of the approach means that it must be married with a principled approach to the 
intensity of review if concerns about legal certainty and judicial accountability are to be 
addressed.  Adjudicating SE rights cannot be a formulaic exercise. The varied interests at 
stake demand a nuanced methodology. But, it is my argument that the classification 
described here may prove useful to judges and litigators not only in the context of South 
African courts grappling with these issues but in the context of other jurisdictions more 
sceptical of judicially enforceable SE rights.  
 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
applicable in all politically sensitive matters. Neither approach is helpful in developing a model for the 
adjudication of SE rights. 
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Chapter One 
Social and economic rights and the courts: justiciability of politically sensitive 
issues 
 
(1) Introduction 
 
In current legal discourse, the enforcement of social and economic (SE) rights is typically 
bound up with questions about the justiciability of these rights. A preoccupation with 
justiciability is ill-advised for two main reasons. First, it advances the perception that judges 
bear the primary responsibility for the implementation of these rights. Second, and this is 
especially relevant for a jurisdiction like South Africa in which SE rights are clearly 
justiciable, it shifts attention away from a detailed study of what the most effective judicial 
approach to the rights is. The result is an unhelpful polarisation of the debate. An attempt to 
seriously engage with the question of how judges should approach these rights demands an 
acknowledgement both that judges have a role to play in SE rights enforcement and that they 
are limited by institutional and constitutional factors in doing so.  In defending their sides of 
the justiciability debate, neither those in favour of justiciable SE rights nor those against 
them, are keen to make these admissions.   
 
  Despite my reservations over the dominance of justiciability debates in the literature 
on SE rights thus far, I recognise that it is an issue I need to address in this thesis. SE rights 
are justiciable in South Africa but concerns about the capacity of judges to pronounce on 
them have an ongoing impact on how judges approach their task. These concerns are also 
significant for jurisdictions in which SE rights are not formally justiciable – because there is 
often indirect enforcement of the rights in their courts as well as growing domestic and 
international pressure for SE rights to be included in the constitutional fabric of these 
jurisdictions. 
   
  In this chapter, I begin by discussing the background to the adoption of SE rights in 
the South African constitutional drafting process. I address the justiciability debate in two 
stages. First, I argue that it is impossible to draw a bright line between SE and civil and 
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political (CP) rights. This argument has already been made by a number of commentators in 
the field and I draw on this literature, as well as the South African CC‟s approach in its early 
jurisprudence on SE rights in elaborating this point. Many of the influential arguments 
against justiciable SE rights are based on scepticism about judicial review in rights 
enforcement generally, however. Thus, in the second stage of the argument, I examine the 
underlying concerns of the sceptics, using Jeremy Waldron‟s work as the prime illustration of 
these concerns.  
 
  In the main, the criticisms are based on the view that judicial review is inherently 
undemocratic and therefore ill-suited to resolve disputes on complex moral issues. Courts 
may identify the issues in particular cases but resolution of these disputes should ultimately 
be left to legislatures. Waldron‟s harsh appraisal of the manner in which judges deal with 
cases is combined with an idealised view of the functioning of legislative bodies. The 
problem with this position is that neither of these views is a fair reflection of the reality in 
modern democracies.  There are flaws in the manner in which both judicial and legislative 
institutions operate. Not only is the effectiveness of their respective decision-making 
processes in implementing rights questionable, the extent to which these bodies genuinely 
protect democratic values like public participation is also uncertain. The point is that these 
shortcomings are not unique to the processes of litigation and judicial reasoning. Once we 
accept that both legislative and judicial branches are limited in their capacity to give effect to 
constitutionally recognised rights, these issues cease to act as a categorical bar against 
justiciability and become relevant only in determining how judges should treat the rights.   
 
  In an attempt to reconcile judicial rights-protection with democratic legitimacy, many 
scholars are turning to „dialogic‟ or „social conversation‟ accounts of judicial review. Such 
accounts view the judiciary as one actor in a continual dialogue with other government 
branches, as well as civil society, about how best to protect rights. These accounts could allay 
worries about the democratic legitimacy of judicial pronouncements on politically sensitive 
matters – in the human rights sphere, these matters may be defined as those which „require 
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difficult choices between the interests of the individual and the needs of society‟.1 In this 
chapter, I discuss these arguments and draw on aspects of dialogue theory as particularly 
relevant to the adjudication of the kind of SE rights protected in the South African 
Constitution. My argument is that SE rights adjudication in South Africa requires that judges 
reconsider their relationship with other arms of government. But the argument goes further. 
SE rights adjudication also demands that judges take into account considerations which have 
not explicitly come into play in the resolution of disputes over rights. Questions about 
whether government is taking action to progressively realise the rights within its available 
resources involve judges in a balancing exercise that gives weight to government‟s long-term 
policy objectives. As a result, re-thinking the judicial role in rights enforcement presents 
challenges not only to those generally suspicious of judicial review but also to commentators 
who support strong judicial review.  
 
  On a classic rights-based view of constitutionalism, rights act as trumps against 
government policies in which they come into conflict. Rights form part of a higher-order law, 
and judges are there to ensure that individual rights are not invaded as a side effect of 
government pursuing its long-term, broad policy goals. Adjudication of governmental duties 
to provide housing, health care, food, water and social security takes judges out of this 
conventional remit. It requires that judges go beyond the immediate impact of legislation and 
policies on individuals and consider their enduring effects on society as a whole.  Classic 
rights-based constitutionalism envisages a strong review role for judges but in the much 
narrower realm of individual liberties. SE rights adjudication of the kind suggested in this 
thesis, then, requires concessions on both sides of the justiciability debate. 
 
(2) Social and economic rights in the South African Constitution: background to 
the adoption of the rights 
 
The enactment of a post-apartheid Constitution in South Africa signalled a ground-breaking 
shift in the way people think about and use the law. For law students, legal professionals, 
                                                 
1
  A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 2 WLR 87 (HL) at par. 38, as cited in S 
Fredman (2008) Human rights transformed: positive rights and positive duties (OUP:Oxford) at 95. 
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people and organisations affected by the law, the interim
2
 and final Constitutions
3
 
fundamentally challenged received notions about the role of law in society. Post-1994 
jurisprudence has focused on the immense task of teasing out the implications of the move 
from parliamentary supremacy, based on the English practice, to a system of constitutional 
supremacy
4
 in all aspects of the law.  The shift in our law is nowhere more apparent than in 
the reconsideration of the functions and limitations of judicial review, particularly in cases 
where fundamental rights are engaged.  
 
The detailed and far-reaching Bill of Rights binds all organs of state, including the 
legislature, executive and the judiciary itself to its principles. Furthermore, private persons 
and bodies are also, in principle, bound to abide by the rights in the Bill of Rights.
5
 Courts 
are required to apply or develop the common law so that it is compatible with the provisions 
of the Bill of Rights.
6
 They are also given wide powers of interpretation in section 39 of the 
Constitution. The duties of courts in constitutional matters are elaborated in section 172 – 
amongst other things; courts are obliged to declare law or conduct inconsistent with the 
Constitution to be invalid to the extent of that inconsistency. Moreover, courts are 
empowered to make any order that is just and equitable.
7
 Viewed in the abstract, these 
provisions do not give a clear idea of the enormity of the changes wrought to the judicial role 
– it is in the subject matter of potential disputes for adjudication that the full picture emerges. 
Amongst its unusual features, the Bill of Rights contains a right to equality that explicitly 
embraces a substantive model, concerned with the unequal impact of law and conduct, which 
may be applied against private parties as well as the state.
8
 Under the Constitution, access to 
information
9
 and just administrative action (defined as action which is lawful, reasonable and 
                                                 
2
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
3
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. All references to „the Constitution‟ 
hereafter will be to this document, the final Constitution.  
4
  Provided for in sections 1(b) and 2, founding provisions of the Constitution. 
5
  Sections 8 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
6
  Section 8(3) of the Constitution. 
7
  Section 172 (1) of the Constitution.  
8
  Section 9 of the Constitution. On the substantive notion of equality, see P De Vos 
„Substantive Equality after Grootboom: The Emergence of Social and Economic Context as a Guiding 
Value in Equality Jurisprudence‟ (2001) Acta Juridica 52; see also Harksen v Lane NO 1997 (11) 
BCLR 1489 (CC) at pars. 50-52. 
9
  Section 32 of the Constitution. 
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procedurally fair)
10
 are embraced not just as good practice but as fundamental rights to which 
„everyone‟ is entitled, in principle. Most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, the 
Constitution contains judicially enforceable SE rights such as the rights of access to adequate 
housing, health care services, food, water and social security.
11
  
 
Whilst the fact that the Bill of Rights would contain CP rights was never in question, 
there was a significant amount of debate amongst academics, lawyers, constitutional 
negotiators and drafters about the constitutional status of SE goods.
12
 Despite a measure of 
disagreement within the incumbent ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), about 
the wisdom of giving judges the mandate to enforce SE rights, the ANC‟s 1990 draft Bill of 
Rights included a number of SE rights. These guarantees ranged from directly enforceable 
minimum obligations - to „framework‟ rights whose content was conditional upon the 
availability of resources and would be elaborated on through statutory amendment - to 
aspirational goals.
13
 In a memorandum attached to the Bill, the ANC explained its decision to 
include the rights as arising from a wish to address the most compelling needs of ordinary 
South Africans in the Constitution, thereby securing a level of authenticity for the 
document.
14
 The protracted negotiations leading up to South Africa‟s first democratic 
elections in 1994 took place through a number of multi-party negotiating bodies: first, 
CODESA (the Convention for a Democratic South Africa), then CODESA II and, finally, the 
MPNF (the Multiparty Negotiating Forum). The MPNF-appointed technical committee on 
constitutional matters drafted a transitional or interim Constitution. The fundamental rights 
chapter of the interim Constitution protected certain SE rights of children in section 30. The 
document also contained rights with SE dimensions – the rights to equality, dignity and an 
environment that was not harmful to health or well-being, for example. However, the drafters 
stopped short of including generally applicable rights to housing, health, food, water and 
                                                 
10
  Section 33 of the Constitution. 
11
  Other constitutionally protected SE rights are access to land, education and certain children‟s rights 
protected in sections 25(5), 29 and 28, respectively.  
12
  See N Haysom „Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights‟ (1992) 8 
South African Journal on Human Right 451; E Mureinik „Beyond a Charter of Luxuries:  Economic 
Rights in the Constitution‟ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 464; and D Davis „The 
Case Against the Inclusion of Socio-Economic Demands in a Bill of Rights except as Directive 
Principles‟ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 475. 
13
  Haysom (note 12 above) at 453. 
14
  Haysom (note 12 above) at 453-4. 
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social security.
15
  
 
After the 1994 elections, the task of drafting a new Constitution was left to the 
National Assembly and Senate, sitting together as the Constitutional Assembly (CA). In the 
drafting process, the CA had to follow the procedures and rules set out in chapter 5 of the 
interim Constitution. Most importantly, the text of the new Constitution had to be consistent 
with the 34 Constitutional Principles set out in Schedule 1 of the interim Constitution. As 
part of the constitutional drafting process, the CA initiated a public participation programme 
in which ordinary South Africans had the opportunity to write in, expressing their views 
about the content of a new Constitution. Requests for rights to jobs, houses and education 
loomed large in the responses received.
16
 Ultimately, arguments in favour of constitutionally 
entrenched SE rights, directly enforceable by courts, carried the day and gave rise to the 
sections referred to earlier. 
 
Sections 26 and 27, the two provisions on which much of this thesis is built, read as 
follows:  
Section 26 
 (1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
 (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
 (3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order 
of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit 
arbitrary evictions. 
 
Section 27  
 (1) Everyone has the right to have access to- 
  (a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
  (b) sufficient food and water; and 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependents, appropriate social assistance. 
 (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment. 
The sections are similarly structured. A first subsection sets out the content of the right in 
general terms. The CC has consistently interpreted the identically worded second subsection 
                                                 
15
  See S Liebenberg „The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its 
implications for South Africa‟ (1995) 11 South African Journal on Human Rights 359 at 375-7. 
16
  E Christiansen „Adjudicating non-justiciable rights: socio-economic rights and the South African 
Constitutional Court‟ (2007) 38 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 321 at 339. 
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as an internal limitation on the rights to adequate housing; health care services; sufficient 
food and water; and social security. The subsection acts as an internal limitation in the sense 
that the scope of the rights in sections 26 and 27 is determined with reference to the questions 
of what is reasonable, whether the state is progressively realising its obligations and what 
resources are available to it. The third subsections are both negatively phrased rights 
prohibiting certain kinds of acts, which impact upon the rights to housing and health care, 
respectively.
 
 
 
  The provisions owe much of their content to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  International law‟s treatment of SE rights has 
generated a huge amount of literature.
17
 It is not of primary concern for this thesis. It suffices 
to say that, whilst the idea of an indivisible and universal set of rights encompassing both CP 
rights and SE rights was embraced in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 
conventions cataloguing the rights took a different approach. CP rights, such as the right to 
vote and freedom of expression, were placed in the International Convention on Civil and 
Political rights (ICCPR), separate from rights to housing, health care, social security, 
education etc., which were contained in the ICESCR. In addition, whilst the ICCPR set up an 
individual complaints mechanism through a Human Rights Committee,
18
 there is still no such 
mechanism under the ICESCR.
19
 The ICESCR‟s Article 2 acknowledges certain limits to the 
domestic enforcement of the rights - that they may be progressively, rather than immediately 
                                                 
17
  See H Steiner and P Alston (2007) International Human Rights in Context: Law Politics Morals (OUP: 
Oxford and New York) Chapter 4; D Brand and S Russell (2002) Exploring the Core Content of Socio-
economic Rights: South African and international perspectives (Protea Book House: Pretoria); and M 
Craven (1995) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press). For a summary of the development of economic, social and cultural 
rights in international law, see E Palmer (2007) Judicial Review, Socio-economic rights and the 
Human Rights Act (Hart Publishing: Oxford and Portland, Oregon) 11-26. 
18
  See Articles 28-45 of the Convention. 
19
  On 10 December 2008, the General Assembly unanimously adopted an Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR, which provides for an individual complaints mechanism. The Protocol will enter into force 
three months after it has been ratified by 10 member states. It was opened for signature on 24 
September 2009, see:  http://www.escr-
net.org/resources_more/resources_more_show.htm?doc_id=421703, last accessed on 30 July 2010.  
The suggestion of an Optional Protocol setting up such a communications procedure has attracted little 
approval from states – see Steiner and Alston (note 19 above) at 364. How quickly the treaty enters 
into force remains to be seen. To date, only two states have ratified the Protocol – see 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-a&chapter=4&lang=en, 
last accessed on 30 July 2010. 
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realised; and that their implementation is subject to the resources available to the state. It 
provides for a flexibility regarding the methods states may adopt in fulfilment of their 
obligations under the Convention in that it refers to legislative and any other „appropriate 
means‟.20 Finally, the ICCPR‟s insistence that states party to the treaty provide an effective 
remedy for those who rights have been violated including the development of judicial 
remedies where possible,
21
 is not replicated in the ICESCR. In short, however strong the 
arguments about the indivisibility and interdependency
22
 of the two sets of rights and the 
artificiality of sharp distinctions between them, there is no denying the fact that international 
law, largely in an effort at pragmatic accommodation of state attitudes, has historically 
treated them differently and assumed that the judicial enforcement of SE rights is generally 
more difficult to achieve.
23
 The extent to which the text of the South African SE rights 
provisions challenges these ideas is ambiguous. The notion of the indivisibility of rights is 
significantly advanced by the fact that that the Constitution sets out judicial remedies for 
violations of SE rights, alongside its protection of CP rights.  But the internally limiting, 
common subsection (2) mentioned above mirrors the ICESCR‟s distinctive treatment of the 
rights. As a result, the judicial approach to the SE rights provisions is a more revealing gauge 
of the status of these rights. 
 
Section 71 of the interim Constitution required that the CC certify the text of the new 
                                                 
20
  The general flexibility of the ICESCR regarding the approach of state parties to the rights is somewhat 
mitigated by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‟ General Comments. General 
Comment 3, for example, elaborates on the terms „progressive realization‟, „to the maximum of its 
available resources‟ and „all appropriate means‟.  See also General Comment 9 on the domestic 
application of the Convention, which fleshes out the concept of „all appropriate means‟. The General 
Comments fulfil an interpretive role but are non-binding and have not elicited widespread state 
acceptance. 
21
  Article 2. 
22
  See, for example, A Sen „Freedoms and Needs‟ The New Republic (January 10 and 17, 1994) 31 at 32, 
as cited in Steiner and Alston (note 17 above) at 371-2.   
23
  This attitude is reflected in the European and Inter-American systems for the protection and promotion 
of human rights. All European states are required to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), a catalogue of CP rights. No such requirement applies in respect of the European Social 
Charter. The Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, setting out 
economic, social and cultural rights has been ratified by 14 states whereas the Convention itself has 
attracted 24 ratifications. See Steiner and Alston (note 17 above) at 280. Whilst the African 
Convention on Human and Peoples‟ Rights contains SE rights alongside CP rights, enforcement of the 
rights has been generally problematic and it is, as yet, difficult to measure the system‟s commitment to 
these rights.  See, generally, K Acheampong „Reforming the substance of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‟ Rights: civil and political rights and socio-economic rights‟ (2001) African 
Human Rights Law Journal 185.  
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Constitution before it came into effect. In the Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa (First Certification case),
24
 one of the arguments raised against certification 
was the inclusion of SE rights in the Bill of Rights. The objectors raised three arguments 
against the inclusion of these rights. First, they proposed that the rights should not have been 
included as they were not universally acknowledged to be fundamental rights.
25
 Second, they 
claimed that the rights clashed with the separation of governmental powers required by 
Constitutional Principle VI, in that their enforcement would demand judicial invasion of the 
legislative and executive spheres, particularly when it came to determining budgetary 
allocation.
26
 And finally, the detractors made the somewhat different argument that judicial 
enforcement of SE rights was impossible because of the budgetary issues the cases were 
likely to raise – as constitutional entrenchment and justiciability were necessary conditions of 
the recognition of SE rights as rights, they could not be recognised as such.
27
  
 
  On the first objection, the CC noted simply that Constitutional Principle II
28
 allowed 
the CA to include rights beyond those universally accepted as rights.
29
 The CC accepted that 
orders handed down by courts in the enforcement of SE rights could well have budgetary 
implications. However, the same concern applied to the enforcement of relatively 
uncontroversial CP rights to a fair trial, equality and freedom of expression, for example. 
Thus, enforcement of the right to a fair trial could require that resources be spent on legal aid 
and the right to equality could demand extension of state-provided benefits to previously 
excluded categories of people.
30
 The duties to enforce CP rights and SE rights were not so 
different as to lead one to conclude that protection of the latter always leads to a violation of 
                                                 
24
  1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC). The CC did not certify the Constitution in this first certification case. The 
Constitution came into effect after the second certification decision Ex parte Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the amended text of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996  1997 (1) BCLR 1; 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC). 
25
  First Certification case (note 24 above) at par. 76. 
26
  First Certification case (note 24 above) at par.77. 
27
  First Certification case (note 24 above) at par. 78. 
28
  „Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which 
shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution, which 
shall be drafted after having given due consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights contained in 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution‟. 
29
  First Certification case (note 24 above) at par. 76. 
30
  As occurred in Khosa and others v Minister of Social Development and others; Mahlaule and another 
v Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC), 
discussed in chapter 4.  
 28 
the separation of powers principle.
31
 On the argument that enforcement of SE rights 
demanded that courts deal with budgetary issues, the CC held first, that Constitutional 
Principle II required only that universally recognised fundamental rights be constitutionally 
entrenched and judicially enforceable. As SE rights were not so recognised, they did not have 
to be enforced in the same way. Moreover, any budgetary implications arising from SE rights 
cases, did not rule out their justiciability – at the very least, the rights were negatively 
enforceable that is, capable of being protected against improper invasion.
32
  
 
The First Certification case is commonly referred to as authority for the proposition 
that SE rights are justiciable before South African courts.
33
  Certainly, the 1996 Constitution 
and the First Certification case put to rest the argument that SE rights are, in principle, non-
justiciable.
34
 They are an indication that South African courts are required to adjudicate SE 
rights. But the case left a number of questions unanswered. The judges gave no indication of 
whether SE rights are fundamental and enforceable in much the same way as civil and 
political rights. Moreover, the CC left the question of whether the rights could be interpreted 
to require positive action from the state open. This could well have been a consequence of 
judicial avoidance,
35
 arguably appropriate in the first case touching on the enforcement of SE 
rights,
36
 in which the court had simply to determine whether the Constitution met the 
conditions in chapter 5 of the interim Constitution. Nevertheless, the case points to an 
unresolved tension. On the one hand, the Constitution upholds the principle of a separation of 
                                                 
31
  First Certification case (note 24 above) at par. 77. 
32
  First Certification case (note 24 above) at par.78. 
33
  See, for example, M Pieterse „Possibilities and pitfalls in the domestic enforcement of social rights: 
contemplating the South African experience‟ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 882 at 885; K Iles 
„Limiting socio-economic rights: beyond the internal limitations clauses‟ (2004) 20 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 448 at 449; and Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action 
Campaign and Others (No. 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) at par. 25. 
34
  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 at par.20. 
35
  The merits of this practice in South African constitutional analysis have been canvassed in some detail. 
See, for example I Currie „Judicious Avoidance‟ (1999) 15 South African Journal on Human Rights 
138 and C Roederer „Judicious Engagement: Theory, Attitude and Community‟ (1999) 15 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 486. 
36
  But see G van Bueren „Including the excluded: the case for an economic, social and cultural Human 
Rights Act (2002) Public Law 456 at 459 in which she describes the CC‟s approach in this case as a 
„very cautious, toe-dipping‟ one which „drew heavily upon civil and political rights jurisprudence‟. 
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governmental powers,
37
 on the other it embraces a much wider, more ambitious role for the 
judiciary than previously existed in South African law and practice.
38
 
 
  SE rights adjudication occupies an extremely complicated position within this debate. 
South African courts are required to give effect to the SE rights in the Constitution. At the 
same time, the complexities of a comprehensive transformation agenda demand that the 
legislative, executive and administrative bodies be given a certain amount of freedom in 
which to set priorities and make long-term decisions about economic policy. The SE 
transformation of South African society is no less pressing a goal today than it was in 1994. 
Against the background of the vast disparities in wealth, health and education inherited from 
the apartheid regime, one of government‟s stated priorities at the first general election was 
large-scale redistribution of SE goods. Sixteen years on, whilst the country‟s track record on 
protection of CP rights is good, delivery of SE goods guaranteed in the Constitution has been 
considerably slower and less effective.
39
 The question is how best to go about effecting 
urgent SE transformation today. Consequently, whilst the controversy over whether SE rights 
are, in principle, justiciable in South Africa is at an end, concerns about the constitutional 
role and institutional competence of judges impact on an ongoing debate about how judges 
should interpret and apply the rights.  
 
(3)  Why justiciable SE rights? 
 
Rights such as the right to health, housing and education have traditionally been 
considered to be beyond the realm of adjudication by courts on the basis that they are 
imprecise and vague, have considerable resource implications and demand positive action by 
the state.
40
 Some commentators argue that the idea of SE rights undermines the very nature 
                                                 
37
  See, generally, First Certification case (note 24 above) at pars. 106-113.  
38
  See C Hoexter (2007) Administrative Law in South Africa (Juta: Cape Town) at 137. 
39
 See, for example, L Berat „The Constitutional Court of South Africa and Jurisdictional Questions: In 
the Interest of Justice?‟ (2005) 3(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 39; and R Calland and 
P Graham (eds.) (2005) Democracy in the Time of Mbeki: IDASA’s Democracy Index (IDASA: Cape 
Town). See also D Hemson & M O'Donovon „Putting numbers to the scorecard: presidential targets 
and the state of the delivery‟ in S Buhlungu, J Daniel, J Lutchman & R Southall (eds.) (2006) State of 
the Nation: South Africa 2005-6 (HSRC Press: Pretoria). 
40
  See, for example, M  Pieterse „Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights 
(2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 383 at 389. 
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of rights, defined as classical liberties (freedom of action) rather than goods,
41
 as individual 
guarantees against state interference, which are immediately enforceable. However, these 
ideas about the nature of rights are consistent only with a very limited conception of what 
freedom entails. On this limited view, freedom is defined as the absence of interference – as 
Isaiah Berlin put it: 
But whatever the principle in terms of which the area of non-interference is to be drawn, 
whether it is that of natural law or natural rights, or of utility, or the pronouncements of a 
categorical imperative, or the sanctity of the social contract, or any other concept with which 
men have sought to clarify and justify their convictions, liberty in this sense means liberty 
from, absence of interference beyond the shifting, but always recognisable, frontier.
42
   
This view of freedom has been steadily eroded in moral and political philosophy.
43
 
Commentators have argued, instead, for a version of freedom that concentrates on increasing 
individual opportunities, capabilities or choices.
44
  
 
Critics of freedom as non-interference attack as myths two fundamental assumptions 
underlying the traditional liberal notion. First, the sceptics point out that a person may be 
prevented from exercising her rights by factors such as „poverty, poor health, a lack of 
education‟ as well as positive state interference with those rights.45 Second, the idea of the 
state as occupying a neutral space between competing value positions, on which the notion of 
freedom as non-interference depends, is a fiction. Rather than being neutral, the state, on this 
conception of freedom, prioritises the individual over the collective, and ignores the fact that 
some people are better able to access social goods than others.
46
 Freedom as the absence of 
state interference may be experiencing something of a re-birth in modern neo-liberalist 
thought
47
 but the fundamental point for this thesis is that this is a version of freedom which 
the South African Constitution firmly rejects. The constitutional goals set out in the Preamble 
                                                 
41
  D Kelly (1998) A Life of One’s Own: Individual Rights and the Welfare State at 1, as cited in Steiner 
and Alston (note 17 above) 285-7. 
42  I Berlin „Two concepts of liberty‟ in Isaiah Berlin (1969) Four Essays on Liberty (OUP: Oxford) at 
126-7. See also R Dworkin (1978) Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 
Massachusetts) at 267.  
43
  The literature on this issue is vast and I do not attempt to summarise it here. As the South African 
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 31 
include a commitment to equal protection of the law and fundamental human rights, as well 
as social justice and the improvement of the quality of life of all citizens. Most significantly, 
the Preamble refers to the need to „free the potential of each person‟. These themes flow 
through the Bill of Rights – most obviously in the SE rights provisions themselves but also in 
the equality provision. Amongst other things, the latter provision states that equality 
„includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms‟ and that measures aimed at 
advancing those who were previously disadvantaged may be taken in fulfilling this aim.
48
     
 
Once we move away from the view of freedom as non-interference, an argument 
that SE rights are, in principle, non-justiciable because they entail positive duties is 
impossible to sustain. This is because the „richer conception of freedom reveals that 
political rights can also entail positive duties‟.49 Moreover, this richer view of freedom 
also undermines other bases on which commentators usually attempt to draw a bright line 
between traditional CP rights and SE rights. 
50
 The problem of vagueness, for example, 
also applies to duties of restraint or negative duties. This is because most such duties are 
subject to limitation and institutions, whether legislative or judicial, need to find some 
means of deciding what those limitations are.
51
  
 
In some, more nuanced non-justiciability arguments, commentators acknowledge 
that enforcement of CP rights may also have budgetary implications but believe that these 
do not compare to the widespread economic implications of enforcing SE rights.
52
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However, as pointed out by Marius Pieterse, there are aspects of SE rights which are 
easier to define and less expensive to enforce.
53
 Furthermore, courts may play a variety of 
roles in the enforcement of these rights: the duty may be one of directing and overseeing 
implementation of government SE policy, rather than designing that policy itself.
54
 The 
South African CC‟s approach to the question of justiciability of SE rights in the First 
Certification decision, discussed above, was premised on exactly this kind of rejection of 
sharp distinctions between the two categories of rights. In short, the arguments against 
justiciability described above cannot provide a principled basis from which to claim that 
these rights are inherently non-justiciable when they are based on a demonstrably 
unsound strict divide between categories of rights.
55
  
 
But, as noted by Sandra Fredman, some scholars present a more fundamental 
challenge to SE rights adjudication.
56
 Their argument is not that judges are ill-suited to 
adjudicate particular kinds of rights claims but that all rights claims are, by their nature, 
so important that it cannot be left up to judges to resolve them. To do so would be 
inherently undemocratic.  Prominent commentators from a „left‟ tradition57 are returning 
to a Benthamite or neo-Benthamite vision of democracy, in which fundamental questions 
of law are resolved through parliamentary, rather than judicial, processes.
58
A large part of 
the work on political constitutionalism within the left tradition in the U.K. draws on the 
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theory of U.S. constitutional theorist, Jeremy Waldron.
59
 His work has become influential 
in South African constitutional theory as well.
60
 Waldron set out his argument against the 
judicial review of primary legislation in a recent article.
61
 It is worth considering the main 
points of that argument in some detail here. 
 
  Waldron‟s scholarship is rooted in the idea that each person is a „thinking agent 
endowed with an ability to deliberate morally, to see things from others‟ point of view, and to 
transcend a preoccupation with his own particular or sectional interests‟ and that, principal 
amongst all rights, is the right to participation.
62
 Waldron argues that there is no necessary 
correlation between a belief in rights and an insistence on rights-based judicial review.
63
 He 
objects to the judicial review of primary legislation for two main reasons. First, he suggests 
that there is little support for the view that rights are more effectively protected by judicial 
review than they would be through the political procedures of democratically elected 
legislatures. This argument is connected to the relative outcomes of courts as opposed to 
legislatures when it comes to rights protection. Waldron‟s second argument is that, 
irrespective of whether courts produce rights-enhancing outcomes, they lack democratic 
legitimacy.
64
 His argument is against strong judicial review – which allows courts to refuse 
to apply legislation in the case at hand, modify that legislation to make it consistent with 
human rights norms or even strike down a statute.
65
 The argument is conditional on four 
assumptions: 
  We are to imagine a society with (1) democratic institutions in reasonably good working 
order, including a representative legislature elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage; 
(2) a set of judicial institutions, again in reasonably good order, set up on a nonrepresentative 
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basis to hear individual lawsuits, settle disputes, and uphold the rule of law; (3) a 
commitment on the part of most members of the society and most of its officials to the idea of 
individual and minority rights; and (4) persisting, substantial, and good faith disagreement 
about rights (i.e., about what commitment to rights actually amounts to and what its 
implications are) amongst the members of society who are committed to the idea of rights.
66
 
Some further explanation of these assumptions is necessary. As Waldron points out, by 
reasonably well-functioning legislative bodies, he is imagining, not perfect institutions which 
habitually hand down legislation everyone agrees to be just, but ones in which the usual 
safeguards apply. These include deliberation within a large group of people, debate, voting, 
intense committee scrutiny, and the consideration of matters at a number of different levels. 
More importantly, there are ongoing deliberations about how these processes could be 
improved. These deliberations are rooted in a „culture of democracy‟ which prizes 
„responsible deliberation‟ and political equality.67 Waldron also assumes that the legislative 
procedures are the subject of sustained review, that members of the society understand that if 
they consider there to be inequalities of representation in the system, this is a legitimate 
criticism to make. Parliament has the capacity to make changes to electoral and legislative 
procedures if these are considered necessary to remedy the inequalities.
68
 
 
  On judicial institutions, Waldron argues that they „respond to particular claims 
brought by particular litigants‟, handle these matters within the framework of „binary, 
adversarial presentation, and „refer to and elaborate their own past decisions on matters that 
seem relevant to the case at hand‟.69 The society‟s commitment to rights, one of Waldron‟s 
assumptions referred to above, is expanded upon as a commitment to individual and minority 
rights. There may well be people in the society who reject the notion of rights altogether but 
this does not detract from the general consensus on respect for rights. Where respect for 
rights in a society is actually „tenuous and fragile‟, the case is a non-core one in which 
Waldron‟s main arguments do not apply.70 This consensus about respect for rights exists 
alongside considerable and serious disagreement about what these rights are and what they 
mean.
71
 There might be a Bill of Rights relevant to the disagreement and each side to the 
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disagreement will use the text to support its view but such a document will not, of itself, 
provide a resolution, as in Waldron‟s terms „the bland rhetoric of the Bill of Rights was 
designed simply to finesse the real and reasonable disagreements that are inevitable among 
people who take rights seriously for long enough to see such a Bill enacted‟.72 
 
  Waldron accepts that when a statute is enacted, its potential impact on rights may not 
be immediately obvious to legislators but argues that this supports weak, not strong, review. 
Courts may identify the rights issues but not settle them – the position in the U.K. where 
powers of courts extend only to declarations of incompatibility with the HRA is an example 
here.
73
 Rather than simply empowering the majority, legislatures, Waldron argues, are 
institutionally designed to take account of the outcomes of their decisions for different 
groups of people. Information about the acceptability of „various options to different sections 
of the society is fed into the decision-process‟.74  
 
  As to why judicial review is less suited to produce just outcomes, Waldron claims 
that, contrary to common belief, by the time cases get to the higher courts, they are decided 
in the abstract, rather than the particular – they revolve around the dispute, not the litigants. 
In fact, advocacy groups tend to choose particular individuals as test case plaintiffs because 
they represent a larger, more abstract group of people. By comparison, legislatures are able to 
take particular cases into account – through lobbying, hearings and debate.75 As to the 
established Bills of Rights through which courts pronounce on legislation, they tend to give 
rise to a rigid textual formalism – judges make decisions based on theories of interpretation, 
rather than direct argument about the moral issues involved.
76
 This is partly because judges 
need to be concerned about the courts‟ legitimacy in settling disputes on complex moral 
questions.
77
 Similarly, Waldron makes a point about the quality of judicial reason-giving – he 
argues that reasons will be adjusted to the text of the Bill of Rights, which is a particular 
problem when that document no longer represents the outcomes of political deliberations 
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within the society.
78
 A related concern is that, when the rights are entrenched in a 
Constitution, they attain „immunity from legislative change‟ – it is made impossible or, at 
least, difficult to change the legal status of the rights-holders.
79
 On the other hand, the kind of 
consideration that takes place in legislative processes is more directly connected to the moral 
issues at hand and the reasons given arise from full deliberative discussion.
80
 Whilst these 
legislative deliberations may suffer from defects and distortions, these defects arise from 
irregularities or „pathologies‟ in the process. With courts, the defects are inherent in the way 
they are expected to perform.
81
  
 
  Waldron‟s process-related arguments against judicial review are more familiar. He 
points out that legitimacy is relative and that it is much more difficult for judges to provide 
satisfactory answers to legitimacy concerns than it is for legislators. Legislators acquire their 
authority to make decisions from fair elections in which people are equally entitled to 
determine who their representatives should be. The system of majority decision-making used 
by legislators is justified on the basis that it is a „reasonable approximation of the use of 
majority decision-making among citizens as a whole‟, recognising the moral equality of each 
citizen.
82
 Although judges are appointed by officials with some „elective credentials‟, 
[l]egislators are regularly accountable to their constituents and they behave as though their 
electoral credentials were important in relation to the overall ethos of their participation in 
political decision-making. None of this is true of Justices.‟83 Furthermore, judges would find 
it much more difficult to justify their use of majority decision-making. This mechanism may 
be a „simple technical device‟ for reaching a decision but, as judges are not representative of 
citizens in the way that legislators are (through fair elections), there is no moral support for 
it.
84
    
 
It is important to recognise that Waldron is not absolutely opposed to judicial review 
in all circumstances. He defines societies in which there exists „prejudice against discrete and 
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insular minorities‟ as non core-cases in which judicial review may have some credibility.85 
However, this is not the same as an argument that judicial review is needed to protect all 
minorities against the „tyranny of the majority‟. Tyranny, Waldron argues, can only be said 
to exist where topical minorities are aligned with decisional minorities. By this he means that 
those who voted for the losing side in the debate (decisional minority) coincide with those 
whose rights and interests were adversely affected by the decision (topical minority). But, if 
the third and fourth assumptions of Waldron‟s argument - that most people in the society care 
about rights and that there is real, not self-interested, disagreement about the meaning of 
those rights – this state of affairs would only exist in non-core cases.86 Finally, even in such 
cases, judicial review may not come to the assistance of the minorities concerned – it is 
possible that judicial majorities suffer from the same prejudices as legislative majorities in 
these dysfunctional societies.
87
 
 
Waldron is right to be concerned about whether courts are equipped to exercise strong 
powers of review over legislation in a way that enhances, rather than diminishes, democratic 
principles of participation, equality and legitimacy. But, whilst he claims that he is simply 
setting out the way legislatures usually operate,
88
 the picture he presents is unrealistic. It 
displays a faith in electoral processes and legislation-making that is not always easy to 
justify. As he admits:  
„Opponents of judicial review are often accused of adopting a naively optimistic view of 
legislatures. But sometimes we do this deliberately, matching one optimistic picture with 
another in the face of the refusal of the defenders of courts to give a realistic account of what 
happens there‟.89 
Even in a democracy that functions reasonably well, governments are very often elected by a 
minority of voters and an even smaller minority of people who are eligible to vote.
90
 The 
processes through which legislatures and judiciaries reach decisions may be democratic or 
undemocratic but this depends less on the fact that one is voted in and the other appointed, 
and more on the philosophy that operates within particular institutions.
91
 Rather than 
                                                 
85
  Waldron (note 61 above) at 1403. 
86
  Waldron (note 61 above) at 1397-8. 
87
  Waldron (note 61 above) at 1404. 
88
  Waldron (note 61 above) at 1361. 
89
  Waldron (note 61 above) at 1379. 
90
  A Lever „Is judicial review democratic?‟ (2007) Public Law 280 at 285.  
91
  Lever (note 90 above) at 286. 
 38 
protecting the equal dignity of every individual in a society, „electoral and legislative 
politics‟92 often depend on how well-organised, wealthy and influential particular groups of 
people are.
93
  
 
Once in power, there are no absolute guarantees that legislators will live up to their 
election promises and, even with the benefit of a strong civil society, groups who are more 
powerful financially or more vocal are more likely to have their interests protected than those 
who are most vulnerable. Legislatures are directly accountable to the public but, far from 
being the most powerful of the three branches, they play a secondary role to an ever-growing, 
increasingly dominant, and only indirectly accountable executive body in most jurisdictions. 
Whilst members of the executive do build up a body of expertise on policy formulation, there 
are fewer checks on how they exercise that expertise.
 94
 Thus, as pointed out by Fredman, 
Waldron is on shaky ground when he claims that „the right of participation is alive and well 
in the political system‟.95  
 
The extent to which democratic values are realised through legislative politics is 
contingent on a number of factors. Furthermore, decision-making processes in legislative 
bodies are prone to certain shortcomings.   In a helpful categorisation, Rosalind Dixon has 
suggested that these flaws arise from the potential for „blind spots‟ and „burdens of inertia‟ in 
legislative processes.
96
 Blind spots may arise from a legislative inability to foresee the impact 
of statutes on the rights of a range of people from different backgrounds and with differing 
viewpoints („blind spots of perspective‟). Legislators may not realise that laws could be 
applied in a way that limits rights, due to time pressures on them or a simple lack of 
foresight. Finally, legislators, concerned as they are with a particular legislative goal in 
enacting a statute, may find themselves unable to find ways to more fully accommodate a 
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rights claim whilst sacrificing little of that legislative objective („blind spots of 
accommodation‟).97  
 
 There are also likely to be „burdens of inertia‟ in the legislative process. Legislators 
are required to act within the time and capacity limits of a particular legislative session and 
may deem other legislative priorities more urgent than protection of rights. Where a political 
party is divided on a matter, legislators may consider party integrity to be more important 
than a „more responsive legislative outcome‟. And, where the fulfilment of a rights-based 
claim involves a long-term, complex process involving the administration and executive, 
delays in these bodies could act to compound the legislative inertia described above.
98
 
 
It is important not to fall into the trap of assuming that flaws in the legislative 
decision-making process are a sufficient argument for judicial review. As John Hart Ely 
observed , „[t]he conventional wisdom here, that courts are markedly worse than legislatures 
at determining legislative facts, surely can stand significant qualification – but at the same 
time there isn‟t any reason to suppose they are better at it‟.99 But, the argument in this chapter 
is based on the contention that the question of which institution is better at resolving complex 
moral and political disagreements is the wrong question to be asking. In analysing Alexander 
Bickel‟s work, Ely argued that Bickel failed to heed his own warning that „No answer is what 
the wrong question begets…‟100 by assuming that the question was which values courts 
should be defining and imposing.
101
 The criticism may be as easily applied to the assumption 
that, in a democracy, one institution must do the work of defining and applying these values. 
The question is whether courts have a positive contribution to make here. Similarly, in 
assuming justiciability means that judges have the final word on a matter, Waldron forces a 
choice between the institutions but the assumption is itself problematic.
102
 Waldron‟s 
argument is based on the idea that disagreement is a permanent feature of deliberations about 
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the common good and that there is no point in trying to wish it away.
103
 As a result, he is 
strongly against the idea of any kind of pre-commitment through a Bill of Rights – even 
where such a document has been chosen by the people through their elected 
representatives.
104
  His claim, discussed above, that judicial reasoning focuses on an out-
dated set of fixed values follows from this argument. But the judicial striking down of 
legislation is not a necessary consequence of the judicial review of rights claims. A 
declaration of incompatibility, such as occurs in respect of the U.K.‟s HRA, is one 
alternative.
105
 Even where judges have the power to strike down legislation, as in South 
Africa, those judgments are open to subsequent revision – through judicial interpretation 
itself as well as constitutional amendments, which are often not that difficult to pass.
106
 As 
Waldron appears to admit when he refers to the „bland rhetoric‟ of Bills of Rights, these 
documents only represent a pre-commitment to very basic goals. Rights are capable of 
limitation and Bills of Rights are more of a „living tree‟107 than a set of immutable principles. 
 
To summarise then, both legislative and judicial decision-making are imperfect tools 
for realising rights. Courts bring certain strengths to the enforcement of rights.  They act to 
fill gaps in the legislative and executive processes. But there is much in current judicial 
theory and method that is simply not responsive to valid concerns about elitism and a lack of 
legitimacy. For those interested in the realisation of fundamental rights alongside the 
protection of democratic norms, the solution must be found, not in an uncompromising 
curtailment of judicial powers in rights cases but in the reconsideration of the judicial role. 
Fundamental rights and democratic values may best be protected by accepting that the nature 
and extent of judicial intervention need not be the same in every rights dispute. As Sandra 
Fredman puts it, „the real challenge is to formulate a democratically justifiable role for the 
courts‟108 
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 But this kind of reconsideration of the judicial role attracts criticism of another kind. 
Requiring courts to pay attention to the democratic legitimacy of their approach to rights 
adjudication does not sit easily within a classic view of rights-based constitutionalism. 
Thomas Poole describes the „paradigmatic features‟ of classic rights-based constitutionalism 
as comprising the following beliefs: 
(1) Rights-bearers are always individuals; 
(2) There is a common core of human nature from which is it possible to „extract‟ a set of 
natural rights. Denial of these rights entails a denial of what it means to be human; 
(3) The fundamental rights above are a form of „higher-order‟ law. They act as trumps 
against government policies with which they conflict;
109
 
(4) The main goal of public law is to protect citizens‟ rights; 
(5) Protection of citizens‟ rights, the „higher-order‟ law, justifies judicial review; and 
(6) Rights should provide the driving force or main „juridical tools‟ through which argument 
in judicial review is structured.
110
 
It is exactly this kind approach that scholars like Waldron most strongly object to. A classic 
rights-based conception of constitutionalism accords judicial review the central role in the 
protection of rights. On this view, there is „often a single right answer to complex questions 
of law and political morality‟111 and it is the judges‟ duty to discover it.  This view is based 
on an unrealistic faith in the capacity of judges to implement rights. The approach also insists 
on a view of adjudication as somehow abstracted from what other branches of government 
do, and from broad societal interests. As Ely put it:  
Thus the list of values the [U.S. Supreme] Court and the commentators have tended to 
enshrine as fundamental is a list with which most readers of this book will have little trouble 
identifying: expression, association, education, academic freedom, the privacy of a home, 
personal autonomy, even the right not to be locked in a stereotypically female sex role and 
supported by one‟s husband. But watch most fundamental rights theorists start edging toward 
the door when someone mentions jobs, food, or housing: those are important, sure, but they 
aren‟t fundamental‟.112 
The notion that rights-bearers are always individuals is also problematic as even widely 
accepted CP rights like the rights to equality, freedom of religion and dignity often have a 
communal aspect. These aspects - that rights attach to individuals and act as trumps - allow 
little room for engagement with the democratic legitimacy of judgments. On a traditional 
rights-based approach to constitutionalism, when it comes to the limitation of rights, it is not 
enough to strike a balance between the rights of the individual and broader societal 
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interests.
113
 Because rights exist to protect the human dignity and political equality of every 
individual in a society, any infringement of them is to be taken very seriously.
114
 Government 
must provide „some compelling reason‟ for the invasion of the right, a reason „consistent 
with the supposition on which the original right must be based‟.115  
 
Furthermore, the account presented above does not reflect what actually happens in 
courts. In a study of a number of rights-based cases decided by U.K. courts both before and 
after the enactment of the HRA, Poole concluded that much of the argument focused on what 
he referred to as „intermediate‟ or „second-order‟ concerns: „issues relating to constitutional 
structure and administrative decency rather than basic or primary issues of justice and 
morality‟.116 The intermediate concerns Poole refers to range from claims regarding policy, 
expediency and necessity to democratic choices regarding education, health and defence, for 
example.
117
 In a rights-absolutist approach to adjudication, two routes are possible. First, the 
scope of the right is defined in the absence of any consideration of „intermediate‟ matters and 
the court decides whether the right has been infringed on the basis of that definition. The 
state then bears the burden of justifying any infringement by reference to intermediate 
concerns. 
118
 Second, some rights-absolutist accounts suggest that intermediate concerns are 
relevant to rights themselves but draw a distinction between rights that are fundamental 
(negative liberties) and intermediate concerns which are positive rights and, therefore, merely 
aspirational. 
119
 But neither of these routes presents a fair reflection of how courts in common 
law jurisdictions approach rights. Judges do not adhere to this kind of clear two-stage 
process. There is no „pure‟ rights analysis, abstracted from intermediate concerns. Also, 
rights are meant to act as trumps, with the burden of proof on the state to justify their actions 
but, in fact, rights are quite easily outweighed by the intermediate concerns.
120
 Furthermore, 
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intermediate concerns are not simply dismissed as aspirational, positive rights in the 
jurisprudence. 
121
  
 
Poole suggests an alternative legitimacy theory of judicial review, as practised in 
U.K. courts. Legitimacy revolves around the practice of justifying government action.
122
 The 
practice of justification acts to control and structure governmental power.
123
 The legitimacy 
conception provides a more satisfactory account of the importance of second-order 
considerations in judicial review. It is also consistent with the „self-referential‟ nature of the 
practice – courts are required to determine the limits of their own power.124 As a result, 
concerns about their own legitimacy play an important role in judicial decision-making. 
Poole is quick to clarify that a legitimacy conception does not imply that procedural issues 
describe the only appropriate territory of judicial review.
125
 Instead, protection of rights is 
one of the indicators of legitimate governance and rights must be recognised and weighed 
into the process of determining legitimacy.
126
  
 
This last point is extremely important as it signals an attempt to combine first and 
second-order considerations in a way that satisfies both procedural and substantive concerns. 
Moreover, rather than viewing the two (procedure and substance) to be in constant tension, 
legitimacy theory, as set out by Poole, acknowledges that questions of legitimacy have a 
significant impact on the extent to which rights are protected in a society. The protection of 
individual rights cannot be separated from a broader societal interest in good governance, 
efficient administration, and public participation.  
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The problem with Poole‟s analysis lies with his definition of what intermediate 
concerns are. He draws a distinction between „issues relating to constitutional structure and 
administrative decency‟ and „primary issues of justice and morality‟127 and places democratic 
choices regarding goods like education and health in the former category. Drawing on 
Charles Taylor‟s distinction between convergent goods (public goods that are secured 
collectively but which are aimed at benefitting the individual citizen) and common goods 
(which are aimed at the political community as a unit), Poole likens rights to convergent 
goods. He suggests that second-order considerations such as constitutional balance, expertise, 
and margin of appreciation aimed at the „general well-being of the political community‟ are 
common goods, incapable of being broken down into rights.
128
  
 
The idea that the extent to which rights are protected is an indicator of legitimate 
governance is useful but it still rests on a limited conception of rights as negative liberties.  
SE rights to health care and education, for instance, fundamentally challenge this kind of 
strict delineation of individual and common goods. This point is most clearly made with 
respect to the South African Constitution because, in it, SE rights are explicitly protected and 
made justiciable before the courts, and because the internal limitations in sections 26 (2) and 
27 (2) require that courts take what Poole refers to as the „general well-being of the political 
community‟ into account. But the same holds true for U.K. courts enforcing positive duties 
arising from CP rights such as equality and dignity or exercising the power of judicial review 
over governmental decisions made in terms of social welfare legislation.
129
 Furthermore, 
whereas Poole‟s account sees rights enforcement as one indicator of legitimate governance, a 
more integrated conception of rights and democracy would consider legitimate governance to 
be an important aspect of rights enforcement. Considerations of legitimacy, then, should not 
be seen as a pragmatic compromise of rights in favour of broader societal considerations or 
even as a balancing of rights with legitimacy concerns. Instead, legitimacy considerations 
related to things like relative expertise are an integral part of rights implementation.  
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 Like Fredman, Poole appears to be searching for a „democratically justifiable‟ role for 
the courts, a way in which legitimacy concerns may be accommodated in the discourse 
around the adjudication of rights. He sees justification of all governmental action, including 
judicial decision-making, as the focal point of this new conception of the judicial role. In this 
thesis, my aim is to set out a model of adjudication in which the effective implementation of 
SE rights takes centre stage.  The model of adjudication I wish to suggest departs from both a 
classic rights-based view of constitutionalism and Poole‟s legitimacy theory in taking a 
broader view of how rights may be defined.  The argument in this thesis is that choices about 
goods like health care, housing and education are „basic or primary issues of justice and 
morality‟.130 On this view, it is not possible to argue simply that these goods are common 
goods, incapable of giving rise to individual rights. On the other hand, it is essential to take 
legitimacy concerns into account in the adjudication of rights - not merely because of the 
instrumental value of justification or because these concerns impact on the effective 
implementation of rights as a whole but because they are relevant to the question of whether 
people in a society are accorded equal dignity and respect. I have argued above that Waldron 
is too categorical in dismissing judicial decision-making as inherently contradictory to 
principles of democracy. But the source of his concern is valid:  
 For surely, the people have a right to participate in all aspects of the democratic governance 
of their community, a right which is quite deeply connected to the values of autonomy and 
responsibility that are celebrated in our commitment to other basic liberties.‟ 
 It would be foolish to ignore this concern.  Consequently, in considering what an appropriate 
model of SE rights adjudication should look like, we must engage with the question of what a 
„democratically justifiable‟131 role for the courts in this area is. 
 
(4) A ‘democratically justifiable’ role for the courts 
 
Waldron‟s rejection of strong review in all but what he views as extreme cases where 
the assumptions of free and fair elections, well-functioning judicial institutions, general 
societal commitment to individual and minority rights and genuine disagreement about the 
meaning and content of those rights do not apply resonates with certain aspects of a dialogic 
                                                 
130
  Poole (note 59 above).  
131
  Fredman (note 1 above) at 100. 
 46 
theory of judicial review. Writing in the Canadian context, Kent Roach has described the 
operation of this dialogue between governmental institutions thus: 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the structure of the Charter means that its decision 
need not be the final word in democratic debates about how society will treat rights and 
freedoms. It has acknowledged that its most controversial decisions “can be reacted to by the 
legislature in the passing of new legislation… This dialogue between and accountability of 
each of the branches have the effect of enhancing the democratic process, not denying it.”132  
In an article considering the relevance of a dialogic account of judicial review for the 
adjudication of SE rights in South Africa, Rosalind Dixon points out that, as with other 
theories of cooperative constitutionalism,  a dialogic theory recognises that „both judicial 
competence and responsiveness in the process of constitutional rights adjudication‟ are 
limited. This view excludes the „pure strong form approach‟ to SE rights adjudication which 
many South African scholars favour and in terms of which judicial decisions have final 
effect. At the same time, dialogic theories ascribe to courts extensive powers and 
responsibilities for tackling shortcomings in legislative processes.
133
 
 
There are different versions of dialogue theory but, in general, they allow courts a 
more expansive role in giving meaning to rights and handing down strong remedies.
134
 In 
that respect, the theory is a rejection of the idea that legislatures are always best placed to 
resolve fundamental disputes about rights. But, in an attempt to cater for legitimacy concerns, 
dialogue theory also holds that courts must defer to subsequent legislative pronouncements 
on the issue concerned.
135
 
 
  Dialogue theory may be distinguished from other theories of cooperative 
constitutionalism because of its strong emphasis on judicial responsibility for mitigating 
legislative blind spots and burdens of inertia, discussed in section 3 above. In a 
departmentalist version of cooperative theories, courts exist only to settle particular 
constitutional disputes between an individual and the state. Blind spots or burdens of 
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inertia must be dealt with through popular mobilisation.
136
 A conversationalist model, 
associated with judicial review in terms of the HRA in the U.K, envisages courts playing 
a significant role in countering legislative blind spots by pointing them out. However, in 
this system, courts are not expected to deal with legislative burdens of inertia.
137
 
Conversationalist and departmentalist versions of cooperative constitutionalism are both 
more consistent with Waldron‟s approach to judicial review than dialogue theories. 
 
With dialogic theories, courts bear responsibility for countering the defects described 
above. They are required to use both conversational (communicative) and coercive powers as 
far as possible to do this. If they fail to do so (say by taking a democratic minimalist 
approach and directing a question to the legislature)
138
 they become „directly implicated‟ in 
„illegitimate state coercion‟, contribute to legislative blockages and make it „more difficult 
for individuals and social movements in the broader constitutional culture to contest the 
illegitimacy of the status quo‟.139 Furthermore, the basis on which courts may intervene is not 
limited to extreme grounds like irrationality or patent errors. Rather, courts may intervene 
whenever there are potential „failures of foresight, perspective, accommodation, or 
responsiveness‟.140 This wide judicial role is not a threat to democratic values, however, 
because, in a dialogic understanding, the legislature retains the power to limit the effect of 
judicial pronouncements through subsequent legislative action.
141
 This caveat exists not only 
to protect constitutional, democratic values but as an acknowledgement of the institutional 
limits on the exercise of judicial power.  
 
 The theory is attractive because it attempts to marry an expansive role for courts with 
respect for democratic decision-making through legislatures. It acknowledges weaknesses in 
both legislative and judicial institutions and suggests an approach responsive to these 
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weaknesses. However, the theory retains all the judicial responsibility of a strong-review 
approach whilst removing a large part of judicial authority. Dixon notes that courts are 
expected, in a dialogic understanding, to exercise both communicative and coercive powers. 
She explains that judicial decision-making is inherently coercive in any jurisdiction where 
judicial decisions are considered decisive in disputes between specific parties that are 
brought to courts.
142
 But it is difficult to see how the coercive element can be sustained 
where legislatures are entitled to alter the effect of judicial decisions after they are made.
143
  
 
One could argue that this version of dialogue theory relies on the fact that courts still 
hand down binding orders in respect of particular matters brought to them by individual 
claimants and only give up the element of coercion when it comes to broader questions of 
legislative policy. Still, if courts must defer to subsequent legislative pronouncements on 
these broader questions, the impact will be felt in particular disputes as well. Courts may well 
play a significant role in engaging the legislature in a dialogue about the most effective 
means to protect rights but, ultimately, dialogue theory suggests that it is up to the legislators 
to decide the conclusion of such a dialogue. On an approach like Waldron‟s, this is exactly 
where such a decision belongs. But, if dialogue theorists rely on judicial coercion as well as 
communication to counter blind spots and burdens of inertia, it is hard to see where they 
expect that coercion to come from. Even in the context of the U.K., where this kind of weak 
review arguably exists, Tom Hickman has noted: 
 Of course, it has always been open to Parliament to overrule a decision of the courts, and this 
power remains. But the important point is that the government and Parliament should not 
treat court decisions as if they are contestable opinions to be disregarded, overruled or 
excluded whenever the government or Parliament would have applied or interpreted the law 
differently.
144
 
 If the version of dialogue theory described above appears to jar with the approach of courts, 
legislatures, the executive and administration in the U.K., then it is even less consistent with 
the approach in South African constitutional law.  
 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, South African courts have a duty to 
overturn legislation that they find to be inconsistent with the Constitution. The CC has done 
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so on a number of occasions,
145
 including ones where politically sensitive matters were 
involved.
146
 Two provisions of the Charter on Rights and Freedoms are key to an 
understanding of dialogic theories of judicial review in the Canadian context.
147
 Section 1 
makes it clear that all rights in the Charter are subject to „such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society‟. This 
acknowledgement that rights may be limited is common to a number of constitutional 
democracies, including South Africa. But this kind of provision leaves the decision about 
whether limitations are justifiable to the courts. More significantly, section 33 (1) of the 
Canadian Charter provides:  
Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or 
of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate 
notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. 
This section acts as an override, allowing the legislature to pass „overarching laws‟148 that 
conflict with the rights protect in the Charter. The tenor of the South African Bill of Rights is 
completely different. Section 2 states that the „Constitution is the supreme law of the 
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it 
must be fulfilled‟. 
  
The question for this thesis, however, is whether the critiques of judicial review have 
any bearing on the adjudication of SE rights. Where the positive dimension
149
 of enforcing 
SE rights is concerned, dialogue theory suggests an even weaker approach.  A dialogic 
approach demands that courts adopt either weak rights that is, interpret rights narrowly, or 
hand down weak remedies, depending on the particular circumstances of the case and 
country concerned.
150
 Again, this does not capture the position of SE rights in the South 
African Constitution.  
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The main problem with dialogue theory, then, is that its insistence that the 
adjudication of rights be formally subject to subsequent legislative revision deprives judicial 
review of all coercive power, thereby undermining its very rationale. In certain jurisdictions, 
legislative bodies may treat the judicial pronouncements on these issues as strong signals that 
they should legislate in a particular way. The extent to which they act accordingly is, 
however, contingent on the legal and political culture of the jurisdiction concerned. The 
effect of subsequent legislative revision over a period of time is likely to be a legal and 
political culture in which judicial decisions are simply not taken seriously. As noted earlier, it 
is unrealistic to suggest that judicial decisions are immutable, despite the tendency of critics 
of judicial review to resist judicial review on this basis. But to make the decisions formally 
subject to amendment by the legislature deprives every judgment of any authoritative force. 
Judicial review cannot act as a check on governmental power when its consequences are so 
minimal. Moreover, respect for democratic legitimacy does not require this level of deference 
to legislative powers in all cases. And how strong or weak a judicial approach should be 
cannot be determined solely by the question of whether positive or negative duties are 
involved. For example, from a democratic legitimacy perspective, there is a substantial 
difference between a judgment that orders government to implement previously agreed upon 
positive duties and one that consists of an original determination of the content of those 
duties.  
 
Fredman argues that a democratically defensible role for the courts might be possible 
if judges „fulfil an auxiliary role in respect of three key values underlying the democratic 
ideal: accountability, participation and equality‟.151  Courts may act to enhance accountability 
by enforcing the duty on government to justify its actions to the electorate. The judicial 
process is particularly suited to this kind of role and it is a role that presents no serious 
challenge to democratic values because it does not entail judges prescribing to government 
what it ought to do.
152
 We get onto more difficult terrain, however, when we consider what 
standard of justification a court should apply in ensuring governmental accountability. A bare 
requirement to explain, no matter the merits of that explanation, keeps concerns about 
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democratic legitimacy at bay but weakens judicial authority and the ultimate rationale of 
protecting human rights.
153
  
 
Fredman‟s route out of this dilemma is to suggest that, in order to be convincing, a 
justification must be connected to the democratic values of participation and equality.
154
    
Her account of participation draws from the notion of deliberative democracy. Scholars in 
this area tend to view participation in a democracy as aimed either at interest bargaining or 
consensus. With interest bargaining, deliberation exists as a platform from which people may 
put forward and protect their own interests – the aim is to convince others of the worth of 
one‟s own position. Such an approach is problematic because ultimately, the loudest and 
most powerful voices tend to prevail. The equality aspect of democratic theory is 
consequently sacrificed.
155
  Waldron, on the other hand, objects to a „dewy-eyed‟ version of 
deliberative democracy in which consensus provides the „internal logic of deliberation‟.156 
This is because the logic of consensus goes against his fundamental theory that disagreement 
is not en evil to be cured but an important aspect of the political process. But on a different 
conception of deliberative democracy, the aim is not consensus but the resolution of 
disagreements through a value-based continuous process of reasoned persuasion.
157
   In 
respect of what this means for the courts, Fredman suggests an approach in terms of which 
judicial decisions are considered binding vis-à-vis the issues in a particular case, but subject 
to long-term revision „through the dynamic forum of deliberative democracy‟: 
At the point of decision-making, the duty is fixed, and the State is required to take action or is 
absolved from action, as the case may be. But on the broader scale, the decision remains part 
of a process of continuing revisability whether through Parliament, case law or public 
discourse. This does not differ from the court‟s role in common law disputes in general.
158
   
The obvious criticism here is that the constant possibility of revision leaves too much room 
for uncertainty. But Fredman‟s model is based on the idea of gradual revision. More 
importantly, she does not view stability as an absolute requirement in any governmental 
decision-making process. Stability may sometimes be displaced by another principle. Such 
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displacement would have to be justified by the decision-making body.
159
 For human rights 
adjudication, then, this means that legal certainty is just one of the factors a court must take 
into account in fulfilling its duties.   
 
On the question of how judicial decisions might play a role in enhancing equality, 
Fredman
160
 relies, to some extent, on John Hart Ely‟s representation reinforcing theory of 
judicial review.
161
 Writing in the context of the American Constitution, Ely argued that, in a 
representative democracy, the protection of the many did not necessarily mean the protection 
of all.
162
 He believed that judicial review could serve to reinforce representation and 
participation in a malfunctioning political „market‟163 but that, ultimately, policy or value-
based decisions should be left up to elected officials.
164
 Fredman is attracted to Ely‟s theory 
because, in it, justiciable human rights reinforce, rather than detract from, democracy.
165
 But 
his insistence on a model of judicial review that is procedural rather than substantive is 
problematic.
166
 In order to act as representation reinforcing agents, courts, according to Ely, 
must address themselves to „procedural fairness in the resolution of individual disputes 
(process writ small), and on the other, with what might capaciously be designated process 
writ large - with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distributions of 
government‟.167 Fredman argues that the capacity of individuals for this kind of participation 
depends on their access to resources. As a result, it is not possible to draw a bright line 
between process concerns, especially in the „process writ large‟ sense used by Ely above, and 
substantive concerns.
168
 More significantly, Ely‟s theory provides no real sense of how 
minority exclusion from democratic decision-making processes should be addressed.
169
 In 
short then, whilst Fredman is sympathetic to the idea that judicial review can and should act 
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as a representation reinforcing mechanism in modern democracies, she sees the goal of 
judicial review as more value-based than Ely‟s theory allows: 
[T]he aim of judicial review is to enable excluded groups to play an equal part in the 
deliberative, through taking minority arguments as seriously as majority perspectives and 
coming to a deliberative resolution based on the power to convince rather than the power to 
overwhelm.
170
 
 
 Fredman also suggests various ways in which the adversarial approach to 
adjudication, of which sceptics of judicial review are so critical, should change if judicial 
review is to provide a means through which even the weakest voices may be heard and given 
equal powers of persuasion.
171
 For the purposes of this thesis, though, the implications of her 
approach for the judicial interpretation of SE rights in South Africa are most important. 
Fredman‟s approach provides a valuable theoretical basis for the adjudication of positive 
duties. It suggests that any model of adjudication must be measured by the extent to which it 
enhances the democratic values of accountability, participation and equality. The approach 
integrates rights protection and concerns about democratic legitimacy. What does it mean for 
constitutional interpretation in SE rights cases? 
 
 As indicated above, the South African CC has chosen to anchor its approach to SE 
rights in the concept of reasonableness, referred to in sections 26 (2) and 27 (2). Criticisms of 
this approach are discussed in chapter 4. Fredman herself argues that „reasonableness on its 
own is too diffuse a standard to capture the power to override other principles which attach to 
a minimum core principle‟.172 Ely is also highly critical of the kind of „flabby balancing tests‟ 
associated with reasonableness.
173
 Despite these concerns, I argue in this thesis that 
reasonableness is a useful tool for courts in the adjudication of SE rights. The charges that it 
is ultimately a weak and vague standard, fundamentally bound up with procedure-driven 
administrative law and therefore not helpful in the adjudication of rights are based on a 
limited conception of administrative law. Concerns about justiciability, judicial deference or 
respect and judicial activism have, for some time, been at the very heart of administrative 
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law. This is due to what Cora Hoexter refers to as „the continuous tension between the two 
essential aims‟ of this branch of the law: „to empower officials and give them the necessary 
freedom to do their jobs… and to control these powers and limit that freedom in order to 
protect rights‟.174 The democratic values of participation and accountability have played an 
important role in the development of South African administrative law. Whilst administrative 
law has historically been more concerned with process values than the substance of 
decisions, this need not continue to be the case in a constitutional system. The perennial 
debate over the limits of judicial review in administrative law could be an especially useful 
tool for a model of SE rights adjudication in which courts must respond to concerns about the 
democratic legitimacy of their judgments and protect rights. I explore this idea further in the 
next section. 
 
(5)  Limits on judicial review 
 
The criticisms of judicial review remain relevant because they necessitate a thorough 
consideration of the values we hope to promote and protect through the mechanism of 
judicial review. These values will have an impact, not on whether judges intervene in 
politically sensitive cases, but on the extent to which they do so. It is in light of this point that 
many scholars and judges have begun to confront and engage with the notion of deference,
175
 
not in its much-maligned incarnation as judicial subservience
176
 to the legislature and 
executive, but as a means by which to separate cases appropriate for full and thorough 
judicial consideration form those which are not. Recent scholarship in South Africa
177
 and 
the U.K.
 178
 is littered with calls for a more thorough debate about judicial role and purpose, 
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particularly in the context of a constitutional democracy.
179
 At the same time, commentators 
acknowledge that the question of the appropriate extent of judicial control over other 
branches of government is so fascinating precisely because it admits no definitive answer.
180
 
Allan argues that the search for an independent theory of deference is both foolish and futile 
– that any such theory must be linked to the context in which a case arises.181  
 
Many commentators agree that there are degrees of justiciability.
182
 Once we 
acknowledge that cases are more or less amenable to judicial scrutiny and decision, the 
variability of standards of review becomes extremely important: „variability informs the 
entire enterprise of constructing a theory of judicial intervention and non-intervention‟.183  
Ideas about changing constitutional values provide a worthwhile basis from which to 
consider which types or categories of cases should attract a higher level of judicial scrutiny 
and intervention.  Although much will, of necessity, depend on the sensitivity and self-
restraint of judges,
184
 sustained consideration of the kinds of judicial interventions calculated 
to promote values like participation and accountability or justification
185
 may result in 
general guidelines useful to judges, lawyers, potential litigators and legal scholars. These 
general guidelines may be further finessed in the context of particular areas of the law (such 
as the enforcement of SE rights).   
 
Jeffrey Jowell‟s characterisation of limits on the judicial role 186 is a useful analytical 
tool through which to consider theories and arguments about the appropriate role of judges in 
protecting rights. The argument combines conceptual and normative reasoning.
187
 In Poole‟s 
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  H Arthurs „Rethinking administrative law: a slightly Dicey business‟ (1979) Osgoode Hall Law 
Review 1 at 33, as cited in Allan (note 178 above) at 116. 
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terms, the argument addresses itself to first and second order concerns. It builds on the notion 
of variability of the intensity of review so crucial to any discussion of judicial deference or 
restraint. Furthermore, rather than embarking on what Allan suggests is a futile attempt to 
carve out an independent theory of deference Jowell‟s classification is driven by an analysis 
of the cases and is context sensitive. Jowell argues that judges may exercise restraint for 
reasons related to their constitutional role as well as their institutional capacity.
188
 In other 
words, even where the constitutional paradigm clearly allows for judicial intervention in 
politically sensitive areas, there may be good reasons for judges to exercise caution.  
 
Limitations inherent in the constitutional role of courts stem from the notion of a 
separation of powers. In terms of this principle, the formulation of social or economic 
policy, such as whether the state should embark on a plan for nuclear disarmament, is a 
matter for the legislative body or its appointees. However, this does not mean that such 
decisions are insulated from judicial scrutiny.
189
 Courts are required to test these 
exercises of public power to determine whether they are „within the scope of the relevant 
power or duty, and arrived at by the standards of procedural fairness‟. Although courts 
will not easily enquire into the substance of these kinds of „high-policy‟ decisions, they 
may intervene if the decisions lack a rational basis or are not adequately justified.
190
 If the 
matter touches on rights protected in terms of the ECHR, the courts‟ constitutional role, 
in terms of the HRA is to test for the legitimacy of the interference with rights using a 
structured proportionality test. In these circumstances, deference to the executive or 
legislature is not constitutionally required but is prudent due to the courts‟ institutional 
incapacity.
191
 
 
 Where there are no formal, constitutional limits on courts‟ powers to intervene, there 
could well be institutional reasons for them to opt for restraint. These relate to the 
                                                                                                                                                       
interpreted in light of its purpose or rationale, reflecting settled principles and shared assumptions‟. 
Note 181 above at 563. 
188
  Note 176 above. 
189
  De Smith (note 122 above) at 15-17. 
190
  De Smith (note 122 above) at 17. 
191
  De Smith (note 122 above) at 17-18. 
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institutional strengths and weaknesses of the judiciary. Thus, judges are „ill-equipped‟ to 
pronounce on issues which are, in effect, purely matters of preference; issues on which they 
have little knowledge or expertise; and polycentric matters.
192
 Where a body other than the 
court is acknowledged to have specialist knowledge in a particular area, problems arising in 
that area are best resolved by those experts.
193
Even here, though, courts will intervene where 
the „decision is based on a material mistake of fact, or is otherwise illegal or irrational‟.194 
Importantly, for the purposes of this thesis, decisions involving the allocation of limited 
resources are polycentric in nature.
195
  
 
In attempting to address fundamental questions about the appropriate scope of 
judicial review in South Africa and the U.K. today, judges and scholars are considerably 
influenced by the notion of polycentric problems and, in particular, Lon Fuller‟s essay on the 
subject.
196
  This essay continues to hold sway in the public law traditions of common law 
jurisdictions because of the validity of its central concerns, however tenuous its conclusions. 
It is worth discussing Fuller‟s argument in some detail here. 
 
 Fuller argued that, as a form of social ordering, the defining hallmark of adjudication 
is in the particular kind of participation it provides to an affected party – „that of presenting 
proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favour‟.197 The limits of adjudication are 
reached in circumstances where this kind of participation cannot be meaningfully 
provided.
198
 Fuller drew on Michael Polanyi‟s work The Logic of Liberty199 to set out his 
conception of the polycentric problem.
200
 He used the analogy of a spider-web to describe 
such a problem as „many-centred‟. When one pulls on a strand in a web, the repercussions 
may be felt at any point on that web because each intersecting strand „is a distinct center for 
                                                 
192
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193
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195
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  Fuller (note 197 above) at 382, 393, and 398. 
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distributing tension‟.201 Similarly, a polycentric task or problem is one which has many 
strands – an adjudicator who chooses to tamper with any of these strands cannot predict the 
repercussions of his or her action. Thus, Fuller states by way of example: 
 Courts move too slowly to keep up with a rapidly changing economic scene. The more 
fundamental point is that the forms of adjudication cannot encompass and take into account 
the complex repercussions that may result from any change in prices or wages.
202
 
In dealing with such a matter, a court would not be able to guarantee affected parties 
meaningful participation, not only because the matter would, in all likelihood,
203
 involve a 
large number of people but also because the widespread repercussions make it impossible to 
say who would be affected.
204
 Fuller acknowledged polycentricity to be a matter of degree – 
the subject matter of any dispute is likely to contain polycentric features – but a significant 
level of polycentricity would make a matter unsuitable for adjudication.
205
 As a general rule, 
however, the allocation of economic resources is a significantly polycentric task and should 
not be undertaken by courts.
206
 
 
 As to how such matters should be resolved, Fuller favoured managerial direction or 
contract.
207
 He suggested that the complicated tasks of resource allocation, „ “costing 
production”, and pricing goods‟ may be solved by an economic market, which makes use of 
principles of reciprocity and contract.
208
 Whilst elections are not an appropriate vehicle 
through which to respond to polycentric tasks (for much the same reasons he argues courts 
are not), parliamentary procedures, again having contractual features, may provide a 
solution.
209
 Where courts do attempt to deal with polycentric problems, the adjudicative 
approach usually fails. The widespread and unforeseen consequences of the judicial decision 
make it ineffectual and „it is ignored, withdrawn or modified, sometimes repeatedly‟. 
Alternatively, the adjudicator might choose to abandon „judicial proprieties‟ by taking 
consideration of facts not properly proven or consulting parties who did not take part and 
were not represented in the hearing. Finally, the adjudicator could decide to „reformulate the 
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202
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problem to make it amenable to solution through adjudicative procedures‟. These 
consequences could also occur in combination with each other.
210
  
 
Fuller‟s thesis has been the subject of interrogation and critique for a large number of 
scholars.
211
 Perhaps most importantly, writers have questioned his faith in legislation, 
contract, mediation, and managerial or administrative direction as alternatives to adjudication 
in solving polycentric problems. Legislation is, by nature, quite general and relies on 
extensive judicial interpretation. Mediation assumes that the interests of all affected parties 
may be accommodated and contract is driven by the unequal bargaining power of the parties 
involved.
212
 Furthermore, polycentric problems confront managers, administrators, 
legislators and the executive with the same set of difficulties they pose for courts.
213
  
  
 In „The Forms and Limits of Adjudication‟ Fuller placed huge emphasis on the 
importance of a certain kind of participation but it is unclear whether that participation is an 
„optimum‟ or „essential‟ condition of adjudication. Thus, he argued that anything which 
enhances the impact of this participation „lifts adjudication toward its optimum 
expression‟.214 This implies that adjudication may be carried out in a more or less optimum 
way. But, despite this and other concessions to polycentricity as a matter of degree, Fuller 
offered no practical assistance to the adjudicator trying to decide whether and how to 
intervene.
215
 This fact, combined with Fuller‟s insistence that any matter touching on the 
allocation of resources falls outside the scope of adjudication, means that his argument tends 
to act as a non-justiciability doctrine rather than a basis from which to determine 
justiciability.  
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211
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  Fuller viewed the adjudicative role as extremely limited. This was, in part, a 
consequence of his concentration on the Anglo-American adversarial version of this role,
216
 a 
preoccupation he later regretted.
217
 He did not acknowledge the „expert investigative role‟ 
adjudicators can play, and demanded an unrealistic level of neutrality
218
 to ensure an 
impartiality that is at least as effectively protected by the judicial appointment and 
accountability procedures that are part of most modern democracies.
219
 Although Fuller 
recognised that „…a court is not an inert mirror reflecting current mores but an active 
participant in the enterprise of articulating the implications of shared purposes‟,220 his essay 
indicates that he viewed this as a reason to carve out a discrete and limited role for judges. In 
discussing Fuller‟s later emphasis on the collaborative and responsible interaction between 
„lawyer and subject‟,221 Allison suggests that this idea may be developed such that 
adjudication is defined by „responsible and purposive interaction between the adjudicator and 
the parties‟.222 This would allow for a more nuanced judicial role, in which responsibility and 
responsiveness are emphasised.
223
  
  
As with the critiques of judicial review discussed earlier, Fuller‟s arguments are a 
valuable reminder of the limitations of judicial review – this time in the context of 
polycentric matters. The continued engagement with his argument, in South Africa and the 
U.K., is evidence of the enduring and complex nature of his concerns. But the problems with 
his argument described above are a strong indication that it should act as a limit, not a bar, to 
justiciability. This approach is supported by the discussion of the institutional limits of 
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judicial review in De Smith.  Defining matters as polycentric does not completely insulate 
them from judicial scrutiny. The question of whether judges should intervene is entirely 
dependent on context and the legislative requirements. One should avoid general assumptions 
about the greater capacity of the legislature for considering a wide range of interests
224
 for, as 
noted above, the nature of the legislature as an institution has greatly altered over time.  
 
The argument regarding constitutional and institutional limitations on judicial 
review strikes similar chords as that recently made by Jeff King in the context of cases 
dealing with resource allocation. King distinguishes between „discretionary allocative 
decision-making‟ and „allocative impact‟. The latter category recognises that a court‟s 
judgment may necessitate a „financial or distributional adjustment‟. In a smaller number 
of cases, courts are requested to review discretionary governmental decisions, made in 
terms of statute, delegated or prerogative powers, about how scarce resources are 
allocated.
225
 It is this category of cases, involving the review of discretionary allocative 
decision-making that is subject to the non-justiciability doctrine. According to that 
doctrine, the case cannot be reviewed for Wednesbury
226
 unreasonableness or 
irrationality.
227
 According to King, „[a]llocative impact, on the other hand, remains a 
justiciable matter, but one which may continue to function as a policy ground influencing 
judicial discretion‟.228 Most importantly, King remarks that, with discretionary allocative 
decision-making, courts defer because they have been ordered by Parliament to do so. 
With allocative impact cases, courts choose to exercise restraint „for reasons of the 
decision-maker‟s competency‟.229 In Jowell‟s framework of constitutional and 
institutional limits on judicial review set out above then, allocative impact describes an 
institutional reason for judges to exercise restraint. With discretionary allocative 
decision-making, courts are constitutionally required to defer. King‟s analysis is useful 
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because it indicates that resource implications are not themselves a barrier to review for 
rationality. Such a blanket rule may be appropriate in respect of discretionary allocative 
decisions but, with allocative impact, the extent of the deference owed must depend on 
the competency of the particular decision-maker and the context.
230
 
 
(6) Conclusion 
Intricate debates about the nature and purpose of the judicial role occupy a central place in 
current public law scholarship in South Africa and the U.K. Commentators in these 
jurisdictions share a common concern with how fundamental rights may best be protected in 
the context of a constitutional democracy. But there are vast disagreements about which 
governmental institutions should have the power and, therefore, the responsibility for 
enforcing these rights.  
 
 The critiques discussed in this chapter indicate that the debate is highly polarised. 
Those, like Jeremy Waldron, who are against strong judicial review, adopt a very restrictive 
view of how courts function. Similarly, scholars who press for a more robust role for the 
judiciary find it difficult to acknowledge the limitations within which courts tend to operate. 
Waldron suggests that the limitations he describes are inherent in the judicial role but this 
does not adequately account for the creativity with which judges in different jurisdictions are 
approaching politically sensitive matters. Judicial approaches in South Africa and the U.K. 
indicate that many judges take seriously the constitutional and institutional limits of their 
role.
231
 Increasingly, judgements display sensitivity to legitimacy concerns and relative 
expertise.  
 
 
 Adjudication of rights has, for some time now, challenged the traditional notion that 
courts exist to protect individual liberties from state interference. Rights such as equality, 
dignity and access to justice have been interpreted by courts to demand positive action from 
the state. Furthermore, rights to equality and freedom of religion, for example, also present a 
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challenge to the notion that rights-bearers are always individuals as individuals. SE rights 
present a more obvious challenge to a conventional conception of rights adjudication. In the 
South African context, sections 26 (2) and 27 (2) demand that courts consider wider societal 
values in pronouncing on SE rights. The specificities of particular rights, cases and 
jurisdictions will always be relevant. 
 
 The classification of institutional and constitutional limitations on judicial review, 
discussed above, provides a means through which to consider how intensely courts should 
scrutinise executive and legislative action. It is neither possible nor desirable to put forward a 
general theory of judicial deference or restraint. It is possible, however, to use the 
classification to make sense of emerging judicial approaches to cases in which SE rights are 
directly or indirectly protected. Moreover, building on the classification and the cases, we 
may be able to go beyond a descriptively satisfactory account of judicial review in these 
cases to one that is also normatively justifiable. Most importantly, a model of SE rights 
adjudication must be responsive to concerns about democratic legitimacy. Drawing on 
Fredman‟s argument above, an effective way of assessing whether it does so is by asking 
whether it enhances the values of participation, accountability and equality. It is my thesis 
that a reasonableness-based approach has the potential to do this – an argument I explore in 
chapters 3 to 6. 
 
First, I examine the Indian experience of SE rights adjudication. The Indian case-
study is an argument for a more considered approach to SE rights adjudication, one that 
locates the court‟s role within the broader dialogue taking place between various interested 
parties and that attempts to determine the intensity of review on a more principled basis. 
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Chapter Two 
The Indian experience of social and economic rights adjudication 
 
(1) Introduction 
India has a long and rich jurisprudence on SE rights, despite the fact that the Indian 
Constitution protects interests in social and economic (SE) goods only as directive principles 
of state policy.
 1
 The Supreme Court has, for some time now, used the directive principles 
dealing with SE rights, to interpret civil and political (CP) rights – mainly the right to life, 
protected in Article 21.  In doing so, the court has measured state action and policy against 
the standard „fair, just and reasonable‟, the content of which is not fixed but varies according 
to the demands and context of the case. The court has made some far-reaching judgments 
protecting health, livelihood and education, for example, and has enjoyed a significant 
amount of public support.  At the same time, however, there have been concerns about the 
efficacy and consistency of the court‟s judgments in protecting the poor and vulnerable: 
The country still struggles with debilitating poverty and economic hardship. Over 50% of the 
population belongs to the lower castes – which, while not always, often seriously hinders the 
academic, political, and socio-economic opportunities of these individuals.
2
 
 The study of India raises concerns about a particular brand of judicial activism and is useful 
in coming to grips with concerns about the legitimacy and capacity of the judiciary. 
 
  This year marks the 60
th
 anniversary of the year the Indian Constitution came into 
operation.
3
 During a large part of this period, constitutional lawyers at home and abroad saw 
the Indian Supreme Court as a fiercely independent guardian of constitutional principles from 
governmental misuse. The court developed a reputation as both a protector of individual 
rights and an engine for SE reform. To some extent, this received wisdom continues to exert 
a strong influence on perceptions of Indian constitutional law today.
 4
 But recent scholarship 
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increasingly points to a more ambiguous relationship between the court and the other 
branches of government and a much more tenuous link between its jurisprudence and the 
advancement of India‟s poor. This scholarship acknowledges the achievements of the court 
in some of its watershed rulings on SE equality
5
 but seriously questions the extent to which 
the jurisprudence has had an impact in the transformation of Indian society. More than this, 
many of those writing in this field today trace the marginal impact of the jurisprudence not 
just to a lack of political will to implement judgments but to flaws in judicial reasoning and a 
judicial failure to fully appreciate the institutional limitations of the courts themselves.
6
 In the 
following section, I begin by briefly examining the historical background in which the Indian 
Constitution was drafted as well as some of its most important provisions. I move on to 
consider early constitutional jurisprudence before examining the public interest litigation 
(PIL) movement in some detail. My primary interest in all these areas lies in the evolution of 
the judicial role in India and the implications of this evolution for SE rights adjudication. 
 
  (2) Directive principles of state policy, land reform and the judiciary 
Drawing from the Irish Constitution, members of the Indian Constituent Assembly
7
 decided 
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to set out the SE duties on the state
8
 as directive principles of state policy in Part 4 of the 
Constitution, separate from the fundamental rights detailed in Part 3. Article 13 of Part 4 
imposes an obligation on the state to refrain from enacting laws which are inconsistent with 
fundamental rights. Any such laws will be void. The courts are given wide remedial powers 
for the enforcement of these rights.
9
 By contrast, Article 37 of the Constitution, dealing with 
the application of the directive principles states: 
  The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles 
therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall 
be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. 
Thus, the directive principles were not intended to be enforceable by courts.
10
 Instead, the 
drafters of the Constitution saw them as guiding principles for the central and state 
governments in the development of their policies. This is clear from Article 37 itself, as well 
as terms such as „the State shall regard‟, „the State shall endeavour to secure‟, „the State 
shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision 
for securing‟, and „the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing‟ used in the 
subsequent Articles of the chapter on directive principles.  
 
 For the drafters, whilst there was some disagreement about whether the directive 
principles should have been included in the Constitution at all and, if so, in which part of the 
text they belonged, there was no ambiguity about the centrality of the goals they 
enumerated.
11
 Chairperson of the Constitution drafting committee, B.R. Ambedkar, noted 
that the intention of the Constituent Assembly was that the principles be made the „basis of 
all executive and legislative action‟.12 In presenting the Fourth Constitutional Amendment 
Bill before Parliament in 1954, India‟s first Prime Minister and one of the most important 
figures in the drafting process, Jawaharlal Nehru observed: 
 We stress greatly and argue in Courts of Law about the Fundamental Rights. Rightly so, but 
there is such a thing also as the Directive Principles of Constitution…Those are, as the 
Constitution says, the fundamentals in the governance of the Country…if,…there is an 
                                                 
8
  Such as securing the right to an „adequate means of livelihood‟ for all citizens (Article 39(a)); securing 
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inherent contradiction in the Constitution between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive 
Principles of State Policy,…it is up to this Parliament to remove the contradiction and make 
the Fundamental Rights subserve the Directive Principles of the State Policy.
13
 
 
  The directive principles are more expansive than the SE rights provisions in the South 
African Constitution in that they set out a wide-ranging SE programme for the state.
14
 As was 
the case in the South African constitutional drafting process, the architects of the Indian 
Constitution were very aware of the vast inequalities that existed in wealth, education, health 
care, access to land and so on in Indian society. The urgent need for reform in these areas 
was recognised in the text of Chapter 4.
15
 The fact that they did not give rise to fundamental 
rights enforceable by courts signalled a concern with the relative institutional incapacity of 
judges to pronounce on these matters. It was not a sign of the relative lack of importance of 
the directive principles. This drafting choice was an indication that decisions about SE policy 
belonged in the legislative and executive domains. By contrast, and for reasons discussed 
earlier in this thesis, the South African drafters‟ recognition of the urgent need to realise a 
more equitable distribution of SE goods such as health care and land resulted in a set of 
carefully delineated SE fundamental rights. Compared to the Indian Constitution‟s directive 
principles, the South African Constitution‟s SE rights are a less detailed, more functional 
spelling out of the SE goods enforceable by courts - less a vision of the state‟s programme 
for socio-economic reform and more a guide to courts about to implement these rights 
through their judgments.  
 
  When the Indian Constitution was enacted, the political leaders who came to the fore 
were those who had fought in the struggle for India‟s independence whereas the judges were 
colonial appointees, drawn from the elite in Indian society.
16
 One of the concerns of the 
members of the Indian Constituent Assembly was that an unelected judicial body could 
thwart attempts at reform by using the fundamental rights sections to protect established 
economic interests – land interests, in particular.17 This was another reason for keeping the 
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programme for socio-economic reform set out in the directive principles outside the ambit of 
judicial review. In fact, the general view of politicians and judges at the time was that judicial 
review should be closely defined and very limited.
18
 So, if in 1949 „maximum care was taken 
to prevent the courts in India from being more than auditors of legality‟,19 what explains the 
expansion of judicial review the country has witnessed over the intervening decades?
20
  
 
 The legislators‟ fears over judicial antagonism toward land reform, in particular, proved 
to be well-founded. Relying on their rights to property and equality, landholders used the 
courts to resist governmental attempts at land reform. 
21
 This precipitated a lengthy battle 
between legislature and judiciary with the legislature passing a series of Constitutional 
Amendments designed to bolster its capacity to undertake speedy land redistribution and 
landholders challenging these amendments before the Supreme Court.
22
 This battle 
ultimately resulted in the Supreme Court‟s adoption of the basic features doctrine in the 
Kesavananda case.
 23
 In terms of this doctrine, Parliament does not have the power to amend 
the Constitution in a manner which abrogates or changes its basic features or identity.  The 
courts have only used the basic structure doctrine to overturn amendments in a handful of 
cases.
24
 In Kesavananda itself, the judges tested each of the previous amendments against the 
newly set out doctrine and found them to be valid.
25
  But the Kesavananda decision is a 
constitutional landmark. The case is an indication that the court‟s view of its role as quite 
narrowly circumscribed had changed dramatically.
26
   
                                                 
18
  Sathe (note 16 above) at 2-3, 6 and 20. See also N Robinson „Expanding judiciaries: India and the rise 
of the good governance court‟ 2009 8(1) Washington University Global Studies Law Review 1 at 4. 
19
  Sathe (note 16 above) at 3. 
20
  Sathe (note 16 above) at xxxvii (Introduction to the paperback edition). See also P Bhushan „The lack 
of judicial accountability in India‟, talk delivered at the Department of South Asian studies at Princeton 
University, 10 March 2009, text available at 
www.judicialreforms.org/files/the_lack_of_judicial_accountability_in_india.pdf, last accessed on 24 
April 2009 on the extensive powers of the judiciary. 
21
  Neuborne (note 4 above) at 487, Sathe (note 16 above) at 46-7 and Reddy (note 7 above) at 44.   
22
  Some of the most important cases on the judicial review of land reform at the time were: State of West 
Bengal v Mrs Bela Banerjee and others 1954 SCR 558 at 563-4; Karimbil Kunhikoman v State of 
Kerala 1961 AIR 723; and Golaknath and others v State of Punjab and another 1967 SCR (2) 762.  
23
  Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and Ors v State of Kerala and another AIR 1973 SC 1461.  
24
  Sathe (note 16 above) at 87-9. 
25
  See the judgment of Jaganmohan Reddy J in Kesavananda (note 23 above) at par. 1227.  
26
  Much has been written about the basic structure or basic features doctrine. I do not canvass that 
scholarship in any detail here as the doctrine is not one of the central concerns of this thesis. I refer to it 
in this chapter because of its relevance in defining the Indian Supreme Court‟s role generally and 
because it arose in response to state attempts at SE reform. The focus of the discussion is the role of 
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  Most importantly, what Kesavananda and subsequent cases have made clear is that it 
is for the court to determine whether an amendment is valid, testing it against a judicially 
constructed and evolving basic structure doctrine.
27
 As a result, the doctrine has always been 
controversial. The decision was, at the time, an exercise of extreme judicial activism. 
Furthermore, although the court has exercised restraint in its application of the doctrine,
28
 the 
context in which it was originally developed bolstered fears over the capacity of the judges to 
act as a conservative social force, insulating vested private property interests from a 
legislative programme of major SE reform. 
   
  Despite initial resistance,
29
 the basic structure doctrine gained both academic 
approval and acceptance from government over the years.
30
 This change in attitude may be 
attributed, at least in part, to the effects of the state of emergency in India which lasted from 
1975 to 1977. The emergency was precipitated by a legal challenge to Indira Gandhi‟s 
election to Parliament, based on allegations that she had practised election fraud.
31
 The 
challenge succeeded before the Allahabad High Court and her election was set aside.
32
 The 
Supreme Court granted Mrs Gandhi leave to appeal and stayed the execution of part of the 
High Court‟s order33 but, before the Supreme Court decided on the merits of the case, the 
executive declared a presidential emergency.
34
 Government then passed a series of 
constitutional amendments barring the judiciary from enquiring into the declaration of 
emergency itself, any laws enacted during the emergency that conflicted with fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                       
the courts in implementing SE rights. For a recent critical analysis of the doctrine, see S Krishnaswamy 
(2009) Democracy and constitutionalism in India: a study of the basic structure doctrine (OUP: New 
Delhi). 
27
  For a discussion of the evolution of the doctrine, see Reddy (note 7 above) at 61-4. See also 
Krishnaswamy (note 26 above). 
28
  See Sathe (note 16 above) at 87-94 but compare Krishnaswamy (note 26 above), Chapter 2. 
29
  For a description of governmental attempts to suppress the doctrine, see Sathe (note 16 above) at 77-
87. 
30
  See Krishnaswamy (note 26 above) at xx of the Introduction. Recent years have seen a resurgence of 
criticism of judicial activism in India generally – this is discussed later in this chapter. 
31
  Sathe (note 16 above) at 73-4. 
32
  Reddy (note 7 above) at 66. 
33
  Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain and another 1975 AIR 1590 at par. 31. 
34
  The emergency was declared just two days after Krishna Ayer J‟s decision in Indira Nehru Gandhi 
(note 33 above) – Neuborne (note 4 above) at 493. Many commentators view the executive‟s 
declaration of the emergency as an attempt to shield Mrs Gandhi from the judicial process – see 
Neuborne (note 4 above) at 492. 
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rights, the election of a Prime Minister and speaker of the lower house, and censorship 
laws.
35
 Raj Narain, the opposition leader who had challenged Mrs Gandhi‟s election in the 
first place, challenged the validity of the Thirty-Ninth Amendment as it had effectively put 
an end to his original case.
36
 
 
In Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain (known as the Election case),
37
 a majority of the 
judges, although they applied different reasoning, held that the Thirty-Ninth Amendment was 
void on the basis that it abrogated the basic structure of the Constitution.
38
 Whilst the 
decision has been criticised for a lack of conceptual clarity,
39
 its „cumulative effect‟ was „to 
reassert Kesavananda in the teeth of the emergency‟.40 Commentators saw the basic structure 
doctrine in a new light – as a judicial tool through which government excesses could be 
curbed.
41
 But the decision in the Election case was soon followed by Additional District 
Magistrate, Jabalpur v SS Shukla,
42
 a case commentators agree was one of the chief low 
points in the Supreme Court‟s history.43 In this case, the court held that the government's 
wide powers of detention were beyond judicial review because the emergency laws 
prevented access to the courts,
44
 despite the fact that there were widespread reports of various 
atrocities, including police torture.
45
  
 
The court‟s post-emergency „doctrinal effervescence‟46 in interpreting the directive 
principles, in particular may be attributed to two main factors. First, the political landscape 
                                                 
35
  Neuborne (note 4 above) at 493. The Thirty-Eighth, Thirty-Ninth and Fortieth Amendment Acts are 
available at http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/coifiles/amendment.htm, last accessed on 30 April 2009. 
36
  Neuborne (note 4 above) at 493; Sathe (note 16 above) at 96; and Reddy (note 7 above) at 56. 
37
  Note 33 above.  
38
  Sathe (note 16 above) at 76. For a more detailed analysis of the reasoning of the various judges, see 
Krishnaswamy (note 26 above) at 58-60. 
39
  Krishnaswamy (note 26 above) at 41; 59-60. 
40
  Neuborne (note 4 above) at 493. See also Sathe (note 16 above) at 73. 
41
  Sathe (note 16 above) at 76-7. 
42
  1976 SCR 172. 
43
  Neuborne (note 4 above) at 494; see also Krishnan (note 2 above) at 13; Reddy (note 7 above) at 68-9; 
Sathe (note 16 above) at 104.  
44
  At 176-7 of the judgment (note 42 above). But, see the dissenting opinion of Khanna J at 246-304. 
Khanna J held that Article 21 was not the „sole repository‟ of the right to life and liberty. This right 
was an essential feature of the rule of law, a higher value which pre-dated the enactment of the 
Constitution (see pages 266-70). His conclusions are summarised at 302-4. 
45
  See Sathe (note 16 above) at 104-5.  
46
  Sathe (note 16 above) at 104. 
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had changed significantly. As noted by former Justice of the Supreme Court, O. Chinnappa 
Reddy,  
 The year 1973 was indeed a watershed in the constitutional history of India. Until then, it 
looked as if Parliament was asserting and consolidating its power as a democratic institution 
committed to the goals of abolition of all semblance of feudalism, introduction of land 
reforms, and the pursuit of the Directive Principles of State Policy…[w]hile the earlier 
constitutional amendments, that is amendments up to 1973, were aimed at securing to 
Parliament the power to legislate without question in regard to the goals just mentioned, the 
amendments made subsequently appear…to be aimed at securing more and more power to 
the executive. The road signposts clearly changed from democracy to authoritarianism.
47
 
The repressive measures government took against the Indian population created a gap in 
legitimacy which the court attempted to fill by holding the government accountable for its 
constitutional promises of liberty and socio-economic reform. Sathe attributes the post-
emergency judicial activism to the court‟s realisation that its reputation as a site of social 
privilege would not protect it against future attacks by a „powerful political establishment‟48 
– in short, the court needed the people of India on its side. Second, writers in this field also 
tend to see the court‟s development of PIL as an attempt to atone for having so blatantly 
failed the people of India in the Jabalpur case.
49
 
 
 In 1977, Mrs Gandhi called for fresh elections, in which her Congress Party suffered an 
overwhelming defeat to the Janata party, a conglomeration of non-Congress national parties 
and some regional parties.
 50
 The emergency had ended but would continue to have an impact 
on Indian politics – most importantly, for the purposes of this thesis, the stage had been set 
for the judiciary to reinvent both itself and the manner in which social causes were litigated 
in the country. 
 
(3) Post-emergency developments: the birth of public interest litigation 
In the years following the end of the state of emergency in India, a small group of judges and 
                                                 
47
  Reddy (note 7 above) at 65-6. 
48
  Sathe (note 16 above) at 107. The Thirty-Eighth, Thirty-Ninth and Fortieth Amendments mentioned 
above were not the only governmental assaults on judicial powers and independence during the 
emergency period. See Sathe (note 16 above) at 85-7; and Reddy (note 7 above) at 67-8. See also 
Minerva Mills Ltd and others v Union of India and others 1981 SCR (1) 206. 
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  B Rajagopal 'Pro-human rights but anti-poor? A critical evaluation of the Indian Supreme Court from a 
social movement perspective' (2007) 18 Human Rights Review 157 at 159; Krishnan (note 2 above) at 
13-14; and S Dam „Veneet Narain v Union of India: “a court of law and not justice” – is the Indian 
Supreme Court beyond the Indian Constitution?‟ (2005) Public Law 239 at 239, note 1. 
50
  Sathe (note 16 above) at 105. 
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lawyers
51
 developed the model of public interest or social action litigation,
52
 which has 
become such a hallmark of the country‟s jurisprudence. The movement began as an attempt 
to make the courts more accessible to ordinary people by relaxing strict procedural rules. 
Thus, for example, the Supreme Court accepted a letter written to a judge, complaining of the 
violation of fundamental rights, as a legitimate means through which an individual could 
bring a matter before the court.
53
 This relaxation of procedural rules arose from the court‟s 
recognition that it would be close to impossible for people unaware of their rights or lacking 
material resources to engage a lawyer for the purpose of submitting a standard writ petition 
to the court.
54
 But PIL was not limited to new understandings of how cases could be brought 
to a court and who had a right to bring them. The movement also had an impact on the 
court‟s approach to constitutional interpretation. 
 
The Supreme Court has used those directive principles dealing with SE rights to give 
meaning and content to certain fundamental rights in the Constitution, most prominently the 
right to life and personal liberty protected in Article 21. For example, the court has found that 
Article 21 encompasses a right to adequate medical facilities or health care,
55
 and a right to 
livelihood.
56
 The court has also interpreted other fundamental rights in light of directive 
principles. It has held, for instance, that the right to equality before the law in Article 14 
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  M Galanter and J Krishnan „“Bread for the Poor”: access to justice and the rights of the needy in India‟ 
2004 (55) Hastings Law Journal 789 at 795.   
52
  Some scholars prefer the term 'social action litigation' to 'public interest litigation' in the Indian context 
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and the press as well as courts' – F Munger 'Inquiry and Activism in Law and Society' (2001) 35 Law 
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summary, see Neuborne (note 4 above) at 501-2; M Jain „The Supreme Court and fundamental rights‟ 
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  See Paschim Banga; Consumer Education and Research Centre; and Bandhua Mukti Morcha (note 5 
above). 
56
 See Olga Tellis (note 5 above) and Delhi Development Horticulture Employee’s Union (note 5 above). 
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includes a right to education.
57
 The court has a long history of activism on behalf of the poor 
and vulnerable and certain Supreme Court judgments have elicited praise, at least in 
academic and media circles,
58
 for their legal creativity
59
 and the clear demands they make of 
government. 
 I focus on two major developments in Indian jurisprudence in this section. Both relate 
to the interpretation of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which states:  „[n]o person shall 
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law‟. 
For some time, this Article was interpreted very restrictively as a guarantee only that any 
interference with the right was carried out through the mechanism of law. Provided there 
was some piece of legislation in place, the court would not enquire further into the 
soundness of that law and its effect on the individuals concerned.
60
  This changed with the 
case of Maneka Gandhi v Union of India and Another. 
61
 Justice Bhagwati, in whose opinion 
all the judges but one
62
 concurred, held that the procedure by which the Article 21 right is 
impinged on „cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable‟.63 In addition, the majority gave a 
generous meaning to the content of the right protected in Article 21: 
The expression ‟personal liberty‟ in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a 
variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have 
been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given additional protection under 
Article 19. Now, it has been held by this Court … that „personal liberty‟ within the meaning 
of Article 21 includes within its ambit the right to go abroad and consequently no person can 
be deprived of this right except according to procedure prescribed by law.
 64
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  See Mohini Jain (note 5 above). Later, the court clarified the position in Mohini Jain by holding that 
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  See AK Gopalan v State of Madras (Union of India: Intervener) 1950 SCR 88; and Jabalpur (note 42 
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judgment of Beg CJ (at 643-657). 
61
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62
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  Maneka Gandhi (note 60 above) at 671. 
64
   Maneka Gandhi (note 60 above) at 670-1. 
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Finally, Bhagwati J expressed approval for the English notion that the application of the audi 
alteram partem rule demands a level of ‘circumstantial flexibility’.65 Taking this line of 
reasoning further, Bhagwati J, for the majority, held that provided the government gave the 
petitioner a post-decision hearing, the executive decision to impound the passport and the 
procedure set out in the relevant legislation
66
 need not be struck down.
67
 He expressed a 
different view about the validity of government’s refusal to provide reasons for its decision to 
impound the passport. As government had decided to reveal these reasons during the legal 
proceedings, Bhagwati J’s comments are not part of the ratio, but they shed some light on the 
court’s thinking on reasonableness. First, the judge noted that ‘no reasonable person could 
possibly have taken the view that the interests of the general public would be prejudiced by 
the disclosure of the reasons’. Second, the reasons given had to be relevant. And, third, there 
had to be a ‘nexus between the reasons and the ground on which the passport has been 
impounded‟.68 Whilst the majority in Maneka Gandhi did not favour the petitioner‟s request 
that government‟s decision to impound her passport be quashed and the pronouncements on 
what reasonableness requires were quite limited, the case marked a turning point in that a 
majority of the judges acknowledged context and purpose, rather than a literal reading of the 
text, to be the driving forces of constitutional interpretation.
69
  
 In the later case of Francis Mullin,70 the Supreme Court relied on Maneka Gandhi for 
a generous interpretation of Article 21. In this case, the petitioner, a British national was 
arrested and detained on the charge of attempting to smuggle hashish out of the country. 
While the criminal proceedings were pending, she had great difficulty in getting access to 
her legal counsel and members of her family.
71
 The court held that the right to life included 
the protection of „[e] very limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed‟ and by necessary 
extension „the faculties of thinking and feeling‟.72 Most importantly, this meant protection of 
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67
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human dignity and all that is attached to that: „namely, the bare necessaries of life such as 
adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing 
oneself in diverse forms‟.73  The court acknowledged that economic considerations would 
play a role in determining the full content of the right but that, in any event, the right must 
include the „the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare 
minimum expression of the human self‟.74 This reference to minimum standards, below 
which the government cannot go, was a useful addition to the jurisprudence and has been 
taken up in later cases.  
 
The court went on to emphasise, following Maneka Gandhi, that the right to life and 
all that it entailed could only be limited by a reasonable, fair and just procedure. 75 But the 
judges, per Bhagwati J, also held that the prison regulations setting out the rules regarding 
detainees‟ access to family and legal counsel had themselves to meet the standard of „fair, 
just and reasonable‟.76 Thus, it was not merely the procedure by which the regulations were 
drafted, but also their substance, that came under judicial scrutiny. On the issues in this case, 
the court held, first, that a detainee is entitled to two family visits a week, reasoning that, as 
under-trial prisoners are entitled to two such visits a week and convicted prisoners are 
entitled to weekly visits, there was no reason why visits to detainees should be limited to one 
a month. A detainee stood on a „higher pedestal‟ than either an under-trial prisoner or 
someone who has already been convicted. Furthermore, the court had previously held that 
restrictions placed on a detainee must, as a general rule, be minimal.
77
 In effect, the court 
found the rule regarding family visits to be arbitrary or irrational 
78
 and went on to consider 
the right to interviews with one‟s legal advisor. Noting that the legal advisor was likely to be 
someone with a busy practice, the court referred to the onerous nature of the existing rule - 
that the legal advisor must have made an appointment to see the detainee, after having 
obtained the permission of the District Magistrate in Delhi. Bhagwati J held that the advisor 
should be able to see the detainee at any time during the day, after making an appointment 
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78  Francis Mullin (note 70 above) at 530. 
 76 
with the Superintendent of the prison in question.79 This consideration of how onerous the 
rule put in place by the legislation was goes to the question of proportionality, a far 
weightier standard than that of rationality. As the government had provided no explanation 
of the need for the rule,
80
 there were no competing considerations against which to balance 
the burden on the detainees. The court‟s new approach to constitutional interpretation was 
based on a wide and purposive understanding of the text and a concomitant willingness to 
subject governmental action and inaction to more robust judicial scrutiny. Maneka Gandhi 
and Francis Mullin were concerned with the protection of traditional negative liberties, 
requiring that the state refrain from interference with rights rather than take positive action 
to protect them. But given the interpretation of Article 21 favoured in these cases, with the 
judges‟ emphasis on human dignity and the „bare necessaries of life‟, it was not long until 
the directive principles on state policy began to make their way into the jurisprudence.  
 
In Olga Tellis,81 the petitioners were pavement and slum dwellers in the then city of 
Bombay. The state had demolished their shelters and, in certain cases, transported them out 
of the city but they had returned and rebuilt their homes.
82
 They needed to be close to their 
places of work and had no option but to reside on the pavements and in the slums of 
Bombay.
83
 The pavement and slum dwellers made up nearly half of the city‟s population at 
the time.
84
 Both groups of petitioners lived in deplorable conditions – a fact cited by the 
government as a reason for their removal.
85
 They claimed that their right to life, as well as 
their right to settle and reside in any part of the country, protected in Articles 21 and 19 (1) 
(e), respectively, would be violated by their eviction unless government offered them 
alternative accommodation.
86
 In its unanimous judgment, per Chandrachud CJ, the court 
reasoned that the right to livelihood was an „important facet‟ of the right to life protected in 
Article 21. Depriving a person of his or her livelihood would have the effect of making life 
                                                 
79  Francis Mullin (note 70 above) at 531.  
80
  Francis Mullin (note 70 above) at 532. 
81  Note 5 above.  
82
  Olga Tellis (note 5 above) at 63-4. 
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impossible to live and was, thus, a violation of the right to life.
87
  Chief Justice Chandrachud 
held that the rights to an adequate means of livelihood and to work, protected as directive 
principles of state policy in Articles 39 (a) and 41, respectively, were, „equally fundamental 
in the understanding and interpretation of the meaning and content of fundamental rights‟.88 
The obligation on the state to provide its citizens with an adequate means of livelihood and a 
right to work, articulated in the directive principles, meant that the right to life could not but 
be interpreted to include a right to livelihood.
89
 However, this did not mean that a citizen 
could force the state to take positive action to provide him or her with an adequate means of 
livelihood or work. Rather, the obligation on the state was not to deprive someone of the 
right to a livelihood or work without following a fair, just and reasonable procedure 
established by law.
90
  
 
Importantly, the court indicated in this case that unreasonableness would invalidate 
not just the procedure through which a law is implemented but the substance of the law 
itself.91 As to what unreasonableness means, the court stated that all exercises of executive 
power „must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness‟.92 However, this 
was only the „bare minimal requirement‟ of the rule of law.  What reasonableness required 
varied according to the circumstances of the case.93 In deciding on whether government 
action in this case was reasonable, the court noted that the pavement dwellings were, without 
doubt, a nuisance to the public and a threat to their safety because it forced them to use busy 
roads as thoroughfares.
94
 The court interpreted the relevant legislation as allowing, but not 
compelling, government to evict people living in „encroachments‟ without giving them any 
notice.
95
 This preserved the validity of the section. The court also indicated that any 
departure from the rules of natural justice which would, in the ordinary course, require that 
                                                 
87
  Olga Tellis (note 5 above) at 79-80. 
88
  Olga Tellis (note 5 above) at 80. 
89
  Olga Tellis (note 5 above) at 80. 
90
  Olga Tellis (note 5 above) at 80-1; and 85. 
91
  Olga Tellis (note 5 above) at 85-6. 
92
  Olga Tellis (note 5 above) at 86. 
93
  Olga Tellis (note 5 above) at 86-7. 
94
  Olga Tellis (note 5 above) at 87-8. 
95
  Olga Tellis (note 5 above) at 88-9. Section 314 (a) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act provided 
that „the Commissioner may, without notice, take steps for the removal of encroachments in or upon ay 
street, channel, drain, etc‟ – see page 88 of the judgment. 
 78 
the affected parties be given a hearing before the adverse action is taken, is only acceptable 
in exceptional cases.
96
 The petitioners in this case should have been given a hearing but this 
opportunity had, in any event, been provided to them in the course of the hearings before the 
Supreme Court. In light of the impact of the dwellings on pedestrians, the court held that the 
governmental decision to remove the dwellers and their dwellings was, in fact, reasonable.
97
 
Chief Justice Chandrachud directed that none of the dwellers be removed until a month after 
the monsoon season.
98
 The court held that government‟s undertaking to provide alternative 
pitches for those pavement dwellers that had been given census cards in the 1976 census 
should be met, but did not make this a condition of the evictions.
99
 Slum dwellers that had 
been given identity cards in the census had to be offered alternative accommodation before 
they could be removed.
100
 Those slums which had existed for more than twenty years and in 
which improvements had been made could not be demolished unless the land was required 
for a public purpose. And, where the land was required for such a purpose, the state had to 
move the affected individuals on to an alternative site before it could proceed with any 
demolition.
101
 
 
Although Olga Tellis has come to be regarded by some as ground-breaking judicial 
confirmation that the right to life includes a right to shelter,
102
 the discussion above indicates 
that the court‟s findings were much more limited than that implies. The court held, on an 
abstract level, that the right to life included the right to a livelihood. The judges were also 
able to draw a link between livelihood and the place where a person resides,
103
 noting that the 
petitioners were drawn back to the pavements and slums near Bombay out of sheer economic 
necessity.
104
  But the court was quite clear that there was no positive obligation on the state to 
provide people with shelter or an adequate means of livelihood.
105
 In respect of the pavement 
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103
  Ramanathan (note 6 above) at 2908. 
104
  Olga Tellis (note 5 above) at 69 and 75. 
105
  See Sathe (note 16 above) at 118. 
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dwellers, their eviction was not even made conditional on the provision of alternative 
accommodation.  
 
Some commentators view the level of restraint displayed by the judges in Olga Tellis 
as a necessary acknowledgement of judicial limitations.
106
 Scott and Macklem argue that 
Chandrachud CJ actually went quite far in that he „fashioned a remedy replete with positive 
duties on the Government‟.107 In their view, those aspects of the court order dealing with 
provision of alternative sites for the pavement dwellers and the need for existing government 
shelter and slum improvement programmes to be pursued in earnest were intended to get 
government to address the broad, systemic problems with provision of housing or, at least, to 
„engender political dialogue‟ about the issues involved.108 This argument recognises that 
there is a value attached to judicial intervention aimed at encouraging government to 
implement its own programmes. But it is important to recognise that the judges did not 
devise positive obligations stemming from the right to livelihood to be fulfilled by the state. 
Furthermore, even the procedural safeguards available to those in the position of the 
petitioners were tenuous. For one thing, the court upheld the procedure for the removal of 
encroachments in the legislation, recognising that the state could demolish dwellings without 
notice to affected parties in urgent cases.
109
 It is difficult to conceive of a situation so urgent 
that an „encroachment‟ in which a person or family was living would need to be demolished 
without notice. The leeway left to the state here is worrying. The court held that an 
opportunity to be heard should have been provided to the affected parties here but the finding 
that this requirement had been made good by the representations made during the case itself 
meant that there was little deliberation on the purpose behind the provision of an opportunity 
to be heard. The court‟s comments on this issue indicate that there would be a burden on the 
pavement dwellers to show that their dwellings were not actually encroachments on a 
footpath or that they needed more time to prepare for their removal.
110
 The focus then, was 
                                                 
106
  See N Jheelan „The enforceability of socio-economic rights‟ (2007) 2 European Human Rights Law 
Review 146 at 153. 
107
  C Scott and P Macklem „Constitutional ropes of sand or justiciable guarantees? Social rights in a new 
South African Constitution‟ (1992) 141(1) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1 at 121. 
108
  Ibid. 
109
  Olga Tellis (note 5 above) at 89. 
110
  Olga Tellis (note 5 above) at 90. 
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not on engagement between the parties to find a solution to the housing problems.
111
 
Rehabilitation and resettlement of the pavement dwellers took a definite backseat to the need 
to keep pavements clear for pedestrian use.
112
  
 
 The legacy of the Olga Tellis decision is, thus, contested. This is discussed further 
below. But, what is clear is that, in the three cases discussed above, the court had moved 
constitutional interpretation up a gear, applying a significant amount of judicial creativity to 
the cases before them. Furthermore, policy considerations were no longer a bar to 
justiciability in cases dealing with fundamental rights and directive principles. In 
Sachidananda Pandey and Another v State of West Bengal and others,
113
 the court stated:  
When the Court is called upon to give effect to the Directive Principle and the fundamental 
duty, the Court is not to shrug its shoulders and say that priorities are a matter of policy and 
so it is a matter for the policy-making authority. The least that a court may do is to examine 
whether appropriate considerations are borne in mind and irrelevances excluded. In 
appropriate cases, the court may go further, but how much further must depend on the 
circumstances of the case.
114
 
The court did go further – to a consideration of proportionality – in later cases. In Delhi 
Development Horticulture Employees’ Union,115 for example, the court upheld the 
government’s policy because to frustrate its scheme would do more harm than good.116 This 
kind of balancing of interests is part of a proportionality enquiry.
117
 In Saudan Singh and 
others v New Delhi Municipal Committee and others,
118
 the Supreme Court upheld the 
                                                 
111
  In this sense, the case is quite different from the decisions of the South African CC in Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and others 
2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) and Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 
1169 (CC) – these cases are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
112
  Reddy (note 7 above) at 132. See also Rajagopal (note 49 above) at 161-2. 
113
  1987 SCR (2) 223. 
114
  Pandey (note 113 above) at 242. 
115  Note 5 above. 
116
 The petitioners were workers employed on a daily basis who wanted to be absorbed into the regular 
workforce. They were employed under certain government work schemes, designed to provide an 
income to those who lived below the poverty line (Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union, 
note 5 above, at 570-2). If the resources were shifted to provide more regular employment, fewer 
people could benefit from the scheme. See note 5 above at 578-9. 
117
  Discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
118  1992 SCR (2) 243. The case dealt with state removal of people trading on the street who had not been 
granted a stall or a kiosk. The government granted stalls or kiosks on the basis of priority to those who 
had been there the longest and required proof of this in the form of original receipts or other documents 
issued by the police (at 255). The Court upheld the government action but ordered that the government 
review cases if claimants were able to provide proof in the form of original documents after further 
notification of the process through public advertisement (at 258). 
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government policy because it was not ‘unduly harsh’.119 Again, the court’s consideration of 
how restrictive the policy or law is, brings elements of proportionality into the analysis.  
 A final aspect of constitutional interpretation worth mentioning here is the court‟s use 
of the notion of a minimum standard for the protection of the right to life.  This idea was 
most clearly expressed in the Francis Mullin case discussed above and in the later case of 
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India and others.120 In the latter case, the court, using 
Articles 39 (e) and (f), 41 and 42 of the directive principles to give content and meaning to 
the right to life, held that Article 21 included certain minimum requirements to enable a 
person to live with human dignity.121 No state was permitted to take measures that would 
deprive a person of that minimum essential level of the right. Thus, the court upheld the 
notion of a minimum standard but limited the duty it imposed to a negative one.122 As with 
Olga Tellis, the case may be viewed as a disappointment, in certain respects.  In Olga Tellis 
the ideal of a right to shelter in the court‟s interpretation of Article 21 was whittled down to 
a guarantee of an opportunity for affected parties to be heard before they were evicted from 
their homes in the remedy handed down by the court. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha, the desire 
for more robust judicial protection of the values underlying the directive principles was 
fulfilled in the most limited sense – the state was prohibited from acting in a way which 
would remove the right to live with dignity. But in this case the court, per Bhagwati J, also 
held: 
Since the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39, 
Article 41 and 42 are not enforceable in a court of law, it may not be possible to compel the 
State through the judicial process to make provision by statutory enactment or executive fiat 
for ensuring these basic essentials which go to make up a life of human dignity but where 
legislation is already enacted by the State providing these basic requirements to the workmen 
and thus investing their right to live with basic human dignity, with concrete reality and 
content, the State can certainly be obligated to ensure observance of such legislation for 
inaction on the part of the State in securing implementation of such legislation would amount 
to denial of the right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21…123 
                                                 
119
  Saudan Singh (note 118 above) at 256. 
120
 Note 5 above. The case dealt with the problem of bonded labour and government‟s duties in this area.  
121  These were „protection of the health and strength of workers, men and women, and of the tender age of 
children against abuse, opportunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy manner and in 
conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and 
maternity relief‟ – Bandhua Mukti Morcha (note 5 above) at 103. 
122  Ibid. On minimum essential levels, see also Paschim Banga (note 5 above) at 47 – 8. 
123
  Bandhua Mukti Morcha (note 5 above) at 103. 
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A large part of the order in the case, thus, focused on compelling government to implement 
its own legislative scheme by, for example, setting up vigilance committees in each state to 
investigate whether bonded labour existed. The court also drew on a letter in which the 
Secretary to the Minister of Labour, Government of India had set out a scheme for the 
rehabilitation of bonded labourers in framing its order.
124
  
 
 The cases discussed above show that the Indian Supreme Court‟s post-emergency 
activism produced a mixed bag of results. The court‟s inclusive approach to the scope of the 
right to life did not often translate into positive obligations on the state or even a willingness 
to impose more onerous procedural requirements on government than that which already 
existed in the legislation.
125
 As indicated by Neuborne,
 126
 the real „ground-breaking event‟ of 
the movement was the court‟s break with traditional adversarial modes of litigation – the 
relaxation of the rules of standing, flexible pleading rules, new methods of fact-finding
127
 and 
expanded remedial powers.
128
 On the substance of the rights, the court was certainly working 
with a transformed vision of constitutional interpretation and demonstrated a significant 
capacity for judicial creativity. Thus, the development of a variable standard of 
reasonableness and the reference to minimum standards are useful ideas which have 
influenced later cases as well as international jurisprudence. But the cases cannot simply be 
read as the beginning of a movement aimed at the judicial implementation of SE rights 
through the directive principles. This is clear from the cases themselves but also from the 
subsequent development of the jurisprudence. 
 
 (4) A retreat from judicial activism? 
As noted in the Introduction to this thesis, the image of the Indian Supreme Court as tireless 
protector of the marginalised, and the perception that it enjoys widespread public support and 
                                                 
124
  Bandhua Mukti Morcha (note 5 above) at 146, par.4.  
125
  See Neuborne (note 4 above) at 501.  
126
  Neuborne (note 4 above) at 501-3. 
127
  In Bandhua Mukti Morcha (note 5 above), the court appointed a socio-legal commission to investigate, 
and report on, conditions in the quarries. The court treated the commission‟s report as a prima facie 
statement of the facts. The court explained its use of such commissions at some length in the judgment 
(at 111-13 and 142). See also Common Cause v Union of India and others 1996 (1) SCR 89 at par. 10. 
128
  See, for example, Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action and others v Union of India and others 1996 
(2) SCR 503 at par. 70. The court ordered the government to file quarterly progress reports on its 
implementation of the court‟s directions.  
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respect are contested.
129
 Examined more closely, the record of the Indian Supreme Court in 
protecting SE rights is not one of consistent judicial activism in securing these rights. 
Furthermore, for a number of reasons, the impact even of apparently 'pro-poor' Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on the lives of ordinary people is inconsistent and often minimal.
130
 
 In Calcutta Electricity Supply Corporation (CESC) Ltd. Etc. v Subash Chandra Bose 
and Ors,
131
 the issue was whether people working for the respondent, which CESC had 
contracted to carry out work related to public roads, fell within the definition of 'employee' 
in the State Insurance Act, 1978. If they did, the respondent would have to pay contributions 
to the Employment Insurance Fund and the workers would be entitled to the relevant health 
and welfare benefits. The Act defined an employee as someone who is, inter alia: 
employed by or through an immediate employer on the premises of the factory or 
 establishment or under the supervision of the principal employer or his agent on work 
 which is ordinarily part of the work of the factory or establishment or which is preliminary to 
the work carried on in or incidental to the purpose of the factory or establishment.132
A majority of the judges held that the workers did not fall within this definition 
because CESC's final acceptance or rejection of the work did not amount to 'supervision' as 
required in the legislation.133 In his dissenting judgment, Ramaswamy J adopted an approach 
to constitutional interpretation much more consistent with that which emanated from the 
court's post-emergency jurisprudence, described above. He referred to international sources 
on health and workers' rights,134 Article 39 (c) of the Indian Constitution135 and the purpose 
of the Act - to extend health benefits and 'relieve employees from occupational hazards 
consistent with the constitutional and human rights scheme'.136 He held that the degree of 
supervision necessary depended on the nature of the work and that the term was broad 
                                                 
129
 See, for example Rajagopal (note 49 above) 157; and Krishnan (note 2 above). 
130
 Rajagopal (note 49 above) at 158. Neuborne (note 4 above) at 503 argues that the PIL movement has 
had concrete results in helping 'many thousands of poor persons to invoke the rule of law to better their 
lives'. Rajagopal does not disagree with this but argues that the court's record on SE rights is 'patchy 
and getting worse' (at 160). 
131
 1991 SCR Supl (2) 267. 
132
 Section 2(9) (ii) – See CESC (note 131 above) at 279. 
133
 CESC (note 131 above) at 289. 
134
 Art 25(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and Article 7(b) of the International 
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
135
 Providing that state policy should be directed at securing the health and strength of workers. See CESC 
(note 131 above) at 293. 
136
 CESC (note 131 above) at 301. 
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enough to include legal control of the work, as existed in this case.137 
In Almira H. Patel and Anr. v Union of India and Ors,
138
 a case dealing with solid 
waste management in Delhi, the court prioritised the cleaning-up of the city over the welfare 
of slum dwellers. In an earlier order, the court had appointed a committee to look into various 
aspects of solid waste management in a number of states. Following on from the 
Committee‟s recommendations, which had elicited a positive responsive from the four states 
concerned, the court took up the issue of cleaning up a number of cities, Delhi among them. 
In this case, the court handed down a series of orders aimed at enforcing statutory obligations 
regarding the cleaning up of the city, which suffers from notoriously high levels of pollution. 
One of the issues in the case was the management of domestic solid waste.  In his judgment 
for the court, Kirpal J saw the existence of slums as an obstacle to the cleaning up of the city, 
indicating that management of waste was made more complicated when people lived in 
settlements with no proper means of disposing of domestic waste and effluents.
139
 The court 
directed that steps be taken to improve the sanitation in the slums, as a temporary measure 
but made it clear that the goal was to get rid of them altogether as soon as possible.
140
 In 
Olga Tellis, the court also ultimately upheld the government‟s decision to remove pavement 
and slum dwellers from their homes. But the judges in that case were alive to the question of 
how this would impact on the lives of the individuals concerned. Thus, the order, whatever 
its limitations, contained references to the need to provide people with alternative 
accommodation that did not take them too far away from their places of work. In Almira 
Patel, Kirpal J ordered the government to 'take appropriate steps' to stop new illegal 
occupation of public land
141
 and stated that '[r] ewarding an encroacher on public land with a 
free alternate site is like giving a reward to a pickpocket'.
142
 The court's complete failure to 
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 CESC (note 131 above) at 298 and 301. 
138
 Unreported judgment, decided on 15/02/2000, available at 
 http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/chejudis.asp, last accessed on 12 May 2009. 
139
  Almira Patel (note 138 above) at 4. 
140
  See par. 6 of the court‟s order in Almira Patel (note 138 above) at 7. 
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  Almira Patel (note 138 above) at 7. 
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  Almira Patel (note 138 above) at 4. This may be contrasted with the South African CC's approach in 
both Grootboom (note 111 above) at par. 2 and President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005(5) SA 3 (CC) at pars. 33 and 50. In these cases, the judges expressed concern 
about the illegal occupation of land, indicated that self-help was not to be viewed as an acceptable 
solution to the country's housing problems and did not want to appear to be rewarding illegal occupiers 
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consider what was to become of the slum-dwellers is what sets this case apart from Olga 
Tellis and is a worrying precedent.
143
  
 
BALCO Employees' Union v Union of India
144
 is another case that has attracted 
criticism. The court was asked to review the central government's decision to disinvest from 
a public company involved in manufacturing aluminium. BALCO argued that government 
giving up its control over the company in this way would violate the constitutional provisions 
protecting workers' rights.
145
  Not only did the court reject this argument, stating that it could 
not pronounce on a decision which raised complex economic factors, but it also held that 
there was no requirement of  
public notice and hearing to persons who are generally affected as a class by an economic 
policy decision of the government... the disinvestment policy cannot be faulted if as a result 
thereof the employees lose their right or protection under Articles 14 or 16.
146
 
Thus, the court was not even willing to provide the kind of procedural protection to the 
workers it had been prepared to uphold in some pre-1978 cases. 
 
 Finally, the court's long and complex history with the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project has 
come under fire, signalling for many a low point in the court's record. In its 2000 decision 
Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of India,
147
 the court approved what has been referred to 
as 'the largest Court-sanctioned forced eviction in the world'
148
 in the face of evidence that 
the government had not attained environmental clearance for the project or done much to 
secure the rehabilitation of the displaced peoples, both of which were legally required.
149
 The 
Ministry of Environment and Forests had given conditional clearance for the dam project in 
1987. Construction work began in the absence of a comprehensive environmental impact 
assessment and the petitioners argued that this assessment had not been carried out in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
at the expense of those waiting to be allocated low-cost housing by the state. However, they balanced 
this against the terrible circumstances in which the individuals concerned were living and the length of 
time for which they had been waiting for lawful housing. They also considered the options available to 
the state to deal with the particular problems. 
143
  For a critique of the case, see Ramanathan (note 6 above) at 2908-10. 
144
 (2002) 2 SCC 333. 
145
 Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 
146
 Muralidhar (note 6 above) at 28. 
147
 (2000) 10 SCC 664, available at http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx, last accessed on 26 
August 2010. 
148
 Rajagopal (note 49 above) at 162. 
149
 Muralidhar (note 6 above) at 27-8; and Rajagopal (note 49 above) at 162. 
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intervening years.
150
 In response to the concerns raised by Narmada Bachao Andolan, the 
non-governmental organisation which raised objections to the dam construction at the time 
and filed the case with the Supreme Court, government set up a group to look into the 
environmental issues and the questions around rehabilitation of displaced persons.
151
 The 
group did not come up with a definitive finding, noting instead that the height of the dam 
could make the social costs of displacement and rehabilitation too burdensome to manage 
effectively. They recommended that government‟s plan for a phased construction go ahead 
on the basis that consistent monitoring of the situation occurred and that construction would 
be halted if became clear that the height of the dam would, in fact, result in problems too 
difficult to solve.
152
  
 
The court indicated early in the judgment that it did not look upon the case 
favourably. Justice Kirpal criticised Narmada Bachao Andolan for bringing the case to court 
seven years after the construction of the dam had begun.
153
 According to him, this delay 
meant that the only proper question for the court was whether the government‟s 
rehabilitation and relief measures were being properly implemented, consistently with the 
affected parties‟ Article 21 rights.  In other words, the court would not address the concerns 
about the construction of the dam itself.
154
 In making this decision, the court failed to 
recognise that the question of effective rehabilitation was inseparable from the question of 
whether the construction should go ahead as originally planned. The petitioners were arguing 
that the building of the dam at the planned height would result in a displacement problem 
impossible for government to manage. Furthermore, the court did not acknowledge that the 
reason for the delay was that the organisation was engaging in an ongoing process with 
government to try to get a comprehensive assessment of the project.  
 
 In spite of this effective throwing out of a large part of the petitioner‟s case, the court 
went on to discuss their contentions on the environment and the impact on displaced peoples. 
                                                 
150
  Narmada Bachao Andolan (note 147 above) at 9-10 of the electronic version. 
151
  Narmada Bachao Andolan (note 147 above) at 11 of the electronic version. 
152
  Narmada Bachao Andolan (note 147 above) at 12-13 of the electronic version. The petitioners argued 
that this recommendation had not been taken seriously by government – at page 39 of the judgment. 
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  Narmada Bachao Andolan (note 147 above) at 14 of the electronic version. 
154
  Narmada Bachao Andolan (note 147 above) at 14-15 of the electronic version. 
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One of the main arguments presented by the petitioners was that there had never been an 
independent assessment of the impact of the project.
155
 The court‟s response to this was there 
was no need for independent experts to evaluate the studies which had been carried out. 
There was no reason to question the accuracy of the studies or to believe that government 
would not be able to manage any problems that arose.
156
 Adopting a position of extreme 
judicial deference, the court noted: 
 It is now well-settled that the courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress 
into the field of policy decision. Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is 
the type of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part of policy making 
process and the Courts are ill equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so undertaken. The 
Court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and 
peoples fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent permissible under 
the Constitution. Even then any challenge to such a policy decision must be before the 
execution of the project is undertaken. Any delay in the execution of the project means over 
run in costs and the decision to undertake a project, if challenged after its execution has 
commenced, should be thrown out at the very threshold… if the petitioner had the knowledge 
of such a decision and could have approached the Court at that time.
157
 
 
On the Article 21 argument, the court took at face value government‟s assertions that 
the project would ultimately benefit the people displaced by the construction of the dam and 
found that their right to life was not under threat.
158
 Justice Kirpal chose not to engage with 
the petitioner‟s submissions that the rehabilitation programme was fundamentally flawed and 
that the alleged benefits were in doubt.
159
 Counsel for Narmada Bachao Andolan did not 
even raise the social, economic and cultural rights protected in the directive principles of the 
Constitution and in the ICESCR, which India has ratified.
160
 As to the intensity of review, 
Kirpal J held that the court would not „sit in appeal‟ over a decision taken after „due 
consideration and full application of mind‟.161  
 
 These cases do not represent a complete about-face and retreat from activism in 
protecting SE rights on the part of the Indian Supreme Court. Recent jurisprudence on the 
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  Narmada Bachao Andolan (note 147 above) at 22 of the electronic version. 
156
  Narmada Bachao Andolan (note 147 above) at 34 of the electronic version. See also page 70 of the 
judgment. 
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 Narmada Bachao Andolan (note 147 above) at 71-2 of the electronic version. 
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right to food
162
 is held up as an example of the effective use of the courts to widen access to 
SE goods. The case indicates that the court is still willing to come to the assistance of the 
poor and the vulnerable and to place demands on government. However, the background to 
the case raises the concern that the court may only now be persuaded to do so in the most 
limited circumstances. The People‟s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) began the public 
interest litigation on the right to food by filing a writ petition in the Supreme Court in April 
2001.
163
 At the time, India‟s grain stocks were overflowing and in danger of being dumped 
into the sea or eaten by rats.
164
 Yet India‟s rural population was experiencing a famine – 
malnutrition was common and people were dying of starvation. 
165
 A Famine Code and 
various schemes for distribution of food were already in place but were not being 
implemented by government.
166
 PUCL asked for immediate release of the surplus food 
stocks – essentially, they wanted government to take steps to ensure the effective 
implementation of the schemes.
167
 The legal basis for the claim was Article 21. The food 
distribution schemes were meant to ensure that people who could not afford to eat had access 
to food. Without such access they were in danger of malnutrition and death. The failure to 
implement the schemes violated their right to life. The scope of the case has widened over 
time and now addresses many issues connected with the right to food.
168
 The court has yet to 
hand down a final judgment.
169
 But, to date, it has handed down a series of interim orders
170
 
aimed at bringing immediate relief to the affected individuals. The most important of these 
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 Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (2001) 5 SCALE 303; 7 SCALE 484. See 
Muralidhar (note 6 above) 29-30. The Supreme Court‟s orders have been compiled in N Saxena et al 
(eds.) Right to food 3ed (Socio-Legal Information Centre: New Delhi). The court has also recently held 
that the right to life in Article 21 includes a right to water in MK Balakrishnan and others v Union of 
India and others, Writ Petition No. 230 of 2001. Judgment was handed down on 28 April 2009 and is 
available at http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx, last accessed on 6 April 2010. In this 
judgment, the court gave the government of India two months in which to form a Committee to address 
the problem of water shortage in the country. The court made specific orders about the membership of 
the Committee and set out a list of issues for the Committee to consider. 
163
  M Higgins et al (eds.) (2007) Food security and judicial activism in India (Human Rights Law 
Network: New Delhi) at viii. 
164
  Supreme Court order of 20 August 2001 in Saxena (note 162 above) at 27. 
165
  N Saxena „Food security and poverty in India‟ in Higgins et al (note 163 above) at 9-12. 
166
  On the failings of the Public Distribution Schemes, see B Patnaik „The poorest in the poorest states 
suffer the most‟ in Higgins et al (note 163 above) at 45. 
167
  See Supreme Court order of 2 May 2003 in Saxena et al (note 162 above) at 42-4. 
168
  Including the right to work and „even general issues of transparency and accountability‟ – Higgins et al 
(note 163 above) at viii. 
169
  See Higgins et al (note 163 above) at viii-ix. 
170
  For a summary of these orders, see Saxena et al (note 162 above) at 23-37. 
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orders was that handed down on 28 November 2001.
171
 The order converted the schemes‟ 
benefits into legal entitlements.
172
  
 
 The November 2001 order dealt with eight schemes.
173
 Each of the schemes centred 
on some aspect of food distribution as it related to a particular social group. The Mid-day 
Meals Scheme, for example, was directed at providing mid-day meals for all children in 
primary schools.
174
 The court ordered government to make good defects in the 
implementation of these schemes – by completing the identification of people who fell into 
the targeted groups, issuing cards to allow them to collect the grain and distributing the grain 
to the relevant centres.
175
 The court also ordered that those states which had been providing 
dry rations for the mid-day meal in schools begin providing cooked meals within three 
months of the order. Aspects of the order also dealt with inspection by government to ensure 
fair quality grain and replacement of grain that did not meet this standard.
 176
 In this and 
subsequent orders, the court has also set out requirements on reporting, accountability, 
monitoring, transparency and dissemination of court orders aimed at ensuring that its orders 
are followed.
177
 
 
 The right to food case certainly indicates that the history of the Supreme Court cannot 
be neatly divided into activist and non-activist phases. Alongside cases like Narmada Bachao 
Andolan above, the court has also handed down a series of interim orders prioritising the 
rights of the poorest in India. But there are several points to be made about the context of the 
case. For one thing, whilst the court has accepted the idea that the right to life contains a right 
to food,
178
 the actual court remedies focus on the provision of grain to people who are 
without food in a national context of abundant food stocks. Furthermore, the litigation is 
primarily aimed at forcing government to fulfil its pre-existing guarantees and there are no 
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competing „big business‟ or national development interests for the court to grapple with. The 
litigation has led the court to define government‟s obligations more clearly (the emphasis on 
the quality of the grain is an example here) and to put in place supervisory measures. But the 
implementation of the basic and agreed upon guarantees, as well as more expansive orders 
regarding monitoring and access to information are problematic.
179
 PUCL has gone back to 
court repeatedly due to delays in compliance; non-compliance with the orders; or 
governmental decisions to remove people from the list of those „Below the Poverty Line‟, for 
example. The Mid-day Meal Scheme is widely agreed to be one of the more successful 
aspects of the litigation.
180
 But the main reason for this is that, as a cause, it has been 
championed outside the courts through „lively campaigns‟.181 As the litigation is ongoing, 
any overall assessment of its effectiveness will have to wait but the court orders must be read 
within this wider context. 
 
 (5) Conclusion  
Non-governmental organisations working on access to SE goods like food, health care and 
education are quick to affirm the benefits of a clear and substantive judicial precedent 
recognising access to these goods and imposing corresponding duties on government, when 
these occur.
182
 But, they have to weigh those benefits against the high cost of litigation and 
the massive delays in getting a judgment at all.
183
 Studies convincingly demonstrate that non-
governmental organisations are slow to turn to the courts
184
 because of these institutional 
challenges. The structure of the Indian Supreme Court has added to the difficulties in SE 
rights enforcement. There are currently 26 justices on the bench, including the Chief Justice. 
The judges divide into subject-matter benches selected by the Chief Justice. A minimum of 5 
                                                 
179
  See the section on the implementation of the various schemes in Higgins et al (note 163 above) at 39-
85. 
180
  See H Mander „Mid-day Meals Scheme‟ in Higgins et al (note 163 above) at 70-74; J Dreze 
„Democracy and the right to food‟ in P Alston and M Robinson (eds.) (2005) Human rights and 
development: towards mutual reinforcement (OUP: Oxford) 45 at 60-61. 
181
  Dreze (note 180 above) at 61-2.  
182
  The right to food initiative described above has resulted in some successes, as has the work of 
Lawyers‟ Collective, an organization which lobbies for the protection of the rights of HIV positive 
people. The organization has had some notable judicial successes in respect of widening access to anti-
retroviral drugs but has been less successful in working against HIV discrimination. See Krishnan 
Human Rights Quarterly (note 6 above) at 791-819; see also Shankar and Mehta (note 6 above) at 178.  
183
  Krishnan American Asian Review (note 6 above) at 3 of the electronic version.  
184
  Shankar and Mehta (note 6 above) at 176-9; and Krishnan American Asian Review (note 6 above) at 10 
of the electronic version. 
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judges is required for constitutional matters but benches of 15 are not unusual for complex 
constitutional cases.
185
  These factors do not favour legal consistency. In addition, although 
appointment of new Chief Justices through a strict principle of seniority removes elements of 
arbitrariness from the process, the result is that succeeding Chief Justices are already close to 
retirement and tend to serve for only a few years. Again, this does not facilitate legal 
continuity and Chief Justices do not have enough time to instigate major reforms.
186
 The 
courts are overloaded but this is due to the fact that there aren‟t enough judges and courts not 
because of a highly litigious society.
187
 On the one hand, these issues point to the question of 
whether the courts are the right place to deal with SE rights matters at all. This is an issue 
considered at length in chapter 1. As I am concerned in this thesis with best judicial practice 
in the South African and other contexts in which judges are required to engage with these 
issues, the lesson here is that social advocacy groups need to consider how best to use the 
courts, with all their limitations, in creating greater access to SE goods. The most successful 
legal interventions have been those which  
envisioned “strategic” operations of a scale, scope, and continuity that enabled lawyers to 
acquire specialized experience, coordinate efforts on several fronts, select targets and manage 
the sequence and pace of litigation, monitor developments and deploy resources to maximize 
the long-term advantage of a client group.
188
  
 
In addition to the institutional challenges facing the Indian courts, and the Supreme 
Court specifically, there is also a question-mark over the legal principles generated through 
SE rights litigation. It is tempting to view the Indian Supreme Court‟s history of 
implementing SE guarantees in the directive principles through Article 21 as comprising 
three distinct phases: an initial antipathy to any judicial interaction with the strictly non-
enforceable directive principles; a post-emergency highly activist and creative phase in 
which the court regularly handed down „pro-poor‟ judgments; and a subsequent retreat from 
activism with the court simply deferring to government on all matters of economic and social 
policy. The discussion of the cases above counsels one against such a view. When the 
Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence in this area is viewed as a whole, one is most struck by the 
                                                 
185
  Neuborne (note 4 above) at 480. 
186
  Neuborne (note 4 above) at 483; see also Shankar and Mehta (note 6 above) at 149. 
187
  Krishnan American Asian Review (note 6 above) at 10 and 33. 
188
  Galanter and Krishnan (note 51 above) at 796. The work of the Treatment Action Campaign in South 
Africa; the right to food campaign in India; and the work of the Lawyers‟ Collective on HIV in India 
arguably all fall into this category. 
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lack of consistency and firm legal principle. 
 
Critiques of the Indian jurisprudence are not limited to the cases showing a more 
circumspect, deferential approach. Although the court's judicial creativity in the post-1978 
line of cases discussed above has been praised, Cottrell and Ghai point out that there is a lack 
of principle in these cases, that it is extremely difficult to ascertain when and how the court 
will make use of the directive principles. 
189
 SE rights have not always been attributed to the 
directive principles and it is, thus, unclear where they derive from, making it difficult for 
future litigants to be certain of their legal position.
190
 Furthermore, the court has sometimes 
extended remedies granted against the government to states that were not represented in 
court.
191
 This tendency to hand down judgments without fully considering their implications 
is one of the main reasons why the efficacy of the court's approach to SE rights is doubtful. 
The huge backlog of cases in India,
192
 is due, in part, to the fact that cases are often 
repeatedly brought back to court for 'fine-tuning' or because judgments have not been 
enforced, the court having failed to accurately assess the wider implications of their earlier 
orders.
193
  
 
The problem with the early cases and more recent jurisprudence lies in the 
inconsistency of the judgments and in their wider impact. As stated by Upendra Baxi, 
'[j]udicial activism is at once a peril and a promise, an assurance of solidarity for the 
depressed classes of Indian society as well as a site of betrayal'.
194
 The judgments do not 
easily separate into those with wide resource and policy implications and those without.  It is 
not clear why the judges found they had the (institutional and constitutional) capacity
195
 to 
act in particular cases and not in others. Instead, deference to the executive appears to occur 
                                                 
189
 J Cottrell and Y Ghai „The role of the courts in the protection of economic, social and cultural rights‟ 
in Ghai and Cottrell (note 6 above) at 76-7. 
190
 Cottrell and Ghai (note 189 above) at 74. 
191
 Cottrell and Ghai (note 189 above) at 75. 
192
 Neuborne (note 4 above) 504. 
193
 Cottrell and Ghai (note 189 above) 84-5. 
194
 (2000) 'The avatars of Indian judicial activism: explorations in the geographies of (in)justice' in Verma 
and Kusum (note 54 above) at 161. 
195
  J Jowell „Judicial deference: servility, civility or institutional capacity?‟ (2003) Public Law 592. 
Jowell‟s exploration of the link between judicial deference and the institutional capacity of courts is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 1. 
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on an ad hoc basis.
196
  
 
 In short, the Indian Supreme Court has not been careful to locate its approach 
(whether interventionist or deferential) within a coherent, well-considered theory about its 
constitutional duties and responsibilities, informed by the need to maintain a dialogue 
between legislature and executive, the judiciary and civil society.
197
 Judges are influenced by 
a number of factors, government‟s macro-economic policy being one important such factor.  
Government must be able to construct economic policy around changing national and 
international imperatives but dramatic shifts in that policy raise uncomfortable issues for 
judges. On the one hand, they have little expertise and experience in framing macro-
economic policy and are therefore ill-suited to pronounce upon it; on the other, they have a 
duty to protect constitutional values.   
 
The record of the South African CC in this area shows a court still struggling to come 
to terms with the difficult task of balancing these interests. Many would argue that the court 
is overly deferential to government‟s economic policy but the history of the Indian Supreme 
Court reveals a much more worrying trend.  Where the South African CC is grappling with 
the intensity of review in cases with varying policy consequences, in the history of the Indian 
Supreme Court, it is increasingly seeing policy considerations as a complete bar to judicial 
pronouncement.
198
 In India, economic liberalisation and a governmental emphasis on 
sustainable development have had an erratically significant impact on judicial decisions - 
land reform, housing and tribal rights take a back seat to these concerns in an increasing 
number of cases.
199
 As stated by Krishna Iyer J: 
There is no gainsaying the fact that social justice and equal opportunity for educational 
excellence at all levels have gone by default. Of course, globalization, liberalization, 
                                                 
196
 Muralidhar (note 6 above) 31. Rajagopal refers to a „serious measure of substantive ad hocism‟ in the 
judgments of the Indian Supreme Court (note 49 above) at 160. 
197
 See R Dixon 'Creating dialogue about socioeconomic rights: strong-form versus weak-form judicial 
review revisited' (2007) 5 International Journal on Constitutional Law 391, where the author develops 
a theory of constitutional dialogue in the context of SE rights enforcement. 
198
  Justice Suresh (retired) „Socio-economic rights and the Supreme Court‟, available at http://www.escr-
net.org/usr_doc/suresh_article.doc at par. 13, last accessed on 28 July 2010; see also U Ramanathan 
„Communities at risk: industrial risk in Indian law‟ Economic and Political Weekly, 9 October 2004 
4521 at 4524-5 on the court‟s approach to industrial risk. 
199
 Rajagopal (note 49 above) at 161 and 166. See also Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club and 
another v Chander Hass and another 2007(12) SCR 1084; 2008(1) SCC 683. 
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privatisation and marketization have captured the Court‟s notice and the Preamble200 to the 
Constitution is de facto judicially jettisoned‟.201 
The approach of the court in environmental cases is worth expanding on here. Whilst this is 
an area in which the court has been less cautious in expressing views on matters of policy, 
Bhushan has identified two disturbing trends in the approach. First, where there are 
competing interests between environmental protection, on the one hand, and the SE rights of 
the poor and vulnerable on the other, the court tends to find in favour of environmental 
rights.
202
 Second, where protection of the environment comes up against powerful 
commercial interests, the environment is de-prioritised.
203
  
 
The South African jurisprudence is assisted by the fact that the Constitution contains 
legally enforceable SE rights. This feature makes it more difficult for judges to simply bow 
to policy and legislation, and for the executive and the legislature to level charges of 
overreach and illegitimacy at the courts. But, as has been argued above, the CC has still to 
engage with the complex requirement of protecting both SE rights and the constitutional 
balance of powers. In the long term, thoughtful engagement with the judicial role in this area 
will be most influential in determining whether a model for SE rights enforcement is 
sustainable. As much of the South African SE rights jurisprudence turns on the notion of 
reasonableness, I move on to discuss this concept in its administrative law context before 
examining the South African cases in chapter 4. 
                                                 
200
  Which prioritises social, economic and political justice. 
201
  In The Hindu, 17 December 2002, as cited by Suresh (note 198 above) at par.15. 
202
  P Bhushan „Sacrificing human rights and environmental rights at the altar of development‟, talk 
presented at George Washington University Law School on 13 March 2009, text available at 
http://www.judicialreforms.org/files/sacrificing_human_rights_and_environmental_rights_at_the_altar
_of_development.pdf, last accessed on 15 May 2009 at 8. The attitude of the court towards slum 
clearance, described in the Almira Patel case (note 145 above) is an example here.  Kirpal J‟s 
statements indicated that he viewed the slum dwellers an environmental hazard. He viewed the slums 
as responsible for the generation of garbage and solid waste. See also Ramanathan (note 6 above) at 
2910. 
203
  Bhushan (note 202 above) at 7-8. 
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Chapter Three 
Review for unreasonableness in administrative law 
 
(1) Introduction 
The debate over the role of administrative law in the South African Constitutional Court’s 
(CC’s) approach to SE rights derives much of its impetus from comments made by Cass 
Sunstein following the CC’s decision in Grootboom.1 In the context of arguments about 
whether SE rights may ever be properly regarded to be justiciable, Sunstein suggested 
that the CC’s approach in Grootboom was ‘the most convincing rebuttal yet to those who 
have claimed, in the abstract quite plausibly, that judicial protection of socio-economic 
rights could not possibly be a good idea’.2  Referring to the typical administrative law 
case as one that places a burden of explanation on government agencies in which courts 
attempt to curb arbitrary administrative action whilst preserving the democratic integrity 
of government bodies, Sunstein noted that, in its approach to social and economic (SE) 
rights, the South African CC has put forward an administrative law model of SE rights.
3
  
 
As is evidenced by cases like Grootboom,
4
 Treatment Action Campaign
5
 and 
Khosa,
6
 the problem in most SE rights cases is likely to be one of government inaction, 
rather than action. In the judicial review of administrative action, Sunstein noted, courts 
would be cognisant of the limited resources of governmental agencies and ‘any reasonable 
priority-setting will be valid and perhaps even free from judicial review’.7 But there 
remains a duty of reasonableness on the setting of priorities. Administrative decisions that 
do not take statutory requirements and goals seriously should be held to be invalid.
8
 In 
Grootboom, the judges found that government had not taken the constitutional goals 
regarding housing seriously enough in that it did not provide for emergency relief for 
those in desperate need.
9
  
                                                 
1
  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169. 
2
  „Social and economic rights? Lessons from South Africa‟ (2000/2001) 11(4) Constitutional Forum 
at 132. 
3
  Sunstein (note 2 above) 130-1. 
4
  Note 1 above. 
5
  Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC). 
6
  Khosa and others v Minister of Social Development and others; Mahlaule and another v Minister 
of Social Development and Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). 
7
  Sunstein (note 2 above) at 121. 
8
  Ibid. 
9
  Sunstein (note 2 above) at 132. 
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Sunstein’s view was that the primary obligation on government was one of 
‘reasoned judgment’, a ‘burden of explanation’.10 He noted that the approach could act to 
limit government action by ensuring, for example, that government allocate more 
resources than it otherwise would to housing. However, on his analysis, this would be an 
incident of the primary obligation on government to provide a reasonable explanation for 
its choices, rather than the result of an independent evaluation by the courts that the 
current allocation was inadequate.  
 
The classification of the South African CC‟s treatment of SE rights as a 
reasonableness-centred administrative law approach, which makes appropriate demands 
on government „without displacing democratic judgments about how to set priorities‟ 11 
has encountered two kinds of resistance in the literature on the subject. First, a number of 
scholars are sceptical of the capacity of this kind of approach to give real content to SE 
rights. They argue that, rather than striking an appropriate balance between protection of 
SE rights and respect for democratic decision-making, an administrative law approach is 
overly deferential to governmental decisions. A focus on reasonableness in its 
administrative law form results in vagueness and entails a limited enquiry into the process 
by which decisions are made, rather than an interrogation of the substance of those 
decisions. The protection afforded to SE rights on such an approach is, thus, inevitably 
weak.
12
  
 
 An alternate view, articulated by Carol Steinberg in a 2006 article, is that the CC‟s 
SE rights approach is based on an intense form of scrutiny „unprecedented in the area of 
                                                 
10
  Ibid. 
11
 Sunstein (note 2 above) at 131. 
12
 See, for example, D Bilchitz  (2007) Poverty and fundamental rights: the justification and 
enforcement of socio-economic rights (OUP: Oxford); „Towards a theory of content for socio-
economic rights‟, paper presented at the 7th Annual World Congress of Constitutional Law 
(Athens, 11-15 June 2007) at 5 – 8, available at: 
http://www.enelsyn.gr/papers/w13/Paper%20by%20Dr.%20David%20Bilchitz.pdf, last accessed 
on 4 August 2010; „Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: laying the foundations 
for future socio-economic rights jurisprudence‟ (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 
1; and ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth: the minimum core and its importance’ (2002) 118 
South African Law Journal 484. See also D Newman ‘Institutional monitoring of social and 
economic rights: a South African case study and new research agenda’ (2003) 19 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 189 at 196 – 7; M Pieterse ‘Coming to terms with judicial enforcement 
of socio-economic rights (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 383 at 407; and S 
Liebenberg ‘Basic rights claims: how responsive is ‘reasonableness review’? 2003 ESR Review 5(5) 
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administrative law‟.13 The CC‟s SE rights model, she argued, retained the notion of 
respect for the integrity of administrative decision-making and the idea that the intensity 
of the scrutiny must depend on the context. But the character of the scrutiny applied by 
the CC in these cases differed from that applied in administrative review in that the values 
of equality and human dignity „are more heavily weighted in the proportionality exercise 
applied in the socio-economic rights cases‟.14 On this view, Sunstein‟s praise for the CC‟s 
approach to SE rights is affirmed. It is his classification of that approach as an 
administrative law one which is resisted. 
 
 Since the decision in Grootboom, the CC has gone on to confirm that its approach 
to SE rights turns on the question of the reasonableness of government action in several 
cases. But arguments about the role of administrative law in this approach cannot be 
assessed without some discussion of what the judicial scrutiny of reasonableness in the 
context of administrative action involves.   The development of reasonableness as a 
standard of judicial review in administrative law is the subject of this chapter.   
 
 Sunstein‟s assessment of the CC‟s approach in Grootboom is that its key effect 
was to place a burden of justification on government.  Critics of an administrative law 
model argue that it lends itself to an enquiry into process alone and consequently weakens 
the potential for adjudication to make an important contribution to the implementation of 
SE rights. The principal question for this chapter, then, is just how far can an approach 
based on justification go? Is review for unreasonableness limited to questions of process, 
either formally or in effect? Or can it be used as a means of interrogating the substance of 
a decision? As the South African jurisprudence in this area has its roots in English 
administrative law, I discuss both jurisdictions in addressing these questions. 
 
Review for unreasonableness has always been controversial in administrative law 
because of its potential to blur the line between appeal and review. As stated by Cora 
                                                                                                                                                  
7. 
13
  C Steinberg ‘Can Reasonableness Protect the Poor? A Review of South Africa’s Socio-Economic 
Rights Jurisprudence’ (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 266 at 266. See also M Wesson 
„Grootboom and beyond: reassessing the socio-economic jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court‟ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 284. Wesson argues that 
the classification of the CC‟s approach as an administrative law one is misconstrued and that the 
approach in Grootboom, TAC and Khosa is better understood as based on a concern that vulnerable 
sections of society should not be disregarded. 
14
  Steinberg (note 13 above) at 277.  
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Hoexter: 
More than any other ground, review for reasonableness exposes the tension between two 
conflicting judicial emotions: the fear of encroaching on the province of the executive 
arm of government by entering into the merits of administrative decisions, and the desire 
for adequate control over the decisions of administrative authorities.
15
 
Many commentators and judges now accept that, whilst value judgments are unavoidable, 
it is possible for judges to enquire into the substance of a decision without substituting 
their view of the merits of the case for that of the original decision-maker.
16
 Yet some 
judges continue to treat unreasonableness with a great deal of caution. An insistence that 
the level of unreasonableness had to be so severe as to border on insanity or absurdity has 
given way to a more realistic assessment of whether the decision made was within the 
range of reasonable responses open to the decision-maker, but whether reasonableness is 
measured by reference to a standard of rationality alone or something more searching is 
not always clear.  
 
In this chapter, I begin by tracing the expansion of unreasonableness as a ground 
of review in U.K. law – from the extreme deference of the Wednesbury17 approach, to the 
judicial relaxing of the test, to changes wrought by the enactment of the Human Rights 
Act, 1998 (HRA). I then discuss current debates about the future of substantive review 
and the role of proportionality in U.K. judicial review. I move on to an examination of 
pre- and post- constitutional review of administrative action for unreasonableness in 
South Africa. As is the case with the U.K., South African courts are grappling with 
questions about whether review for unreasonableness extends to an enquiry into 
proportionality. The aim of this chapter is to show that reasonableness review is not 
inherently weak, devoid of content and procedure-driven. Much depends on judicial 
responses to new constitutional and international influences in developing this ground for 
review. 
 
(2) United Kingdom 
 
(a) From Wednesbury to the Human Rights Act 
                                                 
15
  C Hoexter (2007) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume Two: Administrative 
Law (Juta: Cape Town) at 293-4. 
16
  See Froneman DJP in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and others 1999 (3) SA 304 (LAC) at 
par. 36; Hoexter (note 15 above) at 317-18; and P Craig (2003) Administrative Law (Sweet and 
Maxwell: London) at 631. 
17
  Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 
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Discussions of review for unreasonableness in English law tend to begin with the dicta 
laid down by Lord Greene M.R. in Wednesbury.
18
  In Wednesbury, Lord Greene M.R. 
noted that lawyers tended to use the term ‘unreasonable’ to encompass any unlawful 
exercise of discretion.
 19
  Included under this head were acts that disclosed bad faith, 
dishonesty, attention given to irrelevant considerations and a disregard of public policy.
20
 
However, the term could also be used to describe an absurd exercise of that discretion. 
Lord Greene M.R. recognised that the two categories were not distinct and could overlap. 
Thus, for example, dismissing a teacher on the basis that she had red hair would be absurd 
and also amount to taking into account an irrelevant consideration, as the statute was 
highly unlikely to have listed hair colour as a significant factor.
21
 But, to the extent that it 
was possible for unreasonableness to exist independently of the other recognised grounds 
of review, it could only be when there was some kind of absurdity or outrageousness.
22
  
Summing up, Lord Greene M.R. noted: 
The court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing 
whether they have taken into account matters which they ought not to take into account, 
or, conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters 
which they ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the 
local authority, it may be still possible to say that, although the local authority have kept 
within the four corners of the matters which they ought to consider, they have 
nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever 
have come to it.
23
 
 
The Wednesbury test was designed to allay concerns about judicial intrusion into 
the legislative and executive domains, limiting as it did the kinds of cases in which judges 
could intervene to a rather narrow list. Over the years, it has come under fire for being 
tautological and unnecessarily extreme.
24
 Judges have pointed out that a decision-maker 
could be acting with perfect lucidity or rationality yet still make an error. An error in 
reasoning should be sufficient as an indication of unreasonableness. The reviewing court 
                                                 
18
  Note 17 above. The case concerned a condition, imposed by Wednesbury Corporation in the 
exercise of a statutory discretion, prohibiting children under 15 from attending Sunday 
performances at the local cinema theatre (at 226-7). 
19
  Wednesbury (note 17 above) at 229. 
20
  Wednesbury (note 17 above) at 229. 
21
  Wednesbury (note 17 above) at 229. 
22
  Wednesbury (note 17 above) at 229. 
23
  Wednesbury (note 17 above) at 233-4. See also Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the 
Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374 where Lord Diplock held that irrationality applied to „a decision 
which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible 
person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it‟ (at 410). 
24
  See H Woolf, J Jowell and A Le Sueur De Smith’s Judicial Review (Sweet and Maxwell: London) 
at 551-3; Craig (note 16 above) at 613, citing Lord Cooke in R. v Chief Constable of Sussex Ex. p 
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should not need to go on to find that the decision-maker had temporarily lost control of 
his or her faculties.
25
 Some judges also noted that the kind of unreasonableness or 
irrationality envisaged in Wednesbury gave the person challenging the decision „a 
mountain to climb‟.26 In 1985, the House of Lords made perhaps the most forceful 
judicial criticism of Wednesbury unreasonableness in English law. In an oft-quoted 
passage in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Daly,
27
 Lord Cooke 
described Wednesbury as: 
 [A]n unfortunately retrogressive decision in English administrative law, insofar as it 
suggested that there are degrees of unreasonableness and that only a very extreme degree 
can bring an administrative decision within the legitimate scope of judicial invalidation.
28
 
 
 The test for reviewing delegated legislation on the basis of unreasonableness was 
significantly different from that for administrative decisions set out in Wednesbury.
29
 In 
Kruse v Johnson,
30
 Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. held that judges should be slow to 
overturn by-laws made by representative bodies with sufficient authority conferred by 
Parliament.
31
 However, even such by-laws could be declared invalid in certain 
circumstances: 
If, for instance, they were found to be partial and unequal in their operation as between 
different classes; if they were manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad faith; if they 
involved such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to 
them as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men…32 
Whilst the term „manifestly unjust‟ leaves this test open to charges of a lack of precision 
similar to that underlying the Wednesbury formulation, it is considerably more definite in 
other respects. The categorisation of bad faith, partiality, inequality and oppressive 
interference with rights as examples of what makes a by-law invalid is useful. And, in 
                                                                                                                                                  
International Trader’s Ferry Ltd. [1999] 2 A.C. 418 at 452 and in R. v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department Ex. p Daly [2001] 2 A.C. 532 at 549. 
25
  See Lord Woolf M.R. in R. v Lord Saville of Newdigate Ex p. A  [1999] 4 All E.R. 860 at par. 33; 
Sedley J in R. v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Ex p. Balchin [1997] C.O.D. 146. 
See also R. v North and East Devon Health Authority Ex p. Coughlan [2001] Q.B. 213 at pars 65-
9. For criticisms of the Wednesbury approach, see also N Blake „Importing proportionality: 
clarification or confusion?‟ (2002) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 19 at 19; A Le Sueur 
„The rise and ruin of unreasonableness‟ (2005) 10(1) Judicial Review 32; D Longley and R James 
„Judicial review and tragic choices: Ex parte B‟ (1995) Public Law 367 at 369, 372-3. 
26
  Lord Bingham in R. v Lord Chancellor Ex p. Maxwell [1997] 1 W.L.R. 104 at 109. 
27
  Note 24 above.  
28
  Daly (note 24 above) at 549.  
29
  Administrative decisions comprise the largest group of administrative actions. See Hoexter (note 
15 above) at 294.  
30
  [1898] 2 Q.B. 91. 
31
  Kruse (note 30 above) at 98-99. 
32
  Kruse (note 30 above) at 99-100. 
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contrast with Wednesbury, the test does not in general demand that the flaws in delegated 
legislation be extreme, bordering on the ridiculous, in order for them to be invalid.
33
   
   
 As noted by Craig, courts began to modify the Wednesbury approach - to temper 
the extreme nature of the test - even outside the context of human rights.
34
 In other words, 
they considered Wednesbury unreasonableness to be too low a standard of scrutiny even 
where the case concerned did not impact on fundamental rights. Increasingly, courts have 
turned to a simpler version of the test: whether the impugned decision is ‘within the range 
of reasonable responses’ open to the decision-maker.35  But the most obvious 
modification of the standard of reasonableness has taken place in the context of 
fundamental rights cases. Before the incorporation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic law through the HRA, courts had begun to adopt an 
‘anxious scrutiny’ approach to cases involving breaches of human rights. They insisted on 
a compelling public interest as justification for the infringement of a right.
36
 Moreover, 
certain statements from the courts indicated that, in such cases, the burden was on the 
decision-maker to show reasonableness, not on the claimant to prove unreasonableness.
37
  
 
These developments have been somewhat overtaken by the enactment of the 
HRA. Since the HRA came into force, most cases involving the review of administrative 
action that impinges on human rights will be based on illegality, rather than 
unreasonableness.
 38
 Infringements of fundamental rights recognised in the HRA will fall 
outside the ‘four corners’ of that statute if they cannot be justified according to a 
structured test of proportionality,
39
 developed by the European Court of Human Rights in 
its jurisprudence.
40
 
 
                                                 
33
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 552. 
34
  Craig (note 16 above) at 612. Craig observes that „[t]he courts have clung to the legitimating frame 
of the Wednesbury test, while at the same time exerting more extensive control than would be 
allowed by a literal reading of the test‟ (note 16 above at 634, and 610-617). See also T Hickman 
„The reasonableness principle: reassessing its place in the public sphere‟ (2004) 63(1) Cambridge 
Law Journal 166 at 181-2; and International Trader’s Ferry (note 24 above). 
35
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 554.  See the examples cited at 554, note 72.  
36
  See, especially, R. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Brind [1991] A.C. 686 at 
749-51. See also Craig (note 16 above) at 613-4; De Smith (note 24 above) at 594-5, and see the 
cases mentioned at 595, note 318. 
37
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 595, discussing R v Minister of Defence Ex p. Smith [1996] Q.B. 517. 
38
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 552. See also Craig (note 16 above) at 569-604. 
39
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 587-8. See also Blake (note 25 above) at 19. 
40
  Discussed in part (d) below. 
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The movement away from Wednesbury unreasonableness is definitely cause for 
celebration. However, there is a degree of uncertainty over both the content and 
application of the various modified tests. The standard ‘within the range of reasonable 
responses’ used to test for unreasonableness in cases where human rights are not 
implicated has the pleasing features of being more comprehensible than Wednesbury and 
setting a higher standard of scrutiny for administrative action. However, it does not, of 
itself, provide an answer to the question of what makes a decision fall outside the range of 
reasonable responses. Furthermore, courts have sometimes retreated to the familiarity of 
Wednesbury unreasonableness in both human rights and non-human rights cases.
41
  
  
 When it comes to SE rights, which are not explicitly included in the HRA, U.K. 
courts have given effect to them indirectly, through the interpretation of recognised 
fundamental rights (mainly the right to respect for family life in Article 8) in the Act.
42
 In 
such cases, the standard of review applied is the structured proportionality test mentioned 
above, and examined in detail below. Nevertheless, ‘reasonableness’ will continue to be 
applicable as a ground of review in a number of instances relevant to this thesis. First, 
U.K. courts are called upon to review rights and interests in SE goods like housing and 
health enshrined in ordinary legislation. In doing so, they apply established grounds of 
review, including reasonableness, to administrative action impacting on these rights and 
interests. Second, courts apply the usual grounds to review administrative action 
impacting on common law rights.
43
 Whether recognition of common law rights to SE 
goods is likely or desirable is a point of some controversy.
44
 But, whilst the possibility 
exists, it is an issue for discussion in this thesis. One of the enduring debates in this area 
is whether and when reasonableness should include an inquiry into proportionality; and 
whether proportionality may act as an independent ground of review outside HRA 
cases.
45
 These are important questions for this chapter. 
 
                                                 
41
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 596. 
42
  Examples of such cases are discussed in Chapter 5 below. See also Huang v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department; Kashmiri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] W.L.R. 
581. 
43
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 552. 
44
  See G van Bueren „Including the excluded: the case for an economic, social and cultural Human 
Rights Act‟ (2002) Public Law 256; and E Douglas „Incorporating socio-economic rights in a 
British bill of rights: pragmatic progression or a step too far?‟ (2007) 4(1) Justice Journal 88. 
45
  See Craig (note 16 above) at 628-32; De Smith (note 24 above) at 585. See further, Blake (note 25 
above). 
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Much of the argument in this thesis addresses the question of whether the South 
African CC’s reasonableness-based approach is a useful way for judges to approach SE 
rights adjudication. As SE rights are constitutionally entrenched and directly enforceable 
by courts in South Africa, it is tempting to conclude that the only U.K. standard of review 
relevant to the discussion is the structured proportionality test used in HRA cases. There 
are a number of reasons why this is not the case. First, whilst the arguments in this thesis 
have been prompted by the South African approach to SE rights, the focus is on a more 
generally workable model for SE rights adjudication. Second, the main SE rights 
provisions in the South African Constitution of interest for this thesis explicitly demand 
an enquiry into reasonableness.
46
 Third, and most importantly, variable intensity of 
review is an essential aspect of the argument here. Alongside the modifications to 
Wednesbury, and in recognition of the impossibility of deciding in advance what 
reasonableness requires in all cases,
47
 courts and academic commentators have indicated 
support for the idea that the standard of review must vary according to context
48
 in order 
to achieve a proper balance between protection of individual rights and interests and 
respect for government decision-making in the public interest.
49
 But flexibility need not 
translate into a complete lack of certainty over when and, moreover, why a particular 
intensity of review is preferred.  
 
The immediate task then is to identify all aspects of unreasonableness and 
consider how exacting these aspects are on exercises of public power. A careful study of 
what we mean by unreasonableness may go some way to promoting the culture of 
justification
50
 that has become so much a part of the vocabulary of public law in 
jurisdictions like South Africa and the United Kingdom.
51
 In the following discussion of 
what unreasonableness has come to mean in the judicial review of administrative action, I 
                                                 
46
  The identically worded sections 26 (2) and 27 (2) provide: „The state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation 
of this right‟.  
47
  As noted in De Smith (note 24 above at 556-7) „the term “unreasonable”, in its Wednesbury or any 
other sense, is no magic formula; everything must depend upon the context‟. 
48
  See Craig (note 16 above) at 613. See also Daly (note 24 above) at 549. 
49
  Discussed in Chapter 1, above.  Proportionality may also be applied more or less intensely. See J 
Rivers „Proportionality and variable intensity of review‟ (2006) Cambridge Law Journal 65(1) 174 
at 178. 
50
  E Mureinik „A bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights‟ (1994) 10 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 31 at 32. 
51
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 597-8. 
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rely on the classification of categories of unreasonableness set out in De Smith
52
 as the 
most current and thorough analysis of its kind. 
 
(b) Requirements of reasonableness 
As noted above, Wednesbury
53
 provided little guidance on what makes an administrative 
decision unreasonable. The difficulties associated with identifying aspects of 
unreasonableness are compounded by the overlap between grounds of review. This is 
partly due to the looseness with which lawyers and judges used the term 
unreasonableness. As noted by Lord Greene M.R. in Wednesbury, lawyers used the term 
to encompass bad faith, 
 
dishonesty, ignoring public policy and taking into account 
irrelevant considerations – all of which are more accurately instances of illegality.  
 
More recent accounts of unreasonableness still tend to begin with the issue of 
relevant and irrelevant considerations.
54
 This could well be because the statute in question 
is not always explicit about what is and is not relevant, making this a question of 
reasonableness, rather than legality. More significantly, it is an indication that an enquiry 
into reasonableness now focuses on the balance of relevant considerations,
55
 rather than 
the need to simply ensure that some consideration was given to them. The other factor 
commonly associated with any test for reasonableness is rationality. The term „rationality‟ 
was used as a substitute for Wednesbury unreasonableness in English law.
56
 Thus, it was 
used to refer to absurdity, bordering on insanity. Today, however, rationality interrogates 
the reasoning process. It demands a rational or logical „connection between premises and 
conclusion: between the information (evidence and argument) before the decision-maker 
and the decision that it reached‟.57  
 
In a detailed classification of categories of unreasonableness, De Smith include 
both these defects – manifest imbalance in the weight attached to the considerations on 
which the decision is based and irrationality – in the group „unreasonable process‟, along 
with „uncertain decisions‟; „decisions supported by inadequate or incomprehensible 
reasons‟ or „by inadequate evidence‟; and decisions „made on the basis of a mistake of 
                                                 
52
  Note 24 above. 
53
  Note 17 above. 
54
  See, for example, De Smith (note 24 above) at 557.  
55
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 557-9. 
56
  See Lord Diplock in CCSU (note 23 above) at 410.  
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fact‟.58 A flaw in the decision-making process, in the process of reasoning and 
justification, taints each one of these decisions.
59
 If review for unreasonableness went no 
further than this, charges that administrative law is entirely focused on decision-making 
procedures would be difficult to refute. But the authors move on to describe categories of 
unreasonableness that go to the substance of the decision. Decisions that violate the 
common law or constitutional principles such as the rule of law and equality may be 
impugned for unreasonableness. Furthermore, oppressive decisions - those that have an 
unduly harsh impact on the rights and interests of affected parties - may also be 
challenged as unreasonable.
60
 
 
 Over the years, English courts have come to accept that administrative acts must 
be consistent, not just with their enabling statutes, but with common law and 
constitutional principles.
61
 Using principles of interpretation, courts recognised a number 
of individual rights as common law rights even before the HRA was enacted.
62
 
Constitutional principles are those „governing the exercise of power in a constitutional 
democracy‟.63 These include respect for certain individual rights, common to 
constitutional democracies the world over – freedom of expression and access to justice 
are examples here. Some overlap between the HRA and common law rights is, 
consequently, to be expected. Courts have, in addition, applied the general constitutional 
principles of respect for the rule of law and equality to all exercises of public power.
64
  
 
 The rule of law, as a general principle, is a rich source of values through which the 
exercise of public power is controlled and limited.
65
 The courts have developed the 
principles on a case-by-case basis. To date, it has been held to encompass „the values of 
                                                                                                                                                  
57
  Mureinik (note 50 above) at 41. See also De Smith (note 24 above) at 559-60.  
58
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 556. 
59
  Ibid. 
60
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 556-7. 
61
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 569-70.  
62
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 570. 
63
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 569. 
64
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 570. The authors note that an express parliamentary directive against 
any of these principles would be sufficient to rob them of their authority, due to the fact that 
parliamentary supremacy continues as the „prime constitutional principle‟ in this jurisdiction. 
Some writers have taken issue with this argument – see T Allan „The constitutional foundations of 
judicial review: conceptual conundrum or interpretive inquiry?‟ (2002) 61(1) Cambridge Law 
Journal 87 at 88. 
65
  This is also the case in South Africa. See the discussion of the constitutional principle of legality, 
which derives from respect for the rule of law, below. 
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legal certainty, consistency, due process and access to justice.‟66 More recently, the House 
of Lords has also interpreted the principle of respect for the rule of law to demand a level 
of accountability from public officials.
67
 The principle of equality, increasingly employed 
by U.K. courts, is used in a formal sense to demand that the law is applied in an even-
handed fashion. The values of legal certainty and consistency under the rule of law would 
produce the same effect in most circumstances but, with formal equality, the underlying 
goal is equal treatment of similarly situated persons, rather than predictability.
68
 In its 
substantive sense, the principle of equality focuses not on whether the law is applied 
even-handedly, without prejudice or preference, but on whether the content of that law 
discriminates against individuals or groups.
69
 Equality in its formal and substantive 
senses is now part of domestic law because of the HRA. The principle has also been used 
to challenge administrative action under the common law, with varying degrees of 
success.
70
 
 
 The final category of unreasonableness in the classification devised by De Smith 
is that of oppressive decisions. As the authors note, this issue reveals an obvious overlap 
between reasonableness review and the principle of proportionality, discussed below.
71
 
However, the status of the principle of proportionality in English law is unclear. A 
concern with whether administrative action imposes too onerous a burden on rights and 
interests has been a part of substantive review in English law, quite independently of any 
express recognition of a proportionality principle, for some time.
72
 Examples of 
oppressive decisions range from those which impose burdens impossible for individuals 
to meet, to those made despite the fact that an alternative, less burdensome on rights and 
interests, was available to the public body concerned.
73
  
 
The categorisation used by De Smith indicates that unreasonableness is no longer 
                                                 
66
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 571. 
67
  R. (on the application of Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 
36; [2004] 1 A.C. 604, as cited in De Smith (note 24 above) at 571. 
68
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 572. 
69
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 574. See further, S Fredman „From Deference to Democracy: the role 
of Equality under the Human Rights Act 1998‟ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 53. 
70
  For examples, see De Smith (note 24 above) at 576-8. 
71
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 578. See also Blake (note 25 above) at 19. 
72
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 579. 
73
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 579-84. See also, the discussion of R. v Secretary of State for Social 
Security ex parte. Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants; R. v Secretary of State for Social 
Security ex parte. B [1997] 1 W.L.R 275 in Chapter 5, below.  
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used as shorthand for the conclusion that an administrative act is invalid, thereby drawing 
procedural unfairness and illegality into its ambit.
74
 Although there can be no bright lines 
separating these three grounds of review from each other, post-Wednesbury jurisprudence 
has served to strengthen unreasonableness as a ground of review in its own right. Cases 
emerging just before and after the HRA have added a great deal of content to the notion 
of unreasonableness. Administrative acts that impinge on the principles of respect for the 
rule of law and equality, for example, are often overturned on the basis that they are 
unreasonable.
75
 The enactment of the HRA and a more widespread consensus over the 
meaning and applicability of the values underlying a constitutional democracy have 
provided a solid foundation for the development of the content of the standard of 
reasonableness. But unreasonableness, as it now operates, is open to criticism on the basis 
that it is applied with a great degree of uncertainty and, sometimes, inconsistency.  
  
(c) The place of proportionality in English law 
Lord Diplock suggested the possibility that proportionality could become an independent 
ground of review in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service.
76
 He 
held, however, that the case at hand was not a suitable one in which to develop this 
ground. Judges in earlier cases had accepted that an administrative act could be 
overturned if it was disproportionate with the harm it sought to address. However, these 
judges considered a lack of proportionality to be an indication of irrationality or 
unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense, not a separate ground of review.
77
 
Furthermore, as is the case with Wednesbury unreasonableness generally, judges would 
overturn a decision only if the level of disproportion was extreme.
78
  
 
Although the CCSU case was decided in 1985, proportionality is still only a 
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  In the sense discussed by Lord Greene M.R. in Wednesbury (note 17 above) at 229. 
75
  De Smith (note 24 above) at 569-70.  
76
  Note 23 above at 410. 
77
  Lord Donaldson M.R. summarised the pre-CCSU developments in this area in the Court of 
Appeal‟s decision in Brind (note 36 above) at 721-2. Examples of cases in which judges accepted 
that proportionality played a role in assessing Wednesbury reasonableness are R v. Barnsley 
Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex parte Hook [1976] 1 W.L.R. 1052 at 1057 and 1063; and R. v 
Secretary of State for Transport, Ex parte Pegasus Holdings (London) Ltd. [1988] 1 W.L.R. 990 at 
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  See, for example, Woolf L.J. (McCollough J. concurring) in R. v Brent London Borough Council, 
Ex parte Assegai (unreported), 11 June 1987, as cited by Lord Donaldson in Brind (note 36 above) 
at 721. In his judgment, Woolf L.J. noted that the Council‟s action was „wholly out of proportion 
to what Dr. Assegai had done. Where the response was of out of proportion with the cause to this 
extent, this provides a very clear indication of unreasonableness in a Wednesbury sense‟. 
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possible fourth ground of review. The House of Lords pronounced on the status of the 
proportionality principle again in considerable detail in R. v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department Ex p. Brind,
79
 decided as debates about the incorporation of the ECHR 
were reaching their peak. Echoing Lord Diplock in CCSU, Lord Roskill held that, whilst 
proportionality could emerge as a separate ground of review at some future stage this was 
not an appropriate case in which to incorporate it.
80
 A number of the Law Lords 
expressed concern that proportionality would entail an enquiry into the merits of the case 
– that, were proportionality to be accepted as an additional basis for review, judges 
would, in effect, be substituting their own views for that of the original decision-maker.
81
  
The situation was, of course, fundamentally altered by the incorporation of the HRA. 
Currently, courts in this jurisdiction will apply proportionality expressly when dealing 
with directly effective European Community law (EC) and with justification for the 
limitation of rights under the HRA.
82
 In recent cases, some judges have expressed support 
for proportionality as an independent ground of review, applicable to the review of all 
administrative acts.
83
 But the status of proportionality in all non-EC and non-HRA cases 
remains unclear.  
 
 English law has developed to the point where proportionality in such cases could 
continue to be an element of the general test for unreasonableness; become an 
independent ground of review applied together with illegality, procedural unfairness and 
unreasonableness; or supplant unreasonableness as a ground of review altogether.
84
 The 
meaning to be given to various tests of proportionality is considered below. For the 
moment, it is important to note that, as the widely discredited Wednesbury test for 
unreasonableness has given way to a modified, looser version in which claimants no 
longer need to show extreme forms of unreasonableness, so too a lack of proportionality 
between objective and means need not be acute or complete for a governmental act to be 
successfully challenged before the courts. Rather the focus is on the balance between 
                                                 
79
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80
  Brind (note 36 above) at 750. 
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  See Lord Roskill at 750; Lord Ackner at 762-3; and Lord Lowry at 767 in Brind (note 36 above). 
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  De Smith (note 24 above) at 584. See also Craig (note 16 above) at 620-22. As this thesis is 
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De Smith (note 24 above) at 587; Craig (note 16 above) at 621-2. 
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  See Lord Slynn in R. (on the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd.) v Secretary of State for 
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84
  See Craig (note 16 above) at 628-32; and De Smith (note 24 above) at 585. 
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means and ends.
85
  Some commentators have questioned whether the choice between 
these options makes any practical difference as the tests for reasonableness and 
proportionality interrogate very similar issues.
86
 Whether this is the case depends on the 
content of the proportionality test applied. 
  
(d) The scope of proportionality 
As pointed out by Craig, striking a balance between a variety of interests and aims lies at 
the heart of any enquiry into proportionality. In particular, proportionality requires that 
the means used be commensurate with the objective sought to be achieved, the most vivid 
example of a lack of proportionality being the use of a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
87
 But 
the widely used formulation of the test for proportionality goes further than this. It asks 
not merely whether some, less restrictive means could have been used to achieve the 
desired goal but goes on to reject that goal if the cost to the individual is considered to be 
too high. In terms of this formulation, a court will ask: 
(1) Whether the measure was necessary to achieve the desired objective. 
(2) Whether the measure was suitable for achieving the desired objective. 
(3) Whether it nonetheless imposed excessive burdens on the individual. This part of 
the inquiry is often termed proportionality stricto sensu.
88
 
 
 The discussion of unreasonableness above indicates that aspects of an enquiry into 
proportionality made their way into the modified Wednesbury test for unreasonableness 
before the HRA came into operation.  Following the enactment of the HRA, there are two 
ways in which proportionality is now applied in English courts.
89
  The Strasbourg court 
has developed a structured test of proportionality to determine whether infringements of 
the rights in Articles 8 – 12, those capable of limitation, are justifiable.90 De Smith 
summarise the test as follows: 
 The authority will normally be required to demonstrate that the measures are ‘prescribed 
by the law’; that they pursue a legitimate end or an end specified in the relevant Article 
(ends such as national security or public safety); that they are rationally connected to that 
end; that no less restrictive alternative could have been adopted, and that they are 
necessary (and not merely desirable).
91
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  See De Smith (note 24 above) at 585-6. 
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  See Craig (note 16 above) at 621; De Smith (note 24 above) at 585; Lord Steyn in Daly (note 24 
above) at 547; and Blake (note 25 above) at 19. 
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  See Brind (note 36 above) at 706. 
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  Craig (note 16 above) at 622. 
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  De Smith (note 24 above) at 585. See also Craig (note 16 above) at 618-22.  
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  De Smith (note 24 above) at 587. 
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Articles 8 – 1192 of the HRA add depth to the concept of necessity by requiring any 
limitation of these rights to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. This addition means 
that the courts must consider whether the objective the public authority seeks to achieve is 
consistent with the values underlying a constitutional democracy. It is not enough that 
there be some rational connection to a legitimate societal goal – the goal itself must 
cohere with values such as tolerance and pluralism.
93
 Strasbourg jurisprudence is not 
binding on domestic courts and there is, therefore, no obligation on the courts to apply it. 
It does, however, have persuasive force
94
 and courts have consistently applied the test in 
HRA cases.   
 
In respect of non-HRA cases, courts consider elements of proportionality in a less 
defined way as a feature of substantive judicial review of administrative action for 
unreasonableness. De Smith refers to the proportionality enquiry in this context as a test 
of „fair balance‟.95 In applying a test of fair balance, courts will examine the balance of 
relevant considerations to see whether the appropriate weight has been attached to various 
factors. They will also ask if there has been a disproportionately severe invasion of 
individual rights and interests. And a rational connection between means and end has 
always been a requirement of reasonableness.
96
 The overlap in content between the two 
kinds of tests is obvious. The most important difference between the two lies in the 
question of the burden of proof.
97
 With the Strasbourg-developed structured test for 
proportionality, the burden of proving that the limitation of the right was justified rests on 
the public authority. With the test of fair balance, it is the claimant – the person bringing 
the case for judicial review – who bears the onus of proving a lack of proportionality.98 
But are there also differences in content and scope between these two forms of 
proportionality? 
 
In R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Daly,
99
 the judges 
were of the view that, though proportionality in each of these contexts would often yield 
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  De Smith (note 24 above) at 587-8. 
94
  Craig (note 16 above) at 623. 
95
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the same result, there was nonetheless a substantial difference between the two.  The 
impugned decision in Daly was made before the HRA came into effect.
100
 Daly argued 
that a blanket policy requiring examination of prisoners’ legally privileged 
correspondence in their absence was an unnecessary and impermissible infringement of a 
fundamental right recognized in the ECHR and the common law – the right to 
communicate with one’s legal advisor confidentially, under the protection of legal 
professional privilege.
101
 The role of the principle of proportionality in fundamental rights 
cases was, as a result, very much at the centre of the decision.  Lord Bingham found that 
the infringement of prisoners’ rights was indeed greater than that shown to be necessary in 
order to meet the relevant public aims.
102
 He chose to base his conclusions on an 
‘orthodox application of common law principles derived from the authorities and an 
orthodox domestic approach to judicial review’.103 Noting that the same result would be 
achieved on an application of the ECHR to this case, Lord Bingham acknowledged that 
there could well be cases in which this was not so.
104
  
 
Lord Steyn, in whose judgment Lord Bingham and Lord Cooke of Thorndon 
concurred,
105
 referred to the Privy Council’s test for proportionality set out in De Freitas v 
Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing in the 
context of the limitation of the fundamental right to free expression. In terms of that test, 
a court will consider the following factors: 
[W]hether (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are 
rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no 
more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.
106 
According to Lord Steyn, these three factors impose a more onerous burden on public 
authorities than that required by a Wednesbury test, even one modified for human rights 
cases: 
First, the doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the balance 
which the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational 
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100
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101
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or reasonable decisions. Secondly, the proportionality test may go further than the 
traditional grounds of review inasmuch as it may require attention to be directed to the 
relative weight accorded to interests and considerations.
 107
  
Lord Steyn went on to note that the heightened scrutiny test which was developed in Ex 
parte Smith
108
 was also not „necessarily appropriate to the protection of human rights‟.109  
Although the court in Ex parte Smith
110
 was ostensibly applying a Wednesbury test 
modified to the human rights context, in reality the threshold for review was set at an 
extremely high level. The Court of Appeal required the Secretary of State to show that 
there was an important competing public interest, which he considered an adequate 
justification for the infringement of the right. The court would only intervene „if his 
purported justification outrageously defies logic or accepted moral standards‟.111 As noted 
by Lord Steyn in Daly, the Strasbourg court objected to this test on the basis that it did 
not allow domestic courts to themselves enquire into whether the measure being 
challenged was taken in pursuit of a compelling public interest and was proportionate to 
that interest.
112
 The requirement of necessity in De Freitas was limited to the question of 
whether there were less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. Lord Steyn‟s reasoning 
in Daly, based on the Strasbourg jurisprudence, added a fourth element to the test for 
proportionality in HRA cases – courts had to decide whether the measure was necessary 
in the sense that it pursued a compelling, rather than merely desirable or reasonable, 
public need.
113
   
 
 Formally, then, proportionality, as applied in HRA cases sets the threshold for 
interference with a right at a higher level than applies when a Convention right is not 
implicated and the courts merely enquire into the question of fair balance as a feature of 
reasonableness. In practice, however, elements of the more onerous structured 
proportionality test have been employed by courts in cases which ostensibly turn on 
unreasonableness.
114
 When it comes to content, there is no bright line between the two 
forms of proportionality described here. Despite this, there are some differences which 
remain relevant. First, the importance of the onus of proof should not be underestimated. 
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The burden of proving a lack of proportionality is a heavy one to bear and could defeat a 
claimant trying to overturn the decision of a state actor with much wider access to 
information or resources. Furthermore, the structured proportionality test arguably has the 
advantage of enhancing legal certainty by removing the discretion about what questions 
are relevant from judicial hands and requiring that the full gamut of the enquiry be 
applied whenever the HRA is implicated. The problem with this argument is there is now 
growing agreement that, as with unreasonableness, proportionality may be applied more 
or less intensely, depending on the demands of a particular case.
115
 Julian Rivers notes 
that the tendency of some courts (British, Canadian and South African) to treat 
„“necessity” as the final stage of proportionality review and to suppress the language of 
balancing‟ means that the public interest is also suppressed.116 Rivers‟ point is that this 
need not be the case if a proportionality analysis is seen as a balancing, rather than a 
„state-limiting‟ exercise. Rivers argues that although 'state-limiting' approaches to 
proportionality appear, at first sight, to grant more extensive rights-protection, British 
courts tend to uphold the government purpose as important and test simply for efficiency, 
assuming that 'whatever it takes to achieve a government aim is justified'.
117
  
Furthermore, the necessity test may often be reduced to the question of whether a 
decision is unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense,
118
 where some theory of judicial 
deference is at play. 
 
 Citing Lord Steyn in Daly,
119
 Rivers notes that the idea of variability in the 
intensity of review derived from a comparison of Wednesbury unreasonableness with 
proportionality. Lord Steyn indicated that a decision might be found to be reasonable in 
the Wednesbury sense but still be disproportionate. Thus, in both English and South 
African law,
120
 proportionality tends to be seen as the most demanding level of scrutiny in 
a number of contexts in which state action is being evaluated.
121
 However, recent cases 
have shown that, instead of seeing proportionality as the extreme end of the review scale, 
it is more useful and accurate to acknowledge that proportionality may itself be applied 
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more or less strictly.
122
 What makes proportionality a flexible principle is not the concept 
itself, but developing theories regarding judicial deference and restraint.
123
 The question 
then becomes one of which factors within a case will demand higher or lower levels of 
scrutiny.
124
 
 
 The House of Lords recently addressed the issue of the balancing of interests in a 
proportionality enquiry in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department; 
Kashmiri v Secretary of State for the Home Department.
125
 In a written intervention made 
on behalf of counsel for the applicants, Liberty criticised the formulation of the 
proportionality test in De Freitas, discussed above, on the basis that it ignored the 
„overriding requirement‟ for proportionality set out in the watershed Canadian decision 
on proportionality and the limitation of rights, R v Oakes.
126
 This requirement was the 
balancing of the interests of society with those of individuals and groups. The House of 
Lords agreed that this was an essential aspect of the enquiry.
127
 But as pointed out by 
Jeffrey Jowell, Huang appears to endorse a more utilitarian approach to the balancing of 
rights and the public interest than was intended in Oakes.
128
 Chief Justice Dickson did 
refer to the balancing of societal interests with those of individuals and groups as an 
objective of the enquiry into proportionality
129
 but prefaced this concern by noting that, in 
the first leg of the test, a court had to establish that the impugned act was taken in the 
pursuit of a sufficiently important objective – one related to concerns „which are pressing 
and substantial in a free and democratic society‟.130 Thus, balancing is indisputably part 
of the enquiry but, in that balancing process, courts are not meant to accept any 
governmental objective as legitimate. The governmental act must be necessary according 
to the standards of a democratic society.
131
 It is important to note here that the House of 
Lords‟ engagement with this issue does not detract from the concerns raised by Rivers. In 
fact, Liberty‟s written intervention in the case is an indication that the balancing element 
and a proper interrogation of the governmental objective are often missing from the cases. 
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This issue must be borne in mind as we consider the future of substantive review in this 
jurisdiction. 
 
(e) The future of substantive review   
A number of commentators have emphasised the impossibility of separating what is 
required in terms of the proportionality tests – fair balance as well as structured 
proportionality – from the requirements of reasonableness.132 The balance of relevant 
considerations, and the questions of whether there is a rational connection between means 
and objectives and whether the measure taken by the public authority has too oppressive 
an impact on affected individuals are all aspects of both reasonableness and 
proportionality enquiries.
133
 This is not to say that all judges are willing to apply these 
factors in all cases – as noted earlier, some judges continue to apply Wednesbury in its 
strictest form,
 134
 even where nothing in the subject matter of the case requires such high 
levels of judicial restraint. This kind of judicial deference is, however, becoming less 
defensible as domestic and international pressure on courts to intervene in areas 
previously impervious to judicial review increases. 
 
 There are a number of possible developments in this area of English law. First, 
proportionality could continue to be applied alongside the modified Wednesbury test. 
Thus, the structured proportionality test would apply only in EC and, more significantly 
for the purposes of this thesis, HRA cases. Courts would apply a modified version of the 
Wednesbury test to all other judicial review cases.  In cases where common law rights and 
interests are implicated, or where the administrative act imposes penalties on 
individuals,
135
 courts would use a fair balance test and insist on a compelling public 
interest justifying the infringement of the rights. Where rights are not implicated at all, 
courts would ask whether the decision falls within the range of reasonable responses.  A 
second possibility is that proportionality will develop into an independent ground of 
review, potentially applicable in all judicial review cases. If this development were to 
take place, the result would be either official acceptance of the informal fair balance 
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enquiry or adoption of the structured proportionality test currently used in HRA cases. 
The latter option is the more likely one. It is difficult to see how proportionality as fair 
balance would suffice when concerns with a fair balance have already been developed as 
part of a less onerous enquiry into reasonableness. The third and final possibility is that 
proportionality could supplant unreasonableness as a ground of review. 
 
Although commentators are still reluctant to hail the demise of unreasonableness, 
there are three reasons why this is a likely development. First, a large number of the cases 
that would previously have been brought on the basis of reasonableness review will now 
be brought as HRA cases, provided a fundamental right in the HRA is implicated.
136
 
Second, as argued in De Smith, one effect of the increased use of the structured test for 
proportionality is a change in expectations of how decision-makers ought to behave. An 
emerging culture of justification demands that an enquiry more searching than is 
permitted under Wednesbury take place when a decision impacts upon fundamental rights 
and important interests.
137
 Similarly, Craig makes the point that the somewhat tenuous 
distinction that currently exists between a modified Wednesbury test and structured 
proportionality may become harder to maintain as courts get into the practice of applying 
structured proportionality.
138
 A third, related point is that, as proportionality may be 
applied at varying levels of intensity, Wednesbury unreasonableness may be „caught 
within the “pincers” of the tests used in EC law and the HRA‟.139 In other words, 
structured proportionality, applied at a less intense level to suit the circumstances of the 
case, would, in fact, accommodate the kind of enquiry which now takes places under 
reasonableness. 
 
Arguments to retain unreasonableness alongside proportionality have more to do 
with the different flavours of the tests than their actual content.  It has been difficult for 
courts to shake the test for unreasonableness free of its Wednesbury roots. The association 
of review for unreasonableness with a high level of judicial caution, whilst not 
inescapable, is strong. By contrast, the structured proportionality test has developed in 
response to international obligations to protect fundamental human rights. The test places 
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more serious demands of justification on public authorities and gives courts greater 
capacity to overturn their decisions. However, this increased capacity for judicial 
interference should not be overestimated. As argued by Craig,  
This is, however, not an argument for rejecting proportionality as a general head of 
review, but for ensuring that its application is subject to the same threshold principles 
which apply generally within administrative law. The reach of proportionality must be 
limited by justiciability.
140
 
The Wednesbury test has already been used to enquire into the merits of, and strike down, 
decisions which could not be said to be absurd or illogical.
141
 Neither this, nor an enquiry 
into the substance of a decision in an application of a structured proportionality test, need 
involve a judge substituting his or her views about what the „best‟ or „correct‟ outcome 
would have been for that of the public authority. Some enquiry into merits in substantive 
review is inescapable but this kind of review principally involves an evaluation of the 
proffered justification.   It does not detract from courts‟ secondary role as reviewers, 
rather than originators of public decisions.
142
 Variability of the intensity of review means 
that proportionality itself may be applied more or less strictly – as a test of mere 
rationality in appropriate instances, for example. There could even be cases in which 
substantive review is not applicable because of widespread policy implications or a 
serious institutional capacity deficit on the part of the courts in a particular area.
143
 
 
(3) South Africa 
 
(a) Pre-1994 review for unreasonableness 
Although some apartheid-era judges used principles of administrative justice to protect 
individuals’ rights and interests against racist and oppressive government policies, many 
considered themselves bound by Parliamentary intent to apply those laws. The system of 
Parliamentary supremacy also meant that the legislature could pass Acts removing the 
power of review from the courts.
144
 As a result, administrative justice in the apartheid era 
was marked by curtailment of judicial power to question or overturn administrative 
action.  
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Under the common law’s convoluted classification of functions approach, a series 
of factors were applied to decide whether the action could be scrutinised in terms of 
principles of administrative law: ‘the nature of the functionary performing the action; the 
nature of the power being exercised; the source of the power; the subject matter of the 
power; and whether the body concerned had a duty to act in the public interest’.145 A 
further classification of the action as purely judicial, purely administrative, legislative or 
quasi-judicial decided the bases for review.
146
  
 
  When it came to the review of administrative decisions, by far the largest category 
of administrative acts,
147
 courts applied a symptomatic unreasonableness test. The leading 
authority here was Union Government v Union Steel Corporation, in which Stratford JA 
stated: 
Nowhere has it been held that unreasonableness is sufficient ground for interference; 
emphasis is always laid upon the necessity of the unreasonableness being so gross that 
something else can be inferred from it, either that it is "inexplicable except on the 
assumption of mala fides or ulterior motive"… or that it amounts to proof that the person 
on whom the discretion is conferred has not applied his (sic) mind to the matter…148 
Thus, unreasonableness was not, in itself, a ground of review for administrative decisions 
at all. Instead, judicial review was based on pre-existing grounds of procedural review 
(the presence of mala fides or ulterior motive).
149
 In NTC v Chetty's Transport 
Commission (Pty) Ltd, the Appellate Division held that, in order to be successfully 
challenged, the decision had to be „so grossly unreasonable to so striking a degree‟ that 
some other illegality could be inferred from it.
150
 Thus, the jurisprudence tended to focus 
on a notion of super-unreasonableness. This approach was heavily criticised on the basis 
that, if we consider unreasonableness to mean that a decision lacks ‘plausible 
justification’, it is difficult to see why an unreasonable decision, as opposed to a grossly 
unreasonable decision made in bad faith or with an ulterior motive, should not be 
evidence of an abuse of discretionary powers.
151
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As with English law, the position was different for acts classified as legislative – 
mainly the enactment of delegated legislation. In such cases, the leading authority was the 
English decision Kruse v Johnson, discussed above.
152
 If legislative acts disclosed 
inequality, injustice and oppression; bad faith; vagueness or uncertainty
153
 they could be 
successfully challenged for unreasonableness.
154
 But under the system of Parliamentary 
supremacy, Parliament could authorise unreasonable forms of delegated legislation, such 
as oppressive or unequal bye-laws, either explicitly or by implication.
155
 Scholars 
researching and writing in this field expected the Constitution to signal a ‘seismic shift’ in 
this area of the law.
156
  
 
(b) Reasonableness and the Constitution 
This expectation appeared to be well founded in three important CC decisions: Fedsure 
Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council;
157
 
President of the Republic of South Africa v SARFU;
158
 and Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of South Africa: Ex parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa.
159
 In these cases, the CC developed a principle of legality based on constitutional 
principles, rather than legislative intent. The constitutional right to administrative justice 
in section 33 and its predecessor, section 24 of the interim Constitution applied only to 
administrative action. Academic commentators took the approach that the definition of 
„administrative action‟ in these sections was intended to be wide.160 This was not always 
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borne out in the cases
161
 and the definition of „administrative action in the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) has been criticised as being overly 
complicated and narrow.
162
 
 
  However, in the three cases above, the CC held that all exercises of public power 
were susceptible to review by the courts on the basis of an overarching constitutional 
principle of legality. This principle included both explicit and implicit constitutional 
requirements
163
 such as a Presidential duty to act in good faith and not misconstrue the 
relevant power.
164
 Moreover, in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, the Court interpreted the 
constitutional principle of legality to demand a rational connection between the decision 
and the purpose for which the power had been awarded.
165
 
 
A number of pre- and post- Constitutional cases challenged the traditional 
symptomatic and gross unreasonableness formulations.
166
 Academic opinion supported 
the view that the interim Constitution’s formulation of a right to administrative action that 
was ‘justifiable in relation to the reasons given’167 overruled both the symptomatic and 
gross unreasonableness approaches.
168
 However, there was little agreement on exactly 
what a new test entailed. 
 
Etienne Mureinik suggested an enquiry encompassing aspects of rationality and 
proportionality, in the fair balance sense discussed above, but was careful to avoid any 
suggestion that the reviewing court could substitute its own judgment on the merits for 
that of the decision-maker.  The factors to be considered were whether: 
(a)  the decision-maker has considered all the serious objections to the decision taken, 
and has answers which plausibly meet them; 
(b)  the decision-maker has considered all the serious alternatives to the decision 
taken, and has discarded them for plausible reasons; and 
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(c) there is a rational connection between premises and conclusion: between the 
information (evidence and argument) before the decision-maker and the decision 
that it reached.
169
 
Some commentators were of the view that ‘justifiable in relations to the reasons given’ 
was used as a synonym for ‘reasonable’ in the interim Constitution’s right to just 
administrative action.
170
 More recently, the CC has indicated that the interim 
Constitution’s formulation demanded only that decisions be lawful, procedurally fair and 
rational.
171
 The final Constitution’s section 33(1), '[e]veryone has the right to 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair' appeared to finally 
close the door on gross and symptomatic unreasonableness but subsequent developments 
in South African administrative law have threatened this apparent clarity.    
 
 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) was enacted to ‘give effect 
to’ the s 33(1) right. Judicial review cases will now ordinarily be grounded in this piece of 
legislation, rather than the common law
172
 or section 33 of the Constitution.
173
 PAJA was 
one of the most anticipated pieces of post-apartheid legislation in South Africa. A number 
of commentators had argued strongly for the need for an Administrative Justice Act to 
provide the framework on which to hang the constitutional right to just administrative 
action.
174
 Commentators hoped that the Act would clarify and contain, to some extent, the 
constitutional right to just administrative action. The English version of the Act is only 
nine pages long. For such a modest piece of legislation, PAJA certainly attracted a great 
deal of controversy upon its enactment. Many would argue that it served to mystify rather 
than clarify matters.  
 
 The South African Law Commission (SALC) undertook, on request by the 
Minister of Justice, to set up a project committee, which would 'investigate and 
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recommend proposals for the fulfilment of the constitutional obligation obtained in s 33 
(3).'
175
 The SALC produced a report and an Administrative Justice Bill by August 
1999.
176
 The final form of Bill was then presented to the Minister of Justice.
177
 In its Draft 
Bill, the SALC adopted a generous approach to unreasonableness as a ground of review, 
including arbitrariness, irrationality and a lack of proportionality in its scope. However, 
the executive and legislature did not approve this formulation.
178
 In its final form, the Act 
includes arbitrariness and irrationality as grounds for review. It does not refer to 
proportionality as an aspect of reasonableness or an independent ground of review but 
includes a general ground of „unreasonableness‟ as a separate basis for review. 
 
 As to what makes an administrative act irrational, section 6(f) (ii) of PAJA states 
that a court or tribunal is empowered to review administrative action that is not rationally 
connected to: 
 (aa) the purpose for which it was taken; 
 (bb) the purpose of the empowering provision; 
 (cc) the information before the administrator; or 
 (dd) the reasons given for it by the administrator [emphasis added]. 
The fact that the rational connection need only exist between the action and any one of 
the categories listed here encourages a deferential approach to judicial review. Courts will 
not be allowed, on the face of it, to enquire into the nature of the purpose for the action or 
the reasons given for such action. Oppressive acts would therefore pass muster on this 
ground provided they exhibit the rational connection required.
179
 There is some 
uncertainty over whether a rational connection exists where there is an objective 
probability that the end will be achieved or whether simply aiming at that end is 
sufficient.
180
 On either interpretation, rationality does not, of itself, allow a court to 
enquire into the legitimacy or impact of the purpose. In certain circumstances, a court 
could find that a rational connection does not exist because the reasons given were so 
obviously baseless. The problem here is that much depends on the willingness of 
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individual judges to interpret PAJA in this way and that judges are only likely to do this 
in extreme cases where decisions are based on patently ‘bad’ reasons, for example. 181 On 
balance, then, this ground of review in PAJA codifies but does not add anything to the 
usual common law grounds.
182
  
 
 Unreasonableness is mentioned as an independent basis for review in PAJA in the 
following terms:  
 A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the 
exercise of the power or the performance of the function authorised by the empowering 
legislation, in pursuance of which the administrative action was purportedly taken, is so 
unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power or performed 
the function.
183
 
This appears to import Wednesbury unreasonableness
184
 into South Africa’s post-
constitutional jurisprudence, at a time when the notion is widely discredited in English 
law.  At the same time, rationality is a separate ground of review in the Act. These factors 
indicate that, when a court reviews the reasonableness of administrative action, it must 
require something more than ‘mere’ rationality – arguably, proportionality.185 As stated by 
Cora Hoexter:  
A reasonable decision is rational in the sense that it is supported by the evidence and 
information before the decision-maker and the reasons given for it; and in the sense that it 
is rationally connected to its purpose or objectively capable of furthering the purpose. 
One must add, however, that a reasonable decision also reveals proportionality between 
ends and means, benefits and detriments.
186 
 
Decisions by the CC have fuelled the confusion on this issue. In Bel Porto School 
Governing Body and Others v Premier, Western Cape, and Another,
187
 a minority of the 
judges held that justifiability, although it does not amount to the court determining what 
would, in its view, have been the ‘correct’ or best outcome, does require ‘something more 
substantial and persuasive’ than a rational connection between the reasons given and the 
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decision reached.
188
 In their dissenting judgment, Mokgoro and Sachs JJ were 
unequivocal about the place of proportionality in post-Constitutional South African 
administrative law:  
The right to administrative action that is justifiable in relation to the reasons given 
incorporates the principle of proportionality, fundamental to a constitutional regime.
 
This 
would ordinarily require that the effects of the action be proportionate to the objective 
sought to be achieved. 
189
   
However, Chaskalson CJ, writing for the majority, found that the interim Constitution had 
not introduced substantive fairness as a basis for reviewing administrative action into 
South African law.
190
 He held that justifiability required only that the decision be a 
rational one, taken lawfully and to a proper purpose.
191
 The majority left open the 
possibility for justifiability to encompass a more intensive standard of review. However, 
this case was held to be an inappropriate one in which to set such a higher standard.
192
  
 
A concern with the principle of separation of powers was at the heart of 
Chaskalson CJ‟s reasoning. He held that the application of a standard of substantive 
fairness would involve the courts trespassing into the political and administrative 
domains. This was of great significance in cases like Bel Porto, where the issues at stake 
were highly complex and politically charged.
193
 In his reasoning, however, Chaskalson CJ 
saw this concern as one that applied when any administrative act was challenged before 
the courts: 
I do not consider that item 23(2) (b) of schedule 6 has…introduced substantive fairness 
into our law as a criterion for judging whether administrative action is valid or not. The 
setting of such a standard would drag courts into matters which according to the 
separation of powers should be dealt with at a political or administrative level and not at a 
judicial level.
194
  
                                                 
188
   Mokgoro and Sachs JJ in Bel Porto (note 187 above) at par. 40. 
189
   Bel Porto (note 187 above) at par. 40. 
190
  Note 187 above at par.88. 
191
  Chaskalson CJ in Bel Porto (note 187 above) at par. 89. Lord Roskill adopted a similar approach 
in Brind (note 36 above) at 749-50.  
192
   Bel Porto (note 187 above) at par. 128. 
193
  Bel Porto (note 187 above) at par. 88. As part of a plan to rationalise and create a more equitable 
education system, the Western Cape Education Department (WCED) decided to reduce posts at 
overstaffed schools and create new posts at understaffed schools. It refused to create new posts 
until the plans had been finalised. The appellants were a group of former House of Assembly 
(reserved for those people classified as „white‟) Elsen schools.  The Elsen schools catered for 
students with disabilities. Under apartheid, the education department paid a subsidy to these 
schools, but not to those of other racial groups, for the employment of general assistants. Under the 
new plans, the WCED would no longer do this. The appellants argued that this change violated 
their rights to equality and just administrative action, as well as the children‟s rights in the 
Constitution. See Chaskalson CJ at pars.8-10; 12-14; 22; 34; 37; 39-40; and 43. 
194
  Bel Porto (note 187 above) at par. 88. 
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What this passage fails to recognise is that not all administrative acts implicate the 
principle of separation of powers or involve politically contentious and complicated 
subject matter. Furthermore, the reasoning here does not take account of the variable 
intensity of judicial scrutiny, indicating instead that a blanket low threshold must apply to 
all administrative acts. 
 
 Fortunately, in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism and others,
195
 the judges of the CC unanimously criticised the 
Wednesbury unreasonableness formulation in PAJA, noted that few decisions would ever 
be successfully challenged on a literal interpretation of the standard and held that the 
section had to be interpreted in line with the Constitution, which required that 
administrative action be reasonable.
196
 The CC referred to the idea of judicial deference 
as a fundamental part of the separation of powers doctrine
197
 but stated   
[t]his does not mean… that where the decision is one which will not reasonably result in 
the achievement of the goal, or which is not reasonably supported on the facts or not 
reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it, a court may not review that decision.
198
  
 
In the recent case of Sidumo, the CC approved the reasoning in Bato Star and 
applied it to a labour dispute.
199
 The court held that the relevant question was whether the 
decision made by the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) 
upholding Mr Sidumo‟s claim for an unfair dismissal had been reasonable. That question 
had to be answered with reference to the test set out by O‟Regan J in Bato Star: was the 
commissioner‟s decision one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach?200  
 
These cases indicate that the general tenor of the test for unreasonableness has 
changed substantially in the constitutional era. But has there also been a transformation of 
the content of that test? In arriving at its decision in Bato Star the CC, per O’Regan J, set 
out a number of factors to be used in determining whether a decision is reasonable: 
 [T]he nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the range of 
factors relevant to the decision, the reasons given for the decision, the nature of the 
competing interests involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and well-being of 
                                                 
195
  Note 173 above. 
196
   Bato Star (note 173 above) at par. 44. 
197
   Bato Star (note 173 above) at par. 46. 
198
   Bato Star (note 173 above) at par. 48. 
199
  Sidumo and Congress of South African Trade Unions v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd; 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Moropa NO 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC). 
200
  Sidumo (note 199 above) at pars. 106-10. 
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those affected.
201
 
 
O’Regan J’s open-ended list adds a number of searching concerns to the enquiry 
and, most importantly, acknowledges that a decision might fall within the parameters of 
the legislation but still have a troubling, adverse impact on affected parties. This idea is in 
keeping with the approach favoured by Sachs and Mokgoro JJ in Bel Porto, above – that 
administrative review for unreasonableness in a constitutional context ordinarily includes 
an enquiry into proportionality. Chief Justice Chaskalson approved O’Regan J’s 
formulation of the relevant factors in a reasonableness enquiry in New Clicks.
202
 In 
addition, he noted that the section 33 (1) of the Constitution sets a standard higher than 
rationality for the review of administrative action. Moreover, this standard is variable.
203
  
 
The idea of a variable intensity of review is extremely important as it addresses 
the concerns explored in chapter 1 of this thesis and highlighted in Chaskalson CJ’s 
judgment in Bel Porto above.
204
 A high but variable standard for review does not force 
courts to adopt the highly deferential stance taken by the majority in Bel Porto in all 
cases. It allows judges to balance the protection of rights and interests with respect for 
political and administrative judgment. For different reasons, the Court did not apply this 
higher standard in either case.
205
 In Bato Star, the application of these factors to the case 
was less than rigorous, with no consideration of impact in the determination of 
reasonableness.
206
 Arguably, the judges in Bato Star did not apply proportionality in its 
fullest sense because of the political sensitivity of the issues involved.
207
 This fits with the 
idea of a high but variable intensity of review but this is not clearly articulated in the 
judgment. Explicit engagement with the principle of proportionality and the notion of a 
variable intensity of review could address this concern. Despite the positive development 
of the reasonableness standard in Bato Star,
208
 the CC continues to steer clear of 
                                                 
201
  Bato Star (note 173 above) at par. 45. 
202
  Note 171 above at par. 187. 
203
  New Clicks (note 171 above) at par. 108. 
204
  Note 187 above. Variable intensity of review is discussed further in the chapters below. 
205
  On Bato Star, see pars. 53-4 of the judgment (note 173 above) and J de Ville „Deference as respect 
and deference as sacrifice: a reading of Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
(2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 577 at 580, 583-5. See also New Clicks (note 
171 above) at par.188. 
206
  De Ville (note 205 above) at 585.  
207
  Discussed further in section 3 (c) below. 
208
  Chief Justice Chaskalson approved O‟Regan J‟s formulation of the relevant factors in a 
reasonableness enquiry in New Clicks (note 171 above) at par. 187. 
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explicitly endorsing proportionality as an integral factor of an enquiry into 
reasonableness.
209
  
 
(c) Rights, proportionality and the future of reasonableness under the 
Constitution 
The scope of review for unreasonableness in South Africa is not as critical to the 
protection of individual rights as it was under apartheid. Individuals whose rights and 
interests have been adversely affected by administrative action need not rely on 
administrative law for relief. For example, claims that administrative acts such as a 
decision or the enactment of subordinate legislation are unequal in their impact are likely 
to be brought in terms of the right to equality protected in section 9 of the Constitution. 
The Bill of Rights is remarkably inclusive and it is probable that many other challenges to 
the acts of public officials will be brought on the basis of rights to freedom of expression, 
dignity, freedom of religion, privacy and so on. Most rights in the Bill of Rights are 
subject to limitation in terms of section 36: 
1. The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking 
into account all relevant factors, including-  
a. the nature of the right;  
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
c. the nature and extent of the limitation;  
d. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
2. Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, 
no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  
 
The CC has made it clear that the limitation analysis is a balancing exercise, an 
enquiry into proportionality: 
The limitation of constitutional rights… involves the weighing up of competing values, 
and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality. This is implicit in the provisions 
of section 33(1).
 210
 The fact that different rights have different implications for 
                                                 
209
  But, see the separate, concurring judgment of Sachs J in New Clicks (note 171 above) at par. 637 
and the minority judgment of Sachs and Mokgoro JJ in Bel Porto (note 187 above), discussed 
earlier. 
210
  The test of section 33, the limitation clause in the interim Constitution, in terms of which this case 
was decided, was slightly different from that in section 36 of the final Constitution. However, the 
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democracy…means that there is no absolute standard which can be laid down for 
determining reasonableness and necessity. Principles can be established, but the 
application of those principles to particular circumstances can only be done on a case by 
case basis. This is inherent in the requirement of proportionality, which calls for the 
balancing of different interests.
211
 
Thus, administrative acts that infringe rights protected in the Bill of Rights will have to 
pass a quite onerous proportionality test in order to be upheld.
212
 In the South African 
system, the same applies to original legislation and executive policies, which are no 
longer immune from judicial review. Despite this, the interpretation placed on 
reasonableness as a ground of review in administrative law remains relevant for similar 
reasons as those that apply to non-HRA cases in the U.K. 
 
 Important interests that do not easily fall within the protection of any of the rights 
in the Bill of Rights are likely to be at stake in a significant number of cases. The Bato 
Star
213
 case, mentioned above, is a good example of this. The case dealt with the 
allocation of fishing quotas in the deep-sea hake trawling industry in South Africa.
214
 In 
2002, the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism set up an application 
process for longer-term allocations, thought to be preferable, as it would encourage key 
participants to invest their capital and human resources in the fishing industry.
215
 Bato 
Star, one of the applicants for the 2002 – 2005 allocation, was unhappy with the 
allocation it had been granted, first by the Central Director, an official in the Department 
and then on appeal to the Minister.
216
 The company launched the internal appeal to the 
Minister and simultaneously sought judicial review of the allocation decisions before the 
High Court.
 217
  
 
The Department‟s policy guidelines, which accompanied the public invitation for 
applications indicated that allocations would be assessed according to the criteria set out 
in section 2 of the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998. The aim of protecting scarce 
                                                                                                                                                  
sections are textually very similar and this interpretation of section 33 is as applicable to section 
36.  
211
  Chaskalson P, as he then was, in S v Makwanyane and another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
at par. 104. 
212
  Although the test is not always applied rigorously. This issue is explored further in Chapter 5. 
213
  Note 173 above. 
214
  Bato Star (note 173 above) at par.1. 
215
  Bato Star (note 173 above) at par. 8. 
216
  The Minister had increased the allocation from 856 to 873 tonnes – see pars. 15-16 of the judgment 
(note 173 above). 
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marine resources featured prominently in the Act‟s objectives. The need to transform the 
industry, historically controlled by people classified as „white‟, in order to redress past 
imbalances and ensure equity was also a goal in the legislation.
218
  
 
Thus, issues vital not just to the individual companies concerned but to society in 
general were implicated in this case. Despite this, it would have been a legal distortion 
had the applicants based their claim on any of the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
Constitutional values such as equality
219
 and protection of the environment
220
 were 
important to the judgment but Bato Star’s fishing rights were not akin to an individual or 
group right to any of the rights listed in the Bill of Rights. Section 33 – the right to just 
administrative action – was, naturally, pivotal in the case221 but the section cannot be 
understood without some interpretation of ‘procedurally fair’, ‘lawful’ and, most 
importantly for this chapter, ‘reasonable’.222  
 
(4) Conclusion  
It is important to acknowledge the overlap between the various grounds of review in 
administrative law. It is impossible to conceive of these grounds as distinct wholes, 
hermetically sealed off from each other.  Whilst review of administrative decisions for 
unreasonableness in these two jurisdictions began as a legal fiction, a term used merely to 
indicate that some more established basis for review existed in a case, it has evolved into 
a more searching enquiry. This more searching enquiry interrogates the reasoning 
process, by demanding a rational connection between means and ends, for example. The 
enquiry could go even further by imposing certain requirements on the substance of the 
decision – that the importance of the goals underlying the administrative act outweighs its 
oppressive impact, for instance. 
 
Thus, a reasonable administrative act can denote much more than just a rational 
decision, provided for by the relevant legislation and taken according to established 
                                                                                                                                                  
217
  Bato Star (note 173 above) at pars.14-16. Phambili Fisheries, another company unhappy with its 
quota, also challenged the decision and the applications were heard together in the High Court. See 
O‟Regan J (note 173 above) at par. 17. 
218
  Bato Star (note 173 above) at par. 5. 
219
  See the separate concurring judgment of Ngcobo J, Bato Star (note 173 above) at pars. 73-5. 
220
  See O‟Regan J, Bato Star (note 173 above) at par.38. 
221
  O‟Regan J, Bato Star (note 173 above) at par 23. 
222
  Generally now to be interpreted through the lens of PAJA. 
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procedural norms. Currently, courts in both jurisdictions discussed here apply the 
reasonableness enquiry at varying levels of intensity. Where these cases involve the 
protection of fundamental rights, certain writers have been critical of a weak approach to 
review.
223
 But such writers themselves admit to limits on the capacity of judges to 
interfere in politically sensitive matters, in respect of which the legislature and executive 
have the responsibility to make long-term decisions in the public interest. Varying the 
intensity of review has the benefit of accommodating these limits whilst protecting rights 
and interests. Unfortunately, it has proved difficult for many judges to separate review for 
unreasonableness from its deferent roots. Furthermore, even where judges apply a higher 
standard of scrutiny, their reasons for doing so are often unclear. The standard of review 
applied must be related to current debates about justiciability.
224
 
 
  A structured proportionality test seemingly has the advantage of being a more 
precise means through which all decision-makers, including judges, must justify their 
decisions. It also has the advantage of explicitly encompassing procedural and 
substantive, deferential and more invasive aspects of review. But, even within a 
structured proportionality test, much depends on the attitude of judges to their role. As 
Rivers argues, judges could decide to emphasise the question of whether there are less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose at the expense of a real enquiry into an 
appropriate balance between individual and societal interests. They often choose to 
simply accept the public official‟s view of whether a compelling public interest exists. So, 
applying a structured proportionality test does not, in itself, guarantee greater certainty or 
more effective protection of rights.  
 
 The burden of proof is another issue which must be addressed in any model of SE 
rights adjudication. When structured tests for proportionality such as those set out in 
HRA cases in the U.K. and section 36 of the South African Constitution are applied, the 
onus of demonstrating proportionality rests with the decision-maker. This means that a 
claimant need not confront the difficulty of proving a lack of proportionality in someone 
else‟s decision-making process. When proportionality is considered as a feature of review 
for unreasonableness in administrative law, the burden of proof is the claimant‟s unless 
                                                 
223
  The critique of SE rights cases or cases impacting on SE interests are most relevant for this thesis 
and are examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 below. 
224
  Discussed in Chapter 1. 
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common law rights are implicated. At the moment, common law rights do not extend to 
SE rights. The South African Constitution contains SE rights but these are subject to 
internal limitations which turn on reasonableness, rather than the general limitation clause 
in section 36. As a result, the claimant bears the onus of proof. This is a factor to be borne 
in mind when thinking about the extent to which administrative law and reasonableness 
should inform judicial approaches to SE rights. These issues are discussed further in 
chapter 5. 
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Chapter Four 
Using reasonableness to enforce social and economic guarantees in South Africa 
 
(1) Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the South African Constitutional Court‘s (CC‘s) approach to social 
and economic (SE) rights in the most important cases decided to date. At the outset, it is 
worth emphasising the point that the judicial role in implementing SE rights is a limited one. 
The importance of adjudication in this area has been exaggerated in South Africa, arguably 
because of the novelty value of constitutionally protected, justiciable SE rights. This judicial 
emphasis may also be related to the part judicial review sometimes played in vindicating 
rights under apartheid.
1
 Before the enactment of our first post-apartheid Constitution, South 
Africans often turned to the courts for relief from discriminatory laws and practices because 
they had few other available means to protect their rights. Although the record of the courts 
in protecting rights was patchy, the image of the judiciary as a principal means through 
which to resist state interference with rights has survived.   
 
In reality, judicial oversight is only one of a number of tools which may be used to 
secure access to housing, medical treatment, social security benefits and so on. It is not even 
the most important such tool:  
The greatest challenge facing human rights implementation is perhaps what is neatly but 
glibly referred to as 'mainstreaming' human rights. It may be that the consciousness of 'the 
judge over your shoulder' is necessary to begin or to reinforce the awareness and 
operalisation of standards of behaviour, but eventually success will depend on this seeming 
right (not a matter of rights).
2
Furthermore, as argued in chapter 1, even where there is a constitutional mandate to give 
effect to SE rights and interests there are often convincing reasons for judges to exercise 
caution. The potential exists for the judiciary to do damage to the broader goal of societal 
transformation and a fair distribution of resources if judges do not consider the long-term 
implications of their orders, or if they impede the ability of government officials to quickly 
respond to changing needs and priorities. As a result, we must consider the judicial role 
                                                 
1
  C Hoexter ‗The future of judicial review in South African administrative law‘ (2000) South African 
Law Journal 484 at 499-500. 
2
 J Cottrell and Y Ghai 'The role of the courts in the protection of economic, social and cultural rights' in 
Y Ghai and J Cottrell (eds.) (2004) Economic, social and cultural rights in practice: the role of judges 
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within the context of that played by others - such as lawmakers, legal practitioners and civil 
society organizations - who have an interest in protecting these rights. 
 
  Most of the commentary on the CC’s approach to SE rights focuses on four early 
cases: Soobramoney,
3
 Grootboom,
4
 Treatment Action Campaign
5
 and Khosa.
6
 As stated at 
the beginning of chapter 3, Cass Sunstein’s classification of the CC’s approach to SE rights as 
an administrative law model, following the court’s decision in Grootboom, has been 
remarkably influential in the debate over the efficacy of SE rights adjudication in South 
Africa.
7
 To reiterate, many commentators do not share Sunstein’s enthusiasm for the CC’s 
approach. Scholars have identified a preoccupation with the internal limitations set out in 
sections 26 (2) and 27 (2); a consequent failure to give real content to the rights; and the 
rejection of a minimum core approach to the rights as the main flaws in the CC’s SE rights 
adjudication. They trace these shortcomings to the court’s adoption of an administrative law 
approach, arguing that a focus on procedure, rather than substance, is one of the defining 
characteristics of administrative law.
8
  
 
Certain commentators have disagreed with Sunstein‘s assessment that the CC‘s 
approach to SE rights is driven by administrative law principles. Steinberg, for instance, 
argues that the court employs a unique concept of reasonableness suited to the adjudication 
of SE rights in that it places particular emphasis on the values of human dignity and 
equality.
9
 Wesson also refutes the administrative law understanding of the CC‘s SE rights 
jurisprudence, suggesting that the judgments in Grootboom, Treatment Action Campaign and 
Khosa are better understood as driven by a concern that government action should not 
                                                                                                                                                       
in implementing economic, social and cultural rights (Interights: London) at 65. 
3
  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
4
  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
5
  Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC). 
6
  Khosa and others v Minister of Social Development and others; Mahlaule and another v Minister of 
Social Development and Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). 
7
  ‗Social and economic rights? Lessons from South Africa‘ (2000/2001) 11(4) Constitutional Forum at 
132. 
8
  See, for example, D Bilchitz (2007) Poverty and fundamental rights: the justification and enforcement 
of socio-economic rights (OUP: Oxford), chapter 5; and M Pieterse ‗Coming to terms with judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights‘ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 383 at 407. 
9
  C Steinberg ‗Can Reasonableness Protect the Poor? A Review of South Africa‘s Socio-Economic 
Rights Jurisprudence‘ (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 264 at 265 and 277.  
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disregard or neglect vulnerable sections of society.
10
 
 
For the sake of clarity, scholars in this area may roughly be divided into three 
categories: those who are attracted to the idea of an administrative law model because it 
limits what may be expected of government to process-related concerns of transparency and 
justification; those who reject the model for precisely the same reason, arguing that it entails 
weak enforcement of the rights; and those who support the CC‘s model as one that goes 
beyond administrative law review for unreasonableness to an emphasis on substantive 
concerns such as dignity and equality. It is not always possible to fit particular commentators 
neatly into any single category. For example, with reference to the South African CC‘s 
decision in Khosa, Sandra Fredman notes that the standard of reasonableness may be 
interpreted to include a high level of substantive content and may entail high intensity review 
of governmental action and inaction. At the same time, ‗the ease with which reasonableness 
can descend into a highly deferent standard of review has frequently been noted‘.11  
 
Fredman‘s comment highlights an important point about the academic criticism of the 
CC‘s SE rights jurisprudence. Although many scholars have questioned the CC‘s focus on 
reasonableness, few have quibbled with the outcome of the early decisions mentioned above. 
Most of the criticism of the CC‘s approach has been based on the court‘s methodology.12 
Sometimes, calls for the court to have gone further in its interpretation of the content of the 
SE rights have been accompanied by praise for aspects of the judicial method and approval 
                                                 
10
  M Wesson ‗Grootboom and beyond: reassessing the socio-economic jurisprudence of the South 
African Constitutional Court‘ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 284. 
11
  ‗Human rights transformed: positive duties and positive rights‘ (2006) Public Law 498 at 515. See also 
S Liebenberg ‗Basic rights claims. How responsive is ―reasonableness review‖?‘ (2003) ESR Review 5 
(5) 7 at 9-10. 
12
  See note 8 above. See also M Pieterse Resuscitating Socio-economic Rights: Constitutional 
Entitlements to Health Care Services (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 473 at 475; D 
Bilchitz ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: laying the foundations for future socio-
economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 1 at 2. Many 
commentators have criticised the CCs failure to use the remedy of a structural interdict, which would 
have required government to report back to the court on the implementation of its orders. In this thesis, 
I focus on the court’s approach to the interpretation of SE rights. A discussion of supervisory 
jurisdiction and other remedies is beyond the scope of the thesis. Literature on this issue includes: T 
Bollyky 'R if C>P+B: A Paradigm for Judicial Remedies of Socio-Economic Rights Violations' (2002) 
18 South African Journal on Human Rights 161; K Pillay 'Implementing Grootboom: Supervision 
Needed' (2002) 3 ESR Review 11; and D Davis 'Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: The Record 
of the Constitutional Court after Ten Years' (2004) 5(5) ESR Review 3. 
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for the judicial outcome.
13
 In light of this, it is important to address the question of why 
further engagement with the South African CC‘s approach to SE rights adjudication is 
necessary.  
 
Although fourteen years have elapsed since the final Constitution was enacted, there 
have been relatively few cases dealing with the SE rights sections of the Constitution. In 
cases such as Grootboom, Treatment Action Campaign and Khosa, the court‘s task was made 
easier by the fact that the cost implications were limited or that there was already a level of 
agreement between government and the litigants. However, the court has had to confront 
much more complex issues in cases decided in 2008 and 2009. Furthermore, the question of 
relative institutional power is an increasingly thorny issue in the South African political 
context.  
 
To date, executive criticism of the court has been swiftly followed by ruling party 
(ANC) statements of respect for judicial independence, evidence that the court enjoys a 
significant amount of institutional security.
14
 As Theunis Roux points out, the CC‘s 
institutional security cannot be explained either by high levels of judicial deference – the 
court continues to hand down judgments which are not always popular with legislative and 
executive bodies – or by high levels of public support.15 Roux locates the CC‘s success, 
measured in terms of institutional security and widespread respect in the national and 
international legal communities, in ‗its ability to hand down decisions of principle in cases 
where other courts may have balked‘.16  The fact that the CC has managed to do this in the 
absence of public support is due to what Roux has termed a ‗mutually beneficial relationship‘ 
between it and the ANC. The CC has ‗managed‘ its role with the legislature and executive, 
sometimes compromising on legal principle ‗in the long term interests of the constitutional 
project‘.17 The ANC‘s public endorsement of the CC‘s work and role has mitigated the effect 
                                                 
13
  See D Bilchitz ‗South Africa: right to health and access to HIV/AIDS drug treatment‘ (2003) 1(3) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 524 at 530-1; Pieterse (note 8 above) at 402-3. 
14
  T Roux ‗Principle and pragmatism on the Constitutional court of South Africa‘ (2009) 7(1) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 106 at 112. See also the discussion of the TAC case in 
section 3 below. 
15
  Roux (note 14 above) at 106-107. 
16
  Roux (note 14 above) at 137. 
17
  Roux (note 14 above) at 138. 
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of public reaction to unpopular judgments. And the CC‘s consequent ability to go on handing 
down principled judgments in certain cases lends credence to government policies.
18
 
Furthermore, government‘s acceptance of such decisions – those that challenge established 
policy, in particular, provides very public evidence of the health of the rule of law and good 
governance in the country.  
 
But recently, ruling party criticism of the judiciary has become more common and 
more vehement, with cases involving Judge President of the Cape High Court John Hlope 
and ANC President Jacob Zuma attracting the most attacks on the judiciary in general and 
the CC in particular.
19
 The delicate balance of power between the judiciary and other 
branches of government may well be shifting. In the current political climate, the judiciary 
could begin to face greater threats to its security as an institution. It is even more important 
that their approach to politically controversial cases – often those involving protection of SE 
rights – acts as a bolster, rather than a threat, to that security.  
 
The concern with the court‘s approach to SE rights, then, is largely located in the fear 
that future cases are likely to pose more complex problems; that the political climate could 
pose new challenges to the approach; and that the content of the SE rights has not been 
defined in sufficient detail to cater for this. This concern for the future of SE rights 
adjudication means that we need to engage seriously with the current South African model 
and consider whether it has the potential to address more difficult SE rights cases. The court 
is likely to face increasing criticism from a government following a particular transformation 
agenda and a population frustrated by the slowness of delivery of goods like housing and 
health care. Some of its later SE rights cases deal precisely with the conflict between these 
two sets of interests. The court‘s ability to preserve its institutional security as well its 
                                                 
18
  Roux (note 14 above) at 138. 
19
  In 2008, the Constitutional Court lodged a complaint against Cape Judge President John Hlope. In it, 
they alleged that Hlope had attempted to improperly influence two CC judges over judgements 
concerning Jacob Zuma and the French arms company, Thint. ANC Secretary-General, Gwede 
Mantashe, described the judges as ‗counter-revolutionary‘ for the manner in which they had handled 
the issue. See ‗Mantashe slated for attitude on Concourt‘ by Lavern de Vries, Cape Argus, 16 October 
2008, page 5. See also ‗Provincial ANC takes Hlope‘s side‘ by Bonganie Mthembu and Ella Smook, 
23 June 2008, page 3; and ‗‘Mantashe lashes out at black judges‘ by Political Staff, Cape Argus, 14 
December 2008, page 1. These articles are available at www.iol.co.za (last accessed on 18 February 
2009).  
 137  
reputation for principled decision-making will be significantly influenced by the extent to 
which its approach to SE rights stands up to the most rigorous scrutiny. These concerns 
provide the background against which I examine the CC‘s developing model of SE rights 
adjudication. 
 
(2) Constructing an approach to social and economic rights adjudication: early 
cases before the Constitutional Court 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal)
 20
 was the first case brought on the 
basis of one of the SE rights in the Constitution. Mr Soobramoney was a diabetic with 
ischaemic heart disease and cerebro-vascular disease. He had a stroke in 1996 and his 
kidneys failed. At the time the case was decided, he was suffering from chronic renal 
failure. The outcome of the case could not have been more serious for Mr Soobramoney 
as his continued survival depended on his access to renal dialysis treatment.
21
  Due to a 
shortage of resources and facilities, the relevant hospital‘s policy was that patients with 
acute renal failure that could be remedied by renal dialysis would automatically be given 
treatment. Other patients had to show they were eligible for a kidney transplant. Mr 
Soobramoney‘s renal failure was irreversible and, due to the fact that he suffered from 
the other health conditions mentioned above, he was also not eligible for a kidney 
transplant.
22
  The case dealt with whether Mr Soobramoney could compel the hospital to 
provide renal dialysis by relying on his constitutional right to health. The court rejected 
his argument that the treatment amounted to emergency medical treatment in terms of 
section 27 (3) of the Constitution.
23
 The case then turned on whether the hospital‘s policy 
amounted to reasonable access to health care services, as required by section 27 (1) (a), 
read with section 27 (2).  
 The court held that the hospital's policy benefitted more patients than any other 
                                                 
20
  Note 3 above. 
21
  Soobramoney (note 3 above) at par. 1. 
22
  Soobramoney (note 3 above) at pars. 1 and 3-4. 
23
  The court found that the ordinary meaning of 'emergency medical treatment' did not include the 
ongoing treatment of chronic illnesses for the purpose of prolonging life. In Mr Soobramoney's case, 
there was no emergency that called for immediate remedial treatment. Instead, the condition was 
ongoing and incurable. Soobramoney (note 3 above) at par. 21. 
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policy would.
24
 Soobramoney is an example of a case in which the court found that the 
resource limitations on the state made its policy reasonable in the circumstances. The case 
has been criticised for a number of reasons.
25
 For the purposes of this chapter, the problem 
with the case lies in the court‘s reasoning on what ‗reasonableness‘ required in this context.  
The court held:   
The provincial administration which is responsible for health services in KwaZulu-Natal has 
to make decisions about the funding that should be made available for health care and how 
such funds should be spent. These choices involve difficult decisions to be taken at the 
political level in fixing the health budget, and at the functional level in deciding upon the 
priorities to be met. A court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good 
faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with 
such matters [emphasis added].
26
 
 
  The rationality standard is an extremely low one. In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 
the CC referred to rationality as ‘a minimum threshold requirement applicable to the exercise 
of all public power by members of the Executive and other functionaries’.27  On the question 
of what the content of the requirement of rationality is, the court found, relying on Prinsloo v 
van der Linde
28
 that ‘(a) s long as there is a rational relationship between the method and 
object it is irrelevant that the object could have been achieved in a different way’.29  
 
On a reading of section 27(1) itself, use of the standard of rationality is a problem, as 
the section demands that state action be measured against a standard of reasonableness. But, 
if one accepts that some degree of variability is necessary to uphold a constitutional balance 
of powers, as I have argued in chapter 3 above, what is missing from the Soobramoney 
judgment is not necessarily the application of a more onerous standard but some explanation, 
based on the circumstances of the case, for the adoption of bare rationality. Furthermore, 
although the court used the language of bare or mere rationality, its reasoning was more 
complex, focusing on the potential of the policy to benefit the greatest number of patients and 
                                                 
24
  Soobramoney (note 3 above) at par. 25. 
25
  For a more general critique of the court‘s approach, see C Scott and P Alston ‗Adjudicating 
constitutional priorities in a transnational context: A comment on Soobramoney’s legacy and 
Grootboom’s promise‘ (2000) 16 South African Journal on Human Rights 206. 
26
  Soobramoney (note 3 above) at par. 29. 
27
  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: ex parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa (2) SA 674 (CC) at par. 90. 
28
  1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC). 
29
  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (note 27 above) at par. 90, note 108. 
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the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Health’s significant overspending on its annual budget.30 
This closer examination of the court’s reasoning reveals a more nuanced approach but 
provides little guidance on what, in the nature of the case, attracted the low standard of 
scrutiny adopted by the court. Looking to the court for some elaboration of its general 
approach to SE rights adjudication in this, its first judgment on an SE rights claim, 
commentators were disappointed to find a simple, inadequately explained, application of 
rationality review.  As a result, the Soobramoney judgment appeared to signal a highly 
deferential judicial attitude to these rights.  
 
Happily, the CC moved away from the Soobramoney rationality standard in 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Grootboom and others.
31
 The 
case concerned a group of some 900 adults and children
32
 who had been living in terrible 
conditions, decided to move onto private land illegally and were evicted.
33
 They wanted 
the government to 'provide them with adequate basic shelter or housing until they 
obtained permanent accommodation'.
34
 The CC did not endorse the rationality standard 
from Soobramoney but also did not detail the content of the standard of reasonableness.  
On the judicial role in such cases, the court stated that the particulars of the housing 
programme should be left to the executive and the legislature to work out. It held: 
A court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or 
favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been 
better spent. The question would be whether the measures that have been adopted are 
reasonable. It is necessary to recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be 
adopted by the State to meet its obligations. Many of these would meet the requirement of 
reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measures do so, this requirement is met.35 
In effect then, this aspect of the judgment is disappointingly tautological, indicating that the 
question of reasonableness turns on whether the particular measures taken are reasonable. In 
the result, however, the court found government‘s housing programme to be deficient 
because it did not provide temporary relief for those in desperate need, described in the 
                                                 
30
  Soobramoney (note 3 above) at pars. 24 – 25. 
31
  Note 4 above at par. 20. 
32
  Grootboom (note 4 above) at par. 4, note 2. 
33
  Grootboom (note 4 above) at par. 3. Other people had already moved onto the vacated settlement. At 
the time the case was decided, the litigants were living on a sports field (at pars. 9 -11). 
34
  Grootboom (note 4 above) at par. 4. 
35
  Grootboom (note 4 above) at par. 41. 
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judgment as those with ‗no access to land, no roof over their heads‘; ‗people who are living 
in intolerable conditions‘ and ‗people who are in crisis because of natural disasters such as 
floods and fires, or because their homes are under threat of demolition‘.36 The court set out, 
at some length, what would constitute reasonable government action in the context of 
housing. Amongst other things, a housing programme had to be reasonable in both design 
and implementation; it could not ignore a significant segment of the population; it had to be 
coherent and set out clear tasks for the different spheres of government; national government 
had to put in place an equitable distribution of the housing budget to provincial and local 
governments; and government had to ensure that the required resources, financial and human, 
were available for the implementation of the programme.
37
 
 
In Soobramoney, the judges placed far fewer demands on government action. They 
took at face value the claim of a lack of resources, based on the provincial Department of 
Health‘s overspending on its budget. As indicated above, the court‘s dictum in Soobramoney 
that all government decisions, whether taken at a political (setting the health budget) or 
functional (deciding on health priorities) level had only to be rational and taken in good faith, 
appeared to create a worrying precedent for SE rights jurisprudence. After all, it is difficult to 
conceive of an SE rights case where neither political nor functional decision-making would 
be implicated. But, in Grootboom, the judges did interrogate a functional decision – 
government‘s assessment of priorities in respect of housing – at a higher level of scrutiny. 
The court expressed approval for various aspects of government‘s housing programme38 but 
it dismissed as unreasonable government‘s decision to focus on medium and long-term 
housing aims at the expense of those people facing a housing emergency.
39
 It is likely that 
the judges were influenced by the fact that more rigorous scrutiny of the justification for the 
hospital‘s policy in Soobramoney could not have been achieved without some assessment of 
the budgetary allocation, a decision taken at a political level.  The fact that, by the time the 
case reached the CC in Grootboom, the Cape Metropolitan Council had already conceded 
that its housing programme needed to be amended to cater for people in crisis situations is 
                                                 
36
  Grootboom (note 4 above) at par. 52. 
37
  Grootboom (note 4 above) at pars. 39-45. 
38
  Grootboom (note 4 above) at pars. 53-55. 
39
  Grootboom (note 4 above) at par. 66. 
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also significant.
40
 In the face of such a concession, it could hardly be objected that the judges 
were overstepping the mark in their assessment that the housing programme was deficient.  
 
In the subsequent Treatment Action Campaign case, 41 dealing with access to the 
once-off provision of the anti-retroviral drug nevirapine to prevent mother-to-child 
transmission of the HI virus, the CC's judgment was more far-reaching. Government had put 
forward a number of justifications for limiting the provision of the drug to certain 'pilot 
sites'.
42
   The court employed various aspects of reasonableness in rejecting each of the 
justifications. First, the court examined the argument that nevirapine was not shown to be 
effective in circumstances where the full package of 'testing and counselling, dispensing of 
nevirapine and follow-up services'
43
 was not available. The full package was only available 
at the pilot sites at the time the case was decided. The court rejected this as a reason for 
refusing to provide nevirapine to pregnant women outside the pilot sites on the basis that the 
evidence showed that provision of nevirapine would save a significant number of lives, even 
without the full package being available. The court also rejected the associated argument that 
breastfeeding negates the use of nevirapine, saying that this was not true of all cases.
44
  
 
The second argument put forward by the state was that widening the provision of 
nevirapine could mean that people develop a resistance to it.
45
 Reasoning on the basis of 
proportionality,
46
 the court held:  
Although resistant strains of HIV might exist after a single dose of nevirapine, this mutation 
is likely to be transient.  At most there is a possibility of such resistance persisting, and 
although this possibility cannot be excluded, its weight is small in comparison with the 
potential benefit of providing a single tablet of nevirapine to the mother and a few drops to 
her baby at the time of birth.  The prospects of the child surviving if infected are so slim and 
the nature of the suffering so grave that the risk of some resistance manifesting at some time 
                                                 
40
  In an earlier order, the CC had essentially given formal judicial recognition to an agreement reached 
between the parties (order dated 26 September 2000, available at 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/2874.PDF, last accessed on 29 January 2010). 
41
  Note 5 above. 
42
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at pars. 51-5. 
43
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at pars. 51; 57-8. 
44
  Ibid. 
45
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 52. 
46
  Government‘s policy on the provision of nevirapine imposed an excessive burden on HIV-positive 
mothers and their children and revealed an imbalance between detriments and benefits. See Treatment 
Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 59. 
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in the future is well worth running.
47
 
The government's argument that nevirapine has not been established to be safe was also 
rejected. The court referred to the fact that the drug is recommended without qualification by 
the World Health Authority (WHO). There was also South African evidence of its safety. In 
addition, the only evidence that it could be unsafe related to cases where it is used as chronic 
medication, which would not be the case with the prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission.
48
  
 
Finally, the government argued that it lacked the capacity to provide the 
comprehensive package of treatment.
49
 However, the court stated that this argument related 
only to the provision of the comprehensive package across the public sector and not to the 
once-off provision of nevirapine to reduce mother-to-child transmission outside the pilot sites 
where the facilities exist for counselling and testing.
50
 The court found that government's 
policy was not reasonable because it was inflexible and did not take into account a significant 
segment of society.
51
  
 
Once again, the court did not explicitly engage with the question of what 
reasonableness means in the context of SE rights adjudication and, in particular, whether it 
entails an enquiry into proportionality. Furthermore, the reasons for the court‘s more 
searching examination of government policy remained unarticulated.  The court‘s 
observation that ‗determinations of reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications, 
but are not in themselves directed at rearranging budgets‘52 provides some guidance as to 
what these reasons were. In this case, the cost of the once-off provision of the drug 
nevirapine was not an issue in the case as the drug was being provided free of charge by 
pharmaceutical companies for five years.
53
 The court did not have to grapple with what, in 
Soobramoney, they had classified a political decision.  
 
                                                 
47
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 59. 
48
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at pars.  60-64. 
49
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 54. 
50
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at pars. 65-6 
51
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at pars. 78 and 114. 
52
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 38. 
53
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 71. 
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 The final case I will discuss in this section is Khosa and others v Minister of Social 
Development and others; Mahlaule and another v Minister of Social Development and 
Others.
54
 The case is important for two reasons. First, it is the only SE rights case in which 
the CC has expressly acknowledged that a requirement of rationality is not especially 
onerous and that section 27(2) demands reasonableness, a 'higher standard than rationality'.
55
 
Second, the case may be distinguished from earlier decisions because of the court‘s 
employment of a detailed equality analysis.
 
 
 
The question before the court was whether the exclusion of permanent residents from 
social security benefits, to which they would have been entitled had they been South African 
citizens, was a violation of section 27‘s protection of the right to social security.56 The CC 
found government‘s policy to be unreasonable. The judges echoed the sentiments in 
Grootboom about the limited role of the court. Nevertheless, Mokgoro J held, for a majority 
of the judges, that a series of quite searching factors should be taken into account in 
determining whether the legislation‘s exclusion of permanent residents was reasonable. 
These factors were ‗the purpose served by social security, the impact of the exclusion on 
permanent residents and the relevance of the citizenship requirement to that purpose‘.57 
Accepting that there could well be compelling reasons for limiting access to social security 
benefits, Mokgoro J found that the position of permanent residents was fundamentally 
different to that of temporary or illegal residents in that the former had developed significant 
links with the country.
58
 She rejected the argument that providing social security benefits to 
permanent residents would impose too onerous a burden on government resources, stating 
that, on government‘s own higher estimate, the extension would entail a less than two percent 
increase on the existing cost of social grants.
59
 Justice Mokgoro referred to the strong 
stigmatising impact of the policy of exclusion on permanent residents, an already vulnerable 
                                                 
54
 Note 6 above. 
55
 Khosa (note 6 above) at par. 67. 
56
  Khosa (note 6 above) at pars. 1-3. 
57
  Ibid. 
58
  Khosa (note 6 above) at pars. 58-59. 
59
  Khosa (note 6 above) at pars. 60-62. Government had already conceded that its social security policy 
could not exclude children who were South African citizens from benefits. The residency status of 
their parents or primary care-giver was immaterial (at par. 33). 
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group and warned that the policy could force them into relationships of dependency.
60
 In 
short, she held for a majority of the court, that the dire consequences of exclusion for the 
lives and dignity of permanent residents significantly outweighed the financial and 
immigration concerns on which the state based its case.
61
 
 
Murray Wesson has argued that in considering factors such as the impact of the 
policy on permanent residents, Mokgoro J employed proportionality as part of the enquiry 
into reasonableness.
62
 But the examination of the proportionality of government‘s social 
security policy vis-à-vis permanent residents did not arise from the section 27 enquiry. 
Counsel for the permanent residents raised the right to equality, protected in section 9 of the 
Constitution, alongside section 27. The CC has interpreted section 9 to require first, that any 
differentiation between people or groups of people be rational and, second, that such 
differentiation not have an unfair impact on the affected parties. Failure to meet either of 
these requirements would amount to a violation of section 9. Despite the weaknesses in 
government‘s justifications for distinguishing between citizens and permanent residents, the 
policy succeeded at the first hurdle. Justice Mokgoro was prepared to assume that the policy 
met the relatively undemanding prerequisite of rationality. But the enquiry did not end there 
as section 27 (2) required something more than rationality – namely, reasonableness. 63 In 
concluding that the impugned policy was unreasonable, Mokgoro J focused, not on section 
27 (2), but on the question of whether government‘s policy was unfairly discriminatory for 
the purposes of the equality clause.
 64
 And her examination of the impact of the policy was 
made in the context of section 9‘s enquiry into unfair discrimination. Mokgoro J interpreted 
reasonableness through the lens of section 9 because the applicants claimed that 
government‘s policy was unfairly discriminatory as well as an infringement of the right to 
social security.  Whilst this approach has its strengths,
65
 it does not provide much guidance as 
                                                 
60
  Khosa (note 6 above) at pars. 74 and 76. 
61
  Khosa (note 6 above) at par. 82. 
62
  ‗Equality and social rights: an exploration in light of the South African Constitution‘ (2007) Public 
Law 748 at 757. 
63
  Khosa (note 6 above) at par. 67. 
64
 Khosa (note 6 above) at see pars. 68-77. 
65
  The court has a well-developed approach to the equality clause due to the large number of cases 
brought on the basis of section 9. The court employs the impact test to determine whether 
discrimination is unfair. That test requires the court to balance a number of concerns, including the 
impact of the discriminatory measure on the affected parties. See, for example, Harksen v Lane NO 
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to what reasonableness in the context of section 27 (2), or the identically worded section 26 
(2), means and is useful only where a claim of unfair discrimination is raised alongside one 
of these sections.  
 
An analysis of the court‘s approach to substantive equality lies beyond the scope of 
this thesis. As to what the Khosa judgment means for the development of the reasonableness 
approach, given the focus on the equality claim, it is difficult to draw from the case an 
unequivocal acceptance of proportionality as an element of a reasonableness enquiry where 
the right to equality is not explicitly engaged.
66
 At the same time, the court was careful not to 
state that rationality was all section 27 (2) required in this context. The judgment is arguably 
an indication that variability of the content of a reasonableness enquiry is appropriate in 
adjudicating SE rights. It did not take the jurisprudence much further as to the elements of 
such an enquiry, however.
 67
 
 
(3) Competing readings of the Constitutional Court’s approach: criticism, praise 
and alternatives 
 
(a) Cass Sunstein’s  administrative law model 
In categorising the court‘s approach in Grootboom as an administrative law model, Cass 
Sunstein was commenting not only on SE rights jurisprudence but also on administrative law. 
His conception of the defining characteristics of administrative law is a useful starting point 
from which to consider whether the South African CC‘s approach to SE rights is actually an 
administrative law model.  Three things should be borne in mind here. First, Sunstein‘s view 
was that the primary obligation on government was one of explanation, the duty to provide 
                                                                                                                                                       
and others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489; 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at pars. 50 – 51. As a consequence of this, 
discriminatory policies or programmes must meet the stringent requirement of proportionality in 
section 9 cases. 
66
  This is borne out by the fact that Khosa is the only case in which the CC has applied the equality 
analysis, developed in section 9 cases. 
67
  Dennis Davis has recently argued that the court‘s ‗approach appeared to be unfettered by the 
reasonableness standard that had dominated the earlier cases‘ in ‗Socioeconomic rights: do they deliver 
the goods?‘ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 687 at 703. As indicated above, in 
my view, the CC determined whether government policy was reasonable through the prism of 
substantive equality only because section 9 was raised alongside section 27 in the case. The case did 
not represent a shift in the CC‘s approach to SE rights. 
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reasons for its choices regarding matters such as housing, health care and social security.
68
 
He noted that the approach could have the effect of limiting government action by ensuring, 
for example, that government allocate more resources than it otherwise would to housing. 
However, this allocative impact would arise indirectly from the primary obligation on 
government to provide a reasonable explanation for its choices, rather than an independent 
judicial assessment that the current allocation was inadequate. Second, Sunstein‘s argument 
was aimed principally at an audience sceptical of justiciable SE rights. He presented the 
‗administrative law model‘ as a third way, the most palatable middle ground between 
immediately and fully enforceable SE rights on the one hand, and a complete bar on their 
justiciability, on the other.
69
 Thus, Sunstein‘s argument was an attempt to soothe concerns 
over rampant judicial intervention. In light of this, it is not surprising that the administrative 
law model he presented was relatively deferential to government policy. Third, Sunstein‘s 
description of the administrative law model as applied by the court in Grootboom does not 
provide an answer to the question of what, on an administrative law approach, makes an act 
or a lack of action unreasonable. The ‗burden of explanation‘ idea provides a framework 
within which to understand the CC‘s approach to SE rights. A fuller understanding of the 
approach demands that we grapple with the question of what makes an explanation 
inadequate.  
 
What led the CC to conclude that section 26 (1) included an obligation to provide 
temporary shelter to those in desperate need? What made the exclusion of such a provision 
from the National Housing Programme unreasonable? Without an answer to these questions, 
it is difficult to establish whether Sunstein‘s view of an administrative law model of SE 
rights adjudication rested solely on the protection of process values or extended to include 
principles of equality and proportionality, arguably part of substantive administrative review 
in jurisdictions like South Africa and the U.K. And these questions would, in any event, have 
been difficult to address based on the CC‘s limited jurisprudence at that point. Sunstein‘s 
argument was located in a particular context: drawing on the Grootboom judgment to 
convince sceptics that the adjudication of SE rights need not undermine a constitutional 
                                                 
68
  Sunstein (note 7 above) at 130. 
69
  Ibid. 
 147  
balance of powers. The usefulness of an administrative law approach must be assessed in the 
light of the CC‘s SE rights jurisprudence as a whole and the criticisms of that jurisprudence. 
 
(b) Criticisms of the Constitutional Court’s approach and the minimum core 
argument 
It is largely because of the amorphous nature of the reasonableness standard that critics have 
argued that the CC is failing in its duty to give content to the constitutional SE rights.
70
 
Commentators have proposed a shift of focus to the minimum core content of the rights as 
one of the main alternatives to the court‘s preferred reasonableness approach.71 The origins 
of this concept are to be found in General Comment 3 of the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
[A] minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party… If the Covenant 
were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be 
largely deprived of its raison d‘être. By the same token, it must be noted that any assessment 
as to whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligation must also take account of 
resource constraints applying within the country concerned.
72
  
Although it is clear from the above that a state‘s resource limitations will be taken into 
account in determining its minimum core obligations, the Committee has also indicated that a 
state claiming a lack of resources will have to ‗demonstrate that every effort has been made 
to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, 
those minimum obligations.‘73  
 
 Counsel in Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign argued that the CC should 
interpret the rights set out in sections 26 (1) and 27 (1) to include minimum core obligations 
to which everyone in need is entitled. In Grootboom, the court rejected this argument, citing 
                                                 
70
  See, for example, Bilchitz (note 8 above) at 162; (note 14 above) at 532; Pieterse (note 8 above) at 
410; and ‗Possibilities and pitfalls in the domestic enforcement of social rights: contemplating the 
South African experience‘ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 882 at 898. 
71 
 David Bilchitz is the main proponent of this approach in South Africa. See notes 8 and 12 above;  
‘Towards a theory of content for socio-economic rights’, unpublished paper presented at the 7th Annual 
World Congress of Constitutional Law (Athens, 11-15 June 2007) at 5 – 8, available at: 
http://www.enelsyn.gr/papers/w13/Paper%20by%20Dr.%20David%20Bilchitz.pdf, last accessed on 4 
August 2010; and ‗Giving socio-economic rights teeth: the minimum core and its importance‘ (2002) 
118 South African Law Journal 484. 
72
  At par. 10.  
73
  Ibid. 
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a lack of information as its main reason.
74
 But the judgment did not shut the door on the 
minimum core argument. Writing for a unanimous court, Yacoob J stated: 
 There may be cases where it may be possible and appropriate to have regard to the content of 
a minimum core obligation to determine whether the measures taken by the state are 
reasonable. However, even if it were appropriate to do so, it could not be done unless 
sufficient information is placed before a court to enable it to determine the minimum core in 
any given context. In this case, we do not have sufficient information to determine what 
would comprise the minimum core obligation in the context of our Constitution. It is not in 
any event necessary to decide whether it is appropriate for a court to determine in the first 
instance the minimum core content of a right.
75
  
 
Faced with a minimum core argument for a second time in Treatment Action 
Campaign, the CC was less equivocal in its rejection. The court‘s main objection was that 
judges did not have the institutional expertise or capacity to undertake the extensive factual 
and political investigations needed to determine minimum core standards with respect to each 
of the SE rights. The court further stated that judges were ill-suited to adjudicate on issues 
with multiple SE implications for society and to decide on how state resources should be 
spent.
76
 The court reiterated its finding in Grootboom that evidence of a minimum core with 
respect to a particular right could be relevant in determining whether government action is 
reasonable but concluded that ‗the socio-economic rights of the Constitution should not be 
construed as entitling everyone to demand that the minimum core be provided to them‘. 77 
According to the court, any attempt to provide everyone with a minimum core of each of the 
SE rights would be doomed to failure due to apartheid‘s legacy of extreme levels of poverty 
and inequality, a legacy which the first democratically elected government would have to 
progressively address.
78
 
 
 Whatever its stated position on the concept, the court, in effect, set out a minimum 
core obligation with respect to section 26 (1) of the Constitution, when it held in Grootboom 
that the state‘s policy was defective because it did not provide temporary relief for those in 
desperate need – described in the judgment as those with no  
access to land, no roof over their heads…people who are living in intolerable conditions 
                                                 
74
  Grootboom (note 4 above) at par. 32. 
75
  Grootboom (note 4 above) at pars. 33. See also Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 34. 
76
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at pars. 37 and 38. 
77
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 34. 
78
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at pars. 35-6. 
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and… people who are in crisis because of natural disasters such as floods and fires, or 
because their homes are under threat of demolition.
79
  
Furthermore, the court‘s judgments are shot through with references to the basic necessities 
of life,
80
 and the duty to cater for those in desperate need.
81
 However, in the cases in which 
the CC has intimated that there are certain minimum levels of social welfare to which every 
individual is entitled, it has traced this idea to the Constitution‘s protection of the right to 
human dignity rather than the notion of minimum core obligations set out in General 
Comment 3.
82
  The clearest expression of the relationship between the right to dignity, 
minimum standards of social welfare and the Constitution‘s SE rights provisions is still that 
set out by Yacoob J in Grootboom: 
 The right of access to adequate housing is entrenched because we value human beings and 
want to ensure that they are afforded their basic human needs. A society must seek to ensure 
that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a society based on human 
dignity, freedom and equality. To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the 
degree and extent of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those whose needs are 
the most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be 
ignored by the measures aimed at achieving realisation of the right.
83
  
At most, the early cases discussed above demonstrate the CC‘s acceptance of the idea that 
basic standards of health care, housing, etc. may be enforced by the court when it considers 
these standards to be reasonably definable and this would generally occur on a case-by-case 
basis.
84
 
 
 For commentators like David Bilchitz, these nods in the direction of minimum core 
obligations are inadequate. Bilchitz argues that the CC should integrate the minimum core 
approach into its judgments.
85
 He is critical of the CC‘s reasonableness-centred approach for 
                                                 
79
  Grootboom (note 4 above) at par. 52. 
80
  Khosa (note 6 above) at par. 52. 
81
  Grootboom (note 4 above) at par. 52. 
82
  See Khosa (note 6 above) at par 52; and Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 
217 (CC) at par. 29.  
83
  Grootboom (note 4 above) at par. 44. 
84
  Though the notion that state policy must provide for those in desperate need, developed in Grootboom 
(note 4 above) has been relied upon in later cases to find government action inadequate – see 
Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 68; Port Elizabeth Municipality (note 82 above) at 
pars.29 and 59; City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W); 
2006 (6) BCLR 728 (W) at par. 47; and Minister of Public Works and others v Kyalami Ridge 
Environmental Association and others [2002] 1 LRC 139 (CC) at pars. 39 and 52.   
85
  Note 8 above at 144-6.  Bilchitz notes that Yacoob J ended up ‗smuggling an obligation to meet short-
term needs into the very notion of reasonableness‘ in Grootboom and argues that it would have been 
both more transparent and more theoretically sound for the judge to have acknowledged what he was 
doing (at 149). See also Bilchitz (note 13 above) at 534; and note 12 above at 15-17. 
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intersecting conceptual and practical reasons. He argues that the approach is conceptually 
flawed because it emphasises procedural concerns over individual interests.
86
 The 
reasonableness standard is amorphous
87
 and does not provide a conceptually satisfactory 
explanation for conclusions the CC has reached in its judgments.
88
 Bilchitz argues further 
that the term ‗reasonable measures‘ in sections 26 (2) and 27 (2) should be read as allowing 
government some leeway in respect of the means it chooses to adopt in implementing SE 
rights. Instead, the CC has used the term to qualify the content of the rights themselves.
89
 As 
a result, the CC‘s judgments provide little or no analysis of what the rights to housing and 
health care actually entail. He acknowledges that, depending on the particular right, this 
could be a complex task but argues that the judges should have made some attempt at 
specification.
90
 Without a greater attention to content, it is difficult for judgments to be truly 
effective as there are no clear guidelines on what government is required to do to meet its SE 
obligations.
91
  
 
But the alternative Bilchitz puts forward is problematic for two main, related reasons. 
First, the determination of the content of minimum core obligations with respect to SE rights 
may be a task for executive bodies. It is one courts are comparatively ill-equipped to 
undertake. This is an obvious criticism – one relied upon in the CC‘s judgments in both 
Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign.
 
Bilchitz addresses this concern by defining an 
extremely narrow content for minimum core obligations - ensuring that people are not 
exposed to conditions that threaten their survival - that is not difficult to square with the CC‘s 
pronouncements in specific cases to date.
 92
 In the context of housing, for example, he 
defines the minimum content of the right as ‗minimal shelter from the elements such that 
one‘s health and thus one‘s ability to survive are not compromised‘.93 Specifically, this 
                                                 
86
  Bilchitz (note 8 above) at 160. 
87
  Bilchitz (note 8 above) at 162. 
88
  See the discussion of Grootboom in Bilchitz (note 8 above) at 144-5. 
89
  Bilchitz (note 8 above) at 143. 
90
  Bilchitz (note 8 above) at 156-8. 
91
  Bilchitz (note 8 above) at 162. Bilchitz expressly rejects suggestions that the main problem lies with 
weak remedies. He argues that, in order to be truly effective, supervisory jurisdiction must be 
combined with a clearer articulation of government‘s obligations (at 164-5). 
92
  Except that Bilchitz argues that the court should set out this kind of obligation for all those affected in 
South Africa, not just particular litigants. See unpublished paper (note 71 above) at 15. 
93
  Bilchitz (note 8 above) at 187. 
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would include ‗access to accommodation that offers protection from the elements, sanitary 
conditions, and access to basic services such as sanitation and running water‘.94 Furthermore, 
and this brings us to the second main problem with the argument, Bilchitz states: 
 The approach does not require that absolute weight be given to the realization of minimal 
interests and, where there is a strong justification, it allows for circumstances in which it may 
be legitimate to fail in this endeavour.
95
 
 Thus, the minimum core approach he proposes falls back on the need for judicial 
assessments of the quality of government‘s justification, either for its suspect policies or 
inadequate implementation of sound policies. Such an approach is not far removed from a 
reasonableness-based approach. Where Bilchitz‘s argument is different is in its desire for the 
minimum core approach to become part of the CC‘s judgments, rather than an ad hoc 
consequence of the interpretation of rights in the circumstances of a particular case. Potential 
litigants would be able to rely on the court‘s determinations of government‘s minimum 
obligations with respect to each of the constitutional SE rights and any courts would require 
the strongest justification for any deviation from these minimum standards by government 
bodies. This kind of development of CC jurisprudence would undoubtedly provide some 
answers to the challenges of uncertainty and weak review. But there are certain persistent 
questions related to the feasibility of Bilchitz‘s suggested model. 
 
Bilchitz is too dismissive of concerns about the democratic legitimacy and 
institutional wisdom of judges making decisions on the allocation of scarce resources that 
have exercised the minds of so many scholars working in this area - both those in favour of 
justiciable SE rights and those against. Thus, for example, he describes the process of judicial 
review in conditions of limited resources as follows: 
 The first stage is to consider the current allocation of the government to the specific area 
                                                 
94
  Bilchitz (note 8 above) at 188. Even this more concrete formulation is not far removed from the CC‘s 
jurisprudence. See the specifications for the temporary residence units set out in the court‘s order at 
par. 7 of the judgment in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and 
others 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC); 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC).This case was decided after Bilchitz‘s book 
was written and is discussed further below. 
95
  Unpublished paper (note 71 above) at 26. See also Bilchitz (note 8 above) at 209-11 where the author 
makes it clear that he does not favour lexical priority for the minimum core obligation. Rather, his 
argument is for a weighted priority. In other words, government is not required to fulfil minimal 
interests as a precondition to moving on to address maximal interests. Government must realise 
minimal interests as a matter of priority but an approach that accords lexical priority to such minimal 
interests would prevent government from adopting forward-looking policies aimed at ensuring that 
people do not fall below the minimum core.  
 152  
under consideration [e.g. housing, health care] and determine whether the policy in such a 
department accords with the dictates of fundamental human rights. If it does not meet these 
standards and this defect cannot be corrected within existing budgetary allocations, then a 
court will be required to consider the overall budgetary allocations of the government. Again 
the enquiry is whether the budgetary allocations of the government fulfil its duties under the 
Constitution in giving priority to the urgent interests of individuals.
96 
As noted by Jeff King, to expect judges to engage in this kind of exercise is simply not 
realistic as, if they were to do this with the thoroughness needed to make it a worthwhile 
exercise, the task would require them to have a breadth of knowledge about the economy that 
is usually only gained through years of hands-on experience.
97
 Perhaps most importantly, the 
approach suggested by Bilchitz has the potential to close-off, rather than enhance, the kind of 
ongoing dialogue amongst the branches of government argued to be the most effective means 
of implementing SE rights in chapter 1 of this thesis. It denies courts the flexibility they 
require to cater for the range of (often competing) interests involved in SE rights 
adjudication. 
 
The delicate balancing act required for effective SE rights adjudication is well-
illustrated by the facts surrounding the decision in Treatment Action Campaign. The court 
showed itself to be acutely aware of the challenges facing government, not just in the context 
of health care but with respect to the implementation of SE rights generally. At the same 
time, it noted that the state had certain obligations under the SE rights provisions of the 
Constitution.
98
 In their unanimous judgment, the judges rejected, in no uncertain terms, 
government‘s submission that that the court only had the power to issue declaratory relief in 
this case.  The judges pointed to the fact that under the Constitution, its powers of relief were 
much wider than this and could extend to orders of supervisory jurisdiction in the form of a 
structural interdict.
99
 The court refused to order supervisory jurisdiction in this case, 
however.
100
  
 
                                                 
96
  Bilchitz (note 8 above) at 233. 
97
  J King ‗Publication Review Poverty and fundamental rights: the justification and enforcement of 
socio-economic rights by David Bilchitz‘ (2008) Public Law 820 at 828. For further criticisms, see 
Steinberg (note 9 above) at 270-6; and O Ferraz ‗Poverty and human rights‘ (2008) 28(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 585.  
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  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at pars. 93 – 94. 
99
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at pars. 99 – 114.  
100
  On the court‘s approach to remedies in SE rights cases, see note 12 above. 
 153  
In a telling series of paragraphs, the judges noted first, that government policy on 
provision of the anti-retroviral drug nevirapine to prevent mother-to-child transmission of the 
HI virus had evolved in the course of the proceedings in the case.
101
 Second, the court stated 
that this development of state policy was an indication that ‗provided the requisite political 
will is present, the supply of nevirapine at public health institutions can be rapidly expanded 
to reach many more than the 10% of the population intended to be catered for in terms of the 
test site policy.‘102  Finally, the judges noted that ‗[t]he government has always respected and 
executed orders of this Court. There is no reason to believe that it will not do so in the 
present case‘.103 But, in the lead up to the court‘s decision, there was a very real fear that this 
was exactly what would happen. This concern was based on statements reported in the media 
by the then Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang.
 
In a televised interview with the 
SABC (South African Broadcasting Corporation), Tshabalala-Msimang was asked whether 
government would abide by the high court‘s order. She said: ‗No, I think the courts and the 
judiciary must also listen to the authorities — regulatory authorities — both from this 
country and the United States,‘ she said. Asked to clarify if she was saying no, Tshabalala-
Msimang said: ‗Yes and no. I'm saying no.‘ 104 Although she was quickly made to retract the 
statement,
105
 the Health Minister‘s comment highlighted the fact that, in the absence of 
political will and a healthy respect for the rule of law, there is little the judiciary can do to 
ensure that SE rights, indeed any rights, are adequately protected. Judges need to consider 
their role in the context of that played by the other arms of government and act in a manner 
which promotes, rather than closes down, the conversation about how best to alleviate 
poverty in the country. The CC‘s approach is an attempt to do that. The extent to which it is 
succeeding is a question I will explore further below. But an approach based on minimum 
core obligations is not a feasible alternative. Any greater clarity regarding the standards 
which government must meet in implementing SE rights gained through a minimum core 
                                                 
101
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at pars. 118 and 120. 
102
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 119. 
103
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 129. 
104  Source: http://www.journaids.org/politicsofhiv.php#pmtctpolitics, last accessed on 12 November 2008. 
See also Roux (note 14 above) at 124. 
105
  Roux (note 14 above) at 124. 
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approach will amount to a pyrrhic victory if government simply ignores the standards set by 
the courts.
106
 
 
(c) An administrative law model? Alternative readings of the Constitutional 
Court’s approach to SE rights 
In contrast with the detractors, Carol Steinberg has recently defended the viability of the 
Court‘s reasonableness approach on the basis that it depends on an intense form of scrutiny 
‗unprecedented in the area of administrative law‘.107 The CC‘s SE rights model, she argues, 
retains the notion of respect for the integrity of administrative decision-making and the idea 
that the intensity of the scrutiny must depend on the context. But the character of the scrutiny 
applied by the CC in these cases differs from that applied in administrative review in that the 
values of equality and human dignity ‗are more heavily weighted in the proportionality 
exercise applied in the socio-economic rights cases‘.108 In my view, this argument misjudges 
the court‘s approach to SE rights to date and underestimates the potential of principles of 
administrative justice to allow for an enquiry into the substance of governmental decisions.  
 
There is no doubt that the values of equality and human dignity have informed all the 
court‘s judgments on SE rights to date. The inclusion of the SE rights provisions in the 
Constitution arose from a deep-rooted awareness of how apartheid sought to rob individuals 
of their equal worth and respect. This background has served as a touchstone from which the 
CC has built its model of SE rights adjudication. But the CC‘s reasons for finding 
government action to be unconstitutional in the SE rights context, have revolved around 
concepts familiar to any administrative lawyer: the requirement of a rational connection 
between premises and conclusions, an assessment of the balance of relevant and irrelevant 
considerations and an examination of whether the evidence or information before the court 
supports a particular conclusion.
109
  
 
That the government policies in Grootboom, Treatment Action Campaign and Khosa 
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  A concern which is reinforced by the Indian case study in chapter 2. 
107
  Note 9 above at 266. 
108
  Steinberg (note 9 above) at 277.  
109
  Discussed in chapter 3 above. 
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did not cater for particular groups of people – those in a housing crisis, those who lived too 
far away from the pilot sites to have access to nevirapine and permanent residents excluded 
from social security benefits, respectively – played a significant role in the judgments. 110  
Where a policy excludes people from some advantage or benefit, the right to equality is 
obviously implicated and the exclusion may amount to a violation of that right. But the tools 
of administrative review for unreasonableness – rationality, relevant and irrelevant 
considerations, the relative weight of the considerations taken into account – are equally 
applicable and are capable of leading a court to a conclusion of unconstitutionality.  Whilst 
substantive equality has informed the court‘s assessment of government justification for its 
action in particular cases, it is not the prism through which the court evaluates such action in 
SE rights cases generally.
111
   The primary tool for analysis in SE rights cases is 
reasonableness.
112
 
 
It was only in Khosa that the CC applied the equality analysis it had developed in 
previous cases to reach the conclusion that government‘s policy was unfairly discriminatory 
and therefore unreasonable. However, in that case, the right to equality protected in section 9 
of the Constitution was raised alongside the right of access to social security. As stated by 
Mokgoro J, writing for a majority of the judges in that case, when the right to life, dignity or 
equality is implicated in a case brought on the strength of one of the SE rights provisions, the 
right forms part of the enquiry into reasonableness, together with the availability of 
resources. What made this case different, she noted, was that the applicants raised a claim of 
unfair discrimination, rooted in the equality provision in the Bill of Rights, in addition to the 
section 27 claim.
113
  
 
The point is reinforced by Mokgoro J‘s treatment of the dignity claim raised in Jaftha 
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  Grootboom (note 4 above) at par. 43; Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 68; and Khosa 
(note 6 above) at pars. 58; 80-2.  
111
  For a reading of the cases based on substantive equality, see Wesson (note 62 above) at 748-69.  For a 
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v Schoeman and others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and others.
114
 Writing for a unanimous court, 
Mokgoro J noted that the CC has always found the right to dignity to be relevant to an SE 
rights claim. However, the appellants‘ reliance on the right to dignity, protected in section 10 
of the Constitution added nothing to the case. This is an indication that, even where the right 
to dignity is raised alongside an SE rights provision, it will play no bigger role than 
informing the interpretation of the SE right, unless the dignity claim is more specific. A 
similar argument would apply to any other right raised alongside one of the SE rights in the 
Constitution.  
 
Even in Grootboom, where the emphasis was very much on the need to cater for those 
most desperate in our society as a matter of fundamental human dignity,
115
 the court noted 
that the absence of temporary housing provision for those in crisis situations may have been 
acceptable if government could have shown that the ‗nationwide housing programme would 
result in affordable houses for most people within a reasonably short time‘.116 The tenor of 
Sachs J‘s judgment in Port Elizabeth Municipality was somewhat different: 
In a society founded on human dignity, equality and freedom it cannot be presupposed that 
the greatest good for the many can be achieved at the cost of intolerable hardship for the few, 
particularly if by a reasonable application of judicial and administrative statecraft such human 
distress could be avoided‘.
 117
  
But the court‘s decision that it was not just and equitable to order the occupiers to be evicted 
was influenced as much by the fact that the Municipality had not attempted any kind of 
discussion or mediation process with the occupiers as by the protection of the occupiers‘ 
fundamental dignity.
118
 The primary impact of the decision was to require that government 
agencies engage in the ‗administrative statecraft‘ to which Sachs J referred, not that they be 
obliged to provide occupiers with alternative accommodation as a pre-requisite to eviction in 
every case. Whatever the circumstances of the case, the court‘s findings have always 
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  2005(2) SA 140 (CC) at par. 21. The question before the court was whether a law allowing for homes 
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section 26 – see par. 1 of the judgment. 
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  See especially, par. 44 of the judgment (note 4 above). 
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  Port Elizabeth Municipality (note 82 above) at pars. 47, 54 and 58. 
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involved a careful balancing of individual dignity and equal worth against respect for the 
long-term goals of government policy.  
 
As a value, human dignity informs the judicial enforcement of all rights at a very 
general level.
119
 It may have a special role in SE rights cases as the very existence of these 
rights in the Constitution stems from a desire to break with the past, to recognise that all 
South Africans are equally deserving of respect, opportunity and socio-economic wellbeing. 
But, in the SE rights cases to date,
120
 the rights to housing, health care and social security 
were treated as the primary rights. Whether the values of human dignity and equality are 
given a central or secondary role in influencing the outcome of SE rights cases depends on a 
range of factors in each of the cases. In my view, the weight attached to these values in SE 
rights jurisprudence cannot be taken for granted in the CC‘s approach. In short, the court has 
been eager to acknowledge the centrality of dignity and equality to its interpretation of the 
SE rights provisions generally but, where the primary claim involves an SE right, it has stuck 
quite closely to administrative law principles in framing the questions it has asked of 
government action.  
 
In her discussion of SE rights cases, Steinberg praises the CC for going beyond the 
administrative law focus on rationality to a more substantive conception of reasonableness in 
determining the constitutionality of government measures. As noted earlier, this assessment 
underestimates the breadth of administrative law. The more substantive conception of 
reasonableness she refers to is not unknown in administrative law. A finding of irrationality 
need no longer be based on absurd or perverse decision-making. An enquiry into rationality 
now also examines the process of reasoning and demands a logical connection between 
premises and conclusion, between the evidence before the decision-maker and the decision 
reached. Rationality has also been used to enquire into the balance of relevant considerations. 
Moreover, rationality is only one aspect of unreasonableness. Unreasonableness, as a ground 
of review, now places quite onerous demands on the reasoning process – decisions must be 
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  See Mohamed J in Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others, Shalabi and Another 
v Minister of Home Affairs and Others, Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 
2000 (3) SA 936 (CC); 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) at par. 35. 
120
  With the exception of Khosa, discussed above. 
 158  
supported by the evidence, rather than merely logically connected to them. Most importantly, 
judicial review of administrative action on the basis of unreasonableness now also entails an 
examination of the substance of the decision: does the decision violate the common law or 
constitutional principles such as the rule of law or equality?
121
  
 
The questions of whether proportionality forms part of an enquiry into 
unreasonableness and whether it has even become a ground of review in its own right are 
more controversial. The findings in cases like Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign 
fit easily into an enquiry into unreasonableness in the administrative law context, as 
described in chapter 3 above, even if we proceed on the assumption that proportionality does 
not apply. In Grootboom, for example, the fact that the National Housing Programme did not 
make provision for those in desperate need was arguably a failure to take into account a 
relevant consideration or to give that consideration sufficient weight. The first issue in the 
Treatment Action Campaign case was whether government‘s decision to limit the provision 
of nevirapine to certain pilot sites constituted a violation of section 27 (1).  The court held 
that government‘s fears that the provision of nevirapine to pregnant women to prevent 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV is ineffective where an alternative to breastfeeding is 
not provided, was not supported by any of the evidence provided by government. In fact the 
weight of scientific evidence put forward by both sides in the case pointed in the opposite 
direction.
122
 A lack of evidence was also the court‘s reason for rejecting government‘s 
submission that the drug was not safe. Again, available evidence, South African and 
international, pointed to a widespread consensus on the safety of the drug.
123
 In balancing the 
weight of the government‘s concern that wider provision of nevirapine would result in people 
developing a resistance to it against the benefit of preventing transmission of the virus, the 
court held, in effect, that government‘s policy got the balance of relevant considerations 
wrong.
124
 The question of whether government had the capacity to provide a ‗full package‘ 
including counselling was an irrelevant consideration at this stage as the court was concerned 
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  See chapter 3 above. 
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  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at pars. 57-8. 
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  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at pars. 60-4. 
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  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 59. 
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with the once-off provision of the drug.
125
  
 
 The second main issue in Treatment Action Campaign was whether government had a 
comprehensive plan to combat mother-to-child transmission of the virus. This aspect of the 
judgment was more complicated, as it demanded that the court consider available resources 
in a more serious way.
126
 The court held that the inflexible nature of government‘s approach 
meant that the entire policy needed to be reviewed. In particular: 
Hospitals and clinics that have testing and counselling facilities should be able to prescribe 
nevirapine where that is medically indicated. The training of counsellors ought now to 
include training for counselling on the use of nevirapine. As previously indicated, this is not a 
complex task and it should not be difficult to equip existing counsellors with the necessary 
additional knowledge. In addition, government will need to take reasonable measures to 
extend the testing and counselling facilities to hospitals and clinics throughout the public 
health sector beyond the test sites to facilitate and expedite the use of nevirapine for the 
purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.
127
  
Whilst providing guidance to government on what a policy should contain and making a 
judgment that additional training of counsellors will not be a difficult task, the judges left 
much to the discretion of government. This is reflected in the court‘s order on government‘s 
plan, which required simply that government take ‗reasonable measures to extend the testing 
and counselling facilities at hospitals and clinics throughout the public health sector to 
facilitate and expedite the use of nevirapine for the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV‘.128 The judges allowed government further flexibility by holding 
that the mandatory aspects of their order, including the order that government remove the 
restrictions on provision of nevirapine, did not prevent government from choosing an 
‗equally appropriate or better‘ manner of adapting its policy, provided this met with 
constitutional requirements.
129
  
 
 Thus, whilst there is no doubt that the court‘s approach to SE rights is strongly 
informed by the values of dignity and equality and that the judges have been prepared to 
place onerous demands on government policy and decision-making, including a requirement 
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  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at pars. 65-6. 
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  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 71. The cost of the nevirapine itself was not an 
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of proportionality, this is not universally so. Although the court has found against 
government in the many of the SE rights cases decided to date, it has done so on relatively 
narrow grounds and often in circumstances where resource implications were not a hugely 
important factor.  
 
In arguing that the CC‘s approach to SE rights is not an administrative law model, 
Steinberg highlights several problems with an approach based on administrative law. She 
identifies the problems with weak review in administrative justice with a focus on ‗the right 
of the individual citizen against the arbitrary exercise of public power‘. By contrast, she 
argues, the SE rights provisions in the Constitution ‗are concerned with the rights of classes 
of deprived people in the context of systemic injustice in our society‘.130 But this represents a 
quite narrow view of what the body of administrative law seeks to achieve. As I have argued 
in chapter 3, the desire to ensure quick, effective implementation of government policy in the 
public interest is at the heart of administrative justice. That individual rights and interests 
should be protected in the process means that courts have to perform a complex balancing 
exercise.  
 
Under apartheid, judicial review came to be seen as the only means through which 
individuals suffering the impact of apartheid policy could try to secure their rights and 
interests. In a racist system based on Parliamentary sovereignty and executive dominance, 
progressive judges found themselves in a combative, relatively powerless relationship with 
the other branches of government. South African administrative law still suffers from this 
historical baggage.  The CC‘s reluctance to explicitly engage with proportionality as an 
aspect of judicial review for unreasonableness is one manifestation of this.
131
 But the 
adoption of the 1996 Constitution should be seen as an opportunity to reinvent our 
administrative law. For years, administrative lawyers in South Africa have hankered after a 
richer understanding of this area of the law – as a means to facilitate good decision-making 
and allow for the effective implementation of sound government policies. Judges now have 
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  Treatment Action Campaign (note 5 above) at par. 4 of the order. 
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  This is discussed in chapter 3. See also C Hoexter ‗Judicial policy revisited: transformative 
adjudication in administrative law‘ (2008) 24 South African Journal on Human Rights 281. 
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more extensive powers but they act within a legitimate legal system and must take the 
limitations of their role in a constitutional democracy seriously.   
 
In enforcing SE rights, judges are required to confront the problems of systemic 
injustice and the need for redistribution of goods like housing head on but this task is not 
altogether different from the post-apartheid conception of judicial review of administrative 
action described above. Judges enforcing SE rights often have to weigh up the immediate 
interests of the claimants before them against the long-term goals of government policy and 
are equally limited by relative lack of expertise and the need to maintain a constitutional 
balance of powers.  
 
The CC has not consistently opted for a higher or lower standard of review in the 
cases discussed above. The shifting content of reasonableness employed in the cases is, thus, 
not an attempt to simply defer to the executive or legislative bodies in every case where 
policy-making and resource-allocation are concerned. As stated by Dennis Davis: 
…where the Court has employed administrative law principles to deal with socio-economic 
rights, its judgments have been based on a deep-seated concern about the limited role of a 
judiciary and the dangers of polycentricity. The tests of reasonableness, sometimes employed 
interchangeably with rationality, have enabled the Court to strike an uneasy balance between 
the existence of a right and its limited input on the nature and extent of policy.
132
 
Most scholars will admit to the need for courts to exercise restraint in appropriate cases.  
Any model for the judicial protection of SE rights must be flexible enough to cater for this. 
The CC‘s model of SE rights adjudication is based on certain ideas about when it is 
appropriate for a court to defer to executive or legislative expertise. If the CC‘s approach 
leans too heavily toward weak review, as some commentators argue, this is due to the court‘s 
underlying ideas about the appropriate role of the judiciary, and is not an inevitable 
consequence of the administrative law roots of the approach. These underlying ideas about 
judicial restraint must be interrogated. In the absence of such an interrogation, suggestions of 
alternative approaches are unlikely to yield any changes – either because the court will 
simply reject them or because alternatives will also be interpreted through the gloss of a 
particular notion of deference.  
                                                 
132
  D Davis ‗Adjudicating the Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards 
―Deference Lite‖? (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 301 at 323. 
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(4) Developing the South African model for the adjudication of social and economic 
rights: implications of recent cases 
Much of the commentary assessing the South African CC‘s jurisprudence on SE rights 
focuses on four relatively early cases: Soobramoney, Grootboom, Treatment Action 
Campaign and Khosa. In this section, I consider the impact of more recent cases on our 
understanding of the CC‘s approach to adjudicating SE rights. As my interest lies in 
identifying trends in, or changes to, the CC‘s approach, the section is not intended to be a 
comprehensive examination of each of the relevant cases. Instead, I focus on particular 
themes emerging from these cases. 
 
(a)  Meaningful engagement 
The most interesting and enduring contribution of recent cases lies in the CC‘s development 
of the notion ‗meaningful engagement‘. Drawing on Horn AJ‘s reasoning in Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and others,
133
 Sachs J held in a 
subsequent CC case Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers that, when dealing 
with the fraught issue of evictions, the legislation and the Constitution required courts to 
engage in ‗active judicial management‘.134 This meant that, in addition to considering 
whether potential evictees were in lawful occupation, a court had also to take into account 
broad considerations of fairness and equitable treatment. Furthermore, the ‗active judicial 
management‘ he referred to would impact not just on how a court chose to deal with the 
issues before it but also on the procedures it adopted, the evidence it took into account and 
the remedies it handed down.
135
  
 
                                                 
133
  2000(2) SA 1074 (SECLD). Though the notion of meaningful engagement was foreshadowed by 
comments in Grootboom (note 4 above) at par. 87; and President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005(5) SA 3 (CC) at par. 31. 
134
  Port Elizabeth Municipality (note 82 above) at par. 36. For the facts of the case, see note 117 above. 
135
  Port Elizabeth Municipality (note 82 above) at par. 36. On a consideration of the factors listed in the 
PIE Act as relevant to a enquiry into whether an eviction is just and equitable, the court held that it was 
not just and equitable to evict the occupiers (at par. 59). The fact that the municipality had not engaged 
the occupiers in any kind of discussion before seeking their eviction was influential in this conclusion 
(see par. 54), as were the facts that the occupants had been on the land for an extended period; that they 
moved on to the land with what they thought was the permission of the owner (at par. 53); and that the 
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A central theme of this part of Sachs J‘s judgment was that, in seeking a sustainable 
way of dealing with competing interests, judges would not always be able to draw a bright 
line between the ‗procedural and substantive aspects of justice and equity‘.136 The managerial 
role of judges would sometimes have to be expressed in creative ways – requiring the parties 
to engage with each other in a serious attempt to find mutually acceptable solutions was a 
tangible example of this kind of creative expression.
137
 Justice Sachs‘ comments about the 
managerial role of the courts in this case led him to consider whether it would be appropriate 
for the court to order the parties to engage in mediation. This question was left unanswered 
as, on the court‘s analysis, mediation was unlikely to be effective at that point of the 
proceedings.
138
 So the practical impact of ‗active judicial management‘ in this case, lay in the 
factors the court took into account in concluding that eviction would not be just and equitable 
– most significant amongst these was the fact that the municipality had not engaged in any 
discussion with the respondent occupiers.
139
 
 
 The notion of ‗active judicial management‘ which emerged from the case, however, 
played a much more significant role in the CC‘s later decision Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, 
Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and others.
140
  
The case concerned a decision by the City of Johannesburg to eject approximately 400 
occupiers from buildings considered to be unsafe and unhygienic in inner city 
Johannesburg.
141
 The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) had earlier authorised the eviction 
and ordered the City to assist those in desperate need of housing to find temporary 
accommodation.
142
 On the 30
th
 of August 2007, two days after the CC heard the occupiers‘ 
application for leave to appeal, the court handed down an interim order designed to ensure 
                                                                                                                                                       
municipality had not given serious consideration to the question of alternative accommodation for 
them (at par. 58).  See par. 59 for a summary of the reasons for the court‘s decision. 
136
  Port Elizabeth Municipality (note 82 above) at par. 39. 
137
  Port Elizabeth Municipality (note 82 above) at par. 39. 
138
  Port Elizabeth Municipality (note 82 above) at pars. 39-47. 
139
  Port Elizabeth Municipality (note 82 above) at par 54. See note 135 above for a summary of the 
court‘s findings. 
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  2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) (Olivia Road). 
141
  Olivia Road (note 140 above) at pars. 1-2. 
142
  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd (253/06) [2007] 2 All SA 459 (SCA); 2007 (6) SA 
417 (SCA). 
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that the parties ‗engaged with each other meaningfully on certain issues‘.143 One of the 
arguments made by the occupiers was that the City should have given them a hearing before 
taking the decision to evict as the decision was administrative in nature.
144
 But none of the 
parties had directly raised the lack of meaningful engagement as an issue before the SCA or 
the CC.
145
   
 
The court drew on its earlier findings in PE Municipality for the underlying rationale 
of the meaningful engagement order – the engagement order was an instance of active 
judicial management.
146
 But Yacoob J also noted that the duty on the state to engage 
meaningfully with people who could be left homeless following an ejectment was firmly 
rooted in section 26 (2)‘s requirement of reasonable state action. This requirement meant that 
each step taken with respect to the provision of adequate housing had to be reasonable. 
Where the state sought an ejectment or eviction order which could render people homeless, a 
court had to take into account the question of whether the authorities had engaged with those 
people in deciding whether the state had satisfied its section 26 (2) obligations.
147
 At the 
same time, people confronting homelessness also had a duty to act reasonably and in good 
faith.  The court drew a link between the notion of meaningful engagement and the value of 
participation in a democratic state, noting that people in need of housing should not be seen 
as a ‗disempowered mass‘ but as active participants in the process of finding housing 
solutions.
148
  
 
In its detailed engagement order, the court set out both the subject matter and the 
objectives of meaningful engagement in the context of this case. The order also specified a 
date by which the parties had to submit affidavits to the court reporting on the progress of 
their engagement.
 149
 When the parties submitted their affidavits, they indicated that they had 
entered into a settlement agreement, although there was some disagreement about which 
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  Olivia Road (note 140 above) at par. 5.  
144
  Olivia Road (note 140 above) at par. 7. 
145
  Olivia Road (note 140 above) at par. 9. 
146
  Olivia Road (note 140 above) at par. 12. 
147
  Olivia Road (note 140 above) at pars. 17-18. 
148
  Olivia Road (note 140 above) at par. 20. 
149
  Olivia Road (note 146 above) at par. 5. 
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issues remained to be decided by the court.
150
 The settlement agreement formed an important 
reference point for the court‘s judgment on the merits of the appeal. The agreement contained 
detailed provisions aimed at making the buildings ‗safer and more habitable‘ as an 
immediate, interim measure. The rest of the agreement, which would take effect only with 
the court‘s approval, provided for alternative accommodation in specified buildings. It set out 
how rent would be calculated and made it clear that the alternative accommodation was 
provided as a temporary measure – the City would work with the occupiers to find permanent 
housing solutions.
151
 
 
The court held that the agreement was, in fact, a reasonable outcome of the 
engagement process.
152
 In terms of the agreement, a concrete plan for permanent housing 
would be developed in consultation with the occupiers. However, the occupiers wished the 
court to pronounce on the state‘s failure to provide permanent housing solutions for them and 
others in their situation. They argued that consultation on the issue of permanent housing was 
being obstructed by the state‘s failure to put together a concrete plan.153 In response, the City 
attached a housing plan, formulated after the settlement agreement, to its affidavit for the 
court‘s consideration. The occupiers asked for time to consider, and respond to, this plan.154 
But the court held that it was not necessary for it to consider the plan at this stage – there was 
every indication that the process of consultation would continue in good faith and the CC 
should, in any event, not be the first and only arbiter of whether the plan was reasonable.
155
 
For similar reasons, the court refused to accede to the occupiers‘ request that it evaluate the 
reasonableness of the housing plan vis-à-vis the thousands of other poor people living in 
inner-city Johannesburg. They held that such an evaluation would be premature and overly-
generalised. A case concerning specific allegations of unreasonableness could be initiated, if 
necessary, at a later stage. For the moment, the court was satisfied with the state‘s acceptance 
of the need for meaningful engagement.
156
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  Olivia Road (note 146 above) at pars. 25-7. 
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  Olivia Road (note 140 above) at par. 28. 
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  Olivia Road (note 140 above) at pars. 32 and 33. 
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  Olivia Road (note 140 above) at par. 33. 
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The notion of meaningful engagement is a promising addition to the jurisprudence on 
SE rights and was used to good effect in this case. As a judicial tool, insisting on engagement 
between the parties can provide SE rights claimants with the relief they request whilst at the 
same time ensuring a level of respect for the democratic legitimacy of governmental choices 
about SE policy. The court in Olivia Road did not have to determine how the City should go 
about dealing with the buildings and their occupants – consultation between the parties 
produced a reasonable settlement of many of the issues in the case. The engagement order 
also ensured that the occupiers were not merely observers or adversaries in the process but 
active participants in it - an idea which bolsters democratic values.   On one reading, the case 
was decided on procedural grounds and is, therefore, yet another example of weak review in 
an SE rights case. However, Sachs J‘s comments about the difficulty of separating procedure 
from substance in PE Municipality, cited with approval in Olivia Road, are relevant here. 
The CC‘s interim order in the latter case focused on a procedural value – it ordered that the 
parties engage meaningfully with one another. Some of the guidelines were detailed enough 
to add depth to the order:  that the parties consult in an attempt ‗to alleviate the plight of the 
applicants who live in the two buildings concerned in this application by making the 
buildings as safe and as conducive to health as is reasonably practicable‘157 is an example 
here. Strictly speaking, this order offered only procedural relief to the occupiers. However, 
the result of the engagement order was a solution going to the substance of the issues raised 
by the occupiers – they did not have to vacate the buildings immediately and the settlement 
made provision for alternative accommodation for those who required it. 
 
It should be noted that the efficacy of an engagement order of this nature is limited in 
the sense that it depends on the good faith of the parties involved. Furthermore, the CC‘s 
finding that any assessment of the City‘s plan for permanent housing solutions vis-à-vis the 
litigants and others in their situation would be premature, highlights the court‘s general 
reluctance to set hard and fast standards regarding the content of the SE rights and their 
preference for case-by-case analysis. The implications of this are discussed in some detail in 
section 5 of this chapter and in chapter 6 below. But some of the limitations of engagement 
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  Olivia Road (note 140 above) at par. 35. 
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  See par.2 of the order in Olivia Road (note 140 above) at par. 5 of the judgment. 
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as a tool for the implementation of SE rights are well illustrated by the CC‘s 2009 decision 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and others,
158
 and are 
worth discussing here.   
 
The circumstances surrounding the litigation in Joe Slovo presented the CC with a set 
of quite different issues from those in Olivia Road. Like the occupants of the two buildings in 
Olivia Road, the occupiers of the Joe Slovo settlement in the Western Cape were facing 
eviction from their homes but this time the application for an eviction order was preceded by 
a drawn out period of consultation and negotiation between state authorities and the 
organisations representing approximately 20 000 residents of the informal settlement.
159
 The 
question of whether engagement had been adequate was a major point of dispute between the 
parties. 
 
People began occupying the area east of the city of Cape Town which would come to 
be known as the Joe Slovo settlement early in the1990‘s. As the number of people moving 
into the area began to grow at a staggering rate, the City of Cape Town started to provide 
people in the settlement with certain basic services: a water supply, container toilets and 
basic cleaning services.
160
 Despite this, people in Joe Slovo continued to live in unhygienic 
and dangerous conditions.
161
 Following a very destructive fire in 2000, the City began to 
upgrade the settlement in 2002 by creating a database of residents, improving water, 
sanitation, health and cleansing services, providing for electricity and establishing residential 
blocks surrounded by walkways.
162
 Government targeted the Joe Slovo settlement for 
reconstruction as part of its Breaking New Ground housing policy aimed at eliminating 
informal settlements country-wide.
163
 This reconstruction would be implemented through the 
N2 Gateway project by a public company called Thubelisha Homes Ltd., the first respondent 
in the case. The project‘s official launch took place early in 2005 but the City had already 
begun the process of convincing Joe Slovo residents that they needed to move out of the area 
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  Joe Slovo (note 94 above) at pars. 20-21 (Yacoob J) and par. 185 (Ngcobo J). 
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so that it could be developed towards the end of 2004.
164
  
 
At first, Joe Slovo residents expressed approval for the Gateway project – as 
evidenced by some people agreeing to move away from Joe Slovo to government-appointed 
alternative accommodation in Delft, about 15 kilometres away. But the residents began to 
turn against the project due to what they alleged were government failures to live up to 
certain promises they had made to the residents.
165
 In particular, the residents complained 
that government had breached an agreement that 70% of the new houses in the development 
would be allocated to eligible Joe Slovo residents. Furthermore, government had indicated 
that rentals in the first phase of the development would be between R150 and R300 per 
month – an amount which the residents could afford. In fact, rentals were between R600 and 
R1050 per month.
166
  Residents resisted their removal from the settlement on the basis that 
government had backtracked on assurances.  They objected to moving to Delft because of 
reports of a high crime rate, poor transport services and few employment prospects in the 
area.
167
 
 
The court handed down a unanimous order, allowing for the Joe Slovo residents to be 
evicted under certain conditions. The order was based, to a large extent, on an order 
submitted to the court by the respondents – Thubelisha Homes Ltd., the national Minister for 
Housing and the provincial Minister for Local Government and Housing.
168
 In terms of this 
order, the residents would have to vacate their homes according to a particular schedule; their 
eviction was made conditional on their relocation to temporary residential units which had to 
comply with certain specifications regarding size and quality; the parties would engage 
meaningfully with each other to try to reach agreement on the scheduling of the relocations; 
and the respondents agreed that they would set aside 70% of the houses yet to be built to 
eligible Joe Slovo residents.
169
 The applicants did not consent to the order.
170
 They claimed 
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that they were not in unlawful occupation of the land and should, therefore, have been given 
formal notices of eviction. The applicants argued, further, that it was possible and preferable 
for the area to be upgraded whilst the residents were in occupation. In this way, the hardship 
of relocation could be avoided.
171
 They wanted the court to hand down an order for further 
engagement between the parties, rather than eviction, at this stage.
172
  
 
The judges were divided on the issue of whether the residents were unlawful 
occupiers but this disagreement did not affect the order.
173
 It is not an aspect of the judgment 
I consider here – as noted above, my interest lies in the notion of meaningful engagement as 
an addition to the SE rights jurisprudence. The fact that there had been some level of 
engagement was not contested in the case but the quality and extent of that engagement was 
of some concern. All the judges acknowledged that there were deficiencies in the process of 
engagement: the state authorities did not provide the residents with even a formal notice 
before launching urgent eviction proceedings;
174
 better co-ordinated and more thorough 
consultation with individual families could have avoided much of the ensuing conflict;
175
 and 
there were ‗major failures in communication‘.176 Justice Sachs elaborated on what these 
failures were in his judgment: 
The evidence suggests the frequent employment of a top-down approach where the purpose 
of reporting back to the community was seen as being to pass on information about decisions 
already taken rather than to involve the residents as partners in the process of decision-
making itself…  [t]here were simply too many rather than too few protagonists on the side of 
the authorities.  At different stages the occupants had to engage with national and then with 
provincial and finally with local entities.  To complicate matters even further, Thubelisha, 
which had been created at national level to function at provincial and local levels, became 
forcefully involved as a protagonist.
177
   
 
 Despite this, the judges all held that flaws in the engagement process were not so 
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serious as to make government action unreasonable and prevent the court issuing an order for 
eviction. What is interesting about the treatment of this issue in the judgment is that the 
requirement of meaningful engagement was watered down in some of the judgments to one 
of reasonable engagement or even mere engagement.
178
 Justices O‘Regan and Sachs dealt 
with the issue at some length in their judgments. Justice O‘Regan actually held that there had 
been no meaningful engagement: 
 Nevertheless it cannot be denied that much of the heat that has been generated in this case has 
been generated because the respondents did not engage fully and meaningfully with the 
applicants and the other communities who have an interest in the housing project.
179
 
For O‘Regan J the question was whether the absence of meaningful engagement meant that 
the implementation of the housing plan in the case was unreasonable.
180
 Justice Sachs found 
that there had been meaningful engagement
181
 but noted that the nature and extent of 
engagement between the parties was only one factor to be taken into account in determining 
whether the implementation of the plan was reasonable.
182
 Both judges were influenced by 
the fact that this was a pilot project, involving huge numbers of people and aimed at 
benefitting the applicants and others in a similar position by providing them with access to 
adequate housing.
183
 They also referred to the fact that thousands of other people who had 
already left the area and were waiting for permanent housing in the new development would 
be adversely affected by further delays.
184
 Engaging in a enquiry into proportionality, Sachs J 
stated that, in his view ‗the means used were not so disproportionately out of kilter with the 
goals of the meritorious Project as to require a court to declare them to be beyond the pale of 
reasonableness‘185 and ‗[i]n all the circumstances I cannot hold that the implementation as a 
whole was so tainted by inconsistency and unfairness as to fail the test of reasonableness‘.186  
 
 One of the main reasons why the residents were arguing for a further process of 
engagement was that they wanted the upgrade to be conducted whilst they remained on site, 
allowing them to avoid the distress of relocation. In situ upgrading was stressed in 
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  Joe Slovo (note 94 above) at par. 381 (Sachs J). 
 171  
government‘s Breaking New Ground housing plan and was consistent with international best 
practice
187
 but the judges held that it was reasonable for government to opt for relocation in 
this case. There is little explanation for this choice in the judgment – simply a contention by 
the respondents that in situ upgrading would not be feasible.
188
 The judges accepted this as a 
matter over which the state exercised significant discretion. They would not question whether 
relocation was the best approach as long as it was within the range of reasonable 
responses.
189
 
 
 In the subsequent case of Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA and another v 
Premier of KwaZulu-Natal and others,
190
 Moseneke DCJ, writing for a majority of the 
judges, summarised the court‘s position on what ‗proper‘ engagement entails: 
 Proper engagement would include taking into proper consideration the wishes of the people 
who are to be evicted; whether the areas where they live may be upgraded in situ; and 
whether there will be alternative accommodation.  The engagement would also include the 
manner of eviction and the timeframes for the eviction.
191 
What is unclear from the jurisprudence is what an absence of such engagement means – 
Olivia Road implies that a resident or occupier is entitled to insist in those circumstances that 
proper engagement take place before a court may issue an eviction order but Joe Slovo 
indicates that a lack of meaningful engagement is just one more factor that plays a role in 
determining whether government action has been reasonable. 
 
(b) Flexibility and the fate of the minimum core argument 
New statements on the minimum core obligation in CC jurisprudence clarify, rather than 
develop, the CC‘s approach to SE rights. The CC‘s most recent articulation of its position on 
                                                                                                                                                       
186
  Joe Slovo (note 94 above) at par. 384 (Sachs J). 
187
  Joe Slovo (note 94 above) at pars. 364 and 367 (Sachs J). 
188
  Joe Slovo (note 94 above) at par. 253 (Ngcobo J). 
189
  Joe Slovo (note 94 above) at par. 113 (Yacoob J); par. 174 (Moseneke DCJ); par. 253 (Ngcobo J); par. 
295 (O‘Regan J); and par. 367 (Sachs J). 
190
  2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC). The Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement, a voluntary organization acting on 
behalf of tens of thousands of residents in informal settlements in KwaZulu-Natal, challenged the 
KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and Prevention of Re-emergence of Slums Act 6 of 2007. Amongst other 
things, they argued that section 16 of the Act was unconstitutional because it made it considerably 
easier for government to evict people living in informal settlements (at pars. 1, 2 and 5). This 
amounted to a violation of section 26 (2) of the Constitution. A majority of the judges held that section 
16 of the Act was inconsistent with section 26(2) of the Constitution (at pars. 92 and 118, Moseneke 
DCJ). 
191
  Abahlali Basemjondolo (note 190 above) at par. 114. 
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minimum core obligations arose from the litigation in the Mazibuko case.
192
  This was the 
first case in South Africa dealing with the right to have access to sufficient water, protected 
in section 27(1) (b) of the Constitution. The case was brought by a group of residents from 
Phiri Township in Soweto, Johannesburg. Amongst other things, they argued that the City‘s 
Free Basic Water policy infringed their section 27 rights.
193
  
 
 The litigation arose in the context of Johannesburg Water‘s Operation Gcin‘amanzi 
(to save water) Plan.
194
 About a tenth of all households in the City did not have access to a 
tap dispensing clean water within 200 metres of their homes.
195
 Under apartheid policy, 
residents of Soweto and other black townships paid a monthly flat rate of R68 per household 
for their water supply. This amount was derived from a deemed monthly consumption rate of 
20 kilolitres per household. The actual consumption rate was much higher. It was not clear 
whether this excess was due to higher consumption rates or leakages through corroded pipes. 
The water distributed to Soweto was completely out of proportion to the revenue generated 
by it. This was partly because a culture of non-payment for services, begun as a response to 
the apartheid government‘s oppressive policies, continued to hold sway.196  
 
It was against this background that Johannesburg Water decided to overhaul the 
system of water provision, starting with Phiri Township in Soweto. The aims of the project 
were to ‗reduce unaccounted for water, to rehabilitate the water network, to reduce water 
demand and to improve the rate of payment‘.197 The Phiri applicants challenged various 
aspects of the Plan. For the purposes of this thesis, the most important part of their case was 
the allegation that the City‘s monthly allocation of 6 kilolitres of water per household was 
unreasonable. The applicants wanted the court to quantify the amount of water that would be 
considered ‗sufficient‘ under s 27(1) (b) and they argued that it should set that amount at 50 
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litres of water per person per day.
198
  
 
The Water Services Act 108 of 1997  governs access to, and provision of, water at a 
national level. ‗Basic water supply‘ is defined in section 1 of the Act as  ‗the prescribed 
minimum standard of water supply services necessary for the reliable supply of a sufficient 
quantity and quality of water to households, including informal households, to support life 
and personal hygiene‘.199 The Minister promulgated Regulations, acting under the authority 
granted to him in the Act. Regulation 3 (b) set the basic water supply at 25 litres per person 
per day or 6 kilolitres per household per month.
200
 The applicants did not challenge this 
Regulation. Instead, they argued that it set a minimum standard and that the court was 
entitled to determine that a greater amount of water formed the content of the right in section 
27 (1) (b).
201
 The applicants argued that 50 kilolitres per person per day was the amount 
‗necessary for dignified human life‘, not the minimum core of the right.202  
 
The court drew a parallel between this argument and those based on minimum core 
obligations made in earlier cases.
203
 Although the amount of water advanced by the 
applicants went beyond the minimum core, their arguments were driven by a desire, similar 
to that underlying minimum core obligation arguments, that the court set out a standard by 
which to measure the government‘s realisation of the right. The CC rejected this argument, 
stating that it ‗must fail for the same reasons that the minimum core argument failed in 
Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign No 2’.204 In the clearest explanation of its 
approach to SE rights to date, the court indicated that fixing a quantified content to the right 
of access to sufficient water could be a ‗rigid and counter-productive‘ way of dealing with 
the right. An approach based on reasonableness, in contrast, allowed for the court to take 
account of variations in context and time in adjudicating SE rights.
205
 According to O‘Regan 
                                                 
198
  See Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 44 for a summary of the arguments the applicants made against 
the Plan. 
199
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 22. 
200
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 23. 
201
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at pars. 44, 56 and 72. 
202
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 56. This distinction supports a conception of the minimum core as 
protecting people‘s interest in survival – see the discussion of David Bilchitz‘s argument above. 
203
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 56. 
204
  Ibid. 
205
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 60. 
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J, for a unanimous court, the government‘s duty in respect of SE rights was to take 
reasonable and progressive action to secure the ‗basic necessities of life‘ to all citizens.206 
And rights-holders were entitled to hold government accountable for the manner in which it 
chose to do this.
207
 The content of the right had to be determined in light of the content of the 
obligations set out in section 27 (2).
208
  
 
 Summarising the court‘s approach to the state‘s positive obligations in respect of the 
SE rights in the Constitution to date, O‘Regan J held that courts would ‗at least‘ require 
government to take steps to realise those rights where no steps were being taken and would 
review unreasonable measures to ensure that they met the standard of reasonableness.
209
 
Furthermore, government had to regularly reassess its policies to check that those policies 
were capable of progressively realising the rights. Courts would find government action that 
did not make provision for those in desperate need to be unreasonable and would order 
government to remove any unreasonable limitations or exclusions from its SE rights 
policies.
210
 The court noted that a challenge to the reasonableness of government action 
required government to explain its choices by providing the information it had considered in 
making those choices and describing the process it had followed in formulating its policy.
211
 
 
In part, then, the judges rejected the applicants‘ argument regarding the quantification 
of ‗sufficient water‘ in section 27(1) because it represented a marked departure from their 
approach to SE rights, developed in earlier cases, principally Grootboom and Treatment 
Action Campaign.
212
 There were two other considerations weighing against acceptance of the 
applicants‘ argument. First, the court found that the expert evidence before it did not provide 
a single, clear answer to the question of what constituted ‗sufficient water‘ in the context of 
this case. This was a debate the court felt ill-equipped to settle.
213
 Second, the fact that the 
                                                 
206
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 59. 
207
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 59. 
208
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 68. 
209
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 67. 
210
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 67. 
211
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 71. 
212
  This approach is predicated on a concern that judges act within the constitutional and institutional 
parameters of their function in a democratic society – see Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 61. 
213
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 62. 
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applicants did not challenge the minimum standard set in Regulation 3 (b) weakened their 
position. The court held that, as a general rule, it will be difficult for an applicant to challenge 
the reasonableness of a government policy based on a particular minimum standard if the 
applicant does not question the reasonableness of that minimum standard.
214
 The court‘s 
reasoning on this point was as follows: 
In most circumstances it will be reasonable for municipalities and provinces to strive first to 
achieve the prescribed (and, in the absence of a challenge, presumptively reasonable) 
minimum standard, before being required to go beyond that minimum standard for those to 
whom the minimum is already being supplied.
215
  
 
The court‘s statement that SE rights ‗empower citizens to demand of the state that it 
acts reasonably and progressively to ensure that all enjoy the basic necessities of life‘216 is 
unsettling as it implies that the SE rights in the Constitution exist to secure only minimum 
levels of goods such as housing, health etc.
217
 However, O‘Regan J made this statement in 
the context of the rationale for the SE rights in the first place – to deal with apartheid‘s 
legacy of millions of people without access to the most basic necessities of life.
218
 Moreover, 
her subsequent comment that a municipality which easily provides for the minimum standard 
(of water, housing, health care etc) to all in its jurisdiction, within its available resources, has 
not necessarily acted reasonably
219
 provides some indication that the court does not view the 
SE rights provisions simply as minimum entitlements.  
 
(5) Conclusion 
The most recent jurisprudence further entrenches reasonableness as the CC‘s preferred tool 
for dealing with SE rights claims. I have argued above that the CC‘s early jurisprudence, 
though informed by the values of human dignity and substantive equality,   drew quite clearly 
on principles of review for unreasonableness in administrative law. There is no simple 
answer to the question of whether this means that the CC‘s approach in those cases may be 
labelled an administrative law model. In my view, it is most accurate to say that principles of 
                                                 
214
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 76. 
215
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 76. The court‘s reasons for finding the government allocation of 
water to be reasonable are discussed in detail in chapter 6.  
216
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 59. 
217
  David Bilchitz (note 8 above) at 194 makes a similar point about Yacoob J‘s reasoning in Grootboom 
(note 4 above). 
218
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 59. 
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administrative justice provided the court with a framework within which to adjudicate SE 
rights.  
 
 The question then, is whether the administrative law framework inevitably leads to 
weak and ineffectual adjudication of SE rights. I have argued in chapter 3 above that judicial 
review in administrative law has been developed, both in South Africa and the U.K., to place 
increasingly onerous demands on government. At the same time, South African 
administrative law continues to suffer from a history of formalistic legal reasoning
220
 and the 
potential for rigorous scrutiny of government action often goes unfulfilled. My argument in 
this thesis is that this unfulfilled potential in respect of SE rights cases is not a consequence 
of the CC‘s use of an administrative law framework or its preference for reasonableness as 
the primary tool through which to adjudicate SE rights. Given the various interests at stake, 
discussed at length in chapter 1, some level of flexibility is necessary in any judicial 
approach to SE rights. Even the most strenuous critiques of the CC‘s approach to SE rights 
make some allowance for this.
221
 
 
  The widespread support for the court‘s early judgments on SE rights is perhaps the 
best argument in favour of a reasonableness paradigm. Although many commentators in 
South Africa criticised the decisions, those criticisms were aimed at the CC‘s reasoning and 
its failure to use the opportunities the cases presented to do more, to set clearer standards. 
Few scholars objected to the actual outcome in these cases.
222
 Some scholars argued, 
however, that the staggeringly slow implementation of the judgments in certain cases may be 
traced to the court‘s refusal to set clear guidelines on what government had to do to comply 
                                                                                                                                                       
219
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 74. 
220
  See Hoexter (note 131 above). 
221
  See the discussion of David Bilchitz‘s minimum core approach above.  
222
  The CC upheld rights claims in Grootboom, Treatment Action Campaign and Khosa, albeit on narrow 
grounds. Commentary on the outcome in Soobramoney is more complicated because, of the four cases, 
it was the only one in which resource scarcity was implicated in a serious way. The court could have 
reached a different conclusion by interpreting ‗available resources‘ less narrowly. In other words, 
instead of limiting their consideration to the resources available to the hospital, undoubtedly fixed and 
limited, the court could have considered the resources available to the state (see Bilchitz, note 8 above 
at 227-30). But consideration of budgetary allocations is something the court has shied away from out 
of respect for the constitutional role of executive and legislative bodies. Given the complexity of the 
issues involved the fairest assessment of Soobramoney is perhaps that given by Scott and Alston (note 
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with its constitutional SE rights obligations.
223
 My argument in this thesis is that this view is 
based on misplaced confidence in the capacity of courts to effect major changes in 
government policies through their judgments.
224
 This confidence is not justified by the 
experience in jurisdictions like South Africa and India. Whilst the SE rights success stories in 
both these jurisdictions are linked to useful judicial decisions, themselves usually quite 
limited, real changes in government‘s provision of SE goods occur when a range of factors 
come together. These may include, for example, a well-defined SE rights issue; a resourceful 
civil society organisation which supports the particular issue; relatively few resource 
constraints; national and international exposure of problematic government action. When 
even narrow judicial decisions – like that in Grootboom – suffer huge problems of 
implementation, it is naïve to think that a more rigorous judgment which placed greater and 
clearer demands on government would somehow have ensured greater effectiveness in the 
development and implementation of the housing programme.  
One of my arguments in this thesis is that the goal of transforming SE conditions for 
the majority of South Africans would be compromised if judges did not exercise a level of 
restraint. Judges are right to remember that they cannot predict the consequences of sweeping 
judgments and they are not experts at juggling SE priorities, especially when the information 
litigants place before them is limited to a narrow set of issues. CC judgments on SE rights 
show that the judges are alive to concerns about the limits of their role. The judgments 
contain many indications of the factors influencing the intensity of review. But the role and 
weight of these factors are not clearly articulated. In the absence of real engagement with the 
factors which inform how rigorously a court will interrogate government action, it is difficult 
to assess whether judicial caution in the context of SE rights claims is an appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                       
25 above) at 243-4 that what was missing from the judgment was a ‗more self-conscious justification‘ 
for the ‗utilitarian ethics‘ it applied in the case. 
223
  Bilchitz (note 8 above) at 151.  
224
  As Dennis Davis points out, by the time the Grootboom case came before the CC, government‘s 
economic policy had shifted from one focused on reconstruction and development to one centred on 
economic growth (note 67 above at 697 and  note 132 above at 315). See further T Madlingozi 'Post-
Apartheid social movements and the quest for the elusive New South Africa' (2007) 34 Journal of Law 
and Society 77 at 78-81. Davis notes that it is unlikely that the Constitution can be read as prohibiting a 
particular kind of economic policy. But policy decisions may be limited by constitutional 
requirements, such as those in the SE rights provisions (note 67 above at 691, note 9). This indicates 
that, whilst CC judgments can force government bodies to take into account constitutional imperatives, 
the court cannot force a change to macroeconomic policy (see, further, Davis, note 67 above at 698). 
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response to the limitations of the judicial role or judicial avoidance of the obligations which 
that role entails. These ideas are explored further in chapter 6 below. The most recent SE 
rights cases shed further light on the CC‘s model of SE rights adjudication. Some of the 
issues which have emerged from these cases merit discussion here. 
 
Justice O‘Regan‘s account of the court‘s approach to SE rights in the Mazibuko case 
confirms, in unambiguous terms, a number of the criticisms made by commentators like 
David Bilchitz. For the CC, SE rights adjudication turns on the definition of state obligations 
vis-à-vis the rights, rather than a quantification of the content of the right.
225
  The court has 
indicated that, of the obligations set out in sections 26 (2) and 27 (2), government‘s key duty 
is to take reasonable measures to give effect to the rights. Any findings as to the content of 
the SE rights in the judgments are incidental to an analysis of the extent of the state‘s 
obligations. In addition, the SE rights entitle a litigant primarily to procedural relief - 
insisting that government take some steps, getting those steps reviewed for reasonableness, 
insisting that government provide access to relevant information, holding government 
accountable for the manner in which it goes about realising SE rights. These points are not 
new – they flow from the CC‘s choice of reasonableness as the main tool through which to 
adjudicate SE rights. The Mazibuko judgment is simply the CC‘s clearest articulation of its 
approach to date. For the reasons set out above in relation to the court‘s earlier cases, my 
view is that an approach which uses the obligations in sections 26 (2) and 27 (2)
226
 as its 
focal point is capable of placing onerous demands on government whilst, at the same time, 
allowing government the opportunity to make decisions about its SE priorities.  
 
The fact that the CC‘s approach is heavily tilted toward procedural relief is more 
worrying. It is important to acknowledge the value of procedural protections – in acceding to 
judicial demands for information and greater transparency, government is often forced to 
confront and deal with deficiencies in its programmes.
227
 Changes in government‘s water 
policy in the course of litigation in the Mazibuko matter is an example of this.
228
 Procedural 
                                                 
225
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 46. 
226
  As noted above, reasonableness is the key such obligation in terms of the CC‘s jurisprudence. 
227
  See Davis (note 67 above) at 710-11. 
228
  Mazibuko (note 192 above) at par. 96. 
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relief can lead to substantive benefits, as illustrated by the Olivia Road decision, discussed 
earlier. But a categorical indication that the SE rights provisions in the Constitution only give 
rise to procedural benefits is problematic.  I have argued above that this does not necessarily 
flow from the CC‘s choice of reasonableness as the main instrument through which to 
adjudicate SE rights claims. It has always been difficult to draw a bright line between 
procedure and substance in the judicial review of administrative action. This is especially so 
when the ground of review is unreasonableness. Review for unreasonableness often goes to 
the substance of a decision.
229
 One of the main advantages of a reasonableness-based 
approach is its flexibility. Courts may vary the level of scrutiny to suit the circumstances of 
the case. If variability is to operate as a mechanism for balancing various interests in SE 
rights cases and not merely translate into weak review in all cases, it must allow courts to 
interrogate the substance of government‘s actions in appropriate cases.  The question then is 
whether the Mazibuko decision is an indication that the CC judges view the SE rights 
provisions in the Constitution as giving rise to procedural relief only, irrespective of the 
context of the particular case. I address this question in chapter 6 below. 
 
 A related issue is whether the CC uses procedural remedies to their greatest effect. 
The potential for a requirement of meaningful engagement to compel government to find 
workable solutions to SE problems through consultation with rights-holders was somewhat 
diluted by indications in Joe Slovo that even unsystematic, haphazard consultation with 
stake-holders would suffice. The court has emphasised the notion of individual agency in its 
meaningful engagement jurisprudence. The act of engagement underscores the fact that 
rights-holders are active participants, rather than helpless victims, in the process of securing 
SE goods like housing and health care. This belies the fact that the parties to this kind of 
engagement are often not equally powerful or well-resourced. One of the arguments made by 
the residents in Joe Slovo was that, once the court had handed down an eviction order, further 
engagement would be compromised by a decidedly unequal relationship between 
government officials and the residents.
 230
 This was especially true of engagement on the 
question of whether the residents had to be relocated while the area was developed. This was 
                                                 
229
  See chapter 3 above. 
230
  Joe Slovo (note 94 above) at par. 402 (Sachs J). 
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one of the main areas of contention in the case and the eviction order removed any real 
incentive for government to consult with the residents on the possibility of on site upgrading 
of the Joe Slovo settlement. Furthermore, granting an eviction order in the face of major 
flaws in the engagement process sends a message to government agencies that they need not 
take the notion of meaningful engagement too seriously. Whether the urgency of the 
situation, the potential hardship to other interested parties, the foreseeable benefits to the 
residents themselves and the overall merit of the development are sufficient justification for 
the court‘s approach are questions I examine in chapter 6. 
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Chapter Five 
Using reasonableness to enforce social and economic guarantees in the United 
Kingdom 
 
(1) Introduction 
As indicated earlier in this thesis, the respective sources of social and economic (SE) 
guarantees in South Africa and the U.K. are significantly different in nature. Whilst the South 
African Constitution contains directly justiciable SE rights, in the U.K., interests in goods 
like housing, medical treatment and social security are protected in a number of statutes. 
Decisions made in terms of social welfare legislation are subject to judicial review on the 
basis of the grounds developed in administrative law and discussed at length in chapter 3 of 
this thesis.  The incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into 
domestic law through the Human Rights Act (HRA) of 1998 provides a second avenue 
through which courts in the U.K. make judgments on the SE entitlements of people in this 
country. Although the ECHR does not contain SE rights in the form of specific rights to food, 
water, health care and housing, for instance, courts have interpreted provisions such as the 
right to respect for family and private life, in Article 8, to include the protection of various 
SE interests.  
 
 Courts in both jurisdictions are grappling with the question of the appropriate 
constitutional role of the judiciary, albeit in very different contexts.  South Africa has moved 
from a system of parliamentary sovereignty to one of constitutional supremacy, in which 
judges may strike down legislation or policy on the basis that it conflicts with fundamental 
rights protected in the Constitution. In the U.K., there has been significant academic 
questioning of whether parliamentary sovereignty is still the bedrock of the law it once was, 
related to changes in the way judges approach cases.
1
 This questioning was intensified after 
                                                 
1
  See, for example, J Jowell „Parliamentary Sovereignty under the New Constitutional Hypothesis‟ 
(2006) Public Law 562 at 571, discussing the House of Lords decision in R. (on the application of 
Jackson v Attorney-General) [2006] 1 A.C. 262 (HL); S Palmer ‗Resource Allocation, Welfare Rights 
– Mapping the Boundaries of Judicial Control in Public Administrative Law‘ (2000) 20(1) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 63 at 63. See also E Palmer (2007) Judicial Review, Socio-economic Rights 
and the Human Rights Act (Hart Publishing: Oxford and Portland, Oregon) at 152; P Craig ‗Ultra vires 
and the foundations of judicial review‘ (1998) 57 Cambridge Law Journal at 63; D Oliver ‗Is the ultra 
vires rule the basis of judicial review?‘ (1987) Public Law 543 at 543. 
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the HRA came into force. Even under the HRA, however, judges are not empowered to strike 
down legislation or policy. And, whilst the centrality of parliamentary sovereignty has been 
challenged, there are a considerable number of decisions in which courts are careful to 
acknowledge its sustained importance. In the relatively recent case of Hooper, for example, 
Lord Hope held that, ultimately, if parliamentary intent cannot be interpreted consistently 
with Convention rights, the rights give way – parliamentary intent is paramount.2  
 
 In this chapter, I begin by discussing current U.K. debates regarding the constitutional 
protection of SE rights. In this discussion, I point to some of the significant differences 
between SE rights protection in South Africa and in the U.K. The discussion illustrates that, 
whilst one must be mindful of these differences, South African and U.K. contexts are 
presenting judges with very similar challenges.  I move on to examine the approach of U.K. 
courts to the adjudication of cases in which SE rights are implicated. As my principal interest 
lies with the efficacy of reasonableness as a judicial tool for interpreting SE rights, the cases I 
am interested in are those in which judges have made use of some version of reasonableness. 
These are primarily cases in which courts apply administrative law grounds of review to test 
the legality of governmental decisions made in the implementation of SE legislative 
provisions, and cases based on article 8 of the HRA. With article 8 cases, courts are required 
to engage in a structured proportionality analysis when considering whether limitations of the 
right are legitimate. These cases provide a basis from which to consider the value of 
structured proportionality tests, as opposed to a consciously variable standard of 
reasonableness, in adjudicating SE rights. 
 
 I do not attempt an exhaustive discussion of cases in the two categories described 
above. I have selected cases that have become influential in the jurisprudence on SE rights 
and interests – cases which suggest a general approach to the issues raised in SE rights cases, 
rather than ones that reflect more narrowly on the particular dispute. The aims of this study 
                                                 
2
  R. (Hooper) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions; R. (Withey) v Same; R. (Naylor) v Same; R 
(Martin) v Same [2005] UKHL 29. See similar statements by Lord Scott at par.92 and Lord Brown at 
pars. 122 and 123. See also Lord Nicholls for the court in In Re S (Minors) (Care Order: 
Implementation of Care Plan); In Re W (Minors) (Care Order: Adequacy of Care Plan) [2002] UKHL 
10; [2002] 2 AC 91 at pars. 25 and 35. The fact that Parliament did not intend courts to exercise a 
supervisory role over child care orders played a very significant role in the reasoning.  
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are as follows. First, I draw on the cases to show that U.K. courts are already engaging with 
SE rights issues. Second, I examine the extent to which reasonableness features as a judicial 
tool for dealing with cases in which SE rights are implicated. Third, I consider how rigorous 
a standard of review courts are willing to apply in these cases. Finally, I make some tentative 
points about the reasoning behind different levels of scrutiny. I build on these tentative 
conclusions in chapter 6.  
 
(2) Bill of Rights debates: implications for the protection of social and economic 
rights in the United Kingdom  
Discussion of a U.K. Bill of Rights could trigger a more radical questioning of the centrality 
of parliamentary sovereignty in U.K. law but government‘s approach to the justiciability of 
any potential Bill of Rights has, thus far, been cautious. This caution is especially apparent in 
proposals about the place of SE rights in such a Bill of Rights. The fact that government has 
shown an interest in including SE rights, in any form, in a Bill of Rights is something of a 
change in direction – as Conor Gearty recently put it:  
Under Gordon Brown, Labour has even shown a tentative interest in extending protection 
into the realm of social and economic rights: its discussion paper on a bill of rights and 
responsibilities was widely mocked when it appeared early last year and the idea has been 
shelved until after the election, but it reflected the mild leftward drift of a government that 
seemed to be heading towards an election that was already lost.
3
 
But indications are that, even were such a Bill of Rights to be adopted at some point in the 
future, the role of courts in adjudicating SE entitlements would not be far removed from their 
current role in this area.
4
    
 
 In its 2008 report on a Bill of Rights for the U.K., Parliament‟s Joint Committee on 
Human Rights agreed with government that fully justiciable SE rights would risk courts 
intruding on the legislative mandate to exercise choices about social welfare policy and 
priorities.
5
 The committee proposed a model falling somewhere between fully justiciable SE 
                                                 
3
  ‗Terms of art‘ London Review of Books Vol. 32, No. 5, 11 March 2010, p 27-29. 
4
  Especially since the ‗mild leftward drift‘ Gearty refers to is likely to be curtailed under the new 
coalition government. 
5
  Joint Committee on Human Rights Report ‗A Bill of Rights for the U.K.?‘, Twenty-ninth Report of 
Session 2007-08, published on 10 August 2008, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/165/165i.pdf, last accessed on 12 
March 2010 at 47, par. 167. 
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rights and directive principles intended merely to guide government policy.
6
 In terms of this 
model, courts would be assigned a role in giving effect to constitutionally protected SE rights 
but that role would be carefully circumscribed: 
 On this third model, implementation of the basic commitments spelled out in the Bill of 
Rights is still primarily through democratic processes rather than the courts, but with the 
possibility of a degree of judicial involvement in extreme cases…  Individuals do not have 
legally enforceable rights against the State to full protection of the rights recognised by the 
Bill of Rights. But resort to the courts might be possible if one particular vulnerable group 
was being neglected altogether, because then the State is failing to take reasonable legislative 
and other measures, within available resources, to achieve progressive realisation of the 
rights. So there is scope for some judicial role in enforcing the constitutional provision, but 
the caveats
7
 surrounding the definition of the rights mean that there is very little scope indeed 
for judicial interference with the setting of priorities.
8
  
The Committee based this „hybrid model‟ on its understanding of the South African 
Constitutional Court‟s (CC‟s) jurisprudence on SE rights.9 On the Committee‟s assessment of 
the South African approach, the concept of unreasonableness borrowed from English 
administrative law sets a very high threshold for a judicial determination that one of the SE 
rights has been infringed. This ensures that courts may only intervene when there are „very 
serious or large-scale violations‟ of SE rights.10 In a further indication of how limited a role 
courts would have in implementing SE rights contained in a potential U.K. Bill of Rights, the 
Committee proposed that various terms be added to the South African Constitution‟s 
formulation of SE rights to ensure that the role of the courts is „appropriately limited‟.11 
  
 The use of South African jurisprudence in the Joint Committee‟s report is interesting 
for two reasons. First, the Committee‟s assessment of the jurisprudence, whilst not 
inaccurate, is selective. The terms „progressive realisation‟; „within available resources‟; and 
„reasonable legislative and other measures‟ are based on the formulation of SE rights in 
                                                 
6
  Note 5 above at 49, par. 172. 
7
  Such as progressive, rather than immediate, realization of the rights, and a duty on that state only to 
take reasonable legislative and other measures and to act within its available resources. 
8
  Note 5 above at 49, par. 172. 
9
  Note 5 above at 53, par. 192. The report draws on information gleaned from a Committee visit to 
South Africa (19
_
23 November 2007), as well as informal discussions with Justice O‘Regan, then of 
the South African CC – note 5 above at 8, pars. 8-9. 
10
  Note 5 above at 48, par. 171. 
11
  Note 5 above at 53, par. 192. For these additional qualifications, see note 5 above at 54, par. 192 
‗Judicial Review‘. 
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international law.
12
  The South African constitutional text does not place further limitations 
on the rights. The CC‟s decision to focus on the concept of reasonableness in adjudicating the 
rights allows it to respond to concerns about resource allocation and polycentricity in 
particular cases. As I have argued in chapters 3 and 4, the use of reasonableness – even 
reasonableness based on judicial review in administrative law – does not necessarily mean 
that the courts may „respond only to very serious or large-scale violations‟.13  The fact that 
most of the South African SE rights cases successfully argued before the courts, have turned 
on large-scale violations, or the unjustifiable exclusion of vulnerable groups from SE 
entitlements, is a consequence of the South African social, economic and historical context. 
The nature of the cases is not an indication that the Constitution or the CC‟s model for SE 
rights adjudication is based on the principle that other, less serious cases, do not belong 
before the courts. Furthermore, not all of the South African cases deal with „extreme‟ 
situations. Port Elizabeth Municipality, for example, turned on the most equitable means of 
conducting the eviction of about 68 people from privately owned land. It was not a large-
scale violation or a case in which a vulnerable group had simply been excluded from SE 
benefits.
14
 Most importantly, the Joint Committee‟s report fails to appreciate that, even when 
the SE rights violation is not as obvious as it was in cases like Grootboom
15
 and Treatment 
Action Campaign,
16
 and a case is argued unsuccessfully before the CC, the process of 
litigation often causes government to revisit and to amend its policies to more effectively 
take account of SE rights concerns.
17
 This cannot happen if the constitutional text prevents 
the cases from even being brought before the courts. 
  
 The absence of any mention of the differences in context between the U.K. and South 
                                                 
12
  Article 2, International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  
13  Note 5 above at 48, par. 171.  
14
  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC).   
15
  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
16
  Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign and others (No. 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 
(CC). 
17
  Mazibuko and others v City of Johannesburg and others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 
intervening) 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC); 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) is a good example here, as is Residents of 
Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and others 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC); 2010 
(3) SA 454 (CC). 
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Africa is a second interesting feature of the Joint Committee‟s Report.18 Limited resources 
and poor infrastructure are a much more serious concern in South Africa, as the country 
moves from a system of first-rate service delivery for a minority of the population to a more 
equal distribution of resources. The majority of South Africans still live without the most 
basic of SE goods, such as safe and hygienic shelter and access to clean drinking water. In 
addition to making decisions about SE priorities, policy-makers also have to grapple with the 
absence of a functional infrastructure for the provision of SE goods.
19
 It is in this context that 
the CC judges have felt themselves to be ill-equipped to apply the most searching standards 
of scrutiny when interrogating government action. But, as O‟Regan J noted in the Mazibuko 
case, a municipality which easily provides for the minimum standard (of water, housing, 
health care etc.) to all in its jurisdiction, within its available resources, has not necessarily 
acted reasonably.
20
 This is an indication that SE rights claims do not have to involve the most 
obvious, large-scale infringements of SE rights for them to be successfully argued before the 
court. Whether the CC has found the right balance between deference to government‟s 
democratic mandate and fulfillment of its own duty to give legal effect to the rights is 
something I consider in chapter 6. But, to interpret the CC‟s model as based on a principle 
that the only justiciable SE rights cases are those based on large-scale violations of SE rights 
or unjustifiable discrimination against groups in the provision of SE goods is a mistake. 
 
 In contrast to South Africa, the U.K. is the world‟s fourth-largest economy.21 Whilst 
resources are naturally not limitless in the U.K., they are certainly less of a constraining 
factor in the delivery of SE rights. Further, provision of SE goods is not complicated by 
comparably poor service-delivery mechanisms. The source of the U.K. government‟s 
antipathy to judicially enforceable SE rights then, lies primarily with a desire to maintain a 
separation of governmental powers and with a lingering commitment to parliamentary 
                                                 
18
  This is a point to which Ewing has alluded in ‗Judicial Review, Socio-Economic Rights and the Human 
Rights Act; Weak Courts, Strong Courts: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law‘ Book Review (2009) 7(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 155 at 160-
1. He argues that the expense and time involved in the Committee‘s visit to South Africa would have 
been better spent on carefully examining the texts of Constitutions of countries closer to the U.K.  
19
  As illustrated by Mazibuko (note 17 above), discussed in chapter 3 above. 
20
  Mazibuko (note 17 above) at par. 74. 
21
  Ewing (note 18 above) at 165. 
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supremacy.
22
 The Joint Committee‟s list of ten factors that courts must consider when 
assessing the reasonableness of government measures to give effect to the SE rights includes 
caveats which are common to international law and the South African Constitution – the duty 
to take into account the availability of resources, for instance. The fact that there is a list of 
additional factors, and the nature of most of those additional factors, serve to strongly 
reinforce the idea that U.K. courts would have only a marginal role to play in giving effect to 
constitutional SE rights.  
 
 Common SE rights clauses include phrases like „progressive realisation‟ and „within 
available resources‟ as explicit acknowledgements that states are not expected to give effect 
to the full gamut of SE rights immediately. But, depending on how a court interprets them, 
these caveats could still require courts to ask searching questions of government: is 
government taking steps to progressively realise the rights? Is a particular governmental 
measure retrogressive? Do government measures make use of its available resources?  The 
Joint Committee‟s formulation includes the following additional considerations, relevant in 
every SE rights case: „the latitude inherent in a duty to achieve the realisation of the rights 
progressively‘; ‗the fact that a wide range of measures is possible to meet the Government‘s 
obligations‘; and ‗the availability of an alternative means of realising the rights is not, of 
itself, an indication of unreasonableness‘.23 These factors do not require the court to ask any 
questions of government. Instead, they require a court to make a number of assumptions in 
government‘s favour. These factors are not necessarily appropriate in every SE rights case. In 
South Africa, Treatment Action Campaign
24
 is an example of a case where a wide range of 
measures to meet government‘s obligations simply did not exist in the circumstances of the 
case. The factors in the Joint Committee‘s proposed SE rights clause makes reasonableness 
less of a flexible device to be tailored to the requirements of particular cases and more a 
mechanism to guarantee weak review in all SE rights cases.  
 
 The caution over SE rights is even more pronounced in the Ministry of Justice 2009 
                                                 
22
  See Ewing (note 18 above) at 162-3. 
23
  Note 5 above at 54, par. 192 ‗Judicial Review‘. 
24
  Note 16 above, discussed in chapter 3 above. 
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Green Paper „Rights and responsibilities: developing our constitutional framework‟.25 The 
Green Paper underlines government‟s view of parliamentary sovereignty as the foundation of 
the U.K. constitution.
26
 The job of deciding how social entitlements are distributed rests with 
elected representatives, democratically accountable to their constituents.
27
 Courts are an 
inappropriate forum for decision-making on SE matters in general: 
 Decision-making in economic, social and cultural matters usually involves politically 
sensitive resource allocation and if the courts were to make these decisions, this would be 
likely to impinge on the principles of democratic accountability as well as the separation of 
powers between the judiciary, the legislature and the executive which underpins our 
constitutional arrangements.
28
 
The paper makes it clear that new, individually enforceable SE rights would not form part of 
government proposals for a Bill of Rights. Instead, the paper encourages discussion on the 
benefits of distilling constitutional principles from existing welfare provisions.
29
  
 
 As indicated in chapter 1, limitations on what judges may do in the arena of SE rights 
implementation do not necessarily signify a lack of commitment to the protection of these 
rights.  It is dangerously inaccurate to cast judges in the role of staunch protectors of SE 
rights and to assume that legislators and policy-makers see the rights as tiresome limitations 
on their ability to pursue their political agendas. As pointed out by Gearty, in the context of 
the HRA, ‗[t]he fact that the current generation of judges is largely liberal may yet prove as 
historically anomalous as the progressive Warren Supreme Court in the United States‘.30 So 
limiting the role of courts in implementing SE rights could serve to protect a future 
government‘s SE agenda from judges eager to preserve private economic interests, for 
example. But, at the same time, flaws in the political process mean that the rights of poor 
people often lose out to the interests of more vocal, economically powerful groups.
31
 Most 
worryingly, judges, legislators and policy-makers may act together to preserve an 
                                                 
25
  Ministry of Justice Green Paper ‗Rights and responsibilities: developing our constitutional framework‘, 
March 2009, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/rights-responsibilities.pdf, last 
accessed on 12 March 2010. 
26
  Note 25 above at 57, par. 4.27. 
27
  Note 25 above at 43, par. 3.52. 
28
  Note 25 above at 43, par. 3.52. 
29
  Note 25 above at 43, par. 3.53. 
30
  Gearty (note 3 above). See also Ewing (note 18 above) at 163.  
31
  Ewing (note 18 above) at 168. This argument is canvassed more fully in chapter 1 above. 
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‗inegalitarian status quo‘.32 In modern democracies, neither serious political will supporting 
SE rights nor a judicial commitment to their protection may be assumed. In these 
circumstances, important reasons exist for judges to play some role in SE rights 
implementation but, at the same time, for that role to be limited.  
 
 Whilst the differences in context need to be borne in mind, South Africa and the U.K. 
are facing very similar questions about the role of judges in giving effect to SE rights.  
Though South African judges are constitutionally mandated to adjudicate SE rights claims, 
they must do so taking the internal limitations in the SE rights provisions, as well as the 
limits of their broader constitutional role into account. In the U.K., government discussion of 
a future Bill of Rights to date is a strong indication that such a document is unlikely to give 
courts any further powers of review, especially in the area of SE rights.  If the kind of Bill of 
Rights suggested in government discussion documents comes into being, decided cases with 
SE rights implications will provide a foundation upon which courts will build an approach to 
the adjudication of tightly circumscribed SE rights.  If a Bill of Rights does not materialise 
from recent discussions, Article 8 of the HRA and judicial review of administrative decisions 
will continue to provide the primary means through which individuals may approach the 
courts to challenge governmental decision-making on SE rights and interests. Whatever 
happens, existing jurisprudence in this area will continue to be important.  
 
(3) Relevant United Kingdom cases 
In the discussion that follows, I examine a selection of U.K. cases, decided both before and 
after the HRA came into affect, to identify patterns in the higher courts‟ approach to cases 
with SE rights implications. I am particularly interested in the extent to which judicial 
attitudes to cases involving SE matters is changing, and in the levels of scrutiny courts use 
when assessing government action in this area.  
 
Cambridge Health Authority represents the orthodox position on the justiciability of 
resource allocation decisions and continues to be referred to by judges as a starting point in 
the adjudication of similar SE rights issues. The case concerned a father‘s application for 
                                                 
32
  Gearty (note 3 above). 
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judicial review of the health authority‘s refusal to provide further treatment to his daughter. 
She was suffering from non-Hodgkin‘s lymphoma and common acute lymphoblastic 
leukaemia.
33
  The court acknowledged that the interests of a young child in life itself was at 
stake but held that the only question for it was whether the decision was lawful.
34
 On this 
question, the court found that the health authority had not exceeded its powers and that its 
decision was reasonable.
35
 The judgment of Lord Bingham MR reinforced ‗the non-
justiciability of resource allocation decisions founded on Wednesbury reasonableness‘.36  He 
disagreed with the judge in the court of first instance who required the health authority to 
‗explain the priorities that have led it to decline to fund the treatment‘ noting that: 
Difficult and agonising judgments have to be made as to how a limited budget is best 
allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum number of patients. That is not a 
judgment which the court can make. In my judgment, it is not something that a health 
authority such as this authority can be fairly criticised for not advancing before the court [my 
emphasis].
37
 
A different approach may not have affected the result of this case. The weight of the medical 
evidence indicated that the medical procedure would have had little chance of success.
38
  But, 
the fact that the court was not willing to require from the health authority that it provide 
evidence supporting its claims illustrates just how limited a role was envisaged for judges 
acting in cases concerned with the allocation of health care services. The resource limitations 
on the health authority were taken as a given
39
 and Lord Bingham MR expressed the view 
that it was not realistic to expect a health authority to demonstrate before the court, with 
reference to its accounts, that if treatment were provided to the child in question, another 
patient would be deprived of some comparable procedure.
40
 Beyond stating that ‗[n]o major 
health authority could run its financial affairs in a way which would permit such a 
demonstration‘,41 Lord Bingham MR did not indicate why he considered such an expectation 
to be utterly far-fetched. Moreover, the issue of transparency in this case was set up as a 
choice between two extremes: the health authority had no obligation to justify its choices or 
                                                 
33
  Regina v Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte. B [1995] 1 W.L.R. 898 at 900. 
34
  Cambridge Health Authority (note 33 above) at 905. 
35
  Cambridge Health Authority (note 33 above) at 907. 
36
  E Palmer (note 1 above) at 164. See also 207-10. 
37
  Cambridge Health Authority (note 33 above) at 906. 
38
  Cambridge Health Authority (note 33 above) at 905-6. 
39
  Cambridge Health Authority (note 33 above) at 906. 
40
  Cambridge Health Authority (note 33 above) at 906. 
41
  Cambridge Health Authority (note 33 above) at 906. 
 191  
had to engage in the medical equivalent of itemised billing, showing a direct, knock-on, 
adverse effect on one patient of providing treatment to another. An explanation for a 
particular policy need not contain that level of detail.  
 
The Court of Appeal‘s approach in North-West Lancashire Health Authority v A, D, 
and G,
42
 marked a departure from the established position represented by Cambridge Health 
Authority. The three applicants concerned challenged the health authority‘s refusal to provide 
funding for their gender reassignment surgery. Lord Justice Auld began from a similar 
position as that taken by the Court of Appeal in Cambridge Health Authority. He noted that 
decisions regarding allocation of resources and medical priorities rested within the health 
authority‘s judgment, provided it fulfilled its legislative obligation to ‗meet the reasonable 
requirements of all those within its area for which it is responsible‘.43 The court accepted as 
rational the health authority‘s determination that transsexualism was an illness of low priority 
and that treatment for it would only be provided in ‗exceptional circumstances‘. 44 The court 
held that this rational assessment was unassailable ‗provided the policy genuinely recognises 
the possibility of there being an overriding clinical need and requires each request for 
treatment to be considered on its individual merits.‘45 However, the authority was reluctant to 
accept gender reassignment surgery as a successful treatment for transsexualism. As the 
authority did not recognise the existence of an effective treatment which it would fund, the 
undertaking that treatment would be provided in exceptional cases that is, where there was 
some ‗overriding clinical need‘, was meaningless.46  
 
The Court of Appeal unanimously quashed the policies of the health authority to the 
extent that they concerned gender reassignment surgery and ordered the authority to 
reconsider its policy and the three decisions involved here on their merits. The court was 
prepared to leave a large amount to the discretion of the health authority, demanding simply 
that it act within the parameters of its own policy. Although the court did not direct the 
authority as to what priority the illness should take, it made an order requiring the authority 
                                                 
42
  [2000] 1 WLR 977.  
43
  North-West Lancashire Health Authority (note 42 above) at 991. 
44
  North-West Lancashire Health Authority (note 42 above) at 991. 
45
  North-West Lancashire Health Authority (note 42 above) at 991. 
46
  North-West Lancashire Health Authority (note 42 above) at 993. 
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to give proper credence to its own acceptance that transsexualism was an illness.
47
 Lord 
Justice Auld noted in passing that it could well be irrational for such an authority not to have 
a policy aimed at allocating resources according to its stated priorities (not in issue here as 
such policies were in place).
48
 He went on to set out additional criteria a health policy would 
have to meet. A general policy was acceptable but there had to be space within that policy for 
judges to consider each case on its merits in determining whether there was some overriding 
clinical need.
49
 In deciding on its priorities, the relevant health authority had to accurately 
‗assess the nature and seriousness of each type of illness‘; ‗determine the effectiveness of 
various forms of treatment for it‘; and ‗give proper effect to that assessment and that 
determination in the formulation and individual application of its policy‘.50 
 
The reasons for the approach taken here are elaborated on in Lord Justice Buxton‘s 
judgment. Noting that the only requirement was that the decision be ‗rationally based upon a 
proper consideration of the facts‘,51 he held that, in the face of a significant amount of 
medical opinion in support of the procedure, the health authority could not simply dismiss its 
efficacy without giving some reasons for this attitude.
52
 Although the standard of review 
applied was still very much rationality, the case was an indication that the complexity of the 
matter at hand is not a bar to justiciability.  
 
 When one considers what might have given rise to the difference in approach in 
Cambridge Health Authority, a number of possibilities are apparent. For one thing, in the 
Lancashire Health Authority decision, the weight of medical evidence contradicted the health 
authority‘s views on gender assignment surgery. Furthermore, the health authority‘s 
approach to these cases was inconsistent with its own policy, in terms of which 
transsexualism was an illness for which it would provide treatment. Thus, the court in 
Lancashire was not called upon to question the health authority‘s own assessment of its 
priorities. The tenor of the judgment in Cambridge Health Authority indicates that the court 
                                                 
47
  North-West Lancashire Health Authority (note 42 above) at 994-5.  
48
  North-West Lancashire Health Authority (note 42 above) at 991. 
49
  North-West Lancashire Health Authority (note 42 above) at 991. 
50
  North-West Lancashire Health Authority (note 42 above) at 991-2. 
51
  North-West Lancashire Health Authority (note 42 above) at 997. 
52
  North-West Lancashire Health Authority (note 42 above) at 998. 
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considered any interrogation of the Health Authority‘s justification for its policy to be 
tantamount to challenging that policy, something it was not prepared to do. 
 
In R. (on the application of Rogers) v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust
53
 the Court 
of Appeal developed its approach in Lancashire Health Authority. The Court of Appeal had 
to review the refusal by the Primary Care Trust (PCT) to fund the appellant‘s treatment for 
breast cancer with an, as yet, unlicensed drug. The question for the court was whether the 
PCT had acted lawfully and rationally.
54
  The court held that the PCT had acted irrationally 
as it had paid insufficient attention to its own policy. The policy made it clear that the 
sizeable cost was not relevant, 
55
 and that unlicensed drugs would be provided in exceptional 
circumstances. But the PCT did not place any medical evidence indicating that a distinction 
could be made in the clinical needs of breast-cancer sufferers before the court.
56
 Thus, there 
was no basis on which the drug could be provided to some patients and not others, making 
nonsense of the notion of ‗exceptional circumstances‘.57 There are obvious similarities 
between this case and North-West Lancashire Health Authority, discussed above and referred 
to as authority in Rogers.
58
 
 
It should be noted that, as in North-West Lancashire Health Authority above, the 
judgment in Rogers was limited in the sense that the court left a large amount of the 
discretion as to how to formulate a lawful policy to the PCT.
59
  Furthermore, the court made 
it quite clear that, had the issue of scarcity of resources been taken into account by the PCT, 
the policy could not have been attacked as irrational.
60
 Syrett argues that, due to advances in 
medical technology, the rationing of health care resources has become more visible to the 
public where once it was ‗practised in an ―implicit‖ form as medical professionals, having 
                                                 
53
  [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2649. 
54
  Rogers (note 53 above) at 2651. For a fuller discussion of the facts, see the judgment of Sir Anthony 
Clarke MR at 2649 – 2653. 
55
  Rogers (note 53 above) at 2661. 
56
  Rogers (note 53 above) at 2660. 
57
  Rogers (note 53 above) at 2672. 
58
  Rogers (note 53 above) at 2673. 
59
  Rogers (note 53 above) at 2673; see also K Syrett „Opening eyes to the reality of scarce health 
resources? R. (on the application of Rogers) v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust and Secretary of 
State for Health‟ (2006) Public Law 664 at 667. 
60
  Rogers (note 53 above) at 2671 and Syrett (note 59 above) at 669-70. 
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internalised resource constraints, presented allocative decisions to patients as matters of 
clinical judgment‘.61 This development demands that there be a more transparent system in 
place, with guidelines for making necessary assessments.
62
 Both this case and Lancashire 
Health Authority may be viewed as requiring transparency, rather than something more 
substantive, from public bodies. In particular, when scarcity of resources is a concern, as it 
always is in matters of public health, the point at which a court is willing to intervene may be 
determined by whether the authority concerned is willing to admit the role that scarcity of 
resources plays.
63
 What this also means is that, in any case in which a public body simply 
raises scarcity of resources, the court may be unwilling to intervene. 
 
In Regina v. Secretary of State for Social Security ex parte. Joint Council for the 
Welfare of Immigrants; Regina v Secretary of State for Social Security ex parte. B,
64
  decided 
two years before Lancashire, the Court of Appeal was willing to apply a more rigorous 
standard of review in a judgment with implications for the allocation of public funds outside 
the context of health care. The Social Security (Persons from Abroad) Miscellaneous 
Amendment Regulations of 1996 excluded from the definition of ‗asylum seeker‘ those who 
sought asylum at any point later than upon their entry into the U.K.
 65
 and those who were in 
the country pending appeals after their claims for asylum had been rejected by the Secretary 
of State for the Home Department.
 66
 Consequently, these individuals would no longer be 
entitled to ‗urgent cases payments‘.67 The Regulations were aimed at ‗discouraging 
unfounded applications from those who are actually economic migrants‘ whilst, at the same 
time, making sure that genuine asylum seekers continue to find a safe haven in the country.
68
  
 
 In his dissenting judgment, Neill LJ considered the judicial role in cases like this, 
where subordinate legislation enacted in terms of one statute impacts on fundamental rights 
                                                 
61
  Syrett (note 59 above) at 668. 
62
  Syrett (note 59 above) at 668. See also 671. 
63
 Syrett (note 59 above) at 671. 
64
  [1997] 1 W.L.R 275. 
65
  Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (note 64 above) at 281. 
66
  The Regulations did allow for some exceptions to this - Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants 
(note 64 above) at 283. 
67
  Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (note 64 above) at 281, 283. 
68
  Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (note 64 above) at 280. 
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granted in another statute or under the common law. He held that judges are empowered to 
intervene in these cases where the interference with the right is disproportionate to the 
objective sought to be achieved
69
 but engaged in a cursory proportionality analysis. Whilst 
acknowledging the ‗very serious effect‘ the Regulations would have on significant numbers 
of genuine asylum seekers, Neill LJ stated that Parliament had entrusted the allocation of 
resources in this area to the Secretary of State and the balance opted for could not be said to 
be unlawful, given the purpose of the legislation and its results. This reasoning supports 
Julian Rivers‘ observation that British courts tend to treat proportionality as a question of 
necessity (asking whether the decision or Regulation was necessary to achieve the desired 
objective) rather than as a question of balancing.
70
 In a true balancing exercise, fundamental 
rights may sometimes be so important as to trump the governmental objective. With an 
enquiry into necessity, the only relevant question is whether the governmental objective may 
be achieved in any other way.  In such a process, the government objective is often upheld, 
irrespective of is relative importance or the detrimental impact on individuals.
71
  
 
 In contrast, Simon Brown LJ, writing for the majority, pointed out that the 
Regulations had an untenable impact on many genuine asylum seekers, forcing them to 
remain in the U.K. with no means of financial support
72
 or to return to the countries in which 
they had experienced serious persecution and from which they were attempting to escape.
73
 
Simon Brown LJ was well aware that he was taking the jurisprudence in the area a step 
further as this was not a case in which the state authority had interfered directly with existing 
fundamental rights. Rather, the judgment here required the Secretary of State to maintain 
some provision of benefits to asylum seekers in order to protect those among them who 
would turn out to have genuine claims to have their rights protected.
74
 But, he went on to 
hold that the Regulations were ‗so uncompromisingly draconian in effect that they must 
indeed be held ultra vires.‘75 He observed that the Regulations: 
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  Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (note 64 above) at 282-3. 
70
  J Rivers ‗Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review‘ (2006) 65(1) Cambridge Law Journal 174 
at 190. 
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  See discussion of Rivers‘ argument in section 4 of this chapter. 
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  Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (note 64 above) at 286. 
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  Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (note 64 above) at 283 – 4. 
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  Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (note 64 above) at 292. 
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 contemplate for some a life so destitute that to my mind no civilised nation can tolerate it. So 
basic are the human rights here at issue that it cannot be necessary to resort to the European 
Convention on Human Rights to take note of their violation.
76
 
Simon Brown LJ used a standard of proportionality in making his determination. In a 
balancing of the Secretary of State‘s right to limit benefits in order to discourage economic 
migrants,
77
 and the serious impact of the legislation on genuine refugees, the seriousness of 
the adverse impact on affected parties weighed more heavily for Simon Brown LJ. Despite 
the difference in their judgments on the outcome of the case, both Neill LJ and Simon Brown 
LJ reviewed the Regulations on the basis of whether they were a disproportionate 
interference with rights protected in other legislation or in the common law. This is most 
clearly articulated in Neill LJ‘s judgment. He noted that the Secretary of State was acting 
within the powers granted to him under the enabling statute. So the basis for a finding that 
the Regulations were ultra vires had to be a lack of proportionality between the purpose of 
the Regulations and their impact.
78
 The judges derived their consideration of proportionality 
from ordinary principles of administrative law, not the ECHR. 
 
The role that fundamental human rights have to play in determining the level of 
scrutiny to be applied has naturally been much more clearly articulated in cases in which the 
HRA is relied upon. In Regina (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,
79
 an 
Iraqi man had entered, and was seeking asylum in, the U.K. Matters were complicated by the 
fact that he had come to the U.K. from Germany and the U.K. was, therefore, under a treaty 
obligation to return him to Germany. However, he resisted removal on the basis of his Article 
8 right under the ECHR.
80
 He argued that returning to Germany would be detrimental to his 
mental health. He was being treated for mental health problems in the U.K. and claimed that 
he would commit suicide if returned. His application was successful before the lower courts 
and the Secretary of State appealed the decision to quash the certificate ordering his removal 
to Germany on the basis that Mr Razgar‘s claim was ‗manifestly unfounded‘. Lord Bingham 
held that the first question before the Court was: ‗Can the rights protected by Article 8 be 
engaged by the foreseeable consequences for health or welfare of removal from the United 
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  Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (note 64 above) at 292. 
77
  Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (note 64 above) at 291-2. 
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  Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (note 64 above) at 282-3. 
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  [2004] 2 A.C. 368. 
80
  Razgar (note 79 above) at 378.  
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Kingdom pursuant to an immigration decision, where such removal does not violate article 
3?‘81 This question of principle arose from recent U.K. and European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence on Articles 3 and 8.
82
 
 
There is an interesting line of cases on Article 3, in which potential immigrants about 
to be sent back to the state in which they were nationals, or from which they had arrived in 
the U.K, sought to stay in the country because they would otherwise lose access to health 
care they had been receiving. This line of cases includes D v United Kingdom,
 83
 Bensaid v 
United Kingdom,
84
 and N v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Terence Higgins 
Trust intervening).
85
  In order to qualify as torture or inhuman or degrading treatment under 
Article 3, the treatment concerned (that is, the consequences of sending the individual back) 
would have to meet an extreme level of severity. Only one of these cases, D v United 
Kingdom, has resulted in a successful Article 3 claim.
86
  
 
In Razgar, Lord Bingham held that, in principle, Article 8 could be engaged in cases 
where removal could have consequences for the health of the claimant, despite the fact that 
Article 3 is not engaged.
87
 On the issue of the scope of review, Lord Bingham noted that in 
proceedings reviewing the Secretary of State‘s decision to certify a removal order, the court‘s 
role was merely supervisory. However, due to the fact that this case involved irrevocable 
action, potentially infringing fundamental human rights, the level of scrutiny was high.
88
 As 
the question before the court was whether the claim was manifestly unfounded, the court had 
to determine the likelihood of success on appeal. In doing that, it had to consider each of the 
questions that would be asked on appeal – essentially determining whether the right would be 
infringed by the removal and if so, whether this limitation of the right was in accordance with 
the law, ‗necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
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or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others‘  and 
‗proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved‘.89  
 
Lord Bingham was of the view that as long as the proposed removal was carried out 
in terms of a ‗lawful immigration policy‘ it would be found to be necessary in the sense used 
above unless there was ‗bad faith, ulterior motive or deliberate abuse of power‘.90 Thus, the 
intensity of review at this stage was low. Moving on to the proportionality enquiry, Lord 
Bingham noted that proportionality was always a balancing exercise between individual 
rights on the one hand, and the interests of the community on the other. In this exercise, the 
question of the seriousness of the consequences of the limitation of rights had inevitably to 
be considered.
91
  The Secretary of State had not acknowledged that Article 8 could apply in 
this case and had not dealt with the question of proportionality. The possibility that an 
adjudicator would decide in Mr Razgar‘s favour could not be ruled out and a majority of the 
Law Lords, thus, dismissed the appeal.
92
 Due to the reliance on the HRA, proportionality was 
quite clearly of concern here. However, it is interesting to note Lord Bingham‘s view that a 
lawful policy would only give rise to a lack of proportionality between means and end in rare 
cases
93
 and that proportionality as an enquiry always pits the individual‘s rights against 
societal or community interests. Again, this view bears out River‘s point that, for British 
courts, proportionality is often a ‗state-limiting‘ rather than a balancing exercise for British 
courts.
94
 
 
(4) Lessons from the United Kingdom jurisprudence 
As I have sought to argue in chapters 3 and 4, an approach that builds on reasonableness 
                                                 
89
  Razgar (note 79 above) at 389. 
90
  Razgar (note 79 above) at 389-90. 
91
  Razgar (note 79 above) at 390.  
92
  Razgar (note 79 above) at 390-1. 
93
  Razgar (note 79 above) at 390. The House of Lords indicated that this comment was merely Lord 
Bingham‘s view on the matter and should not be interpreted as adding a requirement of exceptionality 
to these kinds of cases in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Kashmiri v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department [2007] 2 WLR 581at 593. The House of Lords did not comment on 
the substance of Lord Bingham‘s comment that lawful policies would only be disproportionate in 
exceptional cases.  
94
  See the discussion of Rivers‘ argument in section 4, below. 
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review in administrative law is potentially very useful in balancing the need to make SE 
rights meaningful with respect for the balance of powers amongst the branches of 
government. Some level of flexibility in a judicial approach is necessary and desirable but, at 
the moment, the combination of a lack of predictability and a tendency to weak review 
apparent in the later, more complex South African SE rights cases discussed in chapter 4 are 
a concern. This tendency to weak review is also a feature of the U.K. jurisprudence on SE 
rights. The circumstances in which courts are willing to intervene tend to be extreme - in 
Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, for example, the impugned Regulations would 
have left a significant number of people destitute - or to involve a glaring omission on 
government‘s part. Lancashire Health Authority and Rogers are examples of this kind of 
obvious flaw as the authorities in both these cases had not applied their own policies in a 
rational manner. 
 
In the South African context, some commentators have suggested that, even if the CC 
persists with its reasonableness based approach, a more rigorous standard of review may be 
assured if section 36, the general limitation clause, is applied in SE rights cases. A large part 
of the South African CC‘s jurisprudence on SE rights has focused on the identically worded 
sections 26 (2) and 27 (2), internal limitations on the rights. The court has not applied the 
Constitution‘s general limitation clause, section 36,95 to test if infringements of the SE rights 
are justifiable.
 96
  The debate over the continued relevance of section 36 in SE rights cases 
stems from a concern that the internal limitation of the rights in sections 26 (1) and 27 (1) 
means that the Court always defines the rights in light of the considerations in sections 26 (2) 
and 27 (2). The Court is, thus, able to avoid setting out the content of the rights with any 
exactitude.
97
 Furthermore, section 36 requires that a court consider the proportionality of the 
                                                 
95
  Discussed in chapter 3. 
96
 The rights to social security (section 27) and equality (section 9) were both raised in Khosa and others 
v Minister of Social Development and others; Mahlaule and another v Minister of Social Development 
and Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC), discussed in chapter 4 above . The Court 
used an equality analysis to find that both sections 9 and 27 had been violated. The majority, per 
Mokgoro J, did not move on to a full-blown section 36 analysis, preferring to apply the internal 
limitations in section 27 (2) and indicating that reasonableness in that section was not significantly 
different from reasonableness in section 36 at pars. 80; and 83-4. 
97
 D Davis „Adjudicating the Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards 
“Deference Lite”? (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 301 at 310, note 35; C Steinberg 
‗Can Reasonableness Protect the Poor? A Review of South Africa‘s Socio-Economic Rights 
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governmental act being challenged in every case. Finally, in a section 36 analysis, the burden 
of proof is reversed. Once the claimant shows a prima facie infringement of a 
constitutionally protected right, it is up to the state to show that the infringement is 
reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 36.  
 
Three points must be borne in mind here. First, the CC has cautioned against an 
overly technical approach to the burden of proof in SE rights cases. In Port Elizabeth 
Municipality, Sachs J stated, for a unanimous court: 
The court cannot fulfil its responsibilities…if it does not have the requisite information at its 
disposal. It needs to be fully apprised of the circumstances before it can have regard to them. 
It follows that although it is incumbent on the interested parties to make all relevant 
information available, technical questions relating to onus of proof should not play an unduly 
significant role in its enquiry. The court is not resolving a civil dispute as to who has rights 
under land law… What the court is called upon to do is to decide whether, bearing in mind 
the values of the Constitution, in upholding and enforcing land rights it is appropriate to issue 
an order which has the effect of depriving people of their homes.
98
 
 
Second, CC jurisprudence indicates that section 36 will only be applied when SE rights are 
indirectly enforced through other rights in the Constitution,
99
 and then sometimes only in a 
most superficial sense.
100
 To date, it has only been the Khosa case in which an SE right was 
indirectly enforced through another right.
101
 Third, and most importantly, in a consideration 
of proportionality under section 36, one does not inevitably escape the conceptual and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Jurisprudence‘ (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 264 at 282-3 and K Iles 'Limiting Socio-
Economic Rights: Beyond the Internal Limitations Clauses' (2004) 20 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 448. See also S Liebenberg ‗The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic 
rights‘ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 1 at 28. 
98
  Note 14 above at par. 32. 
99
 See Davis' discussion (note 97 above) of Khosa at 309-10; and President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) at 312-313; and 325.  In the High Court 
decision Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v South Metropolitan Local Council (2002) 6 BCLR 625 
(W), Budlender AJ held that section 27 (2) did not apply when the negative duty to respect the right in 
section 27 (1) was limited. In other words, when individuals or groups were deprived of a pre-existing 
right of access to water, for example, the internal limitations were not relevant. Budlender AJ went on 
to engage in a justification analysis akin to that set out in section 36 although, as pointed out by Iles 
(note 97 above) at 460 note 72, he did not categorise it as such. See pars. 15-18; 20-32 of the 
judgment; and M Pieterse ‗Towards a useful role for section 36 of the Constitution in social rights 
cases? Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v South Metropolitan Local Council‘  (2003) 120 South 
African Law Journal 41 at 45. The CC has not yet expressed a view on this reading of the section. 
100
 Khosa (note 96 above) at pars. 80; and 83-4. 
101
  Khosa (note 96 above) at pars. 68-77. The applicants in the case relied on both their right to social 
security, protected and section 27 of the Constitution and their right to equality, protected in section 9. 
Justice Mokgoro applied an equality analysis, interpreting the term ‗reasonable‘ in section 27 (2) 
through the lens of the equality clause, in her judgment for the majority. See the discussion of Khosa in 
chapter 4 above. 
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practical difficulties associated with the reasonableness approach, as it has been applied so 
far. 
 
There are divergent approaches to proportionality. Julian Rivers argues that although 
'state-limiting' approaches to proportionality appear, at first sight, to grant more extensive 
rights-protection, British courts tend to uphold the government purpose as important and test 
simply for efficiency, assuming that 'whatever it takes to achieve a government aim is 
justified'.
102
  Furthermore, the necessity test may often be reduced to the question of whether 
a decision is unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense,
103
 where some theory of judicial 
deference is at play. This is supported by Lord Bingham‘s view in Razgar above that there 
would have to be ‗bad faith, ulterior motive or a deliberate abuse of power‘104 for a decision 
made under a lawful immigration policy to fail the necessity test. In the South African 
context, the balancing test is often applied superficially and does not, of itself, guarantee 
greater protection of rights. Moreover, even where the Court places rigorous demands on 
government, usually by demanding that the state opt for the least restrictive means of limiting 
the right in terms of section 36, the government objective is not always placed under great 
scrutiny and there is little predictability about the intensity of review.
105
 The point is that 
proportionality is itself applied at varying levels of intensity
106
 by South African and U.K. 
courts. We need to go further to try to ascertain how courts decide on the level at which they 
will interrogate government action if we are to make sense of judicial approaches to cases 
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 Rivers (note 70 above) at 190. 
103
  Rivers (note 70 above) at 178, citing H Wade and C Forsyth (2004) Administrative Law at 366. 
104
  Razgar (note 79 above) at 389-90. 
105
  See, for example, Ngcobo J in Jordan v S 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at pars. 25 and 26 and Rósaan 
Kruger‘s critique of the judgment ‗Sex work from a feminist perspective‘ (2004) 20 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 138 at 146. Ngcobo J held that it was not for the court to assess the efficacy 
of legislative choices on how to deal with ‗social ills‘ like ‗prostitution and brothel keeping‘. See also 
Chaskalson P (as he then was) in S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC); 1997 
(10) BCLR 1348 (CC) at par. 90 compared with O‘Regan J‘s reasoning at par. 125. One of the issues 
under consideration in Solberg was whether certain provisions of the Liquor Act 27 of 1989, 
preventing the sale of alcohol on Sundays, Good Friday and Christmas Day by the holder of a grocer‘s 
licence, violated the right to freedom of religion protected in section 14 of the interim Constitution. 
Chaskalson P accepted that the purpose of the legislation was the restriction of the sale of alcohol on 
the relevant days, rather than the compulsion of sabbatical observance. O‘Regan J held that, even if the 
purpose was the restriction of alcohol consumption, the Act was flawed because (a) it only prevented 
certain types of alcohol being sold and (b) it did not restrict or prevent the sale of alcohol on ‗non-
religious public holidays… when the roads are particularly full and the restriction of consumption 
would appear to be particularly desirable‘. 
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  Seer Rivers (note 70 above). 
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involving SE rights. 
 
There has been some consideration of the factors that determine the intensity of 
review in United Kingdom administrative law. Lord Justice Laws suggested the following 
guidelines in International Transport Roth GmbH v Home Secretary:
107
  
(1)  greater deference should be paid to Parliament than to subordinate legislative 
or executive acts; 
(2)  there is less scope for deference in the case of unqualified, or apparently 
unqualified rights; 
(3)  greater deference should be paid when a matter lies within the constitutional 
responsibility of the executive (e.g. defense of the realm) than within the 
constitutional responsibility of the courts (e.g. criminal justice);  
(4)  greater deference should be paid where the question turns on matters of 
executive expertise (e.g. macro-economic policy). 
 
These factors are of some value to cases on SE rights or cases having SE 
implications, but they beg a range of questions. By their very nature, SE rights cases will 
more often and more seriously implicate state resources and matters of policy and could quite 
easily be classified as falling into category (4) above. What would ‗greater deference‘ in the 
context of such cases then require? If we read this to mean that the courts should apply some 
kind of gross unreasonableness or rationality test in all such cases, we make nonsense of the 
protection of SE rights. The factors above were also set out in relation to a particular 
jurisdictional and factual context and we must be wary of simplistic legal transplants.  Much 
would depend on the constitutional system and subject matter involved. However much some 
scholars argue that U.K. law appears to have moved away from a system centred on 
Parliamentary supremacy and adopted protection of the rule of law as its fundamental 
constitutional principle, this ‗new constitutional hypothesis‘ has so far stopped short of 
recognising rights to SE goods as a constitutional principle.
108
 When it comes to distribution 
of such goods then, the U.K. Parliament enjoys a higher level of discretion than its South 
African counterpart.
109
 This point is well supported by Simon LJ‘s judgment in Joint Council 
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  [2003] Q.B. 728 at 765 – 767, as cited in Rivers (note 70 above) at 204. 
108
  Jowell (note 1 above) at 573, 576 and 578. But, see S Fredman ‗Human rights transformed: positive 
duties and positive rights‘ (2006) Public Law 498 at 517 where she argues that R. (on the application 
of Limbuela) v Secretary of the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66; [2006] 1 A.C. 396 (HL) 
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  See Jowell (note 1 above) at 578. 
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for the Welfare of Immigrants. Whilst the fact that Parliament had been ‗closely involved in 
the making of the impugned Regulations‘ was of some concern to the judge, ultimately his 
view was that Parliamentary sovereignty was not threatened by judicial intervention in this 
case because the Regulations were only secondary legislation.
110
 His conclusion was that: 
Parliament cannot have intended a significant number of genuine asylum seekers to be 
impaled on the horns of so intolerable a dilemma: the need either to abandon their claims to 
refugee status or alternatively to maintain them as best they can but in a state of utter 
destitution. Primary legislation alone could in my judgment achieve that sorry state of 
affairs.
111
 
This reasoning also implies that, where Parliament has imposed statutory duties on public 
bodies in relation to the provision of SE goods like housing and health care, the courts have 
an unassailable mandate to give effect to those duties. The role of the courts in such cases is 
less susceptible to criticism on the basis that they are usurping the powers of democratically 
elected legislators because their responsibility to act derives directly from the will of those 
legislators. 
 
The role of legislative intent in the adjudication of politically sensitive matters in the 
U.K. is complicated by a series of cases in which judges have distinguished between directly 
enforceable rights and target duties.
112
 R. (on the application of G) v Barnet London Borough 
Council,
113
 turned on the interpretation of section 17 (1) of the Children‘s Act of 1989:  
It shall be the general duty of every local authority (in addition to the other duties imposed on 
them by this Part)—(a) to safeguard and promote the welfare of children 
within their area who are in need; and (b) so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the 
upbringing of such children by their families, by providing a range and level of services 
appropriate to those children's needs.
114
  
The case dealt with the duty on local authorities to provide accommodation to children in 
need.  The main issue for the court was whether the section placed an obligation on local 
authorities to determine what the specific needs of a child classified as ‗in need‘ were and 
then to provide for those needs, according to this assessment.
115
 Writing for a majority of the 
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  Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (note 64 above) at 292-3. 
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  Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (note 64 above) at 293. 
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  Lord Woolf LJ, as he then was, used the term ‗target duty‘ in R. v Inner London Education Authority 
Ex p. Ali (1990) 2 Admin L.R. 822, as cited in  H Woolf, J Jowell and A Le Sueur (2007) De Smith’s 
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  See the opinion of Lord Nicholls in Barnet LBC (note 113 above) at 220-1. 
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  See the opinion of Lord Nicholls in Barnet LBC (note 113 above) at 216. 
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Law Lords, Lord Hope held that, properly construed, section 17 (1) imposed a general duty 
on local authorities vis-à-vis all children in their areas. This general duty acted as a guide to 
local authorities in their performance of more specific duties.
116
  Lord Hope was influenced 
by the fact that, if the section were interpreted to give rise to specific, individually 
enforceable rights, the cost involved in providing for the children‘s assessed needs could not 
be taken into account. He noted that Parliament must have been aware of the fact that local 
authorities would have to exercise a judgment about how best to spend limited resources.
117
  
 
The jurisprudence on target or general duties suggests that they are to be treated as 
akin to the directive principles of state policy in the Indian or Irish Constitutions.
118
 The 
principal concern with classifying these duties as ‗target duties‘ is that this waters down their 
status from statutory obligations to mere aspirations.
119
 This removes one of the main tools 
available to judges in the U.K. in dealing with concerns about the democratic legitimacy of 
their decisions. When judges enforce statutory obligations, they are acting in compliance 
with the intent of democratically elected legislators. One could argue that questions of 
legitimacy continue to be relevant in respect of generally phrased duties if the specificities of 
those duties fall to be decided by the courts. A statute‘s clarity on the content of obligations 
owed may, consequently, be relevant in determining how intensely a court will scrutinise 
administrative action. Allowing government bodies some flexibility in determining how 
general or broadly phrased obligations are to be fulfilled would be permissible, particularly 
where the availability of resources is a concern. However, to allow the generality of the 
obligation to lead to its non-enforceability before the courts undermines the legislative 
intention to impose a duty in the first place.
120
 Affording a local authority or other decision-
maker the widest possible scope in how a generally phrased duty is to be met would be 
tantamount to a doctrine of non-enforceability in respect of all such duties. Instead, judges 
should treat the generality of the duty as just one of the factors relevant in determining how 
rigorously they will interrogate the impugned decision and the appropriate remedy to be 
awarded.  
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  Lord Hope in Barnet LBC (note 113 above) at 239. 
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  Lord Hope in Barnet LBC (note 113 above) at 235. 
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  On this point, see De Smith (note 112 above) at 260.  
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  De Smith (note 112 above) at 260. See also King (note 112 above) at 215. 
120
  See De Smith (note 112 above) at 260. 
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The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal adopted this kind of approach in Family 
Planning Association of Northern Ireland v The Minister for Health, Social Services and 
Public Safety.
121
 The respondent Minister and his Department had a statutory obligation 
(a)  to provide or secure the provision of integrated health services in Northern Ireland 
designed to promote the physical and mental health of the people of Northern Ireland 
through the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness; 
(b)  to provide or secure the provision of Personal Social Services in Northern Ireland 
designed to promote the social welfare of the people of Northern Ireland.
122
 
The appellant body argued that the term ‗integrated health services‘ included ‗reproductive 
health services involving the lawful termination of pregnancies as part of the ―prevention, 
diagnosis and treatment of illness‖‘ and challenged the respondent‘s failure to provide this.123 
Drawing on Ex p. Ali
124
 and Barnet LBC,
125
 Nicholson LJ held that the statutory provision 
imposed a target, and not an absolute, duty.
126
 However, the fact that the duty was phrased in 
broad terms did not mean it was unenforceable before the courts.
127
 The duties allowed the 
relevant public body a ‗considerable degree of tolerance‘ in deciding how the provision 
should be implemented. Failure to give effect to the target duty would not necessarily amount 
to a breach of the statute.
128
 In many cases involving general duties, the appropriate remedy 
would be to ask the relevant body to ‗consider what steps they should take to fulfil the target 
duty, rather than ordering them to perform a specific act‘.129 Lord Justice Nicholson upheld 
the appeal and indicated that the respondent Department had a duty to investigate whether 
certain steps were necessary to fulfil its duties.
130
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  [2004] NICA 39, cited in H Woolf, J Jowell and A Le Sueur (2009) De Smith’s Judicial Review (6ed), 
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adequate. See par. 115 of the judgment. 
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 In the result, the case was limited in the sense that Nicholson LJ did not impose any 
mandatory steps on the respondent Department. But the principle that target duties may not 
simply be treated as non-enforceable is important. In determining what was required of the 
Department, Nicholson LJ was influenced by the fact that this was not a case in which the 
Department could be said to be doing all it could to remedy any breach of its obligations at 
the time the matter reached the courts.
131
 At the same time, Article 4 of the Order had to be 
read in the context of surrounding provisions, all of which accorded to the Department a 
significant amount of discretion in choosing how to give effect to its duties.
132
 These factors 
suggested that the Department was entitled to some flexibility but that it had to show it was 
taking appropriate steps. Ultimately, the judgment suggests that it is the statutory and factual 
context in which the case arises, rather than the form in which the duty is phrased, that will 
determine the court‘s approach to target duties.133 
 
The factors set out by Laws LJ in International Transport Roth GmbH are useful as a 
general starting point from which to consider the specificities of SE rights cases and cases 
having clear SE implications in each jurisdiction. They may be expanded upon with reference 
to the relevant case law. Transparency is emphasised in many of the cases discussed in this 
chapter. Where a public body is entrusted with the duty to form a policy, it may be held to 
account for lack of evidence to support that policy. In other words, where the policy contains 
internal inconsistencies or where there are obvious, unexplained contradictions between the 
policy and other, relevant evidence (such as medical opinion in the context of health care) it 
is likely that a court will find decisions taken in terms of the policy, or the policy itself, to be 
unreasonable. This implies intense scrutiny of the policy but a fairly cautious demand for 
transparency and coherence. An even more basic requirement is that, where there is an 
obligation on a public body to design a policy, it must have a policy in place. Where the 
statutory duty is framed in very broad terms, courts may grant public bodies a high degree of 
discretion in determining how to implement that duty. But recent jurisprudence suggests that, 
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  Family Planning Association of Northern Ireland (note 121 above) at par. 41.   
132
  Family Planning Association of Northern Ireland (note 121 above) at pars. 31-6. 
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  An approach advocated both in De Smith (note 112 above) at 260-1 and by King (note 112 above) at 
215-6. 
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in these circumstances, courts could, at the very least, order these bodies to investigate 
whether their actions were adequate.   
 
Whilst the capacity to force government‘s hand when it comes to designing effective 
policy or to interrogate steps taken by public officials in implementing such policy should not 
be underestimated, an approach that goes no further than demanding that a set of procedures 
be followed will be inadequate in many cases. In Grootboom,
134
 for example, although one 
issue was the state‘s failure to give the litigants the requisite notice before eviction, the 
primary concern was with the fact that these litigants did not have basic shelter and services. 
It would have been a serious failure of justice had the Court ignored this latter concern.  
 
The seriousness of the invasion of the right, with references to fundamental human 
dignity and essential attributes of humanity, appear in many of the South African and U. K. 
cases.  In the Grootboom, TAC and Khosa cases, discussed in chapter 4 above, the relatively 
low impact on resources played a key role in enabling the CC to find government policy 
deficient. In the U.K. case of Rogers, whilst the cost implications were sizeable, the Primary 
Care Trust‘s policy made it clear that this was not a relevant consideration.  Other factors 
may already be playing a role but are less visible in the case law on SE rights. The level of 
review to be applied must also turn on whether there are wider communal interests to be 
considered. If a court order enforcing the right would improve the situation of a few at the 
expense of a larger group of people,
135
 a court may find that it does not have the institutional 
expertise to pronounce on the matter or that a lower standard of scrutiny should be applied. If 
a court has already handed down an order, which government has failed to implement, this 
may afford judges a wider scope for intervention in a subsequent case.  
 
The number of people affected is also relevant but its role in determining the level of 
review is ambiguous. If a law or policy has a detrimental impact on a large group of people, a 
court is likely to find the invasion of rights to be serious. However, where a large group is 
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  The court‘s concern not to reward ‗queue-jumping‘ that is, providing housing and land to people who 
have occupied land illegally whilst others in need continue to wait for state housing hints at this factor.  
See Modderklip (note 99 above) at pars. 33 and 50. See also Grootboom (note 15 above) at par. 2 
where the court rejected ‗self-help‘ as a solution to housing and land problems. 
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involved, one would expect greater resources to be implicated, giving cause for judicial 
caution. Clearly, adjudicating SE rights cases is never going to be a simple calculation of 
‗factors in favour of greater scrutiny‘ against ‗factors against greater scrutiny‘. The factors 
themselves may be differentially weighted, both within each individual jurisdiction and in 
comparison with other jurisdictions. They could intersect and interact in complex ways in a 
single case. But continued engagement with them holds the promise of providing clearer, 
more coherent guidelines for future cases. 
 
(5) Conclusion 
The South African cases discussed in chapter 4 and the U.K. cases discussed here show that 
courts are playing a role in enforcing SE rights. Debates about justiciability have been 
overtaken by national and international sources of SE rights and interests, which demand 
some level of judicial review. The discussion in chapter 3 and the examination of Joint 
Council for the Welfare of Immigrants in this chapter indicate that judges in the U.K. may not 
be as wary of proportionality as their South African counterparts. But the extreme nature of 
the lack of proportionality between legislative purpose and adverse impact in Joint Council 
for the Welfare of Immigrants, coupled with the fact that the court was dealing with 
subordinate legislation meant that the application of proportionality was not a huge departure 
from a generally deferential approach when it comes to decisions in which the allocation of 
public funds is implicated. Furthermore, Razgar is an indication that, even in a structured 
proportionality analysis, courts may choose not to interrogate the governmental purpose too 
rigorously.  
 
 If we accept that a model for the adjudication of SE rights requires some variability or 
flexibility, as I have argued we must, the question is whether a particular standard of review 
was legitimate in the circumstances of the cases. Variability means that some level of 
uncertainty will have to be borne. But, by examining the cases, we may be able to identify 
the factors which determine levels and intensity and to assess whether a particular level was 
justified by the circumstances of the case. This is a task to which I turn in chapter 6 below, 
drawing on the South African and U.K. cases. 
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Chapter Six 
Factors influencing the method and intensity of review in social and economic rights 
adjudication 
 
(1) Introduction 
 
The fiercely divergent responses South African social and economic (SE) rights 
adjudication has elicited in academic commentary to date is one of its most interesting 
features. This difference in views arises from a tension that provides one of the main strands 
of argument in this thesis. Courts have a role to play in implementing SE rights such as 
access to adequate housing, health care, education and social security but they must exercise 
this role in a manner which respects the democratic mandate and expertise of the legislature 
and executive in setting political and economic priorities for the state. One of the arguments 
made throughout this thesis is that this tension cannot be viewed as a battle between rights-
protection and pragmatism, between those who wish to extend the greatest possible 
protection to SE rights and those who wish to defer to legislative and executive social and 
political choices at every juncture. The need for judges to constantly consider their role in 
this area stems not just from pragmatic concerns over whether other arms of government will 
implement judgments they perceive as going too far, for example, but from normative 
concerns with what respect for democratic values and effective protection of SE rights 
requires from judges in these circumstances. 
 
As argued earlier in this thesis, the variability of the intensity of review, developed in 
the context of judicial review of administrative action, is potentially the most useful tool 
judges have through which to balance various interests in SE rights adjudication. However, 
variability lends itself to a degree of uncertainty. The lack of clarity regarding what elements 
of a case lend themselves to high degrees of judicial intervention or restraint is a problem for 
potential litigants, scholars, advocacy groups, legislators, administrators and judges 
themselves. Consequently, some attempt to identify and categorise the many factors which 
may legitimately influence the intensity of review is necessary. This chapter is aimed at such 
identification and categorisation in the context of the adjudication of SE rights.  
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In line with various scholars cited earlier in this thesis, I take the view that, whilst we 
need to engage, at both conceptual and functional levels, with the question of how to 
adjudicate politically sensitive cases, a general theory of judicial restraint is neither possible 
nor desirable. As was stated by Lord Steyn in R. (on the application of Daly) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department,
1
 „In law context is everything‟.2 In the context of SE rights, 
Dennis Davis has questioned the usefulness of a theory of deference: 
But, other than offering some guidance to courts to “defer” to greater levels of institutional 
competence when it comes to the formulation of social and economic policy and the allied 
question of the distribution of limited resources, a theory of deference fails to capture the 
positive, dialogic role that a court is required to play within the scheme of socio-economic 
rights.
 
3 
Davis‟ criticism applies, to some extent, to the nature of the Constitutional Court‟s 
(CC‟s) approach to deference. He argues that „the Constitutional Court has followed, albeit 
carefully, a reading of deference embraced by apartheid jurisprudence‟.4  His concern about 
the relationship between a theory of deference and the dialogic role of the court is a more 
fundamental attack on the notion of a theory of deference. To be of any use, engagement with 
the notion of deference must go beyond a mere instruction to courts to always defer to 
government‟s expertise in policy-making on SE matters and resource allocation. In this 
chapter, I use the discussion of factors influencing the intensity of review in the case law as 
the basis for a more substantial analysis of what deference means for the adjudication of SE 
rights disputes.  
 
If one accepts that there are sound reasons for judicial restraint or deference in certain 
cases, some engagement with the notion of deference is necessary. The focus then shifts to 
the factors which may usefully and appropriately be used to decide the level of deference or 
restraint required. And, in the development of any guidelines for the extent of judicial 
intervention in SE rights cases, the primary concern must be with how best to foster an 
ongoing dialogue between state institutions, civil society and the courts to provide the most 
effective protection of the rights whilst acknowledging their place within a broad societal 
                                                 
1  [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 A.C. 532.  
2  Daly (note 1 above) at par. 28. 
3  D Davis „Adjudicating the Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards 
“Deference Lite”? (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 301 at 319-20.  
4  Davis (note 3 above) at 327. 
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project of redistribution and transformation.
5
 
A properly contextualised examination of the 
factors which influence judges in determining how restrained or how interventionist an 
approach to take in particular cases, including some consideration of how these factors 
interact,  would not only „capture‟ the dialogic role of the courts but could also facilitate it. 
 
In this chapter, I draw upon South African and U.K. cases and academic commentary 
to suggest a framework within which judges may decide on the intensity of their scrutiny in 
cases with political repercussions. It is particularly important to recognise that the formal 
constitutional context is only one aspect that impacts on what judges do. The timing of the 
case and the factual and political environment within which it arises are also significant. As a 
result, a framework cannot function as a formula with key variables producing an answer to 
the question of how intense judicial scrutiny should be. Any framework cannot hope to be 
more than a guide to judicial approaches.  
 
 
(2) Principles guiding the intensity of review in South African and United Kingdom 
cases 
 
(a)  Relevant cases and the comparative framework: setting the terms of the 
analysis 
In this section, I examine selected South African CC and UK higher court judgments to 
identify a range of factors influencing the intensity of review in cases with implications for 
SE policy. I then draw on these factors to suggest that there are four principal issues which 
affect the intensity of the review: the constitutional balance of powers; relative institutional 
expertise; the severity of the impact of the government action or inaction; and, to a limited 
extent at least, state conduct.  
 
 In analysing the cases, I took the emerging South African CC approach to SE rights 
                                                 
5  On the dialogic role of courts in protecting SE rights, see Davis (note 3 above) at 320 and 323-4. See 
also J Jowell „Parliamentary Sovereignty under the New Constitutional Hypothesis‟ (2006) Public Law 
562 at 579 on dialogue between the judiciary and Parliament more generally. 
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as my starting point. The question I was most eager to answer was what factors influenced 
the judges in their decisions about how rigorously they could or would scrutinise government 
action. The identification of relevant factors is complicated by the fact that the role of these 
factors is not made explicit in the judgments. Whilst judges will cite resource scarcity as a 
reason for courts to exercise restraint in a particular case, for example, they might also 
mention the severe impact on affected parties as a reason for rigorous scrutiny in the same 
case. In reaching a conclusion judges do not often reveal their weighting of various factors. 
Questions about whether judges engage in a balancing of the range of factors relevant in the 
case or whether a particular factor may act as a „trump‟ are not addressed in the judgments. 
As a result, in the analysis below, I draw upon the factors in the context of each judgment 
and in the light of the conclusions which judges have reached to try to establish what their 
reasoning process on the interaction of the various factors is. The discussion of the U.K. 
cases points to a number of parallels in the approaches of South African and U.K. judges to 
the issue of how rigorous judicial intervention should be in cases with SE rights implications. 
 
 What follows in the remainder of this section, then, is a close examination of 
important cases with the limited purpose of pinpointing factors influencing the intensity of 
judicial review. In section 3, I begin to analyse the factors and consider their relative 
importance in the jurisprudence. 
 
(b) Constitutional balance of powers and relative institutional expertise in the 
cases 
Many of the competing considerations at play in SE rights cases were highlighted in 
Soobramoney,
 6
 the CC‟s first judgment in the area. In this case, concerns about the 
polycentric nature of the claim and scarcity of resources appeared to be the most significant 
reasons for the judges‟ decision to exercise restraint. It was an undisputed fact that the 
hospital‟s budget did not provide for the additional dialysis machines and trained nursing 
staff required to extend access to dialysis treatment to Mr Soobramoney and others in the 
                                                 
6
  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). For a discussion of the 
facts, see chapter 4 above. 
 213 
same position.
7
 But counsel for Mr Soobramoney argued that the state should increase the 
hospital‟s budget for this purpose.8 In turn, the Provincial Department of Health showed that 
it had already overspent on its budget and that scarcity of resources in the health sector was a 
national problem.
9
 The judges were not prepared to interpret section 27 (3) to mean that 
anyone requiring life-prolonging treatment, which they found the dialysis treatment in Mr 
Soobramoney‟s case to be, had an unqualified right to receive it as this could compromise the 
state‟s ability to fulfil its primary obligation to provide health care to all under sections 27(1) 
and (2). The effect of a finding of this nature would be to prioritise the treatment of those 
with terminal illnesses over others and this was a policy decision the court did not feel able to 
make in the absence of a clearly expressed governmental intent to that effect.
10
 To allow the 
claim would have necessitated a „dramatically increased health budget‟ thereby placing at 
threat the other needs the state has to meet.
11
 The medical expertise supported government‟s 
concern that admitting everyone in the same position as Mr Soobramoney for the treatment 
could place patients who qualified for treatment under the established guidelines at risk 
because of increased pressure on facilities.
12
 The judges were aware of the grave impact of 
the refusal to provide the treatment on Mr Soobramoney and his family but held that complex 
policy decisions about the health budget and functional decisions on health priorities should 
be left to the provincial health administration.
13
  
 
Justice Sachs wrote a concurring judgment in which he expanded on the approach in 
the main judgment. He went to some effort to ensure that the main judgment not be seen 
simply as capitulating to an argument based on the limited nature of state resources. Justice 
Sachs noted that Chaskalson P‟s14 main judgment did not „merely toll the bell of lack of 
resources.‟ Instead, it recognised that the interdependency of rights meant that access to life-
prolonging medication and treatment had to be viewed within the context of the other, 
equally valid claims of large numbers of people. Balancing such claims amounted to an 
                                                 
7
  Soobramoney (note 6 above) at par. 2. 
8
  Soobramoney (note 6 above) at par. 23. 
9
  Soobramoney (note 6 above) at par 24. 
10
  Soobramoney (note 6 above) at par. 19. 
11
  Soobramoney (note 6 above) at par. 28. 
12
  Soobramoney (note 6 above) at par. 26. 
13
  Soobramoney (note 6 above) at pars. 29 and 31. 
14
  President of the Court from 1994 until 2001 and Chief Justice of South Africa from 2001 until 2005.  
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attempt, not to limit rights, but to most effectively protect the rights of all people within the 
country.
15
 Summing up, Sachs J noted that courts were not the appropriate place to resolve 
the „agonising personal and medical problems that underlie these choices‟. For reasons 
related to both institutional capacity and „appropriate constitutional modesty‟ their role in the 
circumstances of this case had to be more restrained.
16
  
 
The Treatment Action Campaign case
17
 also concerned a governmental decision to 
restrict access to medical treatment but in a very different context and with an infinitely 
different outcome. A number of factors came together in this case to encourage the court to 
interrogate government action more rigorously. The court‟s rejection of the minimum-core 
based argument made in the case may be traced to concerns with its relative lack of expertise 
and to the problem of polycentricity.
18
  In its reasoning process, the court drew a distinction 
between judicial determinations which have budgetary implications and those that are 
themselves directed at rearranging budgets. The latter, the judges held, were inappropriate for 
a court to engage in because of the potential for such determinations to have multiple SE 
effects.
19 
  The court has, similarly, flagged its discomfort with being the „court of first and 
last instance‟ on whether government has acted reasonably. In Olivia Road,20 Yacoob J, 
handing down judgment for a unanimous court, refused to evaluate the City‟s plan for 
permanent housing solutions, preferring that the court limit itself to the specific 
circumstances of the occupiers who had brought the case in the first place.
21
 In the same case, 
the court rejected a request that it assess government‟s plan as it applied to the thousands of 
other people living in inner city Johannesburg on the basis that such an evaluation would be 
premature and „comes close to an abstract evaluation which is undesirable at the best of 
                                                 
15
  Sachs J in Soobramoney (note 6 above) at pars. 52-54. See also Chaskalson P in Soobramoney (note 6 
above) at par. 31. 
16
  Sachs J Soobramoney (note 6 above) at pars. 57-8. 
17
  Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign and others (No. 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 
(CC). For the facts of the case, see chapter 4 above. 
18
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 17 above) at pars 37-8. See also Government of the Republic of 
South Africa  v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 at pars. 32-3. 
19
  Treatment Action Campaign  (note 17 above) at par. 38. The court also made this point in Grootboom 
(note 18 above) at par. 66. 
20
  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg and others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC), discussed in chapter 4.   
21
  Olivia Road (note 20 above) at par. 34. 
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times‟.22  
 
Judges in the U.K. have also made clear their reluctance to hand down judgment on 
claims which are overbroad and not sufficiently tailored to the factual circumstances before 
them. In R. (on the application of Burke) v General Medical Council,
23
 for example, Mr 
Burke sought judicial review of the guidance issued by the General Medical Council (GMC) 
on the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. Lord Phillips, who handed down 
judgment for the court, stated that Mr Burke‟s challenge implicated parts of the GMC‟s 
guidelines which were not at all relevant to his situation. He held that the relief prayed for 
went far beyond what was needed to „ally any apprehensions Mr Burke might have in respect 
of his personal situation‟.24 The court pointed to the danger of courts engaging in matters 
which are not attached to a factual context within which the determinations must be made. 
Without such a factual context or practical problem, the court could set out principles without 
fully appreciating their consequences.
25
 
 
For overlapping reasons of a relative lack of expertise and respect for a constitutional 
balance of powers, then, the court in Treatment Action Campaign, rejected arguments based 
on the concept of a minimum core obligation. However, the court had no problem subjecting 
government policy to relatively intense scrutiny and finding government‟s decision to restrict 
access to nevirapine to pilot sites to be unreasonable. There are several reasons for this. The 
court referred to the severity of the impact of government‟s decision to restrict access to the 
drug. It was clear that, for a lengthy period, the drug would not be available to mothers and 
babies who did not have access either to private health care or to the pilot research sites in 
which the drug was being provided.
26
 But the consequences for Mr Soobramoney and his 
family were also grave. What explains the difference in the judges‟ approach?  Most 
obviously, Treatment Action Campaign was not a case directed at rearranging budgets as the 
                                                 
22
  Olivia Road (note 20 above) at par. 35. 
23
  [2005] EWCA Civ 1003; [2005] 3 WLR 1132. 
24
  Burke (note 23 above) at par.16. 
25
  Burke (note 23 above) at par. 21. 
26
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 17 above) at par. 17. The severity of the harm to the individual or 
group, as a factor influencing the intensity of review, is discussed further below. 
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cost of the drug was being borne by pharmaceutical companies for a period of five years.
27
 
Thrown into the balance was also the fact that Treatment Action Campaign involved the 
once-off provision of nevirapine to save lives, not ongoing treatment to prolong life. 
Furthermore, the weight of medical evidence in this case directly contradicted government‟s 
stance. Finally, there was a very public outcry against government‟s approach to the 
HIV/AIDS crisis in general.
28
  
 
In South Africa, the constitutional imperatives to both give effect to SE rights and 
respect the constitutional balance of powers means that the CC has had to consider the nature 
of the question before it more carefully. In a jurisdiction where courts are required to resolve 
SE rights disputes, the fact that a case has SE implications cannot act as a bar to justiciability. 
The extent to which the CC will interrogate matters of SE policy depends on their level of 
political or social sensitivity. In the U.K. too, courts are increasingly willing to delve into the 
nature of the political question in deciding whether it is amenable to judicial intervention. 
Thus, Lord Justice Laws noted in Begbie: 
The case's facts may be discrete and limited, having no implications for an innominate class 
of persons. There may be no wide-ranging issues of general policy, or none with multi-
layered effects, upon whose merits the court is asked to embark. The court may be able to 
envisage clearly and with sufficient certainty what the full consequences will be of any order 
it makes. In such a case the court's condemnation of what is done as an abuse of power, 
justifiable (or rather, falling to be relieved of its character as abusive) only if an overriding 
public interest is shown of which the court is the judge, offers no offence to the claims of 
democratic power. There will of course be a multitude of cases falling within these extremes, 
or sharing the characteristics of one or other. The more the decision challenged lies in what 
may inelegantly be called the macro-political field, the less intrusive will be the court's 
supervision.
29
  
Decisions about SE policy, particularly those that involve choices about the equitable 
distribution of resources still lie very much within the domain of elected officials.
30
 These 
include the questions of whether the state provides funds to enable everyone to have a 
                                                 
27
  Treatment Action Campaign (note 17 above) at par. 71.  
28
  T Roux „Principle and pragmatism on the Constitutional court of South Africa‟ (2009) 7(1) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 106 at 123. 
29
  R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 at 1131. 
30
  See, for example, R. (Hooper) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions; R. (Withey) v Same; R. 
(Naylor) v Same; R (Martin) v Same [2005] UKHL 29 at par. 32. 
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home;
31
  and the circumstances in which the state will provide support to asylum-seekers, for 
example.
32
 But, in interpreting legislation providing for such benefits, judgments have been 
quite nuanced. Courts do not simply baulk at any resource implications. Instead, they 
consider how great the resource implications are; whether they may be quantified;
33
 and the 
possible knock-on effect for responsibilities the government agent has in respect of other 
individuals and groups.
34
 Furthermore, courts have often balanced these considerations 
against how severe the impact of the governmental act was on the individuals concerned; and 
the extent of government‟s culpability in that end result.35 These two aspects of judicial 
analysis are discussed further below. 
 
The court in Treatment Action Campaign was able to go quite far in rejecting 
government‟s reasons for limiting access to nevirapine because the resource implications 
were fairly limited and predictable. As noted above, the case was politically very 
controversial but the open public support for the roll-out of nevirapine facilitated the court‟s 
interventionist stance.  The role of public opinion as a factor influencing intensity of review 
is ambiguous, however. In the South African context, the court has not been afraid to make 
decisions which are clearly not supported by the majority of the population. In his discussion 
of principle and pragmatism in the CC, Theunis Roux points to S v Makwanyane,
36
 in which 
                                                 
31
  Anufrijeva and another v Southwark London Borough Council; R. (N) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department; R (M) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 1406; 
[2004] 2 WLR 603 (CA) at par.19 . 
32
  R (Limbuela) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; R (Tesema) v. Same; R (Adam) v. Same 
[2005] UKHL 66 at pars. 13-14. The case involved a review of the Secretary of State‟s decision to 
refuse three asylum-seekers support on the basis that they had not made their claims for asylum „as 
soon as reasonably practicable‟ after entry into the U.K.  Section 55 (1) of the Nationality, Immigration 
and Asylum Act of 2002 prohibited the provision of support to late applicants. But section 55 (5) (a) 
allowed for the Secretary of State to provide support for late applicants where this was necessary to 
avoid a breach of their Convention rights. The individuals concerned were arguing that Convention 
rights - Article 3 specifically - entitled them to support, despite their late applications.   The facts of the 
case are set out in the opinion of Lord Hope. 
33
  See N v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Terence Higgins Trust intervening) [2005] 2 
A.C. 296 at pars. 49 and 53. 
34
  In Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan); In Re W (Minors) (Care Order: 
Adequacy of Care Plan) [2002] UKHL 10; [2002] 2 AC 91 at par. 43. 
35
  See Anufrijeva (note 31 above) at par. 47 and Limbuela (note 32 above) at pars. 46-7. 
36
  1995(3) SA 391 (CC). 
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the CC overturned legislation allowing for capital punishment; and Fourie,
37
 the case in 
which the CC held that the restriction of marriage to heterosexual couples, both in the 
common law and in the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 amounted to unfair discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation and was therefore unconstitutional.
38
 The judges could afford to 
go against the glaring public support for the death penalty because they had the backing of 
the ruling party – the ANC had not been able to reach consensus on the issue in the 
constitutional negotiations partly because of disagreement between party leadership and 
supporters on this issue.
39
 When it comes to gay and lesbian equality, the large majority of 
South Africans would have preferred to have retained laws criminalizing sodomy and 
preventing same-sex marriage in the country‟s legal system. However, this issue had 
effectively already been dealt with in the constitutional negotiation process. The explicit 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in section 9 of the 
Constitution meant that the CC did not really have to decide on the substance of issues like 
same-sex marriage – to have these laws on the statute books was a blatant violation of section 
9.  But in Fourie, the court was divided on the question of what remedy to hand down. A 
majority of the judges suspended the order of invalidity to give Parliament the opportunity to 
remedy the provisions in an appropriate manner.
40
 The issue of remedies is, strictly speaking, 
beyond the scope of this thesis but the question of what factors inform judges in handing 
down more or less interventionist remedies is a useful one to consider here. Judges may 
sometimes not have a real choice about the substance of their decision and judicial attitudes 
about restraint and activism are then often played out in the remedies they choose to hand 
down. In respect of the Fourie case, Roux has argued that the CC‟s more cautious approach 
arose from the fact that there was a divergence of opinion on same-sex marriage within the 
ANC ruling elite itself. This made it more important for the court to structure its order „in a 
                                                 
37
  Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another (Doctors for Life International and 
Others, Amicus Curiae); Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Others 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC). 
38
  Roux (note 28 above) at 118-22. 
39
  Roux (note 28 above) at 120. 
40
  Fourie (note 37 above) at pars. 160-161. See Roux (note 28 above) at 121. Compare the CC‟s 
approach in Olivia Road (note 20 above) at par. 51 where the judges opted to read a phrase into the 
relevant piece of legislation. The court reasoned that, in this case, there were not a „myriad ways‟ in 
which the Legislature could cure the section – a as result, the court was not closing off legislative 
options. 
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way that would embed the decision in democratic politics‟.41 
 
In the South African political context, with one dominant political party, public 
support for a particular judicial outcome could act to protect the court‟s institutional security 
against threats, if only implied, from a government wanting its policies upheld – as was the 
case in Treatment Action Campaign. On the other hand, as suggested by Roux in the 
discussion above, the court may choose to ignore the weight of public opinion in favour of a 
principled outcome when it can rely on the backing of the ruling party. Even more interesting 
is the balance that courts have to strike in the absence of public support and in circumstances 
where there is a lack of consensus in the ANC‟s leadership. In such circumstances, the need 
to appeal to democratic legitimacy, to be seen to be acting with this in mind, is most pressing. 
This discussion also points to a disconnection between traditional conceptions of democratic 
decision-making and newer concerns with actual public participation and social consensus.  
On a traditional conception of democracy, the weight of public opinion impacts upon 
legislation and policies at the level of elections: people vote the party whose policies they 
support into power and the legislation and policies emanating from the resulting government 
are deemed to have public support. As was elaborated on in chapter 1, this vision of what 
democracy means no longer holds much sway. This also makes the question of how one 
measures public opinion – or democratic legitimacy, for that matter – much more complex. 
 
In recent cases and scholarship, the question of whether there is some kind of social 
consensus and how to measure this is answered not simply by reference to the fact that a 
particular piece of legislation has been passed. The degree of public participation in the 
decision-making process is also relevant for a court deciding how rigorously to scrutinise 
government action.
42
 Drawing on the House of Lords‟ approach to article 8 in the context of 
housing legislation in Kay v Lambeth London Borough Council,
43
 counsel for the Secretary 
of State in Huang argued that any appellate immigration authority should assume that the 
Immigration Rules and directives struck the appropriate balance between competing interests 
because, having passed through Parliament, they had the seal of democratic approval. The 
                                                 
41
  Roux (note 28 above) at 123. 
42
  See C Hoexter (2007) Administrative Law in South Africa (Juta: Cape Town) at 143. 
43
  [2006] 2 AC 465. 
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Lords rejected this argument as it applied to immigration cases. They held that national 
housing policy was a product of democratic debate and significant consideration in which 
various interests were fully represented before Parliament. Immigration Rules, however, are 
not actively debated before Parliament and, in any event, the interests of non-nationals 
wishing to stay in the country are not represented there.
44
 The level of support within 
Parliament may itself also be relevant. In his dissenting judgment in R. v Gloucestershire 
County Council and another, ex parte Barry, Lord Lloyd acknowledged that the Act in 
question had begun its existence as a private member‟s Bill  but that it had subsequently 
received strong all-party support.
45
 
 
When it comes to relative expertise, judicial approaches are also less categorical than 
they used to be. Courts no longer necessarily accept, as a matter of form, that their relative 
lack of expertise when it comes to matters of SE policy precludes any engagement with the 
issues before them. Rather, courts may interrogate whether they were in as good a position as 
the original decision-maker to make the determination. Sometimes, the court will fall short. 
In the context of child care proceedings, for example, the House of Lords has held that, in 
comparison to the local authority, courts do not have the „close, personal and continuing 
knowledge of the child‟.46 In the context of the „socially sensitive‟ area of immigration in the 
U.K., however:  
The Court of Appeal held that the IAT had misdirected itself by not considering that Article 8 
ECHR added anything to the Community law concept of public policy with which it had 
engaged; the IAT had therefore failed to consider whether deportation was a disproportionate 
interference with the right to respect for private life. Both parties to the appeal agreed that 
proportionality was a matter of law; and that proportionality under Article 8 was the same as 
under E.U. law: namely, no greater interference than was strictly necessary to justify the 
pressing social need engaged in. The Court of Appeal concluded that as the appeal to them 
was on a point of law, and applying the law to the facts found by the IAT, it was as well 
                                                 
44
  Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Kashmiri v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2007] 2 W.L.R. 581 at 591-2. 
45
  R v Gloucestershire County Council and another, ex parte Barry [1997] A.C. 584 at 600-1. Lord 
Lloyd, with Lord Steyn concurring, held that Parliament‟s silence on the relevance of resources in 
assessing the needs of disabled persons under the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970 
highlighted the legislative intention to treat resources as irrelevant in this determination. 
46
  In Re S (Minors) (note 34 above) at par. 27. 
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placed as that Tribunal to determine whether deportation was proportionate and concluded 
that it was not.
47
  
This approach was made easier by the fact that the court was dealing with a point of law. But 
judges have also been less than deferential when other forms of expertise are involved. In the 
South African case of Khosa,
48
 Justice Ngcobo stated in his dissenting judgment that 
policymakers held the expertise required to predict future conditions and that courts should 
be slow to reject any reasonable estimates they made.
49
 However, the majority engaged 
seriously with governmental estimates on the additional cost in social welfare spending that 
would result from an extension to benefits to adult
50
 permanent residents. They found that, 
even on the higher estimates, the extension would entail an increase of less than two percent 
on the current spending.
51
 
 
 Another issue that tends to arise in the cases is the question of who actually holds the 
expertise in a particular case.  As already noted, medical evidence was presented in both TAC 
and Soobramoney. The difference was that, in the former case, the vast weight of medical 
evidence contradicted government‟s assertions. On the questions of the efficacy and safety of 
the drug, the court followed the medical expertise.  Expert evidence by social workers is a 
common feature of UK cases concerning people with special needs such as children or 
people with disabilities, for instance. In their reasoning, judges have referred to their own,
52
 
as well as government officials‟,53 relative lack of expertise. 
 
(c) The severity of the impact of the decision or policy on affected individuals 
and groups 
The high levels of political sensitivity in a case, often manifested in large and indeterminate 
                                                 
47
  N Blake „Importing proportionality: clarification or confusion?‟ (2002) European Human Rights Law 
Review 19 at 22, discussing B v. SSHD (2000) Imm. A.R. 478; R. (Farrakhan) v. SSHD October 1, 
2001-10-11; R. v. SSHD, ex p. Isiko [2001] Imm. A.R. 291.  
48
  Khosa and others v Minister of Social Development and others; Mahlaule and another v Minister of 
Social Development and Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). 
49
  Khosa (note 48 above) at par. 128. 
50
  Government had already indicated that it would be extending the benefits to children of permanent 
residents. Khosa (note 48 above) at par. 62. 
51
  Khosa (note 48 above) at par. 62. 
52
  See The Queen on the application of W v Lincolnshire County Council [2006] EWHC 2365 at par. 23. 
53
  See the dissenting opinion of Lord Lloyd (Lord Steyn concurring) in Barry (note 45 above) at 598-9. 
Lord Lloyd noted that the assessment of the needs of a disabled person was up to the professional 
judgment of the social worker and that resources could not assist in determining the need.  
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resource and policy implications, may narrow judicial options when it comes to the intensity 
of review. Relative lack of information or experience could have the same effect. In those 
cases, a certain amount of what Sachs J has referred to as „active judicial management‟54 
could allow a court to require that government engage in mediation or „meaningful 
engagement‟55 with those whose rights or interests are affected even if it decides it is 
inappropriate to find particular legislation or policies to be unreasonable. However, where 
debates about constitutional capacity and institutional expertise produce no clear result for or 
against rigorous judicial scrutiny of governmental acts, courts have been swayed by the 
severity of the impact of the acts on individuals and groups. Thus, in Grootboom, for 
example, the court was influenced by the fact that people in desperate need were to be left 
homeless without any help and with no end in sight to this situation.
56
 In his dissenting 
judgment in Khosa, Ngcobo J held that the limitation of the rights of permanent residents was 
for a limited period of time and that it was within the power of these individuals to change 
their situation.
57
 He was referring to the fact that the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 
1995 allowed a person to become a naturalised citizen after five years in the country and to 
apply for naturalisation (and by implication, social benefits) in exceptional circumstances, 
before five years had elapsed.
58
 However, in her judgment for the majority, Mokgoro J noted 
that the naturalisation process, including what counted as „exceptional‟, was left up to 
administrative discretion and was, therefore, not within the control of the individuals affected 
here.
59
 The extent to which state action, whether through legislation, policies or 
administrative decisions, closes off options for affected individuals is also relevant. In Jaftha, 
for example, legislation allowed for a person‟s house to be sold in execution to satisfy a 
trifling debt without the matter first coming before a court for consideration.
60
 In finding this 
to be unconstitutional, the South African CC was influenced by the fact that once the 
individuals in the case had lost their state-provided houses through sale in execution of their 
debts, they could never again apply for state assistance to buy a house.
61
 
                                                 
54
  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) at par. 36. 
55
  See Olivia Road (note 20 above). 
56
  Grootboom (note 18 above) at par. 65. 
57
  Khosa (note 48 above) at par. 119. 
58
  Ibid. 
59
  Khosa (note 48 above) at par. 56. 
60
  Jaftha v Schoeman and others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and others 2005(2) SA 140 (CC) at par. 1. 
61
  Jaftha (note 60 above) at par. 39. 
 223 
 
Courts in the UK have employed the severity of the consequence for the individuals 
concerned in a similar way. In Limbuela, Lords Bingham and Brown referred to the fact that 
the three asylum-seekers had no alternative sources of support and were left destitute. For 
those affected there was no foreseeably swift end to this situation.
62
 Thus, the seriousness of 
the interference with the right is measured, in part, by its duration and predictability. As 
Baroness Hale put it in Limbuela: 
It might be possible to endure rooflessness for some time without degradation if one had 
enough to eat and somewhere to wash oneself and one‟s clothing. It might be possible to 
endure cashlessness for some time if one had a roof and basic meals and hygiene facilities 
provided. But to have to endure the indefinite prospect of both, unless one is in a place where 
it is both possible and legal to live off the land, is in today‟s society both inhuman and 
degrading‟.63 
The question of alternative remedies is also relevant to a determination of how seriously 
affected the individual or group is. In Barry, the majority held that an individual who was 
unhappy with the manner in which resource limitations had impacted on the assessment of 
his or her needs could apply for review on the basis of Wednesbury unreasonableness.
64
  In 
his dissenting opinion, however, Lord Lloyd felt that this remedy was inadequate as it 
reduced the „minimum obligation under section 2 of the Act of 1970 to the level of 
Wednesbury unreasonableness‟.65 In the later case of Tandy, the court agreed, saying that 
Wednesbury review was a „very doubtful form of protection‟ as it is very difficult to review 
decisions on how a local authority chooses to allocate scarce resources.
66
  
 
(d) State conduct 
The behaviour of the state, the extent of its culpability in the deprivation of rights or interests, 
features in some of the cases. The question of how the state conducted itself has sometimes 
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allowed courts to be more searching in their approach. In both Grootboom
67
 and Olivia 
Road,
68
 the fact that the government officials had not even attempted to engage with the 
occupiers concerned to try to resolve the problem was relevant to the judicial outcome. In R 
v. Secretary of State for Social Security ex parte. Joint Council for the Welfare of 
Immigrants; Regina v Secretary of State for Social Security ex parte. B,
69
 the fact that it was 
state action which deprived the relevant class of people from benefits and prevented them 
from seeking employment contributed to the finding that their situation was untenable. 
 
However, the jurisprudence on Article 3 of the ECHR in UK courts points to a need 
to be circumspect when considering the significance of state responsibility for harm.  Article 
3 gives rise to a primarily negative obligation: the state must refrain from acts of torture; or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. But, the right may also be engaged when the 
state is required to take positive action to prevent others from inflicting the harm.
70
 Thus, the 
state may be directly or indirectly responsible for the invasion of the right.
71
 In either case, 
once it is established that the state is responsible, the obligation is absolute.
72
  
 
In the Court of Appeals decisions of Limbuela
73
 and Gezer,
74
 Lord Justice Laws 
attempted to deal with the complexities of state responsibility in this area through a 
„spectrum analysis‟: 
In my judgment the legal reality may be seen as a spectrum. At one end there lies violence 
authorized by the state but unauthorised by law. This is the worst case of category (a) and is 
absolutely forbidden. In the British state, I am sure, it is not a reality, only a nightmare. At the 
other end of the spectrum lies a decision in the exercise of lawful policy, which however may 
expose the individual to a marked degree of suffering, not caused by violence but by the 
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circumstances in which he finds himself in consequence of the decision. In that case the 
decision is lawful unless the degree of suffering which it inflicts (albeit indirectly) reaches so 
high a degree of severity that the court is bound to limit the state's right to implement the 
policy on article 3 grounds.
75
 
The House of Lords was divided on the utility of the analysis. Lord Hope and Baroness Hale 
signaled their discomfort with it.
76
 In part, Lord Hope‟s concerns stemmed from a worry that 
the analysis would act to downgrade the absolute nature of the Article 3 right by allowing 
considerations of proportionality in through the „backdoor‟ when the interference with the 
right arose from lawful government policy.
77
 By contrast, Lord Brown found the analysis to 
be helpful, not as a means of classifying each and every case along a spectrum or continuum, 
but as a means of underlining the various factors that come into play in such cases.
78
 All 
three Law Lords agreed that the lawfulness of the state policy did not detract from the 
absolute nature of the obligation on the state.  The real questions are: is the harm severe 
enough to be classified as „torture‟ or „inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment‟; and 
is the state responsible for the harm? Whether the harm occurred as a result of lawful state 
policy is irrelevant.
79
 The Law Lords, following European court jurisprudence, accepted, 
however, that the question of whether the harm has resulted from intentionally inflicted acts 
of the state is relevant in a determination of whether the high threshold for a violation of 
Article 3 has been met.
80
  
 
In Limbuela, this high threshold was met because of the degradation inflicted by a 
government policy that effectively denied asylum seekers who were lawfully in the country 
access to state support and, at the same time, prevented these people from seeking 
employment to support themselves.
81
 In the case of N, where the court held that deporting an 
illegal immigrant who was HIV positive back to Uganda where she would no longer receive 
the kind of medical care that was keeping her alive and functional in the U.K. did not violate 
Article 3, some of the reasoning focused on the fact that she was not the victim of 
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intentionally inflicted harm by the state or by non state agents.
82
 Viewed in this way, then, 
the Law Lords appear to be saying that the harm contemplated by Article 3 is exceptionally 
severe and, in circumstances where the affected individuals are not being singled out through 
direct state action, it is less likely that the harm will be considered to amount to degrading or 
inhuman treatment or punishment. The problem with this argument is that it does not entirely 
explain the difference in approach to HIV positive persons who wish to stay in the U.K. 
rather than give up the comparatively high level of medical care and return to their home 
countries. In the context of the U.K., only D was brought successfully. In neither N nor D 
was the state directly responsible for the harm. N was in a better state of health than D but 
this was only due to the treatment she was receiving in the U.K. There was no doubt that she 
would die within a matter of months after returning to Uganda. The real difference between 
the cases, then, as pointed out by Lord Brown was that the case of D concerned a purely 
negative obligation. In N, the fact that the appellant was asking for positive action – access to 
ongoing medical treatment – was key. The resource and policy implications of a decision that 
N and, therefore, others in her situation could not be deported were potentially huge.
83
 In D, 
the humanitarian considerations of the case and the fact that comparatively little was required 
of the state, operated against D‟s deportation. In N, the humanitarian considerations were 
balanced against the resource and policy implications involved in determining whether the 
state was responsible.   
 
Despite some expansion of the Article 3 jurisprudence, the right still applies in a very 
limited set of circumstances. The cases indicate that, when the state has been indirectly 
responsible for the harm, this is relevant to a determination of whether the high threshold set 
for a violation of the right has been met. At the same time, judges need to be careful not to 
interpret indirect responsibility to exclude any state obligation. 
 
(3) The relationship between the factors: relative weight and relevance 
In analysing the South African CC‟s approach and considering how it may be further 
developed, guidelines for judicial restraint and intervention are key. In each case it decides, 
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the CC has to provide some justification for the degree of restraint it shows or the intensity of 
review it applies. This justification is not always clearly articulated. I have identified four 
main factors which impact on the intensity of review in cases with SE implications: the 
constitutional balance of powers; relative institutional expertise; the severity of the impact of 
the governmental decision or policy; and the conduct of the state. I turn now to the issue of 
the relative weight of these factors in the adjudication of disputes. 
 
   (a)  Constitutional balance of powers 
Modern democracies all uphold a balance of powers between the different arms of 
government. How this balance is struck differs from country to country. Courts must pay 
attention to the manner in which this balance of powers is formally protected in their 
jurisdictions. So, in the U.K., for example, much of the jurisprudence above is informed by 
the principle of parliamentary supremacy. The expansion of judicial review in administrative 
law and the incorporation of the ECHR through the HRA have raised questions about the 
continuing significance of parliamentary supremacy in the U.K. But courts are still very wary 
of interfering in „macro-political‟ or high policy areas like foreign policy, social welfare and 
national security. In the area of SE rights, then, it is for Parliament to decide whether to 
provide state funds for housing for all or to decide what benefits asylum-seekers are entitled 
to. Once Parliament has set out certain statutory duties, however, the courts are required to 
give effect to them.
84
 In South Africa, courts are explicitly required to pronounce on the 
constitutionality of SE legislation and policy. But they must assess government action within 
the bounds of reasonableness, progressive realisation and available resources. This is a 
reflection that the legislature and executive are the ultimate architects of long-term SE policy 
because of the fact of limited resources and the sheer enormity of the task of redistributing 
wealth and services in the country. For these reasons, the constitutional balance of powers is 
a factor in both South African and UK jurisprudence. In determining the appropriate balance 
of powers, UK courts will look to Parliamentary intent as an important concern whereas 
South African courts will look to the Constitution itself. 
 
But, due to shifts in understandings of what an appropriate balance of powers 
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requires, courts in both jurisdictions are increasingly willing to look to actual political 
legitimacy, rather than a formal notion of institutional separation of powers. So, courts will 
draw a distinction between cases which involve rearranging of budgets and those which have 
minor implications for the allocation of resources. Courts have also been influenced by 
factors such as the extent to which a particular policy or rule or regulation was the subject of 
parliamentary debate, how much support it had in Parliament and, certainly in South Africa, 
the level of public support for a particular policy (if this is clear). These, more nuanced 
questions require that courts interrogate real levels of political legitimacy, rather than simply 
assume that such legitimacy exists simply because of an institution‟s formal political 
pedigree. In Treatment Action Campaign, public support for a particular judicial intervention 
in the face of significant resistance on the part of the South African government facilitated a 
relatively far-reaching judgment in which the court overturned existing government policy.  
 
In determining whether close interrogation of government policy would interfere with 
the constitutional balance of powers, courts in both jurisdictions have taken into account, not 
just the subject matter of the dispute but the extent to which the case has a genuinely 
polycentric impact. So, for example, if a small and definable group of people is affected, the 
court will be more willing to intervene. Furthermore, decisions about resource allocation are 
easier for judges to make when they are simply enforcing what the state has already agreed 
to; or if the impact on resources is, according to government‟s own estimation, small. U.K. 
courts have used Parliamentary intent to enforce duties on the state, even where these duties 
are not plainly identified in legislation. Once Parliament has explicitly decided to provide 
certain services and goods, judgments ordering that government take particular steps to fulfil 
that duty are not as easily susceptible to criticisms about courts overstepping the boundaries 
of their role. 
 
(b) Relative institutional expertise 
In these cases, the court exercises caution (in respect of justiciability, intensity of scrutiny or 
type of remedy), not out of concern for its rightful constitutional place but out of a sense of 
its own practical limitations.  It can be difficult to separate this issue from the constitutional 
balance of powers as the court‟s relative lack of expertise in a particular area may, to some 
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extent, be due to the fact that such area has been historically „out of bounds‟ for it. But there 
are a number of cases in which courts adopt a cautious approach, even where they are 
constitutionally permitted to intervene in the area concerned, because, on their own 
assessment, they lack the kind of expertise, relative to another institution, needed to make a 
proper determination. Generally, concerns about expertise arise when resources are proven to 
be scarce; broad policy issues are involved, the court cannot safely predict the consequences 
of a particular order; or a determination of the case requires medical or social expertise that 
the court does not have. 
 
Again, courts are no longer merely accepting that they have insufficient expertise to 
hand down judgments impacting on SE policy. Instead, the question of expertise impacts on 
how far a court is willing to go in scrutinising governmental decisions. Furthermore, some 
courts are harnessing the expertise of independent bodies in acknowledgement of the fact that 
other governmental institutions may themselves lack experience when compared with 
individuals or groups who have researched and worked in the area of social welfare for a 
long time. Whether a court may itself call on such expertise is politically and practically 
controversial – politically, because many such individuals and groups are invested in a 
particular approach that may be at odds with what elected representatives feel to be 
necessary; practically, because the setting up of a credible socio-legal investigative body is 
likely to prolong a decision in any case. But courts are regularly presented with evidence by 
medical experts, social workers etc. and have to decide what weight to attach to such 
evidence. A court‟s willingness to intervene is influenced by whether there is agreement 
between other expert parties (relevant state bodies or medical authorities, for example).  
 
Is there a distinction to be drawn between expertise, on the one hand, and information 
on the other? Sometimes, the court refuses to make a determination, not because some other 
arm of government has a more specialised and overarching understanding of the issues but 
because it simply does not have the information before it to make a finding. In such cases, 
utilising judicial procedures to get that information is less controversial as it is not a question 
of disagreeing with legislative or executive views. Courts will also be reluctant to pronounce 
on matters not contained to the factual scenario before them.  
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(c) Severity of consequences of government action/inaction 
As the relative weight of the factors is never made explicit in the judgments, determining 
whether the first two – constitutional balance of powers and relative institutional expertise – 
act as „trumps‟ in the judicial process is complex. In Soobramoney,85 for example, though the 
consequences of the hospital‟s policy could not have been more severe for Mr Soobramoney 
and others in his position, the court found that policy to be reasonable in the circumstances. 
The serious resource and policy implications in the case – potentially involving what the 
court later referred to as the rearranging of budgets
86
 – outweighed the harsh impact of the 
hospital‟s policy. One could conclude from this that the first two factors are more heavily 
weighted in any consideration of whether judicial intervention is appropriate and, if so, how 
intense the review of the governmental decision should be. But this assessment is 
complicated by the fact that the approach of court has evolved. In the later case of Khosa,
87
 
the court was prepared to make an order which did require a shift in the budgetary allocation.  
 
One explanation for the difference in the outcome of the cases is that the court 
considered the estimated less than two percent increase in the social security budget required 
in Khosa to be something government could easily absorb.
88
 The cost implications of 
ordering that dialysis treatment be provided to Mr Soobramoney and everyone in his position 
may have been much higher but this was not explored in the judgment. So, the court‟s 
difficulty lay not so much with the seriousness of the cost implications but with the fact that 
those implications were not clearly defined and predictable on the evidence before it. This is 
an indication that concerns about the constitutional balance of powers or with the court‟s 
relative lack of expertise in certain areas will no longer be treated as reasons for the court not 
to intervene or to apply only a very low level of scrutiny to the impugned governmental 
action. A different outcome, taking other factors like the impact of government‟s action into 
account, may be possible where expert evidence before the court shows that resource and 
policy implications are definite and predictable.  
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 In the context of the U.K., whilst the severity of the consequences of the government 
action weighed heavily in the judgments in Limbuela
89
 and D v United Kingdom,
90
 the same 
did not apply in the string of Article 3 cases following D v United Kingdom, in which 
individuals attempted to claim leave to remain in the U.K. because of the access to medical 
treatment they were receiving in this country, which would not be available to them in their 
home countries.
 91
 The rationale for this, more constrained, approach to asylum claims based 
on access to medical care focused very much on the positive nature of the duties which 
would be imposed on government should these claims succeed. In D v United Kingdom, the 
state‟s obligation extended only to allowing the individual concerned to die with dignity. 
Successful claims in the other cases would have required ongoing medical treatment for the 
individuals and others in a similar position. But the court‟s finding in Limbuela also imposed 
positive duties with cost implications on government, with the court holding that the high 
threshold for a breach of Article 3 had been met because government policy could leave 
people destitute for an indefinite period of time.
92
 Again, as with the South African CC‟s 
judgments, and although this was not made explicit in the cases, the cost implications of 
ongoing medical care were certainly indeterminate, and most likely greater than that of state 
support for the basic welfare of asylum seekers waiting for their applications to be decided. 
This is the most plausible explanation for the difference between Limbuela and D v United 
Kingdom, on the one hand, and the medical treatment cases referred to above.  
 
Following the decision in Limbuela, it would be very difficult for a government 
agency to claim that it has no obligation purely on the basis that such an obligation would 
entail positive action, such as the provision of social welfare benefits to a particular group or 
class of people. For South African courts, the text of both sections 26 and 27 make it clear 
that the state has positive duties vis-à-vis SE rights. This is certainly how the CC has 
interpreted the provisions. In both jurisdictions, then, serious and/or indeterminate resource 
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or policy implications tend to outweigh any other consideration for a court deciding on how 
rigorously it will scrutinise governmental action and what remedy it will hand down. Where 
those implications are not severe, however, courts will take other factors into account. 
 
Increasingly, courts are referring to minimum standards of dignity and minimum 
essential levels of social welfare. They are finding the interference with rights in certain 
cases to be so severe that the court must intervene, even where the judgment may tread on 
legislative and executive toes. In such cases, the court is still likely to be quite cautious in the 
level of scrutiny applied and the remedy handed down. There is also a balancing of broader 
societal needs against the extent and duration of interference with the right. The court itself 
engages in this balancing. Individual needs sometimes give way to broader needs of society.  
 
 The court will also consider whether the affected parties have the opportunity to 
mitigate the negative impact in some way – to apply for an exemption from the law or 
regulation, for example. The question of whether the negative impact exists for a forseeably 
short or finite time is also relevant, as is the question of whether the individuals concerned 
have some alternate, effective remedy open to them to pursue. 
 
(d) State conduct 
The South African CC has explored the issue of what attempts the state made to resolve the 
dispute before the legal proceedings commenced. This question has become a factor in 
determining whether state action or inaction is constitutional. The significance of this factor 
is, however, unclear. The outcome in the Olivia Road case strongly suggested that 
governmental attempts at the eviction or ejectment of homeless people from land or buildings 
could not proceed in the absence of meaningful engagement with affected parties. But, as 
discussed in chapter 4, the CC‟s decision in Joe Slovo indicates that some attempt at 
engagement, even if relatively superficial, may suffice in the particular circumstances of the 
case. This is discussed further in section 4 of this chapter. 
 
In Article 3 cases in the U.K., judges have suggested that, where the state is indirectly 
responsible for the harm, the threshold for a violation of the right is higher. In those 
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circumstances, the question of whether the obligation on the state demands ongoing 
redistribution of resources, for example, may need to be balanced against the harm. In cases 
of direct responsibility, however, state conduct is not relevant and courts have been wary of 
allowing any kind of balancing of interests to dilute the right. Article 3 cases form a small 
part of the jurisprudence, however. What is important to note is that the manner in which the 
state has conducted itself has some relevance to the intensity of review. 
 
(4) The South African Constitutional Court’s evolving approach: balancing the 
factors 
In this section of the chapter, I draw on two of the South African CC‟s recent and most 
complex judgments on SE rights – Joe Slovo93 and Mazibuko94 – in order to gauge whether 
the CC is striking an appropriate balance amongst the factors I have identified above, in its 
model of SE rights adjudication. I have chosen to anchor the discussion in these two cases 
because, as two of the court‟s three latest pronouncements on SE rights, they provide a good 
indication of how the CC‟s approach has developed.95 They are also by far the most 
complicated cases on SE rights the court has had to deal with.  
 
 (a)  Joe Slovo  
 In terms of the balancing of the various considerations at play, the first two factors – 
constitutional balance of powers and relative institutional capacity – weighed very heavily in 
the case. The judges were not prepared to interrogate the government‟s decision to relocate 
residents of the informal settlement, rather than engage in on site upgrading, despite the fact 
that minimal relocation is a key aspect of government‟s own Housing Code and is recognised 
as international best practice.
96
 As Ngcobo J put it:  
It is not for the courts to tell the government how to upgrade the area.  This is a matter for the 
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government to decide.  The fact that there may be other ways of upgrading the area without 
relocating the residents does not show that the decision of the government to relocate the 
residents is unreasonable.  It is not for the courts to tell the government how best to comply with 
its obligations.  If, in the best judgement of the government it is necessary to relocate people, a 
court should be slow to interfere with that decision…97 
The N2 Gateway pilot project involved huge numbers of people. The resource implications 
were, therefore, considerable and delays were adding to the overall cost of the project.
98
 The 
consequences of government‟s decision to relocate residents in order to upgrade the 
settlement were undoubtedly severe. It required people to uproot their lives, took them away 
from transport routes and cost-effective access to their jobs, and placed them in an area with 
an extraordinarily high crime rate and with little security for their homes, goods and 
persons.
99
 But residents remaining in the Joe Slovo settlement were not the only ones 
affected by government‟s decision and the court‟s judgment. Broader societal considerations 
also played a significant role in the judgment. As O‟Regan J pointed out, thousands of Joe 
Slovo residents had already agreed to move. They had, in fact, been moved to Delft and were 
eager to return to the, now upgraded, settlement.
100
 Further delays would impact negatively 
on this group of people. 
 
 Whilst these considerations were important and finding the right balance of the 
various interests at stake in the case was no easy task, the CC‟s approach was problematic in 
a number of respects. For one thing, the delays, rising costs and miscalculations
101
 associated 
with the N2 Gateway housing project were not primarily a consequence of a lack of co-
operation by residents. These problems arose directly from flaws in the project. Although 
residents‟ behaviour added to these problems, the state‟s top-down approach102 to engaging 
with affected parties played a significant contributing role in the failure to find mutually 
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satisfactory solutions.
103
   
 
The state‟s responsibility for the failings in the N2 Gateway pilot project was made 
clear in a report by the Auditor-General of South Africa, released in May 2009 when 
argument in the Joe Slovo case had already been heard. Although the report was completed 
almost a year earlier, it was only made public when the CC‟s judgment in the case was 
pending.
104
 The report raised a significant number of concerns about the project going ahead, 
when key requirements set out in the Housing Act,
105
 the social housing policy and the 
memorandum of understanding drafted by the various role-players had not been met.
106
  
 
The Auditor-General‟s Report identified R19 977 804 as „fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure‟ which could have been avoided if the stakeholders had exercised „reasonable 
care‟ in the planning stages of the project.107 There were also various problems with the 
process through which the first project manager was appointed. Amongst other things, the 
company selected to manage the project did not comply with the formal requirements for the 
proposal, was ranked only 6 by the evaluation committee, lacked the expertise needed to 
fulfill a variety of project management duties and was paid a fee, unrelated to actual 
performance, greatly above the norm.
108
  There were also grave inadequacies in the quality of 
the houses that had been constructed in Phase 1 of the project.
109
 In an ensuing parliamentary 
hearing, the Director-General in the national department of human settlements, Itumeleng 
Kotsoane, stated that many of the project‟s failings could be attributed to political influence. 
The outcome of the hearing was that the three levels of government would enter into a new 
agreement within two months.
110
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 The report was not available to the court when it deliberated on the Joe Slovo 
judgment so the CC cannot be criticised for failing to take it into account. However, there 
were many indications in the submissions before the court that the N2 Gateway Project was 
fundamentally flawed and that the delays and escalating costs were more a consequence of 
poor management than uncooperative residents. The enormous disparity between what 
residents were initially told they would have to pay in rentals for housing and the figures they 
were later given, attributed, at least in part, to building costs being higher than predicted was 
one worrying signal that there were serious defects in the budgeting and management of the 
project.
111
 The suggestion that the plan would not be able to house as many people as was 
initially promised by government was another such signal.
112
 Despite these questions about 
the state‟s conduct in the case, the CC chose not to interrogate the implementation of the 
project too closely. The judges allowed the state‟s nominal acceptance of the need for 
meaningful engagement and the overall worthiness of the project to outweigh concerns about 
its impact on the residents. The argument that other, affected parties – particularly those who 
had already moved to Delft and were waiting to be allocated permanent housing – had also to 
be considered was, on the face of it, very convincing. However, the idea that an order 
allowing for eviction of the residents would speed things up rested on the assumption that the 
primary cause of the delay was the residents‟ unwillingness to move. As discussed above, 
this was not the case.  
 
The CC attempted to mitigate the harsh effects of its judgment through a carefully 
crafted order, discussed in chapter 4 above. But granting the evictions in the first place 
removed much of the „sting‟ from the CC‟s orders that further engagement take place and 
that the state take steps to improve the transport situation for people in Delft, for example.
113
 
Arguably, the CC finally recognised the systemic problems with the state‟s conduct in 
respect of the N2 Gateway Project when, on 24 August 2009, it decided to stay the execution 
of its order until further notice.
114
 As Pierre de Vos points out, though, the CC handed down 
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its second order in the case quietly.
115
 As this was an order, unattached to a judgment, the 
court did not make its reasons for staying the execution of the evictions clear. Thus, the poor 
management of the N2 Gateway project, although made explicit in the parliamentary hearing, 
did not feature as part of the court‟s reasoning on why the evictions should not yet take place.  
And so the relevance of state conduct as a factor influencing the intensity of review was 
disregarded in the Joe Slovo litigation as a whole. 
 
(b) Mazibuko  
A tendency to focus on the first two factors – constitutional balance of powers and relative 
institutional capacity – was, again, evident in the court‟s approach in Mazibuko. This 
tendency was most pronounced in the judges‟ rejection of the applicants‟ argument that the 
court should set out the quantity of water which forms the content of the right to water in 
section 27 (1) (b) of the Constitution.
 116
 The court‟s reasoning on this matter is examined at 
some length in chapter 4 of this thesis. To summarise, the court likened the argument to that 
based on minimum core obligations, which had been made in the earlier cases of Grootboom 
and Treatment Action Campaign. O‟Regan J held, for a unanimous bench, that the expert 
evidence was not sufficiently clear to allow the court to determine what the content of the 
right was.
117
 The court lacked the institutional capacity to make this determination itself and 
would, therefore, defer to government in this regard. Furthermore, the court found that, as a 
general approach, quantifying the content of the right could counteract the desired flexibility 
of a reasonableness-based approach and prevent a proper study of context.
118
 Most 
importantly, in clarifying its general approach to SE rights adjudication, the court in 
Mazibuko stressed accountability and process concerns as principal state obligations,
119
 
noting that judges „would not seek to draft policy or to determine its content‟.120  
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In arguing for the usefulness of a reasonableness-based approach to SE rights 
adjudication in chapter 4, I noted that such an approach does not preclude judicial acceptance 
of the notion of minimum core obligations or other content-driven methods for adjudicating 
SE rights claims in appropriate cases. In its earlier jurisprudence, the CC left open the 
possibility of recognising minimum core obligations if the evidence of the content of those 
obligations was sufficiently clear and if the analysis was properly contextualised, rather 
conducted in the abstract.
121
 In addition, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, both the South 
African CC and courts in the U.K. have employed the idea of minimum essential levels of 
welfare in finding government action to be unreasonable. But the South African CC‟s 
association of quantifying the content of SE rights with policy-making in Mazibuko strongly 
suggests a more generalised antagonism to delineating the content – minimum or otherwise – 
of SE rights, on the basis that this would involve the court in policy-making and therefore 
upset the constitutional balance of powers.  
 
 The difference between the court‟s earlier and later jurisprudence on this matter is 
made apparent by the nature of the applicant‟s arguments in the case. In contrast to the earlier 
cases, the applicants in Mazibuko were able to produce specific international evidence of the 
quantity of water required for various household uses. As indicated earlier, the court dealt 
with this evidence by finding that there was no agreement between the experts on what 
amount of water was „sufficient‟ – what counted as „sufficient‟ depended on the uses to 
which the water was put.
122
 But the applicants‟ expert witness, Gleick, had put forward 
evidence detailed enough to show the quantity of water required for various different uses 
relevant to the case.
123
  General Comment 15 on the ICESCR provides that „[t]he quantity of 
water available for each person should correspond to World Health Organization (WHO) 
guidelines‟.124 As to what those guidelines are, the Comment refers to a 2002 WHO study by 
Howard and Bartram as well as the findings of the expert witness used by the applicants in 
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the Mazibuko case, Gleick.
125
 As the amicus curiae pointed out in their submissions, whereas 
Gleick‟s evidence indicated that 50 litres per person per day was the „minimum necessary for 
a healthy life that allows basic hygiene and consumption needs to be met‟, Howard and 
Bartram suggested that 20 litres per person per day constituted „basic access‟ to water126 
However, Howard and Bartram indicated that this basic level of access entailed a „“high” 
level of health concern‟. Furthermore, Howard and Bartram did not include water-borne 
sanitation – the kind relevant to the case – in their calculations.127 The applicants also 
referred to a more recent (2005) WHO study conducted on the amount of water required for 
daily domestic use, which put the figure at 50 litres per person per day if cleaning and 
washing were included.
128
 
 
 Justice O‟Regan did not engage with these submissions in her judgment for the court. 
Instead, she referred only briefly to two affidavits presented by the first and second 
respondents, which drew on research by the WHO before concluding that what amounted to 
sufficient water was unclear and context-dependent. As noted in chapter 4, the applicant‟s 
submissions on this matter were weakened by the fact that they ultimately did not challenge 
the minimum standard of 25 litres per person per day set out in Regulation 3 (b), 
promulgated in terms of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997.
129
 Instead, applicants argued 
that 50 litres per person per day went beyond a mere interest in survival and encapsulated 
„what is necessary for dignified human existence‟.130 The court was, predictably, even less 
amenable to quantifying the content of the right as a whole than it has been to set minimum 
standards, especially since the applicants had, in effect, accepted that government was 
providing the minimum essential level of the right. 
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A challenge to the amount of 25 litres per person per day as a minimum standard may 
have strengthened the applicants‟ case.  The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has defined the minimum core of the right to water to be an amount which is 
„sufficient and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease‟.131 The Committee has 
described personal and domestic uses as including „drinking, personal sanitation, washing of 
clothes, food preparation, personal and household hygiene‟.132  So the applicants could have 
made a convincing argument that 25 litres per person per day, which did not include water-
borne sanitation, did not provide the minimum amount needed for personal and domestic 
uses to prevent disease.  
 
But the fact that applicants did not challenge the amount of 25 litres per person per 
day, as a minimum standard, should not have detracted from their argument that 50 litres per 
person per day is what was required for a dignified existence, where that water was being 
used for water-borne sanitation, as well as other personal and domestic uses – as was the case 
in Phiri. This was not a case in which the court lacked information. The court could have 
concluded, based on the available evidence, that 50 litres per person per day was, indeed, 
what was required for the various uses identified here and relevant to Phiri. This finding 
would have been relevant to an enquiry into reasonableness. Even if the court went on to find 
that, for reasons of limited resources, the government could not provide this amount 
immediately, the recognition of the amount needed for the relevant personal and domestic 
uses would have been a significant indication of how far government needed to go in the 
progressive realization of the right. And, at the very least, government would have had to 
provide support for its claim that it did not have the resources to provide the 50 litres per 
person per day. 
 
Another worrying feature of the Mazibuko decision was the court‟s failure to properly 
consider the severity of the consequences of government‟s decision to install pre-paid meters 
for the applicants and others in their position. There were 3 levels of service provision under 
Johannesburg Water‟s Operation Gcin‟amanzi (to save water) Plan: 
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The first level is the most basic and consists of a communal tap and communal ventilated pit 
latrines; the second level is a yard standpipe and a sewer connection or shallow communal 
sewer system with a pour-flush toilet; and the third level is a full metered water connection 
on each stand and a conventional water-borne sewerage system.
133
  
Residents of Phiri Township were asked to choose between the second level (a yard 
standpipe) or a pre-paid meter.
134
 If residents refused both a yard standpipe and a pre-paid 
connection, their water supply would be cut off.
135
 During the implementation process, a 
majority of the residents opted for pre-paid meters.
136
 There were undoubtedly problems in 
the implementation process – for example, Mrs Mazibuko, one of the applicants in the case, 
who passed away during the course of the litigation, had alleged that she was not given a 
choice between a yard standpipe and a pre-paid connection. When she refused a pre-paid 
connection, her water supply was cut off for a period of over six months, until she applied for 
a pre-paid connection to be installed.
137
 The court held that these problems were not so 
severe as to render the implementation of the programme, as a whole, unreasonable. 
Furthermore, O‟Regan J held that should those people occupying the house Mrs Mazibuko 
had resided in wish to change from a pre-paid meter to a yard standpipe on the basis that the 
latter option had not been presented to Mrs Mazibuko, „that request would no doubt be 
considered by the City‟.138  
 
Residents of Phiri were not given the option of the third level of service provision, 
operated on the basis of a credit meter system.
139
 There were certain disadvantages associated 
with the credit meter system. Customers with credit meters paid higher tariffs for water 
supply than those with pre-paid meters. Interest could be charged for arrear payments and 
defaulters names could be registered with the credit bureau.
140
 And, of course, water supply 
could be cut off, as a consequence of non-payment. However, the discontinuation of the 
water supply could only be effected after officials had complied with a range of requirements 
ensuring a fair procedure.
141
 With the pre-paid connections, water supply would stop once 
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the free basic water supply had been exhausted, unless and until the consumer purchased 
credit for further water supply.
142
 
 
The court ruled, in favour of the respondents, that the municipality did not need to 
provide pre-paid customers with reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before 
their water supply was stopped. Justice O‟Regan reasoned as follows: 
A customer in Johannesburg who has a pre-paid water meter understands that the water meter 
will provide a certain quantity of water which may be exhausted; and that…the customer 
should purchase new credit to recommence the water supply or wait for the beginning of a 
new month. To require the City to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard each time a 
pre-paid allowance is about to expire, as the applicants contend, would be administratively 
unsustainable and in most cases serve no useful purpose.
143
  
In effect, then, the court did not consider the suspension of the water supply to have that 
severe an impact on the affected individuals. Partly, this was because there was something 
the affected parties could do to ameliorate any harsh effects – pay for usage of water over 
and above the free basic amount of 25 kilolitres per person per month. This reasoning was 
flawed in two respects. First, it assumed that the free basic allocation was reasonable. As 
argued above, the court did not take all the evidence, especially that concerning usage for 
water-borne sanitation into account when it concluded that 25 kilolitres per person, per 
month amounted to „sufficient‟ water. Justice O‟Regan found that, based on average 
household sizes, the existing free basic water allocation was sufficient for 80% of households 
in Johannesburg, even if „sufficient‟ were taken to mean 50 litres per person per day.144 But, 
as she recognised in the judgment, the average household size in the townships of 
Johannesburg was higher than that in the rest of the city. Often, more than one household 
relied on the same water connection. Sometimes, this meant that 20 people, rather than the 
average of 3.2 people were dependent on one source for their supply of water.
145
 
 
 The court also found that the negative consequences of the municipality‟s policy 
could be softened through the indigent persons policy which the municipality had introduced 
and revised in response to criticism both before and during the litigation proceedings.
146
 In 
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terms of this policy, an additional 4 kilolitres per month would be provided free of charge to 
those households registered as indigent.
147
 The court recognised that the City‟s approach may 
be unfair because the application procedure was too complex or because people were 
unaware of it, for example. However, an alternative universalist approach to providing the 
additional 4 kilolitres per household each month would benefit people who did not require 
the excess water, which would be costly and wasteful.
148
 
 
 The problem with this reasoning is that it pays insufficient attention to the actual 
consequences for people who had used up their free basic water allocation and could not 
afford to pay for more.  The fact that only one-fifth of the households eligible to be registered 
as „indigent‟ were actually on the register149 is an indication that the introduction of the 
indigent persons policy was ineffective. The burden of knowing about, and following, a 
complex application procedure to be included on the register should not be placed on 
vulnerable people with few resources.  However one analyses it, Johannesburg Water‟s plan 
to overhaul the system of water provision in Phiri Township resulted in people with pre-paid 
meters being cut off from their water supply for potentially months at a time while they tried 
to somehow find the money to pay for more water. As was pointed out by the amicus curiae 
in the case, this policy applied regardless of how dire the need for water was.
150
 The amicus‟ 
evidence of the negative effect of the installation of pre-paid meters on public health was not 
considered in the judgment.
151
 
 
 The CC‟s finding that the City‟s water policy was reasonable, given the need to 
ensure that water was supplied in a sustainable fashion,
152
 which allowed for cost recovery
153
 
was a departure from earlier indications in Grootboom that the urgency of the need is 
relevant to a determination of reasonableness: 
Those whose needs are the most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most 
in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving realisation of the right. It 
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may not be sufficient to meet the test of reasonableness to show that the measures are capable 
of achieving a statistical advance in the realisation of the right. Furthermore, the Constitution 
requires that everyone must be treated with care and concern. If the measures, though 
statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of those most desperate, they may not pass 
the test.
154
  
At the very least, the court should have required more stringent justification for the City‟s 
refusal to give the residents of Phiri Township the choice of credit meters. A culture of non-
payment in the townships was certainly an important consideration
155
 but more serious 
attempts at debt recovery would have been less invasive than suspending the water supply. 
Availability of resources is, of course, also a relevant consideration but the court accepted, 
without any real discussion, that limited resources meant that government had a great deal of 
leeway in deciding its water supply policy. Resources will always be limited. In the Khosa 
decision, the CC actually interrogated government‟s claim that it could not afford to extend 
certain social grants to permanent residents and found this claim to be exaggerated.
156
 But 
questions such as whether better attempts to recover debt would be more cost-effective than 
installing pre-paid meters and whether the fact that a universalist approach to providing the 
extra 4 kilolitres a month was more cost effective than keeping an indigent persons register, 
given the fact that the City‟s representative had indicated before the court that a universalist 
system would be cheaper to administer,
157
 were not examined by the court. The amicus 
curiae noted in their submission to the court that resource constraints were not raised as an 
issue by the government before the High Court. They also pointed out that the latest evidence 
before the court indicated that respondents had the requisite resources to provide the relief 
claimed by the applicants and that it was, in fact, their intention to provide it.
158
 The court did 
not examine this submission. 
 
 (5) Conclusion 
The South African CC‟s latest judgments reveal a disturbing trend. In its earlier cases, the 
court was prepared to uphold the rights to housing, health care, social security etc. where 
government did not have a plan in place, where that plan simply could not be justified on the 
available evidence or where the plan did not take account of a significant segment of the 
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population. Where government had not bothered to engage with affected parties at all, this 
weighed against the reasonableness of their policies or, at least, persuaded the court to order 
that such engagement take place before government could proceed with any action.  
 
The Joe Slovo and Mazibuko cases involved more convoluted issues. Government in 
both cases had devised fairly elaborate programmes for housing and had initiated a process of 
engagement with affected parties. But, as the South African jurisprudence develops, the fact 
that government has devised a comprehensive plan and consulted with stake-holders should 
not prevent a court from rigorously scrutinising the reasonableness of that plan or the nature 
and quality of the engagement with affected individuals. In determining how intense a 
standard of scrutiny to apply, courts need not only to consider the under-utilised factors of 
the severity of the consequences of government action on affected parties and state conduct, 
but also to attribute appropriate weight to these factors. Where the impact on individuals is 
severe, there should be room for serious scrutiny of claims of limited resources, for example. 
 
 The fact that the CC has not followed this approach in its latest decisions has little to 
do with its choice of a reasonableness-based approach to SE rights adjudication and more to 
do with its own attitude to judicial restraint. In Mazibuko, for example, the fact that the 
government‟s expert evidence did not include water-borne sanitation as part of the 
calculation of what was required for household water use could have been dealt with on the 
basis that a relevant consideration had been overlooked – an important part of any enquiry 
into reasonableness. The question of whether the government‟s policy in the case, whatever 
its laudable motives, nonetheless imposed excessively harsh burdens on individuals could 
have been useful in the case and is, as argued in chapter 3, increasingly part of a 
reasonableness enquiry in the judicial review of administrative action. This enquiry was also 
relevant to the eviction of the residents of Joe Slovo and their relocation to Delft. The point is 
that reasonableness, as a concept, provides the tools needed to rigorously scrutinise 
government action. The court chose not to employ these tools in Joe Slovo and Mazibuko. 
 
As judges in South Africa and elsewhere grapple with more complex SE rights 
matters, they could feel themselves to be limited by their constitutional role and relative 
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institutional expertise. The cases I have discussed in this chapter show how the issues of 
constitutional balance of powers and institutional capacity may be interrogated, rather than 
simply accepted as reasons for non-intervention or extremely limited intervention. On one 
level, cases like Joe Slovo and Mazibuko indicate that, once a court has decided, for a range 
of reasons including the current political climate, that a high level of deference to 
governmental action or policy is required, there is little litigators can do to persuade them to 
overturn the challenged policy or action. In this chapter, I have sought to argue that greater 
attention by judges and litigators to the factors influencing the intensity of review would be 
helpful. By this I mean that litigators need to make explicit arguments linking the intensity of 
review to the under-used factors of state conduct and the impact of government action on 
individuals. By making these arguments explicit, the ideas that the extent to which the state 
has contributed to the problem is relevant and that the harshness of the impact could 
outweigh laudable government motives would have a chance of taking root in the 
jurisprudence on SE rights. Furthermore, grounding the arguments in familiar aspects of a 
reasonableness enquiry, such as the need to consider relevant factors and discount irrelevant 
factors, could help, rather than hinder, SE rights cases by showing that what is being required 
of the courts is not unusual.  
 
Arguments suggesting alternative approaches to that being employed by the South 
African CC are attractive because they create the impression that by merely changing the 
form, one will alter the substance, of decisions on SE rights. This is a comforting, but false, 
assumption. Whatever approach they adopt to SE rights, judges will be guided by their own 
sense of what their appropriate constitutional role is and by the need to secure sufficient 
goodwill in their dealings with government. The best approach available in trying to move 
the jurisprudence forward is to employ the types of argument that take account of these 
imperatives. It is hoped that such arguments will persuade courts to re-evaluate their own 
assumptions about their constitutional role and expertise.  
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Conclusion 
 
For a number of democracies around the world, the last two decades have seen a steady 
expansion in judicial powers of review in cases where human rights are implicated. Along 
with the proliferation of human rights treaties at an international level has come 
corresponding pressure on states to incorporate human rights provisions into domestic 
legislation. Human rights treaties do not always require that states provide judicial remedies 
for breaches of their provisions but, increasingly, courts are seen as important tools in the 
implementation of treaty obligations at a national level. Moreover, national experiences of 
human rights protection increasingly inform the development of international human rights 
law. Despite this, the capacity of courts to interrogate and overturn governmental acts on the 
basis that these acts conflict with fundamental human rights is the subject of a great deal of 
controversy. The contentious nature of judicial review in human rights matters is even more 
pronounced when it comes to social and economic (SE) rights. This is due largely to the 
perception that SE rights adjudication, by definition, involves courts in politically sensitive 
matters that are outside both their constitutional mandate and institutional expertise. 
 
 
The presence of justiciable SE rights in the South African Constitution raises as many 
questions as it answers. The existence of the rights means that, unlike many other national 
courts, South African courts cannot treat SE rights matters as non-justiciable. But debates 
about the appropriateness of judicial intervention in this area continue to be relevant in 
developing a model of SE rights adjudication because of the constitutional imperative to 
maintain a balance of governmental powers and the adoption of specific limits to the states 
obligations with respect to these rights. The task of constructing an approach to SE rights 
adjudication fell to the CC.  
 
Academic commentators expressed concern over the court’s approach – in particular, 
with the decision to measure governmental efforts to implement SE rights against a standard 
of reasonableness. Reasonableness, they argued, was too vague and too deferential a standard 
to facilitate strong protection of SE rights.  This argument was based mainly on the genesis 
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of the reasonableness standard through judicial review of administrative action. In this thesis, 
I have argued that there is nothing intrinsically vague or weak about reasonableness as a 
standard for review.  
 
One of the principal advantages of using reasonableness as a tool through which to 
adjudicate SE rights is the flexibility of the standard – the idea that it may be applied at 
varying levels of intensity, depending on what is required in any given case. This flexibility 
allows a court to respond to legitimate concerns about the limits of both its constitutional role 
and its institutional capacity. Even arguments for purportedly more robust approaches to SE 
rights such as that based on defining minimum core obligations vis-à-vis each of the rights 
acknowledge the need for some flexibility.  
 
Ultimately, even approaches aimed at getting courts to clearly define the content of 
the rights turn on the question of justification – on calling government to account for 
decisions made on SE rights and being able to set those decisions aside when adequate 
justification is not forthcoming. My argument in this thesis has been that an approach based 
on reasonableness is capable of achieving exactly that. In addition, I have argued that 
employing reasonableness as the means through which to assess government action does not 
prevent courts from defining the content of SE rights – minimum or otherwise – in 
appropriate cases. But criticisms of the CC’s jurisprudence on SE rights cannot simply be 
dismissed. There is a lack of clarity over when the court will apply a rigorous standard of 
review in evaluating government action and when it will adopt a more cautious approach.  
 
With much of the court’s early SE rights jurisprudence, concerns over the court’s 
approach did not extend to the actual outcome of the cases. Whatever the flaws in the court’s 
emerging model of SE rights adjudication, it did not shrink from finding government action 
to be unreasonable and ordering it to remedy the deficiencies. Thus, in cases like Grootboom
1
 
and Treatment Action Campaign,
2
 the court found in favour of those claiming their rights had 
been violated – even if they did not go as far as some commentators would have liked in 
                                                 
1
  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
2
  Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign and others (No. 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 
(CC). 
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defining the content of the rights of access to adequate housing and access to health care 
services, respectively. I have argued in this thesis that the protracted debates about the court’s 
approach in these early cases arose from a fear that this approach would not be equal to the 
task of adjudicating more complex cases, which were likely to come before the court as 
government’s SE rights policies developed. By more complex cases, I mean those in which 
the resource and policy implications are greater and in which government action is less 
obviously flawed.  On one level, the court’s most recent jurisprudence shows the critics’ 
fears to be well-founded.  The court’s willingness to defer to government in cases like Joe 
Slovo
3
 and Mazibuko
4
 despite glaring inadequacies in the implementation of the relevant 
government programmes, as well as extremely severe consequences for the affected 
individuals is worrying and difficult to explain on the basis of its earlier judgments.   
 
But the central argument in this thesis is that inconsistency in the CC’s approach and 
disquieting signs of an overly deferential attitude to governmental decision-making have 
little to do with the choice of reasonableness as the centrepiece of the court’s model of SE 
rights adjudication. Any approach to SE rights adjudication must allow for some degree of 
flexibility so that courts may strike an appropriate balance amongst interests in rights-
protection and respect for democratic principles of decision-making. More importantly, 
courts should not treat these two sets of interests as being in constant competition with each 
other. In jurisdictions with justiciable bills of rights, courts play a role in implementing 
fundamental rights – including SE rights in jurisdictions where they are justiciable. But this 
role is limited to pronouncing on disputes when they are brought before the courts and 
creating a body of jurisprudence against which government action may be measured and by 
which government bodies may themselves assess their progress in giving effect to rights. The 
most productive work in ensuring that fundamental human rights are implemented is done 
through civil society organisations and government agencies engaging with each other. This 
engagement is often antagonistic but is aimed, ultimately, at interested parties finding 
common ground in what many commentators have referred to as an ongoing dialogue. When 
                                                 
3
  Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and others 2009 (9) BCLR 847 
(CC); 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC). 
4
  Mazibuko and others v City of Johannesburg and others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 
intervening) 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC); 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC).  
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courts are called upon to settle rights disputes, they must do so in a manner that preserves the 
integrity of this dialogue in order to facilitate effective, sustainable protection of rights.  
 
A level of flexibility in any approach to SE rights adjudication, then, is needed not 
only to protect the governmental interest in a balance of institutional powers. It is also a 
fundamental requirement of effective rights-protection. But allowing for flexibility involves 
leaving room for courts to decide, on a case-by-case basis, how rigorously to scrutinise 
governmental action. In order to mitigate the effects of this uncertainty, we must engage with 
the factors, often not explicitly discussed in the judgments, which determine how deferential 
or how interventionist a court will be in a particular case. In this thesis, I have argued for the 
identification of, and engagement with, these factors rather than for the development of a 
theory of deference. This is because the idea of a theory of deference has problematic 
connotations. It assumes that it is possible to construct one theory to cater for all cases in 
which a court is called upon to deal with politically sensitive matters. It also implies that a 
single theory is capable of capturing the myriad interests courts are required to balance in 
such cases and allow courts to decide on the intensity of review in some kind of formulaic 
way. I have argued that the factors I have identified in this thesis should be seen as guidelines 
which allow courts to take into account a range of issues in deciding on their approach in a 
particular case and assist those bringing the cases to argue them most effectually.  
 
I argued that the range of factors informing the intensity of judicial review fits within 
four categories: constitutional balance of powers; relative institutional expertise; severity of 
the consequences of the government action or inaction; and state conduct. The later South 
African jurisprudence reveals a tendency on the part of the CC to focus on the first two 
factors at the expense of the latter two. As the SE rights jurisprudence has developed, so has 
government’s SE policy and programmes. Large housing and other projects have, by 
definition, significant resource implications. At the same time, government’s construction 
and implementation of its programmes has become more sophisticated, with more of an 
effort made to engage with affected persons and to meet the requirements of reasonableness 
developed in the CC’s SE rights decisions.  
 
 251 
The problem is that, as both the jurisprudence and government programmes evolve, 
large projects aimed at implementing various SE policies, in which government has made 
some attempt to meet constitutional benchmarks will become more common. Unless the 
court is prepared to balance concerns about its constitutional mandate and relative 
institutional expertise against the severity of the impact of government’s programme, and to 
seriously consider any role the state may have had in exacerbating the problem, the 
complexity of the case will begin to function as an automatic reason for weak review. This 
contradicts the idea of a variable reasonableness-based approach, in which judges balance a 
host of factors against each other to decide on how intensely to scrutinise government action.  
For example, if courts accept nominal engagement as opposed to meaningful engagement as 
constitutionally adequate or if they exercise weak review simply because the project 
concerned involves large sums of money and large numbers of people, the adverse impact on 
those affected by the policy will be routinely ignored and government will not be pressed to 
move beyond a kind of box-ticking approach to the implementation of SE rights.  
 
The task of balancing various factors to determine how closely to scrutinise 
government action is a complicated one. Courts are in a constant dialogue with the other 
arms of government. The Indian case-study and the history of the Treatment Action 
Campaign case in South Africa show how finely balanced the relationship between 
governmental institutions is. The political climate and the attitude of other arms of 
government to the judiciary may push the court to take a more pragmatic approach to certain 
SE rights cases. So far in South Africa, CC judgments going against government decisions, 
legislation and policy have been respected. The future of SE rights and the rule of law 
depend on this continuing to be the case. But a move in the direction of knee-jerk deference 
will also lose the court its integrity and weaken the values of accountability and transparency 
on which the rule of law is based. It is my argument that continued discussion of, and 
engagement with, the factors I have identified in the final chapter of this thesis – by both 
those bringing the cases and those deciding them – will allow for the jurisprudence to 
develop in a way that gives proper weight to the impact of government’s SE programmes on 
affected parties and considers the state responsibility for any failings or delays in the 
implementation of those programmes. 
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In the years since the South African Constitution came into force, the idea of 
justiciable SE rights has become less of a novelty. But many jurisdictions continue to be 
wary of the idea of courts pronouncing on rights so closely aligned with politically sensitive 
matters. As the South African jurisprudence has evolved, the CC has shown that adjudication 
of SE rights need not pose a serious threat to the preservation of a constitutional balance of 
powers. Furthermore, in jurisdictions without directly justiciable SE rights – such as the U.K. 
– courts are, in fact, handing down judgments with SE implications. The lesson from all of 
this is that the focus needs to shift away from the question of whether SE rights are 
justiciable to the question of how courts may approach the interpretation of these rights 
whilst recognising the limitations of their constitutional remit. Critics of the South African 
model tend to assume that alternative approaches will automatically result in a more 
consistent jurisprudence and stronger protection for SE rights. My argument in this thesis has 
been that a range of factors impact on the intensity of review in SE rights cases. These factors 
will be relevant and important, whatever the approach adopted. Reasonableness allows courts 
the flexibility to consider the host of issues relevant to SE rights adjudication. The most 
effective way of creating greater legal certainty and consistency in the judgments as well as 
ensuring that the experiences of those affected by SE programmes are not ignored is for both 
judges and litigators to engage with these underlying factors. Through this engagement, the 
role of these factors in the judgments will become more explicit and commentators will be 
able to more accurately assess whether the CC is striking the right balance between all the 
interests at stake in SE rights cases. 
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